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Abstract
This thesis explores the politics and diplomacy o f Soviet efforts to withdraw its 
troops from Afghanistan. Although Soviet leaders began looking for a way out of 
the conflict soon after the introduction of Soviet troops in December 1979, the 
war dragged on because Moscow was afraid o f the damage that a failure in 
Afghanistan could do to itsTeputatioiTas a leader ot the communist world and a 
Supporter of national liberation movements in the Third World. Even as Soviet 
diplomats engaged in international diplomacy in an effort to secure an agreement 
for a withdrawal, Moscow looked for ways to stabilise its client government in 
Kabul. This characterised Soviet policy in the region from 1979 onward, not only 
under the leadership of Leonid Brezhnev and Yuri Andropov, but even under the 
reform-minded Mikhail Gorbachev.
In addition to providing a detailed study o f an important and often-misinterpreted 
conflict, the thesis also situates the Soviet intervention within the growing body of 
scholarship seeking to understand the Cold War in global context, particularly 
with regard to the Third World. Thus the thesis focuses on the broader 
international dimensions of Soviet efforts in Afghanistan, particularly the 
relationship between the United States and the Soviet Union, while also showing 
that communist leaders in Afghanistan were often able to manipulate Soviet 
decision-making in support o f their own internal rivalries. The thesis argues that 
ongoing Soviet involvement in Afghanistan in the 1980s must be seen in the 
context of the Kremlin’s official commitment to the Third World, despite the 
associated difficulties of such a policy.
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Map 3: General Concept and Scheme of Soviet Withdrawal
USSR
Scbtrrgui
^^ P n  ncipl e direction ct~ Nvi tlidrawal/ \
Afghanistan
Atodabui
Fatahrud
Legend
Soviet garrisons evacuated during tlie first phase of 
the withdrawal, 15 May to 15 August 1988
Soviet garrisons evacuated during the first phase of 
the withdrawal. 15 November 1988 to 15 February I 989
Source: Grau, Lester W. “Breaking Contact Without Leaving Chaos” Journal o f Slavic 
Military Studies 2007, 20(2): 248.
10
Introduction
The Soviet intervention in Afghanistan (1979-1989) was easily one of the bloodiest of 
Cold War conflicts. By the time Soviet forces withdrew they had suffered over 13,000 
casualties and 40,000 wounded. Yet the carnage did not end there. Between 1989 and 
1992, the government of the Republic of Afghanistan, supported by Soviet advisers and 
armaments, continued to hold out against mujahadeen groups backed by Pakistan, the 
United States, and Saudi Arabia. The Republic of Afghanistan outlasted the Soviet 
Union by almost five months, but its collapse only precipitated a new phase of civil war, 
which in one form or another continues to the present day.
The intervention in Afghanistan was the culmination of the Soviet Union’s 
involvement with the Third World that began in the 1950s and was extended throughout 
the 1960s and 1970s. In terms of military aid alone, the decade saw Soviet advisers 
taking part in the Egyptian-Israeli War of Attrition (1970), the Angolan civil war (from 
1975), and the Somali-Ethiopian conflict in the Ogaden desert (1977-78).1 In the 
European theatre o f the Cold War, Soviet leaders had also chosen military intervention 
when communist regimes were threatened in Hungary (1956) and Czechoslovakia 
(1968). Broadly speaking, all of these involvements were undertaken to shore up Soviet 
friendly regimes and demonstrate Moscow’s willingness to use force on behalf of allies. 
Yet while the intervention in Afghanistan had its precedents, it also became a turning 
point. The war, so costly in blood and treasure, forced Soviet leaders to reevaluate 
interventions as instruments of foreign policy. Thus when a crisis broke out in Poland in 
the summer of 1980, threatening the regime in Warsaw, even an ardent pro-
1 As Karen Brutents, former deputy o f the International Department o f the CC CPSU put it, there was a 
certain “logical progression” in the decisions to intervene or provide significant military aid from Angola 
to Ethiopia to Afghanistan. The seeming success of the first two interventions, and the general climate of 
Cold War confrontation in the late 1970s both set the context for the decision to intervene in Afghanistan. 
Georgiii Kornienko, a Deputy Foreign Minister who also took part in the discussion, agreed with 
Brutents: “This competition of superpowers had its own logic... Angola, it’s okay. Why not Ethiopia? It’s 
okay. Just as Czechoslovakia defined what we could do in Europe.” See O. Arne Westad, ed., “US-Soviet 
Relations and Soviet Foreign Policy toward the Middle East and Africa in the 1970s,” Transcript from a 
workshop at Lysebu, October 1-3 1994 (Oslo: Norwegian Nobel Institute, 1995), 49-52.
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interventionist like KGB Chairman Yurii Andropov conceded that “the quota of 
interventions abroad has been exhausted.”
Historians approaching the Afghan war in the years since 1992 have primarily 
been interested in understanding why the Soviet Union intervened in the first place, or 
on the military aspects of the intervention. My thesis poses a different question: why did 
it take the Soviet Union so long to bring its troops home? After all, shortly after the 
invasion Soviet leaders realised that the intervention was becoming a quagmire with 
serious costs for their relationship with the rest of the world. This question is 
particularly important because it relates not only to the war in Afghanistan but also to 
the debate about changes in Soviet foreign-policy thinking in the 1980s, the emergence 
and influence o f New Political Thinking, and the potential o f superpower cooperation 
and UN involvement in resolving regional conflicts.
This thesis will therefore be primarily a study in the history of Soviet decision­
making. It will look at the political struggles behind the decision to withdraw within the 
Politburo and other institutions involved in the foreign policy process in the Soviet 
Union, including the military and the KGB. In seeking to undersatnd why certain 
policies triumphed over others and why key decisions were made (or delayed), this 
thesis will analyze the impact of ideology, political legacy, patron-client relations, 
superpower diplomacy, and bureaucratic politics on elite decision making during the 
Afghan war.
I will put forward the hypothesis that Soviet leaders found it difficult to 
disengage from the Afghan conflict because they feared undermining Moscow’s status 
as a defender o f Third World countries against encroaching neo-colonialism. Notably, 
they also continued to believe that the USSR could help stabilise the country, build up 
the Afghan armed forces, and make the Kabul government more acceptable to its
2 Vladislav Zubok, A Failed Empire: The Soviet Union in the Cold War from Stalin to Gorbachev (Chapel 
Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2007), 267.
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people. Efforts at withdrawal were complicated by cold war tensions, particularly in 
1980-85, divisions among Soviet officials and agencies involved in Afghanistan, and 
the persistence of an “Afghan lobby” within the Soviet leadership that refused to 
concede defeat in Afghanistan. This hypothesis will be tested through analysis o f  
decision-making and diplomacy in the years immediately following the invasion and 
particularly in the period after Mikhail Gorbachev became General Secretary of the 
Communist Party o f the Soviet Union.
Historiography
There is, as yet, no comprehensive historical account o f the Soviet war in Afghanistan, 
but the topic has been addressed widely by former policy makers and diplomats. There 
has also been no account of the withdrawal based primarily on archival research. 
Writing on the Afghan war began soon after the introduction of Soviet troops. The 
invasion was sharply criticised by both the left and the right in the West, and this was 
reflected in contemporary accounts by specialists on the Soviet Union and Afghanistan. 
It was often assumed that the invasion was part of an attempt to spread Soviet influence 
and bring it closer to the Persian Gulf, although a number o f more nuanced accounts 
challenged this view .4 The ultimate costliness o f the invasion to the USSR and its 
aftermath in diplomatic, human, and economic terms meant that scholars continued to 
wonder about why the Brezhnev leadership chose to invade Afghanistan.
3 Aleksandr Liakhovskii Tragedia i doblest’ Afgana [The Tragedy and Valour o f Afghanistan] (Moscow: 
Nord, 2004). Although the invasion o f Afghanistan by NATO forces in 2001 has renewed interest in the 
Soviet experience there, there have been few attempts at overviews o f the Soviet war effort. The 
exceptions largely ignore the politics, diplomacy, and decision-making behind the war, and focus instead 
on the experience of soldiers and military operations in general. See, for example, Gregory Feifer The 
Great Gamble: The Soviet War in Afghanistan (New York: HarperCollins, 2009).
4 See David K. Shipler, “Out of Afghanistan,” Journal o f  International Affairs 1989 42(2): 477-486 for a 
survey of the literaturefrom this period. Among those who noted the defensive nature o f the intervention 
were Harry Gelman, although he also believed that Soviet leaders saw the Afghan revolution as an 
opportunity to spread their influence southward. See Harry Gelmanm The Brezhnev Politburo and the 
Decline o f Detente (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1984), 170-171.
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Naturally, the end o f the Cold War and the opening o f Soviet archives made it 
possible to explore this vital question the first time. How and why the Brezhnev 
leadership decided to invade Afghanistan turned out to be o f interest not only to 
scholars but to the Soviet government itself. Soon after the withdrawal a commission 
was set up to review this question. As a result, numerous documents were declassified 
and some even published in the late Soviet era. Both Russian and Western scholars have 
made use of these documents to re-evaluate the earlier conclusions drawn by their 
colleagues. The result was a radically different understanding o f the decision-making 
process and motivations behind the Soviet decision to invade. If some contemporary 
commentators saw the invasion as part of a planned Soviet expansion towards the 
Persian Gulf, archivally-based of the decision to invade accounts have shown that in 
fact Soviet leaders were largely responding to events in 1979.5
The change in our understanding of the decision to invade highlights the 
importance of archival research, combined with careful oral history and combing of 
primary sources such as memoirs, for testing assumptions about how decisions were 
made in the Soviet Union. Thus far, the scholarly treatments o f the Soviet withdrawal 
from Afghanistan have come primarily from International Relations scholars using the 
withdrawal as a test-case for learning theory. These studies tend to focus heavily on the 
influence of “new thinking.” Andrew Bennett, in his thoughtful and stimulating study 
on Soviet thinking about interventionism, interprets the Soviet invasion in light of 
Soviet thinking about interventionism in the 1970s; that experience, and the influence of 
“new thinking,” moved Gorbachev to reassess interventionism in general as well as the
5 See, for example, Odd Arne Westad, “Concerning the Situation in A: New Russian Evidence on the 
Soviet Intervention in Afghanistan,” Cold War International History Project Bulletin 8-9 (Washington: 
Wilson Center Press, 1996). David N. Gibbs, “Reassessing Soviet Motives for Invading Afghanistan: A 
Declassified History,” Critical Asian Studies 2006 38(2): 239-263 or Matt W. Wolf, “Stumbling Towards 
War: The Soviet Decision to Invade Afghanistan,” Past Imperfect 2006 (12): 1-19.
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relationship between third-world conflicts and US-Soviet relations.6 An earlier study by 
Sarah Mendelsohn argued Gorbachev wanted to withdraw as soon as he came to power, 
but was held back by the conservative security elite. This view was voiced in the early 
1990s in interviews given by one of Gorbachev’s closest and most liberal associates, 
Aleksandr Iakovlev. Mendelsohn views the withdrawal as a result of Gorbachev’s 
successful maneuvering to oust the conservatives in the leadership, including such 
figures as long time Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko.7
More recently this view of the interaction between internal domestic poitical 
struggles and the decision making process behind the withdrawal has been partially 
revised, primarily in more general works on the Soviet Union, the Cold War, and the 
Gorbachev era. As Vladislav Zubok points out, Gorbachev’s first few years did not see 
the ideological divides that became apparent later, something most clearly evident in the 
case of Afghanistan. Zubok points out that Gorbachev resisted calls from both liberals 
and conservatives to withdraw, siding instead with those who supported various efforts 
to maintain the pro-Soviet government in Kabul.8 A similar conclusion was reached in 
Melvyn Leffler’s overview of the Cold War, For the Soul o f  Mankind9 Looking at the 
conduct of the withdrawal and its effects, several recent articles highlight the important 
successes o f Soviet diplomatic efforts and of military planning in ensuring a withdrawal 
in good order.10
Contemporary responses to the Geneva Accords (April 1988) and the 
withdrawal often reflected a highly suspicious view of Soviet actions and a serious
6 Andrew Bennett, Condemned to Repetition? The Rise, Fall, and Reprise o f  Soviet-Russian Military 
Interventionism, 1973-1996 (Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press, 1999), 212-213,292-294.
7 Sarah E. Mendelsohn Changing Course: Ideas, Politics, and the Soviet Withdrawal From Afghanistan 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1998).
8 Vladislav M. Zubok, A Failed Empire, 296-297.
9 Melvyn P. Leffler, For the Soul o f  Mankind: the United States, the Soviet Union, and the Cold War 
(New York: Hill and Wang, 2007).
10 Lester W. Grau, “Breaking Contact Without Leaving Chaos” Journal o f Slavic Military Studies 2007 
20(2): 235-261
Alex Marshall, “Managing Withdrawal: Afghanistan as the Forgotten Example in Attempting Conflict 
Resolution and State Reconstruction” Small Wars and Insurgencies 2007 18(1): 68-89
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misunderstanding of Soviet motivations in agreeing to the accords. A collection of
essays on Afghanistan published in 1989 epitomised this view. In the only chapter
dealing explicitly with the accords, the authors (also the editors of the volume)
expressed their concern that the Geneva Accords left Afghanistan vulnerable to Soviet
re-invasion and that, by not demanding “immediate withdrawal,” the accords gave the
USSR the opportunity to change its mind and leave troops in. They rejected the
proposition that the USSR would have withdrawn unilaterally anyway, and they credit
the introduction of the Stinger missiles with inducing the USSR to get out.11 Some
scholars were more perceptive, however, taking note o f the political and ideological
difficulties inherent in a perceived “disengagement under duress.”12 My own
interpretation o f the Accords is closest to that of Alvin Z. Rubinstein, who saw them as
a culmination of efforts undertaken by Gorbachev between 1985 and 1988 to disengage 
1 ^from Afghanistan.
There is also a range of opinions amongst former Soviet actors regarding the 
decision to withdraw that reflect the divisions within the Soviet foreign policymaking 
establishment. On the one hand, professional diplomats and former Foreign Ministry 
officials who were involved in the Geneva negotiations, as well as Soviet-Afghan 
relations, tend to highlight the importance of the accords but are critical of Gorbachev 
and Shevardnadze for their handling of Afghan policy. The most prominent o f these is 
former Deputy Foreign Minister Georgii Kornienko, who publicised his view in a 
number of different publications. His account o f the Soviet withdrawal from 
Afghanistan appears in Glazami marshala i diplomata [Through the Eyes of a Marshal 
and a Diplomat], Kholodnaia voina: svidetelstvo ee uchastnika [Cold War: Testimony
11 Amin Saikal and William Malley “The Geneva Accords o f April 1988” in Saikal and Malley, eds., The 
Soviet Withdrawal from Afghanistan (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), 12-28.
12 Marvin G. Weinbaum “The Soviet Union and Afghanistan,” in Edward A. Kolodzej and Roger E. 
Kanet, eds The Limits o f  Soviet Power in the Developing World: Thermidor in Revolutionary Struggle 
(London: Macmillan Press, 1989), 248-249.
13 Alvin Z. Rubinstein, M oscow’s Third World Strategy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988), 
274-279.
of a Participant], as well as in an English-language journal.14 Kornienko belongs to the 
group of Soviet leaders (along with his one time co-author, Marshal Sergei Akhromeev) 
who originally supported Gorbachev’s reforms and later became disenchanted with him. 
Kornienko blames Gorbachev for wavering in his commitment to withdrawal and 
shifting between different positions. According to Kornienko, this resulted in significant 
delays in the withdrawal. Kornienko’s views are similar to those offered by other 
“professional” diplomats such as Nikolai Egorychev.15 Their general distrust of 
Shevardnadze, a party functionary with no diplomatic experience before he was 
appointed Foreign Minister by Gorbachev, and disillusionment with Gorbachev himself 
is related to their assessment of the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan.
On the other hand, former military officers take another position and are almost 
uniformly critical o f Gorbachev and even more critical of the accords. While some, like 
retired General Boris Gromov, are restrained, others, like Valentin Varennikov, the 
chief of staff representative in Afghanistan (in effect the chief coordinator of combat 
and advisory activity), do not hold back on their dissatisfaction with Gorbachev and 
Shevardnadze. They see the Geneva process as an example of the “new thinkers’” 
tendency to sell out to the West, and believe that while the decision to withdraw troops 
was the correct one, this should have been done unilaterally, since the Geneva accords 
did not put any demands on the Pakistani or US side anyway.16 Like the Foreign 
Ministry officials, these military memoirists are highly critical o f the KGB’s role in 
Afghanistan, both for its part in the decision to send in troops and its role in bypassing
14 Georgiii M. Kornienko, Sergei A. Akhromeev Glazami Marshala i Diplomata [Through the Eyes o f a 
Marshall and Diplomat] (Moscow: Mezhdunarodnie Otnosheniia,1992), G.M.Komienko,. Kholodnaia 
voina: Svidetel’stvo ee uchastnika [Cold War: Testimony o f a Participant] (Moscow: Mezhdunarodnie 
Otnosheniia, 2001), G.M. Kornienko,. “The Afghan Endeavor: Perplexities o f the Military Incursion and 
Withdrawal,” Journal o f  South Asian and Middle Eastern Studies 18(2), 1994.
15 “Afghanistan stoil name 15 milliardov dollarov v god” [Afghanistan cost us 15 billion dollars a year] 
(Interview with N.Egorychev) Kommersant Vlast’, No.46, November 25, 2002.
16 Boris V. Gromov Ogranicheniy kontingent [Limited Contingent] (Moscow: Progress, 1994), V.I. 
Varennikov Nepovtorimoe tom 5: Afganistan [Unrepeatable, volume 5: Afghanistan] (Moscow: Kniga i 
Biazness, 2002) also "Afganskii vopros ostanetsya v istorii "[Tht Afghan Question Will Remain in 
History] (Interview with General Valentin Varennikov) Voenno-Promishleny Courier No.5 February 11-
17 2002 Pg.7
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the military to convey Najibullah’s demands to Moscow in the year prior to withdrawal. 
These memoirs are very revealing of attitudes, but provide little specific information. A 
major exception is General Aleksandr Liakhovskii’s Tragedia i doblest' Afgana [The 
Tragedy and Valor of Afghanistan], which arguably comes closest of existing works to 
a complete scholarly study of the war. Liakhovskii makes wide use o f party and military 
documents, as well as interviews that he has conducted since the war with former co­
participants. Still, Liakhovskii is strongest when writing about military operations, and 
when it comes to explaining policy-making he often relies on conjecture, which in turn 
is shaped by the distrust of “new thinkers” that he shares with the other military 
memoirists.17
Neither Gorbachev nor Shevardnadze have commented on their role in the 
withdrawal in a significant way until very recently. Both men make only passing 
mention to it in their memoirs. Gorbachev emphasises the importance o f Geneva as a 
negotiated settlement of a Third World conflict, but does not say anything about the 
political struggles that led to it nor of his relations with the Afghan communists.18 
Shevardnadze offers little more in his own memoirs, although the few lines he devotes 
there to Afghanistan are revealing. Shevardnadze writes that after signing the accords, 
he left Geneva with mixed feelings, with the sense that he was abandoning a friend and 
ally.19 In fact, as the thesis will show, Shevardnadze’s sense that the USSR must not 
abandon its allies in Kabul was a driving force behind his own role in the conflict. 
Simillarly, in an interview with the radio station Ekho Moskvy on the twentieth 
anniversary of the Soviet withdrawal (February 1989), Gorbachev said with some pride 
that while he believed Soviet troops had to leave Afghanistan, they must not “run” from
17 Aleksandr A. Liakhovskii Tragedia i doblest’ Afghana [The Tragedy and Valor o f Afghanistan! 
(Moscow: Nord, 2004)
18 Mikhail Gorbachev Memoirs (London: Doubleday, 1996), 458.
19 Eduard Shevardnadze, The Future Belongs to Freedom (London: Sinclair-Stevenson, 1991), 69.
18
there since such a departure would be difficult to explain both domestically and 
abroad.20
Soviet decision-making is only part of the story, however, and Soviet diplomacy 
was only one element in a more complex matrix of relations between countries and non­
state actors. Selig Harisson, in the book on the Geneva negotiations that he co-wrote 
with UN mediator Diego Cordovez, concludes that American intransigence on various 
details of the agreement made it very difficult for the Soviet leadership to agree to the 
Geneva accords and push its clients to do the same.21 Documentary evidence regarding 
this period in American politics is still sporadic, although major inroads have been made 
through the efforts of the National Security Archive in Washington DC.22 Extensive oral 
history research, most notably by Washington Post editor Steve Coll in his book Ghost 
Wars, as well as several memoirs including that of CIA Islamabad station chief Milton 
Bearden, suggest that two groups struggled for influence over US policy on Afghanistan 
under the Reagan administration. One group, “the bleeders” only wanted to see the 
USSR withdraw after the maximum price had been paid in blood and treasure (though 
its not clear if they ever defined what that maximum price might be). The other group 
took a more conciliatory approach, arguing that the US should facilitate the Soviet 
withdrawal and an end to the long conflict. US Secretary o f State George Shultz 
manoeuvred between these positions, encouraging the Soviets to continue negotiations 
but also adopting an uncompromising and in some ways unreasonable position.
20 Gorbachev Interview with Echo Moskvy, February 19, 2009, 
http://www.echo.msk.ru/programs/beseda/572796-echo/ Accessed February 26, 2009.
21 Harisson, Selig and Cordovez, Diego Out o f Afghanistan: The Inside Story o f  the Soviet Withdrawal 
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1995).
22 See documents in the “September 11th Sourcebook,” as well as “US Policy on Afghanistan,” at the 
National Security Archive, Washington, DC.
23 Steve Coll Ghost Wars: The Secret History o f the CIA, Afghanistan, and bin Laden, from the Soviet 
Invasion to September 11, 2001 (New York: Penguin, 2004); Dan Oberdofer, The Turn: How The Cold 
War Came to and End (London: Joanthan Cape, 1992); Milt Bearden and James Risen The Main Enemy: 
The Inside Story o f  the CIA’s Final Showdown with the KGB (Novato: Presidio, 2004); George P. Shultz 
Turmoil and Triumph: My Years as Secretary o f State (New York: Scribners, 1993); Jack Matlock 
Reagan and Gorbachev: How the Cold War Ended (New York: Random House, 2004).
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A somewhat similar situation played out in Pakistan in the years between 
Gorbachev’s assent to power and the withdrawal o f Soviet troops. In this case, the 
conflict was between President Zia ul Haq, a fervent supporter o f the mujahedeen, and 
the ISI, Pakistan’s intelligence service, on one side, and Prime Minister Muhammed 
Khan Junejo and the professional diplomats on the other. The latter believed that 
everyone’s interests would best be served by a quick Soviet withdrawal and were 
satisfied with a neutralist Afghanistan taking the place of the “Democratic Republic.” 
The former, however, refused to be satisfied with anything short o f a complete 
mujahedeen victory and the creation of an Islamic state, and pressured the Americans to 
pursue these goals at the Geneva negotiations and in bilateral dealings with the 
Russians. Once again knowledge of these intrigues is restricted to the views expressed 
in remarkably frank, but nevertheless, personal memoirs.24 Finally, little is known about 
India’s role, although, as a traditional player in the area, a friend o f the USSR, and a foe 
of Pakistan, it almost certainly played an important role.
All of these issues are, of course, tied with the wider historiographical debates 
on the end o f the Cold War. There has been a long running debate between 
“triumphalists,” who believe that the US won the Cold War because of Reagan’s tough 
approach to the Soviet Union and his increased defence spending, and those who 
believe that the Soviet Union collapsed because o f internal problems (or under the 
weight o f its Third World commitments, for instance.) There has been a similar debate 
on the Afghanistan question, with “triumphalists” arguing that it was US support for the
24 Mohammad Yousaf and Mark Adkin The Bear Trap: Afghanistan's Untold Story (London: Leo 
Cooper, 1992), Riaz M. Khan Untying the Afghan Knot: Negotiating Soviet Withdrawal (Durham: Duke 
University Press, 1991). Mohammad Yousaf was the chief coordinator o f ISI support for the Afghan 
opposition. Riaz M. Khan was the chief Pakistani negotiator at Geneva. In both cases, part o f their 
frankness in approaching the subject seems to stem from the fact that some o f the key Pakistani players, 
most notable President Zia, had passed from the scene by the time they took up the pen.
25 For example, while India criticised the Soviet invasion, it also publicly accepted Soviet assurances that 
it was undertaken at Amin’s request and criticised the funding and training of opposition fighters in 
Pakistan. See Arundhati Roy, The Soviet Intervention in Afghanistan: Causes Consequences, and India’s 
Response (New Delhi: Associated Publishing House, 1987).
26 For a summary of this debate, see Vladislav Zubok “Why did the Cold War End in 1989?” in Westad, 
ed., Reviewing the Cold War (London: Frank Cass, 2000).
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mujahedeen that forced the USSR to withdraw.27 This view is rejected by most analysts, 
who believe that the withdrawal was a result of changes within the USSR and therefore 
acknowledge that, from a military point o f view, the Red Army could have continued to 
fight the war indefinitely.
There is also the question of the role played by individuals. Few leaders have 
stimulated as much scholarship debating their role in history as Gorbachev. Western 
authors, in general, praise him as the USSR’s first truly democratic leader and the
I
liberator of the communist bloc. Conversely, he seems to invite little more than 
indignation from his own countrymen, who accuse him in various ways o f betraying the 
national interest for “letting go” o f Eastern Europe and blame him as the main instigator 
of the break-up o f the USSR. Exceptions to this trend usually come only from the circle 
of his most intimate advisors, such as Foreign Policy aide Anatolii Chemyaev.30 Not 
surprisingly, it is only the latter group who evaluate his role in Afghanistan positively.
The scholarly literature on Gorbachev, who of course plays a central role in this 
story, is once again informed to a great extent by the memoirs o f those who knew him 
and the interviews that Gorbachev and his closest aides have given to researchers and 
journalists. There is still no work that has really synthesised this information with 
archival sources to provide a detailed study of the “Gorbachev phenomenon” in both
27 Not surprisingly, this point o f view is espoused by, among, others, the current US Secretary o f Defense 
and a major player in the security establishment senior CIA official at the time o f the Afghan war, Robert 
Gates. See Robert Gates From the Shadows: The Ultimate Insider’s Story o f  Five Presidents and How 
They Won The Cold War (New York: Touchstone, 1997), 430.
28 Fred Halliday points out that the Red Army lost twice as many soldiers annually in peace time incidents 
as it did in Afghanistan. See Fred Halliday “Soviet Foreign Policymaking and the Afghanistan War: From 
Second Mongolia to ‘Bleeding Wound”’ Review o f International Studies (1999), 25, 691. See also Barnett 
R. Rubin The Search for Peace in Afghanistan: From Buffer State to Failed State (1995), especially 68- 
70, and Alan Kuperman “The Stinger Missile and Afghanistan” Political Science Quarterly 1999 114:2.
29 One of the better examples is Archie Brown The Gorbachev Factor (Oxford: OUP 1996) For a review 
o f the debate surrounding Gorbachev’s role that compares western and Russian scholarship, see 
V.M.Zubok, “Gorbachev and the End of the Cold War,” Cold War History, 2(2) (2002), 39-71.
30 See Anatolii Chemiaev, My Six Years With Gorbachev (University Park: Pennsylvania State University 
Press, 2000); Pavel Palazhenko, My Six Years With Gorbachev and Shevardnadze: The Memoir o f  a 
Soviet Interpreter (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1997); G. Shahnazarov, Tsena 
Svobodi [The Price o f Freedom] (Moscow: Rossika, 2004).
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domestic and foreign policy.31 Among the most important works currently available are 
Oxford political scientist Archie Brown’s The Gorbachev Factor32 and the studies of 
Russian-American scholar Vladislav Zubok.33 The latter has sifted through the criticism 
and praise of Gorbachev, as well as the archival materials, to distil a more balanced 
understanding of the man and his impact on Soviet and Cold War history. Zubok shows 
that Gorbachev rarely followed any policy systematically, that his planning was often 
overtaken by messianic zeal or faith in a big idea to the point where he would ignore the 
fine details o f negotiations.
Gorbachev is not the only controversial leader in this story. Eduard 
Shevardnadze, the Foreign Minister for most of Gorbachev’s tenure at the top, is often 
seen as a forward-looking, pragmatic foreign minister. Many of his own subordinates at 
the Foreign Ministry considered him a neophyte and party hack.34 While he is generally 
seen as a proponent of “new thinking” and perestroika, his tendency to deal ruthlessly 
with dissent is often overlooked. Historians such as Ekedahl and Goodman have 
managed to put together a political biography that addresses these contradictions in his 
character and career,35 but others continue to write studies that portray him only as a 
visionary democrat.36
The Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan also needs to be evaluated in the 
context of the broader Soviet withdrawal from the Third World. Scholars studying
31 Amherst College historian William Taubman, who wrote a seminal biography of a similarly 
controversial Soviet leader, Nikita Khrushchev, is currently working on what will likely be a similarly 
comprehensive political biography o f Gorbachev.
32 Archie Brown, The Gorbachev Factor (Oxford: OUP 1996). Brown has revisited some o f  the key 
questions regarding Perestorika and the Gorbachev era in Seven Years that Changed the World: 
Perestroika in Perspective (Oxford: OUP 2007).
33 Zubok, A Failed Empire, 265-335. See also “Gorbachev and the End o f the Cold War” Cold War 
History Vol 2, issue 2, 2002, 61-100, and “Why did the Cold War End in 1989?” in Westad, Odd Arne, 
ed. Reviewing the Cold War: Approaches, Interpretations, Theory (2000).
34 See, for example, Kornienko, Kholodnaia voina, and “Afghanistan stoil name 15 milliardov dollarov v 
god,” [Afghanistan cost us 15 billion dollars a year] (Interview with N.Egorychev), Kommersant Vlast’, 
No.46, November 25, 2002.
35 Carolyn McGiffer Ekedahl and Melvin A. Goodman, The Wars o f  Eduard Shevardnadze (University 
Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1997)
36 For example, Nicolas Jallot Chevardnadze: Le Renard blanc du Caucase (Belfond, 2005)
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change in Soviet policy toward the Third World focus on 1987 as the turning point.37 
Yet it is crucial to understand that although visible efforts to withdraw from 
Afghanistan came only in late 1987, the effort to get out o f Afghanistan really began as 
early as 1985 and had roots even earlier, while the effort to change the framework of 
relations with other Third World countries began only in 1987, although a reevaluation 
of those relationships probably began earlier. Still, the difficulties in changing the 
relationship with Third World countries were not dissimilar to those involved in 
withdrawing from Afghanistan, particularly in terms o f the concern about Soviet 
prestige as a world power.
Finally, Afghanistan is just one case of a Third World country affecting the Cold 
War between the superpowers. This phenomenon first manifested itself with the Cuban 
Revolution (1959), and in the period between 1960 and 1991, included areas such as 
Vietnam, the Congo, Angola, the Horn of Africa, Chile, Nicaragua, and El Salvador. 
While scholars have traditionally viewed these countries as pawns in the Cold War, the 
opening of archives since the fall of the Soviet Union has led many historians to re­
evaluate the role of “satellites.” Convincing cases have been made that the Soviet Union 
was more follower then leader when it came to relations with “clients” like Cuba and 
North Vietnam.38 There is evidence to suggest that a similar situation existed with 
regard to the Afghan communists, who learned to manipulate Soviet leaders and even 
maneuver the Soviet bureaucracy in order to get what they wanted.
37 See Celest A. Wallander “Soviet Policy Toward the Third World in the 1990s,” in ibid. See also 
Margot Light, ed. Troubled Friendships: Moscow’s Third Word Ventures (London: British Academic 
Press, 1993) and ‘Soviet policy in the Third World,’ International Affairs 67 (2), 1991, 263-80; Francis 
Fukuyama, Gorbachev and the New Soviet Agenda in the Third World (Santa Monica: RAND 
Corporation, 1989).
38 Some o f the better known examples o f this kind o f historiography are Pierro Gliejeses, Conflicting 
missions : Havana, Washington, and Africa, 1959-1976 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 
2002) and Ilya Gaiduk Confronting Vietnam: Soviet Policy Toward the Indochina Conflict (Washington, 
DC: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 2003).
39 Both Varennikov and Liakhovskii, for example, complain about Najibullah’s use of military-KGB 
rivaliy and his personal channel to Shevardnadze and Gorbachev to change decisions he was unhappy 
with.
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The story o f the Afghan communists will likely remain untold for some time, 
however. The situation in Afghanistan since the Soviet withdrawal has made any kind 
of archival research impossible and few high-level communist officials have come 
forward to give their side of the story.40 Many did not survive the succession of civil 
wars that followed the fall o f their own regime. This is not only unfortunate for the 
individuals concerned, but it also means that significant gaps in the historiography will 
continue to exist even if the Soviet, American, and Pakistani sides are satisfactorily 
studied. This gap includes an understanding of the extent to which Najibullah really 
tried to implement Soviet-driven policies such as National Reconciliation and how the 
Afghan communists evaluated their position prior to and after the Soviet withdrawal.41
My thesis will demonstrate that the story o f the Soviet withdrawal from 
Afghanistan does not fit neatly into the existing interpretations o f the changes in 
Moscow’s foreign policy in the 1980s. I reject the view of contemporary Sovietologists 
who saw the war as an effort to permanently extend Soviet influence and make 
Afghanistan a Soviet republic in all but name. Such a view not only misinterprets Soviet 
leaders’ decision-making, it also ignores the agency of Afghan politicians, who sought 
extensive Soviet involvement in Afghan politics and economy and tried to delay the 
Soviet withdrawal. My interpretation also differs from writers like Bennet and 
Mendelsohn who see the withdrawal as a triumph of “new thinkers” over “old thinkers” 
within Moscow’s elite. While “new thinking” was undoubtedly an important paradigm
40 There are a few exceptions, including the memoirs o f Soltan Ali Keshtmand, Prime Minister for most 
o f the Najibullah, and Mohammed Hassan Sharq, who briefly served as Prime Minister in 1989. 
Mohammed Hassan Sharq, Barefoot in Coarse Clothes (Peshawar: Area Studies Centre, 2001) and Soltan 
Ali Keshtmand, Yad'dasht'ha-yi siyasi va ruyidad'ha-yi tarikhi (Najib-i-Kabir, 2002)
41 Laudable efforts have been made in this regard, however, using published sources and some oral 
history. See, in particular Antonio Giustozzi War, Politics, and Society in Afghanistan (London: Hurst, 
2000) and Barnett R. Rubin The Search for Peace in Afghanistan: From Buffer State to Failed State (New 
Haven: Yale University Press, 1995). Also significant is a work co-written by a journalist who reported 
from Afghanistan and a Soviet Orientalist who went to Afghanistan with the GRU, Vladimir Plastun and 
Vladimir Adrianov Najibullah v tiskah geopolitiki [Najibullah in the Vice o f Geopolitics] (Moscow: 
Russki Biograficheski Institut, 1998). It is the only account that provides a look at how Soviet advisors 
and Afghans interacted below the top level o f party officials and is unique in its detachment from general 
Soviet inter-service and bureaucratic rivalries.
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in Soviet foreign policy during the Gorbachev period, the debate between “new thinkers 
and old thinkers” leaves out key aspects of the story. For example, the military was not 
opposed to the withdrawal and in policy debates on Afghanistan senior officers took 
positions closer to Gorbachev’s most reformist aides, while reformist like Shevardnadze 
pursued a much harder ine. Finally, what all previous accounts and interpretations have 
overlooked is the wide array of actors beyond the top decision makers that affected the 
timing of the withdrawal, its execution, and the diplomatic efforts to find a resolution 
the conflict.
As I show, there were four key paradigms at work when it came to the USSR’s 
involvement in Afghanistan and its slowness to disengage from the country. First, 
starting in the mid-1950s, but particularly from the 1960s onwards, the Soviet Union 
developed a major presence in the Third World as a supporter o f “national liberation” 
movements. It provided economic and military aid and sent thousands o f political, 
technical, and military advisers to states emerging from the yoke of colonialism. There 
were a number o f complex motives behind this costly exercise, but among them was the 
three-way competition with the United States and China. By the 1970s aid to Third 
World become a key component o f the Soviet states’ legitimacy as a superpower. If its 
position in Europe was justified by its defeat of fascism, frequently recounted in 
movies, books, monuments, and demonstrations, then its position as a world power was 
justified by its defense of emerging states against encroaching neo-imperialism. The 
possible effects o f a defeat in Afghanistan on the Soviet Union’s reputation was a 
concern not only o f “old-thinkers” like Brezhnev and Andropov, but even many in the 
reformist group that took over after 1985, not least o f all Gorbachev himself.
Second, Moscow’s presence in Afghanistan was extended by its belief in what it 
could do to transform the country. Even though leaders in Moscow recognised that the
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Soviet example was inappropriate for a country as underdeveloped as Afghanistan, they 
believed that they could go a long way toward stabilizing its client government in Kabul 
through a mixture of political tutelage and modernization programs. Thousands of Party 
advisers were sent to help the People’s Democratic Party o f Afghanistan (PDPA) 
improve its organizational work and gain support in the countryside. As we will see, 
these advisers sometimes did more harm than good. Even after the majority were 
withdrawn, in 1986, Moscow continued try out reform programs such as the Policy of 
National Reconciliation to stabilise the government. As with military aid, Moscow’s 
presence was prolonged by a desire to give its programs a chance to work.
Third, despite a general consensus at the top of the Soviet hierarchy on 
Moscow’s goals in Afghanistan, there was often little coordination in the work of 
various groups in Kabul. The sharpest conflict was between the Soviet military and the 
KGB. Officers o f the two security forces even tended to take sides in the internal PDPA 
split -  the military supporting Khalq and the KGB supporting Parcham. These 
disagreements allowed Afghan communists to play sides off against one another and 
even to develop a “lobby” for their views in Moscow.
Finally, the conflict was prolonged by the high level o f Soviet-US tensions in 
the 1980s. Although Pakistan delivered arms to and trained the mujahadeen opposition 
in Afghanistan, it was US money and resources that kept the jihad  going, with help 
from Saudi Arabia, China, and several other countries. Soviet leaders believed that a 
settlement on Afghanistan would only be possible if the United States agreed to stop 
supporting the mujahadeen. At the same time, Moscow was cautious in opening a 
dialog with the United States, fearing that doing so would be an admission that the 
invasion was a mistake and that it would lose the freedom to act as it saw fit in 
Afghanistan. As we will see, Soviet-US tensions hindered Andropov’s efforts to end the
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conflict in 1983 and they also made it more difficult for Gorbachev to seek a diplomatic 
solution during his first years in power.
Sources
This thesis draws on a mix of sources, many of them only recently uncovered, in 
Russian, US and UN archives, memoirs by military and intelligence officers, diplomats, 
and policymakers, and over a dozen interviews with some of the key players involved. It 
also incorporates recent literature on the late Cold War, interventionism, Soviet reform 
efforts, and the war in Afghanistan. Nevertheless, a number of caveats must be 
mentioned.
To understand Soviet decision-making and implementation, one ideally needs 
sources that reflect the debates at the most senior level, the information received by 
officials with access to decision-makers, the instructions passed to officials in 
Afghanistan and on the various diplomatic battleffonts, as well as reports that evaluate 
the extent to which these instructions are successfully carried out. In addition, an 
assessment of policy-making requires objective information that will help assess 
whether officials were properly informed about a given situation.
Researching this period in Soviet history poses a number o f methodological 
problems, the greatest o f which is the limited access to primary materials. Certain 
aspects o f decision-making and policy implementation are virtually impossible to trace 
in the documentary record. I have overcome these difficulties by using all possible 
archival resources in Russia, supplementing those materials with published documents, 
memoir literature, oral history, and archival research in the Unites States. I have also 
made use o f the numerous memoirs about general Afghan and Soviet politics during the 
1970s and 1980s, some which were discussed above, and have been able to conduct 
interviews with some of the key figures in Soviet military, intelligence, and diplomacy,
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and party leadership that helped shape or carry out Afghan policy. Interviews with 
several figures on the US side helped complete the picture. Although all o f these 
sources carry their own biases (including those formed by the vantage point from which 
they saw the unfolding drama as well as those caused by institutional rivalry), but by 
combining them I have been able to recreate an accurate, if  not always detailed, picture 
of how and why decisions were made and implemented.
Certainly the best possible sources for understanding Soviet policy-making are 
high level memoranda and minutes of meetings that provide a record o f debates. 
However, their selective availability presents some methodological problems. The 
official ones that were released as part of “Fund 89” (held at the Russian State Archive 
o f Contemporary History, or RGANI) were selected in part to embarrass the Soviet 
Communist Party.42 Thus, with regard to Afghanistan, most of them focus on the 
decision to invade, not on the conduct of the war or international diplomacy in the 1980- 
91 period. This gap is partially filled by the collection at the Gorbachev Foundation 
Archive, compiled by Gorbachev’s associates (including Anatolii Chemiaev, his key 
foreign policy aide), which includes a collection o f Politburo documents, many o f them 
minutes o f key meetings 43 These are compiled handwritten notes, not a formal record. 
However, where I have been able to cross-reference these with those available in state 
archives, I have found them to be notably consistent. The materials in the GFA are 
particularly useful for tracing debates at the Politburo level during the Gorbachev 
period, at least through 1990.44 While one might expect these and other documents in
42 Many of these, primarily from Funds 5 and 89 at the Russian State Archive of Contemporary History, 
were collected in an edited volume: Pierre Allan et al., eds., Sowjetische Geheimdokumente zum 
Afghanistankrieg (1978-1991) (Zurich: Hochsch-Verlag an der ETH, 1995)
43 Some o f these were recently compiled in: Anatolii Chemiaev et al., eds., V Politburo TsK KPSS 
(Moscow: Gorbachev Foundation, 2006). The Gorbachev Foundation has also begun releasing a multi­
volume collection o f Gorbachev’s papers, including records o f his meetings with foreign leaders. 
However, since this project was still in the planning stages when I conducted my research, all references 
are to the Gorbachev Foundation Archive, not to the volumes.
44 The various attempts to reform the decision-making apparatus, which decreased the importance o f the 
Politburo, and the general disintegration o f the state makes these notes much less useful for the 1990- 
1991 period.
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the GFA to be selected in a way that sheds a positive light on Gorbachev, the picture 
they present is far from one-sided.45 The bias they represent is primarily that of 
availability: the documents are those that came across the desk of one of the aides or 
were drafted by them -  they do not give anywhere near a complete picture o f the 
conduct of foreign policy in the way that would be possible with access to Foreign 
Ministry, CC CPSU International Department, and military and intelligence materials.
To compensate for these lacunae, I have made use o f a number o f archives that 
either hold formerly declassified documents or those related to my topic that help 
illuminate the context in which decisions on Afghanistan were made. There are many 
documents at the National Security Archive in Washington, DC, retrieved from several 
Russian archives during the 1990s, when access was less restricted than it is currently. 
Many of these are records of conversations between Soviet representatives or leaders 
and those o f foreign countries, including Afghanistan. I have also made use o f records at 
the State Archive of the Russian Federation (GARF), including the papers of Aleksandr 
Iakovlev, a leading reformer and member o f the Afghan Commission of the Politburo. 
GARF also holds the files of the Council of Religious Affairs, the body that regulated 
religious practice throughout the USSR and also tracked religious feeling, reporting its 
findings to the Central Committee. These files were useful in trying to understand the 
extent to which concern about unrest in the Soviet Union’s predominantly Muslim 
regions might have affected Moscow’s decision-making on Afghanistan. They include 
reports written by local representatives of the CRA on the religious climate in the area, 
as well as broader surveys written by officials at the republic level. Documents from the 
Soviet Committee o f Solidarity with Countries of Asia and Africa (SKSSAA) provided 
additional evidence on the nature of the Soviet relationship with Afghan communists
45 It is worth noting in this regard that the former aides who compiled these documents, despite being 
supportive o f Gorbachev and perestroika in general, are quite critical o f certain aspects o f  his policy­
making in their own memoirs.
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prior to the invasion.46 Documents from the Ministry of Foreign Trade, held at the State 
Archive of the Economy (RGAE), helped illuminate the nature o f Soviet aid to 
Afghanistan both before and after the invasion.47
Some archives remained closed to me. Intelligence and military archives are 
generally difficult to access, particularly for a period as recent as the one in question.48 
Some documents from the military have appeared in the various memoirs published by 
officers who served in Afghanistan.49 At the Archive of the Foreign Ministry (AVPRF),
I was allowed to see some of the files from the Kabul Embassy but nothing above the 
level of press clippings and some largely irrelevant correspondence.50
Crucial to evaluating the reasons why it took Soviet leaders so long to withdraw 
is an exploration of their relationship with Afghan communists. Vladimir Plastun and 
Vladimir Adrianov’s Najibullah. Afghanistan v Tiskah Geopolitiki [Najibullah. 
Afghanistan in the Vice o f Geopolitics] (Moscow, 1998) provides over one hundred 
pages of documents relating to Soviet efforts to implement the Policy of National 
Reconciliation, an initiative that Moscow hoped would lead to a broad government with 
popular support and create conditions stable enough for Soviet troops to leave. I have 
supplemented this material with interviews and memoirs written by some of the advisers
46 In Russian, Sovetskiy Kommitet Solidarnosti so Staranmi Azii i Ajriki. GARF, Fond 9540, Opis 1. The 
committee was important in maintaining ties with parties that were out o f power; thus its files contain 
some interesting discussions about aid and expertise the Afghan communists wanted both before 1978 
and in the months after the Saur revolution. The records o f the presidium meetings o f the SKSSAA 
(generally held annually) are also a valuable resource for tracking the evolution o f Soviet policy towards 
the Third World, particularly since the presidium included members o f the Central Committee o f the 
CPSU and the meetings were attended by such senior foreign policy makers as Foreign Minister Andrei 
Gromyko.
47 The Ministry o f Foreign Trade (RGAE, Fond 413) only dealt with bilateral trade, not with 
infrastructure projects or military aid.
48 Even the head o f the Federal Security Bureau archive (where KGB materials are held) apparently was 
not able to make much use of KGB documents in his article on the Geneva Accords. See Vasilii 
Khristoforov, “Trudniy put’ k Zhenevskim Soglasheniam po Afganistanu,” Novaia i Noveishaia Istoriia 
No.5, 2008, 23-47.
49 Especially Liakhovskii, cited above, but also Vladimir Alekseevich Bogdanov Afgnaskaia Voina: 
Vospominania (Moscow: Sovetsky PisateT, 2005), and Mikhail M. Sotskov, Dolg i Sovest: Zakrytie 
Stranitsy Afganskoi Voiny (St. Petersburg: Professional, 2007), as well as some others. I am additionally 
indebted to the late General Liakhovskii for providing me with several documents from his private 
collection which have not been published.
50 AVPRF Fund 169 .1 have, however, been able to use some Foreign Ministry documents that were 
briefly declassified in the early 1990s and made available to my current thesis supervisor. These are now 
housed at the London School of Economics Institute of Diplomacy and Strategy (LSE IDEAS).
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who traveled to Afghanistan. However, evidence on this question is still lacking, and I 
have instead focused on relations at the most senior level, where empirical evidence has 
been somewhat easier to come by.
Another focus o f this thesis is the diplomacy engaged in by Soviet officials as 
they sought a way out o f the Afghan quagmire. This included UN diplomacy, US-Soviet 
diplomacy, and (particularly after 1987) efforts to reach out to opposition fighters and 
their sponsors in Pakistan and elsewhere. Again, evidence from the Soviet archives is 
rather slim, but in this case I was able to supplement Soviet documentation with 
available materials from the Ronald Reagan Presidential Library in Simi Valley, 
California (although many useful documents remain classified there) and the archives 
of the United Nations Organization.51 While these files do not shed much light on 
Soviet decision-making, they do help trace the evolution of Soviet diplomacy from the 
early 1980s until 1992.
Like other historians working on this period o f Soviet history, collecting sources 
with which to understand the recent past has therefore been somewhat of a 
multidimensional and international jigsaw puazzle. Although many documents have yet 
to be declassified, I have made the best possible use of the sources available, repeatedly 
checking them against each other throughout the text.52 As such, this thesis lays the 
groundwork for further research as and when more sources come to light.
Thesis Structure
This thesis has a broad chronological structure. The first chapter shows how key 
elements of Soviet policy in Afghanistan were formed between 1980 and 1985. These 
were first, to fight the opposition while simultaneously training and developing the
51 Both the archive at UN headquarters in New York and the papers o f Secretary General Perez de Cuellar 
at Yale University’s Sterling Memorial Library.
52 Including Zubok, A Failed Empire, who, particularly for his chapters on the Brezhnev and Gorbachev 
periods, laboured under similar limitations.
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Afghan army; second, to strengthen the regime in Kabul and make it more attractive to 
the population, and third, to conduct diplomacy that would help the Kabul regime gain 
recognition and stop foreign aid to the opposition. The chapter shows how what was 
initially envisioned as a temporary invasion became a long-term occupation, how 
various voices in Moscow tried to make their opposition to the invasion known to top 
leaders, and how Soviet leaders came to accept the need for UN diplomacy to help 
resolve the Afghan conflict and pushed their Afghan clients to do the same.
The second chapter will discuss the “correlation o f forces” in Gorbachev’s first 
few years and how this affected policy-making on the Afghanistan war. Contrary to the 
argument advanced by some western authors, the military costs o f the war did not serve 
as a motivation for the withdrawal. Similarly, the social costs of the war, neither in 
Islamic Central Asia nor elsewhere, were sufficient to push Soviet leaders to seek a 
quick withdrawal. Indeed, the desire to withdraw, which was pushed most forcefully by 
Gorbachev’s reformist “new thinkers,” was balanced by concerns for how a withdrawal 
would be seen by other Third World states. This “correlation of forces” explains 
Gorbachev’s decision to seek withdrawal gradually, rather than ending the war in 1985.
The subject of the third chapter will be Moscow’s efforts to seek a gradual 
resolution to the conflict in 1986 and 1987. During this period, Soviet diplomats became 
active in seeking a diplomatic solution to the conflict. However, Moscow also 
undertook a major reform of its efforts within Afghanistan and pushed the Afghan 
government towards the Policy of National Reconciliation. The two were related, as 
Moscow’s diplomatic efforts at the time focused not only on states like the US and 
Pakistan but also on helping Kabul to reach out to opposition leaders. In the end, the 
failure o f these efforts to bring significant results led to the decision to seek a 
withdrawal without waiting for major improvements by appealing directly to the United 
States.
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The effort to negotiate a withdrawal with the United States and complete the 
UN-sponsored “Geneva Process” begun in 1982, is discussed in Chapter Four. 
Determined to withdraw troops and improve relations with the West, Gorbachev was 
ultimately willing to sacrifice the long-standing Soviet position on stopping arms 
supplies to the Afghan resistance in the hopes that improving relations with the US 
would lead to a settlement in Afghanistan and elsewhere in the Third World. Ultimately, 
however, his misjudgement of American politics and decision making, as well as his 
inability to renege on traditional Soviet commitments, meant that a Soviet withdrawal 
did not lead to a resolution o f the conflict.
Chapter Five covers the period from the signing of the Geneva Accords to the 
completion of the Soviet withdrawal in February 1989. The failure to coordinate efforts 
of various Soviet agencies active in Afghanistan was felt acutely during the withdrawal 
period, when the Najibullah regime seemed on the verge of a crisis. The military and the 
KGB clashed over how far to go in seeking an accommodation with the Tajik 
commander Ahmad Shah Massoud, halting the withdrawal, and military operations. 
Within the Politburo, Foreign Minister Shevardnadze took the most hawkish line, with 
Gorbachev often taking his side. Again, the need to protect the Soviet Union’s 
reputation continued to be a major concern.
The last chapter will look at how the declining Soviet regime continued to 
support its client in Afghanistan unti the USSR’s collapse in 1991. Arms, economic aid, 
and military advisers continued to prop up the Najibullah regime as long as the Soviet 
Union could provide them. Only after Kriuchkov was arrested following the failure of 
the August coup in 1991 did Moscow sign an agreement for a mutual cessation of  
supplies to begin in January 1992. Moscow was not able to bring about a reconciliation 
in Afghanistan, but Gorbachev did succeed in limiting the domestic fallout from the war
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by focusing the public’s attention on the errors of Brezhnev, Andropov, and others who 
originally decided on intervention.
Before moving on to the body of the thesis, however, I provide an overview of 
Soviet-Afghan relations since the 1950s and the chain o f events that led to the decision 
to intervene in December 1979.
Background to the Invasion
There were several reasons why Afghanistan was important to the Soviet Union. First, 
the country shared a 2000 kilometer border with the Soviet Union running along its 
Muslim republics, the Tajik SSR, Turkmen SSR, and Uzbek SSR (present-day 
Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan). Contrary to what some Western observers 
believed at the time, the issue was not that the situation in Afghanistan would spark an 
Islamist insurgency. Moscow had little if any concern in the late 1970s or early 1980s 
about separatist tendencies or the emergence of a serious underground Islamist 
movement that could challenge the state. Rather, Soviet leaders worried that 
Afghanistan, traditionally a neutral state, could become the platform for US bases, 
targeting the Soviet Union’s own facilities in Central Asia. These fears were heightened 
because Soviet leaders worried that Afghanistan would become a tempting target for the 
US after the Iranian revolution (1979) and the loss o f US influence in the Persian Gulf.53
Second, Afghanistan was one of the many non-communist Third World states 
with which the Soviet Union had a friendly relationship. Soviet aid to Afghanistan 
confirmed its support for developing countries and respect for non-alignment. After the 
Saur revolution (April 1978) that brought Afghan communists to power, the Soviet 
Union found itself the supporter of a nascent revolutionary government. Once it 
confirmed support for that government, it also exposed itself to potential ideological
53 Westad, “Concerning the Situation in A,” CW1HP Bulletin 8/9, 29.
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damage if that government collapsed, particularly if  it was felled by a “popular” 
insurgency. These factors are important for understanding both the decision to invade 
and the reason that Soviet leaders found it difficult to disengage from the country once 
their troops were committed.
The origins of the Soviet-Afghan relationship can be traced back to 1919, when 
the young communist state became the first to recognise Amir Amanullah’s bid for full 
independence from Britain. The communist government was on o f the Afghan 
monarchy’s staunchest friends at this time. A treaty of friendship, signed in 1921, 
resulted in Soviet subsidies, including arms, to Amanullah.54 Yet relations soon soured 
over disagreements on Central Asia, where the young Soviet state fought to suppress a 
Muslim insurgency, and Afghanistan turned increasingly to Germany for foreign aid. A 
more appropriate starting point for the purposes o f this study, however, is the trip 
undertaken to Afghanistan and a number of other Third World countries by First 
Secretary Nikita Khrushchev, and Premier Nikolai Bulganin in 1955. It was on this trip 
that Khrushchev decided to make Afghanistan an ally by providing military and 
economic aid. Not all o f his Kremlin colleagues agreed -  Lazar Kaganovich pointed out 
that this could set a costly precedent. Other supported the idea, either on practical 
grounds (Afghanistan was a neighbor and should be kept as a friendly state) or on 
broader strategic grounds. Anostas Mikoian, soon to become Khruschev’s right hand 
man on foreign affairs, pointed out: “we will have to render assistance to some states, if 
we wish to enter into more serious competition with the USA. From the point of view of 
state interests, it is necessary to render assistance.”55
At the time of the Khruschev-Bulganin visit, Afghanistan was a monarchy. A 
communist party, the People’s Democratic Party o f Afghanistan, was founded only ten 
years later by a group o f urban intellectuals. Nur Mohammad Taraki and Babrak Karmal
54 Ludwig Adamec, Historical Dictionary o f Afghanistan, 221-222
55 Aleksandr Fursenko and Timothy Naftali, Khrushchev’s Cold War (New York: Norton, 2006), 80-82.
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immediately emerged as its leaders, but disagreements between the two and their 
respective supporters led to a split in the party only two years later, in 1967. The two 
wings that emerged became known as Khalq (Masses) and Parcham (Banner) after their 
respective newspapers.56
There is no evidence that Soviet representatives organised the founding of the 
party. After the PDPA’s creation Moscow provided support to both factions, but 
proceeded cautiously. It was not even invited to the international party congress in 
1968, a slight which Taraki apparently took personally.57 One reason for caution may 
have been the split between the factions. Over the years Soviet representatives 
undertook efforts to bring about a reconciliation. Such efforts were often entrusted to 
KGB operatives within Afghanistan, in coordination with the Central Committee 
International Department. In 1974, the Politburo approved a message to both Taraki and 
Karmal, to be delivered by a KGB operative, informing the two that “In Moscow they 
regard with deep alarm the reports coming from Kabul about the continuing mutual 
fighting between the leadership of
Parcham and Khalq. This internal strife unfortunately and its prolonged nature are 
leading to a weakening of both [sides], and is introducing a split in the ranks of the
co
progressive forces and the democratic [movement] as a whole.”
An even more important reason for caution with regard to support for the 
Afghan communists was that Moscow was quite happy with its existing relations with 
that country. Moscow and Kabul had grown particularly close after a coup in 1973 
which brought Mohammed Daoud (Prime Minister during the first tentative steps to 
cooperation in the 1950s) to power. Daoud deposed the King (his cousin and brother-in- 
law) and established a republic, with himself as president. Continuing the practice of
56 Adamec, Historical Dictionary o f  Afghanistan, 190-192.
57 Vasily Mitrokhin, “The KGB in Afghanistan,” CWIHP Working Paper Series, p.26
58 Decree of the CC CPSU -  An Appeal to the Leaders o f the PDPA Groups “Parcham” and “Khalq” 
January 8, 1974 CWIHP Virtual Archive: Soviet Invasion o f  Afghanistan
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previous decades, Daoud’s government received aid from the United States as well as 
the USSR, but it was the latter that appealed to him as a model of development. For his 
first four years in power he also ruled in collaboration with other urban leftists, 
including members of the PDPA.59
Daoud’s honeymoon with the PDPA did not last long. He felt secure that he 
could control any rural or regional challenges -  the scourge o f leaders who wanted to 
centralise and pass reform -  but he was worried about the challenge that other urban 
leftists could pose. The communists in particular had made headway in the military, 
whose officers received extensive training in the Soviet Union, suggesting the 
possibility o f a future coup. Purges against the Afghan Left, begun in 1977, naturally 
worried Soviet officials. Daoud also seemed to be turning away from Moscow. In 1976, 
he visited Iran and secured a promise of aid for a railway, and the next year he visited 
Egypt, Pakistan, and Saudi Arabia.60 Moscow still preferred that the nascent communist 
leadership find a way to cooperate with the Daoud government, and this was the 
message that its emissaries carried to Karmal and others.61
What became known as the Saur Revolution, which brought the PDPA to power, 
was really a reaction to these purges. In April 1978, a senior Parcham member, Mir 
Akbar Khayber, was assassinated, and his funeral turned into an anti-government 
demonstration. Daoud decided to arrest the communist leadership, including Taraki. 
Hafizullah Amin, a fellow Khalqi, was only placed under house arrest. This proved a 
fatal oversight for Daoud. Amin was able to use his connections in the military to 
launch a coup. In the ensuing fighting, Daoud was killed. Colonel Ahmed Kadyr, a 
leading mutineer, helped establish a revolutionary council which in turn elected Taraki 
as the Prime Minister and President.
59 Odd Arne Westad, The Global Cold War, 300-301.
60 Gilles Dorronsoro, Revolution Undending, Afghanistan: 1979 to the Present (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 2005), 64-65.
61 Westad, The Global Cold War, 302.
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Power did not unite the factions of the PDPA -  indeed, it only polarised them 
further. The Khalqis were anxious to move ahead quickly with their modernization and 
redistribution program. A reign of terror was unleashed on two fronts: against 
traditionalist elements, especially members of the clergy, followers of the Muslim 
Brotherhood or o f Ayatollah Khomeini, and, simultaneously, against the “enemy 
within,” primarily Parchamists. Many were thrown in jail, while others, like Babrak 
Karmal, were sent into diplomatic exile. (Karmal served as Ambassador to 
Czechoslovakia during this period.) Daoud supporters were purged from the 
government at all levels.62
KGB officers in Afghanistan were alarmed by the extent of Taraki’s terror and
the pace o f his attempts to radically transform Afghan society. They feared that his
reforms and repressions would undermine the young government and throw the country
into chaos. In July 1978, the Kabul residency sent an appeal for a political intervention
at the highest levels: “only the leadership of the CPSU can influence the wild [Khalq]
opportunists and force them to change their attitude towards the Parcham group.”63
Indeed, Boris Ponomarev, head of the International Department of the Central
Committee, travelled to Kabul at the end o f September to press Taraki to “stop to the
mass repressions which have taken on increasing proportions following the revolution
in Afghanistan, including repressions against the "Parcham."64
Emphasis was also placed on the importance o f  creating and 
strengthening the party throughout all o f  the country's 
territories, on the adoption o f  prompt measures to normalise the 
activities o f  party organs from top to bottom, on organizing 
agencies o f  the people's government, and on focusing increased 
attention on econom ic problems. The people must experience 
concrete results o f  the revolution in their own lives. That is
62 Christopher Andrew and Vasily Mitrokhin, The World Was Going Our Way: the KGB and the Battle 
fo r the Third World (New York: Basic Books, 2005), 388-389.
63 Ibid, 389.
64 Information from CC CPSU to GDR leader Erich Honecker, October 13, 1978, CWIHP Virtual 
Archive: Soviet Invasion o f  Afghanistan.
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w hy the improvement o f  people's lives should be the primary 
focus o f  the new governm ent.65
Moscow’s concerns did not stop the two countries form signing a Treaty o f Friendship 
on December 5, 1978. By then, a number of Soviet advisors were serving in the 
government, the party, and the military. The latter were advising their tutees in military 
operations against the emerging rebel groups.66
The first great test of Soviet commitment, however, came with the Herat 
uprising in March 1979. An ancient city located in eastern Afghanistan, the largely 
Tajik city o f Herat erupted in revolt on March 15. A mutiny led by mid level officers 
joined with a mass uprising of the city’s residents.67 Afghan officials, Soviet advisers 
and their families all fell victim to the mob violence that overtook the city. The Afghan 
leadership lost its nerve, believing that its’ own military would be unable to deal with 
the situation. They called on Moscow to send Soviet troops and planes to quash the 
uprising.
The Politburo met several times over the following days to discuss the situation. 
At first, key foreign policymakers within the Politburo supported intervention. Dmitrii 
Ustinov, the Minister of Defense, Andrei Gromyko, the Minister o f Foreign Affairs, and 
Yurii Andropov, the KGB chief spoke in favour of armed intervention at a Politburo 
meeting on March 17, arguing that the risks of engaging Soviet troops outweighed those 
of losing Afghanistan. Afghanistan was too important, Gromyko insisted, to let it fall 
into hostile hands: “if we lose Afghanistan now and it turns against the Soviet Union, 
this will result in a sharp setback to our foreign policy."68
By the next time the Politburo met, however, the situation had changed -  
intervention was seen as inadvisable both in view of the situation in Afghanistan and
65 Information from CC CPSU to GDR leader Erich Honecker, October 13, 1978, CWIHP Virtual 
Archive: Soviet Invasion o f  Afghanistan, hereafter CWIHP Afghanistan.
66 Andrew and Mitrokhin, The World Was Going Our Way, 390-391.
67 Liakhovskii, Tragedi i doblest 111.
68 Transcript o f CPSU CC Politburo Discussions on Afghanistan regarding deterioration o f conditions in 
Afghanistan and possible responses from the Soviet Union March 17, 1979 CWIHP Afghanistan.
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because of the threat it would pose to detente. With the Carter-Brezhnev summit 
scheduled for that June in Vienna and the expected culmination of SALT II, there was 
too much to lose. Ustinov and Andropov both realised that the Soviet army would end 
up fighting on behalf o f the Afghan army. Apparently, Brezhnev’s foreign policy 
advisor, Aleksandrov-Agentov, played a key role, pushing his boss to override Ustinov, 
Gromyko, and Andropov’s enthusiastic support for intervention.69 These three leaders, 
along with international department chief Boris Ponomarev, would form the 
Afghanistan Commission of the Politburo, and their dominance over decision-making in
70this area only increased.
The Afghan army was able to pacify Herat, but the situation within the 
leadership continued to deteriorate. The PDPA was further from unity than it had ever 
been, and a conflict was growing between its two top leaders, Taraki and Amin.
Moscow instructed its officials on the ground to take an active role in trying to resolve 
it, but with little success.71 As would happen many times throughout the intervention, 
each side in the intra-PDPA contest had its supporters amongst Soviet advisers. In this 
case, some of the military advisers had been impressed by Amin’s role in putting down 
the Herat revolt in March. Taraki, however, had Brezhnev’s support. During a visit to 
Moscow in September 1979, Brezhnev and Andropov warned him that Amin was 
planning to oust him. When Taraki returned to Afghanistan, he tried to act on this 
information by having Amin killed, possibly with KGB help. In the event, the attack
69 Zubok, A Failed Empire, 260-261; Westad, Global Cold War, 288-330; Karen Brutents, Tridsat’ let na 
staroi Ploshadi, 465. Aleksandrov-Agentov was a long-serving foreign policy aide o f Brezhnev’s. He was 
particularly important because the General Secretary, with little knowledge of foreign affairs yet carrying 
enormous responsibility, relied on someone to interpret the problems and proposed solutions brought 
before him. In his memoirs, Aleksandrov-Agentov himself barely mentions his own involvement with 
deliberations on Afghanistan. He claims to have learned of the invasion after the fact, which however 
does not exclude the possibility that he was involved in the build-up throughout 1979. See Aleksandrov- 
Agentov, Ot Kollontai do Gorbacheva (Moscow: Mezhdunarodnie Otnosheniia 1994), 246-247.
70 Ponomarev was a member o f the commission, but did not have the same clout as Andropov, Gromyko, 
and Ustinov, nor the same proximity to Brezhnev. When Andropov and Ustinov began pushing for 
intervention, they effectively side-stepped Ponomarev.
71 From documents found by Anatolii Dobrynin and read into the record o f the Lysebu II conference. 
Lysebu II, 77.
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failed, Amin escaped unharmed and had Taraki arrested. The poet turned revolutionary
7 0leader was strangled in his jail cell several weeks later.
Taraki’s arrest and murder seems to have started the final sequence o f events 
that led to intervention. At first, Soviet leaders tried to make the best o f the situation, 
instructing their officials in Moscow to accept Amin’s consolidation o f power as a fait 
accompli while working to minimise repression against supporters of Taraki.
Brezhnev seemed resigned yet cautiously optimistic at a Politburo meeting on 
September 20:
W e should assume that the Soviet-A fghan relations w ill not 
sustain som e sort o f  major changes, and, it seem s, w ill continue 
in their previous course. Amin w ill be pushed toward this by 
the current situation and by the difficulties which the Afghan  
governm ent w ill face for a long tim e to com e. Afghanistan will 
continue to be interested in receiving from the U SSR  military, 
econom ic and other aid, and possibly even in increased 
amounts.74
Yet Amin was proving an increasingly difficult partner. Soon after having Taraki killed, 
he expelled the Soviet ambassador, Aleksandr Puzanov. Nor did he adhere to Soviet 
requests to refrain from repression against fellow PDPA members. A memorandum 
from the “Afghan commission” dated October 29 noted that in light o f this, Moscow 
ought to continue working with Amin, but also remain vigilant for “turn by H. Amin in
ne
an anti-Soviet direction.”
There is evidence that at some point in October or November Ustinov and 
Andropov began reconsidering their earlier agreement to hold off on armed 
intervention. Amin’s erratic behavior, including reported secret meetings with US 
officials, was part o f the reason; a worsening international situation was another. The 
Islamic revolution in Iran made senior Soviet planners wonder if the US would now 
look at Afghanistan as a new base for its forces in the Persian Gulf. The Carter
72 Zubok, A Failed Empire, 261-62. Gai and Snegirev, Vtorzhenie, 204-8.
73 Cable from Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko to Soviet Representatives in Kabul September 15, 1979. 
CWIHP Afghanistan
74 Excerpt from Politburo meeting, September 20, 1979 CWIHP Afghanistan
75 Gromyko-Andropov-Ustinov-Ponomarev Report to CPSU CC October 29, 1979 CWIHP Afghanistan 
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administration’s decision to move naval forces into the area in the fall o f 1979 only 
fueled Soviet suspicions.76
Ustinov and Andropov now formed the chief pro-intervention lobby and they
apparently convinced Gromyko, as well as Aleksandrov-Agentov, to support their
arguments. In early December, Andropov wrote a personal memo to Brezhnev laying
out the case for intervention. It highlighted Amin’s untrustworthiness and the possibility
that he might go over to the West.
The situation in the government, the army, and in the state 
apparatus is aggravated. They are practically disorganised as a 
result o f  m ass repressions carried out by Am in. At the same 
tim e w e have been receiving information about A m in’s 
behind-the-scenes activities which might mean his political 
reorientation to the West. He keeps his contacts with the 
American charge d ’affaires secret from u s ... In closed  
m eetings, he attacks Soviet policy and actions o f  our 
specia lists... N ow  there is no guarantee that A m in, in order to 
secure his personal power, would not turn over to the W est.77
Andropov also offered a solution. The Parchamists whom Amin and Taraki had 
expelled could be brought back into the country and form the core of a new government. 
A limited military force, consisting of two battalions already stationed in Kabul, would 
be needed, but a larger group would be kept along the border “just for an emergency.” 
Such an operation, Andropov concluded, “would allow us to solve the question of 
defending the achievements of the April revolution, resurrecting the Leninist principles 
of state and party building in the Afghan leadership, and strengthening our positions in 
that country.”78
Ustinov and Andropov met with Brezhnev on December 8 to further make the 
case for intervention. Their arguments included the point that an Afghanistan that was 
realigned toward the West could well become the staging area for missiles directed at
76 Lysebu II, 64-65.
77 This memorandum was uncovered by Anatolii Dobrynin and read into the record o f the Lysebu 
conference. See Lysebu II, 78.
78 Ibid. 79.
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i
the Soviet Union.79 Once Brezhnev’s support had been secured, only the formal matter 
of a Politburo resolution remained. On December 12, the Politburo met for a brief 
session and approved a handwritten resolution entitled “concerning the situation in 
A ...”.80
When Soviet leaders approved the intervention, they did not envisage fighting a 
war on behalf o f the PDPA. Indeed, Andropov preferred that only a very limited number 
of troops be committed in support of the operation to remove Amin.81 Ustinov, 
however, insisted on a larger contingent, comprising 75,000 troops. Their purpose was 
to boost morale and take a defensive posture in Kabul as well as some provincial 
capitals. The removal of Amin would be handled by an elite brigade.82
The decision to intervene was not without its opponents. They included senior
military officers who tried to make their case to Ustinov in the weeks leading to the
intervention. According to testimony from several senior General Staff officials, they
appealed to Ustinov in particular not to support the introduction of troops. The last
such effort took place on December 10, two days before the final decision to intervene
had been made. Ogarkov spoke on behalf o f the General Staff, setting out to Brezhnev,
Gromyko, Andropov, and Ustinov the reasons why the Soviet Union should not send in
troops. According to General Valentin Varennikov, Ogarkov’s deputy who would go on
to lead the operational group in Afghanistan, his boss made the following points:
first, that the Afghans should deal with their internal affairs 
them selves, and w e should only give assistance; second, that 
the public would not understand us— neither the American  
people, nor the Soviet people, nor the world in general— if  w e  
introduced those troops; third, that our troops did not know the
79 Ibid.
80 Westad, “Concerning the Situation in A,” CWIHP Bulletin 8/9, 29.
81 Soon after Taraki’s murder, Andropov told Viacheslav Kevorkov, a senior KGB officer who served as 
a backchannel between Moscow and Bonn, o f his concern that the US would use Amin to pull the Soviet 
Union into “another Vietnam.” This perhaps explains his reluctance to commit militarily in the way 
Ustinov wanted. Andropov did not believe that Amin could be allowed to stay in power, but he was still 
aware of the potential costs o f an intervention. See Viacheslav Kevorkov, Tainyi Kanal (Moscow: Geia, 
1997), 244-245.
82 Lysebu II, 64-66.
83 Kornienko and Akhromeev, Glazami Marshala i Diplomata, 26.
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specific circumstances o f  Afghanistan very w ell— the tribal 
relations, Islam, and various other things would put our troops 
in a very difficult situation. And he made som e other 
arguments.84
These arguments failed to impress the Politburo members who had already decided on 
intervention. Although, in March, similar arguments had persuaded them to reject 
military intervention as an option, now they seemingly saw no other way to handle the 
situation. The failure of the US congress to ratify SALT II in the summer o f 1979, 
which seemed to signal a turn away from detente by the US, was one reason. The
o c
decision to deploy Pershing missiles in Europe was another. The murder of Taraki by 
his rival Hafizullah Amin, despite Brezhnev’s pledge o f support, helped convince 
Brezhnev that the latter had to be removed from power.86 Growing suspicion that Amin 
might be considering a turn towards the United States contributed to this belief.
Several conclusions can be drawn about the decision-making that led to the 
invasion. First, the invasion was the result o f a decision reached by several key foreign 
policy decision-makers within the Politburo, not the Politburo as a whole. This was 
characteristic of decision-making in the late Brezhnev era. With Brezhnev himself 
ailing, foreign policy was dominated by three people: Andrei Gromyko, the foreign 
minister, Dmitrii Ustinov, the minister o f defense, and Yurii Andropov, chairman of the 
KGB. At the same time advisers, such as Brezhnev’s foreign policy aide Andrei 
Aleksandrov-Agentov, played key roles in shaping decisions.
Second, dissenting voices from within the Politburo as well as from other ranks 
of Soviet bureaucracy were regularly silenced by this troika. According to Karen
84 Lysebu II, 74.
85 Ustinov made the connection between Afghanistan and the missiles in Germany in a conversation with 
Viacheslav Kevorkov. Ustinov noted that the US might take advantage o f a vacuum in Afghanistan, 
creating yet another US base along the Soviet border (others being in Greece, Turkey, and Pakistan.) The 
same was true, he went on, with regard to West Germany. If the US placed the new missiles there, then it 
would be necessary to “find a way to re-establish the balance.” See Kevorkov, Tainyi Kanal, 235.
86 Indeed, Brezhnev complained to French President Valeiy Giscard d’Estaing in May 1980: “President 
Taraki was my friend. He came to see me in September;. And it was just after he returned that Amin had 
him assassinated. That is a provocation. I could not pardon it.” Valeri Giscard d’ Estaing, Le Pouvoir et 
La Vie (Paris: Campagnie 12, 1991), 427.
44
Brutents, in the late fall o f 1979, Aleksandrov-Agentov even pushed those preparing to 
advise against intervention to abandon their position.87 Similarly, senior military 
officers who tried to object to the operation were told to mind their own business and 
“not teach the Politburo.” Once Gromyko, Ustinov, and Andropov had come to an 
agreement amongst themselves and managed to secure Brezhnev’s support, they were 
able to essentially intimidate other Politburo members and senior officials to accept
o o
their decision.
Finally, those who supported the decision to invade did so because they felt that 
the “loss” of Afghanistan would be an unacceptable loss and a blow to Soviet prestige. 
At the same time, it did not mean that they had completely abandoned detente. Leonid 
Brezhnev’s commitment to detente was very strong, as was that of Gromyko and 
Andropov. Nevertheless, it did not override other concerns that these men shared as 
leaders o f a great power with client states around the globe and which was in an 
ongoing perpetual contest with the United States and China for influence, particularly in 
the Third World. The fact that detente hit a low point after the rejection of the SALT II 
treaty by the US congress in the summer o f 1979 served as a catalyst for supporters of 
the invasion. The “loss” of Afghanistan would be particularly embarrassing at a moment 
when the Soviet Union’s main adversary seemed to be abandoning detente. Later efforts 
to extricate the Soviet troops from Afghanistan would often move with the ebb and flow 
of the USSR’s relationship with the United States.
87 According to Karen Brutents, an International Department official, when Aleksandrov-Agentov learned 
that he was writing a memorandum arguing against intervention, the latter said “So, do you suggest 
giving Afghanistan to the Americans?” His memorandum was excluded from materials presented to the 
Politburo. Westad, “Concerning the Situation in A,” 131.
88 Zubok, A Failed Empire, 262-264; Westad, “Concerning the Situation in A..” Cold War International 
History Project Bulletin 128-132. Westad also points out that Kosygin, who had voiced his opposition to 
an intervention in March was absent from the key Politburo meeting on December 12, thus removing a 
key restraining voice.
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Chapter I: Counter-insurgency and “nation-building” in Afghanistan, 1980-1985
Although the main focus of this thesis is the Gorbachev period (1985-1991), it is 
impossible to understand the context in which he and his colleagues made decisions 
without considering the first five years of the war. This chapter will look at the 1980- 
1985 period, when Soviet policy was still made by the “old guard,” people like CC 
CPSU General Secretary Leonid Brezhnev, KGB chairman (and later General 
Secretary) Yurii Andropov, and the long serving Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko, 
while rising stars like Mikhail Gorbachev and Eduard Shevardnadze largely watched 
from the wings when it came to key issues of foreign policy. During this period, Soviet 
leaders began to seek paths beyond their military activities and support o f the Afghan 
communist regime to settle the worsening situation in and around the fledgling socialist 
state. At the same time, concerns about maintaining prestige as well as the worsening 
bilateral relationship with the US, the USSR’s chief cold war rival, meant that the 
Soviet leadership moved slowly and often reluctantly in bringing in outside help, such 
as that of the United Nations.89
During the first months of 1980 Soviet leaders decided on an open-ended 
commitment o f Soviet troops in support of the PDPA regime, complementing their 
military campaign with an influx of aid and political advisors. Moscow assumed a 
defensive attitude to the nearly universal condemnation o f its intervention and 
undertook a number o f propaganda and diplomatic efforts to counteract the hostility of
89 Of all the chapters in the thesis, this one poses the greatest difficulty when it comes to documentation. 
The Politburo notes compiled at the Gorbachev Foundation Archives, which provide a skeleton on which 
a study o f decision-making can be built for much of the Gorbachev period, do not exist for the years in 
question, simply because the advisers who made those notes were not senior enough at the time to sit in 
on Politburo meetings. The Fund 89 documents, which were so important in developing an understanding 
of the intervention itself, are also sparse for this period. What is available, aside from memoirs and a few 
excerpts from diaries, are documents from the private archives of leading military participants such as 
General Valentin Varennikov and Marshal Sokolov, as well as several political advisers, printed in some 
of the books discussed in the previous chapter. See Aleksandr Liakhovskii, Tragedia i doblest ’' Afgana 
(Moscow, 2004) and Vladimir Plastun and Vladimir Adrianov Nadzhibulla: Afganistan v Tiskah 
Geopolitiki (Moscow, 1998). There is also a rich collection in the United Nations Secretary General’s file 
on the UN effort to mediate a settlement. For the purposes o f this work, these documents add to the other 
materials and serve as a tool to help understand the changing attitude o f Soviet leaders.
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the US, Western Europe, and much of the Muslim world. Within the USSR itself there 
was no public protest, but there was a strong reaction to the invasion by influential 
intellectuals in Moscow, including party members, as well as senior military officers. 
Initially ignored, their criticisms eventually came to be heard by the USSR’s key foreign 
policy makers. By 1982 Soviet leaders came to accept the need for UN diplomacy to 
help resolve the Afghan conflict and prodded their Afghan clients to do the same. 
However, the high level o f US-Soviet tensions in 1983 scuttled these efforts, and 
confusion at the top of the Soviet hierarchy caused by Andropov’s death and 
Chernenko’s illness meant that no further significant initiatives were taken before 1985.
The key principles o f Soviet policy in Afghanistan on the military, political, and 
diplomatic fronts were largely developed during this period. By 1985 these were 1) To 
fight the opposition while simultaneously training and developing the Afghan army; 2) 
to strengthen the regime in Kabul and make it more attractive to the population through 
economic aid and political tutelage, and 3) to conduct diplomacy that would help the 
Kabul regime gain recognition and stop foreign aid to the opposition. Under 
Gorbachev’s leadership the Soviet Union departed from these principles only slowly.
Entrapment
The purpose o f the initial Soviet invasion in December 1979 had been limited, and its 
planners expected that Soviet troops would be able to return home within several 
months. The long time Soviet ambassador in Washingon, Anatolii Dobrynin, recalled 
that when he brought up his concerns about the damage the invasion would do to 
Soviet-American relations, his boss, Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko replied “we’ll 
do everything we need to in a month and then get out.”90 Brezhnev confirmed this, 
saying the troops would be out within several months.91 Within several months,
90 Artem Krechetnikov “Afghan- The Soviet Vietnam” BBC Russia 20 June 2007.
91 Liakhovskii, Tragedia i doblest', 356.
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however, the Soviet leaders who dominated foreign policy decided that the stabilization 
of the PDPA regime required a long term commitment of Soviet troops. Rather than just 
providing training and some security, these troops would engage the Kabul regimes 
enemies directly.
Western scholars and analysts have suggested that Soviet leaders were suffering 
from a “Czechoslovakia syndrome” when they intervened in Afghanistan. In that 
situation, Soviet troops had managed to restore a pliable conservative regime after 
several months o f worry over the Czechoslovak experiment with a more liberal 
communism. Although the invasion had been condemned by western countries and even 
by some Soviet citizens, the mere presence of Soviet arms had settled the situation, and 
a sort o f calm quickly returned. There is nothing in the documents to suggest that Soviet 
leaders were thinking of Czechoslovakia when they considered sending troops into 
Afghanistan, although there were certain similarities in the way the actual invasion was 
planned. 92 On the other hand, in earlier discussions o f a possible intervention Soviet 
leaders clearly expressed their concern that such an intervention would lead to Soviet 
troops directly fighting Afghans.93 In the end this was exactly what happened. The goal 
of the invasion was to secure infrastructure and create the necessary conditions for the 
new government to function. Soviet leaders did not envision the Soviet army being 
directly involved in battle after the initial invasion -  they were there to prop up the 
military of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan. For the Soviet army, this was 
supposed to be a light task.94 Almost immediately, however, the Limited Contingent of
tf iSoviet Troops (really the 40 army, commonly referred to by the Russians as OKSV) 
was faced with a situation that foreshadowed the difficulties o f working with the 
Afghan army. In early January 1980 the 4th artillery regiment of the DRA army, based
92 Such parallels are drawn in, for example, Douglas MacEachin Predicting the Soviet Invasion o f  
Afghanistan: The Intelligence Community’s Record (Center for Study o f Intelligence) 
http://www.cia.gov/csi/monograph/afghanistan/index.html. Accessed 02/07/2007.
93 See introductory chapter.
94 Harisson and Cordovez, Out o f  Afghanistan, 58.
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in the northern settlement of Nahrin, mutinied. Since it was suspected that Soviet 
advisors had been murdered, limited contingent troops were sent in to quell the 
insurgency.95 David Gai and Vladimir Snegirev, both o f whom traveled to Afghanistan 
on numerous occasions during the war and interviewed Soviet and Afghan participants, 
write that over 100 mutinous soldiers were killed.96
Nevertheless, there was reason for the new Parchamist leadership to have hope 
in those first few weeks after the invasion that they could establish control over the 
county. The mutiny in the north aside, the removal of Amin had been a popular move. 
His short but bloody reign had made him many enemies. A KGB official working in 
Afghanistan recalled that Soviet soldiers were greeted warmly and told “you have done 
a great deed by removing the bloody Hafizzulah Amin” but warned to go back to their 
homeland quickly.97 The story may not necessarily be authentic, but there does seem to 
have been genuine relief in Afghanistan that Amin was gone and a more conciliatory 
leader had come in his place. Soviet leaders, concerned with Amin’s repressive rule, had 
urged Karmal to be much more lenient, even stopping him from severely punishing 
former Amin supporters. Antonio Giustozzi, who has written one o f the most 
comprehensive analyses of Afghanistan under communist rule, also noted that the 
removal of Amin was welcomed not only in Kabul but even in some provinces, leading
Q O
many rebels to put down their arms.
Within weeks of the invasion it had become clear that there would be no 
immediate withdrawal of Soviet troops. Following the use o f the limited contingent to 
put down the mutiny at the beginning of January, Soviet troops were drawn into 
skirmishes with increasing frequency. Officers and soldiers o f the Red Army noticed 
anti-Soviet propaganda spreading quickly throughout the towns and villages, and by the
95 Liakhovskii, Tragedia i doblest', 355.
96 David Gai and Vladimir Snegirev: Vtorzhenie, 113.
97 Liakhovskii, Tragedia i doblest’, 352. Gai and Snegirev confirm that the population seemed to 
welcome the Soviet troops at first in Vtorzhenie, 113.
98 Antonio Giustozzi War, Politics and Society in Afghanistan 1978-1992 (London, 2000), 10.
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end of the month it seemed like the only pro-Soviet Afghans were those who worked for 
the PDPA." In Moscow, supporters of the intervention defended continued presence in 
Afghanistan. Andrei Gromyko, the foreign minister, told his colleagues that world 
public opinion was divided and not at all solidly in the US camp. Brazil, Argentina, and 
Canada, for example, did not want to follow the US lead o f stopping grain sales. Yurii 
Andropov noted the major effort by Babrak Karmal to create unity within the party and 
to reach out to tribes and certain members of the clergy. Over the previous few weeks, 
he pointed out, the government had once again started to take on solid shape, acquiring 
‘all the necessary organs of party and state leadership.’100 The small outbreaks of 
violence as well as the anti-Soviet and anti-government propaganda described by 
officers did not seem to worry Soviet leaders greatly.
By January 25 the Politburo had approved the draft text o f an agreement 
between the USSR and the DRA on rules governing the presence o f Soviet troops in 
Afghanistan.101 A separate protocol and appendix detailed the location and facilities that 
would be provided to Soviet troops. The appendix listed 16 cities and settlements where 
Soviet troops would be stationed, as well as five airports which would be used for 
Soviet aviation.102 The Soviet ambassador presented these agreements to Babrak 
Karmal, the newly installed Afghan president, with the explanation that such measures 
were necessary due to the increasingly harsh anti-Soviet rhetoric and armed interference 
sponsored by the US and its allies.103
99 B.V. Gromov Ogranichenniy Kontingent, 118.
100 Record of Politburo Meeting, January 17, 1980 in Liakhovskii, Tragedia i doblest’, 334. Archival 
reference APRF Fund 3 Opis 120 Delo 44
101 RGANI Fund 89, Perechen 42, Delo 12, in Pierre et al Sowjetische Geheim dokumente zum 
Afghanistankrieg, 230-250.
102 Ibid, 252-258.
103 Ibid, 260. It would not be fair to judge these agreements as colonialist documents imposed on Karmal. 
Indeed, the main agreement mentioned above stipulated that Soviet soldiers and officers (as well as other 
Soviet citizens working in the DRA) would be subject to Afghan law. In fact, a memorandum submitted 
to the Politburo on January 27th by the “Afghanistan commission” advocated the accord on the status of 
Soviet troops in Afghanistan because of “the Afghan national character.” Presumably this meant the 
Afghan hatred of foreigners. Finally, Karmal himself was unlikely to reject the proposal for such an 
agreement, because he knew that he had essentially inherited an already deeply unpopular government 
that had been faced for the past year with armed uprisings. CC CPSU Memorandum “Regarding further
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At the end of January 1980 Andropov traveled to Kabul to assess the situation 
and report back on it to the Politburo. Unfortunately, documents relating to the visit 
itself are unavailable. However, there is a fragment of the Politburo discussion that 
followed the trip. It is clear from the conversation that someone had suggested the 
possibility of withdrawing troops. Ustinov and Gromyko spoke against this. The former 
suggested it would take at least a year to pacify the opposition; the latter seemed even 
more pessimistic. He pointed out that it would be dangerous to leave before there was 
some written agreement between Afghanistan and the countries supplying the 
opposition with arms. “We will never have a complete guarantee, I think, that no hostile 
country will ever again attack Afghanistan. That is why we need to provide for 
Afghanistan’s complete security.”104 On the one hand, Gromyko seemed to be 
suggesting the need to begin working on a diplomatic track to help secure Afghanistan’s 
position through bilateral agreements; on the other hand, he was arguing for an 
essentially open-ended commitment to maintain the regime’s position through the use of 
Soviet troops.
As protests and small attacks on the regime became more widespread, supporters 
of the intervention became increasingly amenable to the direct use o f Soviet troops to 
attack the opposition. Karmal, like the Khalqis he replaced, hoped that Soviet troops 
would take a more active role in helping him quash the armed opposition. According to 
Liakhovskii, both Marshal Sergei Sokolov and General Sergei Akhromeev, the two top 
ranking soldiers in Afghanistan, had been able to avoid the commitments Karmal 
requested in the first months of the intervention. Increasing hostility to the presence of 
Soviet troops and the DRA government, however, convinced Moscow that Soviet troops 
would have to engage the enemy directly. On February 20 a major protest broke out in
measures...in connection with events in Afghanistan” in RGANI Fund 89, Perechen 34, 3. Also in 
Liakhovskii, Tragedia i doblest', 341-344.
104 Politburo Meeting, February 7, 1980 in Liakhovskii, Tragedia i doblest’, 357. APRF Fund 3, Opis 
120, Delo 44.
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Kabul. Hasan Kakar, at the time a professor of history at Kabul University, wrote that it 
was the largest protest Kabul had ever seen, involving crowds of thousands in different 
parts of the city.105 On February 23, opposition militants had attacked the embassy in 
Kabul as well as several Soviet encampments.106 The event seems to have unnerved 
local Soviet representatives as well as the DRA leadership, who sent urgent requests to 
Moscow that Soviet troops be allowed to “liquidate the enemy.”107 A directive followed 
from Moscow, ordering the 40th army to conduct joint operations with the army of the 
DRA.108
By March the Soviet army was involved in full scale operations, repelling 
advancing guerrillas encroaching on Asadabad, the capital o f Kunar Province. The 
incident foreshadowed a pattern in several ways. Soviet troops were called in to help in 
an area the Afghan army had at first seemed to be in control. They were able to beat 
back the guerillas through intense shelling which, however, also prompted an exodus of 
civilians into Pakistan.109 When the Soviet army left, the guerillas resumed their attack 
on DRA forces. As one observer put it, “[Afghan troops] only ever seemed confident 
near Soviet troops.”110 The more Soviet troops took part in battles, the more the Afghan 
army seemed to limit itself to “mopping up” operations.
The behavior o f Soviet leaders was indeed somewhat paradoxical. On the one 
hand, they clearly saw their goal in Afghanistan as providing the security so that the 
Karmal regime to take root and be able to withstand both military and political 
challenges. At the same time, they did not see their Afghan proteges, either in the party 
or the military, as being able to stand on their own. As in January, oral and written 
statements by members o f the Afghanistan commission noted that considerable progress
105 Hasan Kakar, Afghanistan: The Soviet Invasion and the Afghan Response, 1979-1982 (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1995), 114-116.
106 Gromov, Ogranichenniy Kontingent, 118.
107 Gai and Snegirev, Vtorzhenie, 116.
108 Ibid and Liakhovskii, Tragedia i doblest’ 358
109 Harrison and Cordovez, Out o f Afghanistan, 59.
110 “Nasha bol’ -  Afganistan” [Our pain-Afghanistan -  Interview with Yurii Gankovsky] Aziia i Afrika 
Segodnia No 6, 1989,4.
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had been made by the Karmal government in restoring the authority of the state, but that 
it was too early to think about the withdrawal of troops. A memorandum prepared by 
the commission and approved by the Politburo on March 10 stated that although the 
government was taking proper measures with regard to its position domestically as well 
as internationally, the process was “moving slowly.” At the same time, the 
memorandum said, “the fighting ability of the Afghan troops remains low.”111
The scarceness of documentation makes it difficult to determine the overall 
mood in the Politburo on the question of the OKSV and its role. However, it seems that 
at least some members expressed concern about the consequences o f keeping troops in 
Afghanistan. Liakhovskii cites a document from late February 1980 that suggests 
Brezhnev brought up the question of a withdrawal, but the possibility was rejected by 
Ustinov and Andropov.112 It may well be that Brezhnev was unhappy with the 
possibility of an indefinite presence of Soviet troops in Afghanistan, although earlier 
that month he had himself brought up the possibility of sending more troops.113 In any 
event, he supported the members of the Afghanistan commission when they argued for 
putting off any withdrawal. In all likelihood he was genuinely upset by the possibility of 
a long-term commitment of Soviet troops, but did not know how to proceed and thus 
relied on his colleagues and advisors to direct policy. Still, it was not just Brezhnev who 
wanted to see Soviet troops come home as soon as possible, as is clear from the 
emphasis placed on defending their continued presence in Afghanistan by supporters of 
the intervention.
The architects and defenders of the intervention believed that the Soviet Union 
had made the right decision in intervening and was making the right sort of investment 
in the country. In the Politburo they concentrated their efforts on calming the nerves of
1,1 Afghanistan Commission o f the CC CPSU Memorandum March 10, 1988 RGANI Fund 89, P.34,
Delo 5 and in Sowjetische Geheimdokumente, 304.
112 Liakhovskii writes that the document, from the archive o f the General Staff, is still classified and thus 
cannot be quoted. Liakhovskii, Tragedia i doblest’, 358.
113 Politburo Meeting, February 7, 1980 in Liakhovskii, Tragedia i doblest’, 357.
jittery colleagues who sought to limit the presence of Soviet troops. A memorandum
dated April 7 led with a list of benefits the Soviet invasion had brought to Afghanistan
as well as to the Soviet Union’s security.114 The conclusions to be drawn from these
assessments were that the Soviet Union had invested too much in Afghanistan to
withdraw prematurely. For the time being Soviet troops would have to play a leading
role in defending the regime. The March 10, 1980 memorandum stated quite clearly that
a Soviet military presence would be required for a long time: “The successful resolution
of internal problems and the strengthening o f the new order in Afghanistan will take
significant effort and time, during the course of which Soviet troops will continue to be
the key stabilizing factor.”115 In fact, the 40th army was assuming all the responsibilities
of a national army, as the April memorandum made clear:
...O ur troops in Afghanistan will have to continue fulfilling the task o f  
defending the revolutionary order o f  the DRA, defending the borders o f  
the country, providing securities in key centres as w ell as transportation 
links...O nly  with the stabilization o f  the internal situation in 
Afghanistan, as w ell as the improvement o f  conditions around it, would it 
be possible, at the request o f  the D RA leadership, to consider the 
question o f  a gradual withdrawal o f  Soviet troops from the D R A ...116
Within several months o f the invasion any hope o f a quick turn around evaporated. 
Originally, Soviet troops had entered to save a revolutionary government from an erratic 
leader and to make sure an ally did not go over to the US camp. Now they were there to 
make sure a new government installed through that intervention could stay in power.
The Afghanistan commission developed the idea for the intervention and was 
the key policy-making body in the first years of the invasion. The public knew very 
little and the party was not involved in any decision-making. With the realization that 
Soviet troops would have to stay in Afghanistan for a longer period o f time, however, it 
was necessary to go through the formality o f securing party endorsement for Soviet
114 “The situation around Afghanistan and the role o f Soviet troops” in Liakhovskii, Tragedia i doblest’, 
359. Archival reference: APRF Fund 3, Opisl20, Delo 144.
115 Afghanistan Commission o f the CC CPSU Memorandum March 10, 1988.
116 “The situation around Afghanistan and the role o f Soviet troops” in Liakhovskii, Tragedia i doblest ’, 
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policy in Afghanistan. At a special plenum convened in June 1980, Gromyko delivered 
a speech defending Soviet policy in Afghanistan. The Soviet Union, he said, would not 
apologise for sending in troops, indeed “the ones who should be apologizing are those 
are behind the aggression against Afghanistan, who carried out the criminal plans with 
regard to this country.” Further, Gromyko said, echoing an earlier statement by
117Brezhnev, it was necessary to keep the troops there. The plenum voted to “fully
1 1 Q
approve” the actions taken by the leadership. Both the initial invasion and the 
continuing presence of the 40th army in Afghanistan now had the official support o f the 
party.
It is significant that the Afghanistan commission consisted of the Soviet Union’s 
most senior politicians, all of them close to Brezhnev. There was no more powerful a 
constellation of personalities than Gromyko, Andropov, Ustinov, and Ponomarev119 in 
the CPSU of the early 1980’s. They represented, collectively, the Foreign Ministry, the 
KGB, the Ministry of Defence, as well the International Department. With Brezhnev on 
their side they also represented the party. In experience and in formal position each one 
of them individually was among the highest ranking members of the Politburo. Taken 
together they also represented the chief institutions responsible for the conduct of 
foreign affairs.
In the first six months after the invasion, these leaders came to accept the 
necessity of an open presence of Soviet troops in Afghanistan. They did this not from 
any desire to “colonise” Afghanistan, but because they did not believe that the Karmal 
government was ready to stand on its own. The growing insurgency, rather than
1,7 Speech by Andrei Gromyko, Plenum of the Central Committee o f the CPSU, June 23 1980 
Sowjetische Geheimdokumente, 382.
118 June 23 1980 Resolution o f the CC CPSU “Regarding the International Position and Foreign Policy of 
the Soviet Union,” Ibid, 384.
119 According to several people who worked for him in the International Department, Ponomarev was 
supposedly against the initial invasion. In any case, he put his name to the proposals that came from the 
Afghan commission. Ponomarev was not nearly as Andropov, Ustinov, and Gromyko, and when he did 
object to their policies he was either overruled or bullied into accepting the troika’s point o f view. See 
Chemiaev, Dnevnik Dvukh Epokh.
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discouraging the extended presence of Soviet troops, convinced Moscow that their use 
was necessary and appropriate. From the end of February 1980, Soviet troops would 
become the DRA’s main fighting force.
Propaganda and Limited Diplomatic Approaches
The intervention had brought cries of protest from western nations as well as the 
Muslim world.120 It damaged Moscow’s relationship with friendly nations, such as 
India, which were troubled by the precedent of an invasion undertaken to change the 
person in charge.121 The invasion also contributed to frictions with China, which made 
the withdrawal of Soviet troops one of the preconditions for an improvement in 
relations.122 Soviet diplomacy in the first year o f the invasion focused on creating the 
space to conduct a flexible Afghanistan policy. In the first few months, this meant 
primarily countering the US reaction to the initial invasion, responding to the “Carter 
Doctrine,” and undermining the US effort to create an international consensus on how to 
respond to the USSR. This was primarily a propaganda effort, aimed at the Muslim 
world and other Third World states. Moscow rejected most diplomatic approaches that 
involved any country other than the DRA and Pakistan, the main conduit for arms to the 
resistance. Moscow held firm to the position that the war in Afghanistan was an internal 
matter. The Soviet presence at the request of the DRA government was only necessary 
because of outside interference and US imperialism.
In the months following the Soviet invasion a number o f European countries 
approached the Soviet Union with proposals for political settlement in Afghanistan.
Such approaches came from the European Economic Union, French President Giscard
120 European reaction, however, was generally less dramatic than that o f the US See Wilffied Loth, 
Overcoming the Cold War: a history o f detente, 1950-1991 (New York: Palgrave, 2001), 160-164.
121 See Peter Duncan The Soviet Union and India (London: Routledge, 1989), 27-31.
122 This was one of the “three obstacles” to improvement o f relations with the USSR, as Chinese officials 
framed it, along with the presence of Soviet troops in Afghanistan and Soviet support for Vietnam’s 
occupation of Cambodia. See Sergei Radchenko, Facing the Dragons, manuscript in progress.
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d’Estang, and the government of Italy. These plans emphasised political resolution 
within Afghanistan, Soviet troop withdrawal, and mutual commitments of non­
interference. The USSR rejected these approaches because they emphasised political 
settlement within Afghanistan, arranged by outside powers, implicitly questioned the 
legitimacy o f the Karmal government, and threatened to limit Moscow’s freedom of 
action. The Soviet Union was only interested in proposals that would lead to a 
commitment of “non-interference” by outside powers. Such proposals would also have 
implicitly recognised the legitimacy of the Karmal government.
In March and April 1980 the Politburo approved a set o f propaganda, 
diplomatic, and intelligence measures meant to lessen the blow of the Carter doctrine.
124 The counter-attack to “increase the activity of the international public against the 
aggressive activities o f the USA in the Persian Gulf’ was opened on a broad front.
Aside from the mass media offensive, the Politburo approved in March a plan of 
measures “for the activation of the international community against the aggressive 
actions o f the USA in the Persian Gulf area.”125 The plan approved by the Politburo 
envisioned the activation of every party organ that could possibly be o f relevance, 
including the International Department, the Komsomol, Committees of Solidarity with 
Asian and African countries, as well as with Palestine, reaching out to the non-aligned 
movement at its 25 year anniversary conference, and using various international peace
196and trade union conferences to organise resolutions against US policy in the region.
This strategy relied on traditional state and party institutions that were used for 
domestic and foreign propaganda. Soviet Muslim clergy issued statements addressed to
123 Khristoforov, “Trudny put k Zhenevskim Soglasheniem,” 27-30. Obitchkina, Evguenia “L'intervention 
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124 Apparently, an enraged Brezhnev was against it being referred to as a doctrine at all. Anatolii 
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125 Politburo note “Measures for the activation...” March 13, 1980. RGANI, Fund 89, PerecHen 34, Delo 
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the Muslims of the world asking them to remember that the USSR had always been a 
friend of Muslim peoples and their defender against imperialism.127 The limitations of 
the strategy were evident at the “Tashkent Conference,” assembled in September 1980. 
Although the occasion of the conference was supposed to be a celebration of the 15th 
century of the Hejira, the real purpose was to push “anti-imperialist” propaganda in the 
wake of the Soviet invasion. A planning meeting o f four Soviet muftis in January 1980 
issued a declaration against “US imperialists, Israeli Zionists, the traitor Sadat and 
Chinese hegemonists’ meddling in Afghan affairs.”128 Only a few o f the seventy-five 
countries invited sent delegates, and some of those that did were vocal in their criticism
190of the Soviet invasion.
The propaganda effort was accompanied by a diplomatic effort to shore up 
support from friendly states. The Politburo instructed the Soviet ambassador in Aden to 
speak to the president of the People’s Democratic Republic o f Yemen and ask for his 
help in rallying friendly parties and countries in the region, opening a “wide 
international campaign against the current aggressive course o f American imperialism 
on the Arabian peninsula and in the Persian Gulf.” Soviet leaders hoped there could be a 
coordinated demand for the US to withdraw its troops from the area.130 The results o f 
this initiative were minimal. Three weeks later Soviet leaders adopted new measures, 
prepared by three members of the Afghanistan commission: Andrey Gromyko, Yurii 
Andropov, and Dmitrii Ustinov. In presenting their proposals to the Politburo, they 
wrote “The USA continues to carry out practical measures for widening its military
i ' l ' i
presence on a permanent basis in the Near and Middle East and the Indian Ocean.”
Messages were sent to Addis Ababa, Algiers, Beirut, Teheran, Tripoli, and several other
127 Alexandre Bennigsen, “Soviet Islamic Strategy after Afghanistan” in Alexandre Bennigsen et al,
Soviet Strategy and Islam (Basingstoke: Macmillan,) 1989, 57.
I28lbid, 58.
129 Ibid, 59.
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capitals that could be expected to be sympathetic to an anti-American view as well as 
countries where the US was seen as being on the offensive, such as Somali and Kenya. 
The tone of this message was more defensive. Rather than calling for specific actions, it 
laid the blame on deteriorating US-Soviet relations on the United States and pointed out 
that the situation in Afghanistan was being used as an excuse. Moscow was hoping that 
its record of support for national-liberation movements and progressive governments 
would allow it it mitigate some of the effects of Washington’s global diplomatic 
offensive.132
At the same time the Politburo directed the KGB to carry out appropriate 
measures along a similar line in developing countries, especially Iran.133 It is not clear 
what exactly this meant, nor are there KGB documents that would provide any detail. It 
is almost certain however, that the KGB’s task involved more clandestine ways of  
achieving the same goals the diplomatic initiative was supposed to help deliver. 
According to Leonid Shebarshin, the KGB resident in Tehran from 1979 to 1983 and 
later Chief of the First Directorate, the KGB’s instructions were, aside from gathering 
information, trying to ‘increase anti-American feeling and soften anti-Soviet feeling.’ 
The latter was nearly impossible, the Soviet invasion o f Afghanistan having made the 
USSR almost as big of an enemy for Revolutionary Iran as the United States.134 
Nevertheless, Soviet leaders remained hopeful that the anti-Americanism of the 
revolutionary government would help neutralise the Carter administration’s efforts in 
the Persian Gulf.
The Soviet leadership was not completely rejecting the possibility of using 
diplomacy to settle the Afghan question. Rather, Soviet leaders wanted to avoid having 
to negotiate with the United States directly or undertaking any other approach that
132 Telegram to Soviet Ambassadors in Mogadishu and Nairobi, April 5, 1980 RGANI, Fund 89, 
Perechen 34, Doc 7, Appendix 2
133 Politburo Protocol 191 April 5, 1980 RGANI, Fund 89, Perechen 34, Doc 7.
134 Author’s interview with Leonid Shebarshin, Moscow, September 17, 2007
59
might undermine the legitimacy of the Kabul government or the USSR’s actions in 
support of it. They hoped to use the US offensive in the region to deflect some of the 
anger from Muslim countries directed at the USSR following the invasion. As the
t n c
Afghanistan commission put it, it was necessary to constantly bring up the question 
o f US bases and troops in the Persian Gulf region. This would allow the Politburo “to 
widen the circle of countries well disposed to our position in Afghanistan, or, at least, 
approaching it with understanding.”136 In other words, the Soviet leadership aimed to 
use the US offensive in the region to deflect some of the anger from Muslim countries 
directed at the USSR following the invasion.
Even at this stage the Soviet leadership accepted the need for some sort of 
diplomatic intervention to settle the Afghan question. This stemmed from a realization 
that the problem was not just the opposition but also its support network which included 
Pakistan, China, Saudi Arabia, and the United States. Although they rejected the 
possibility of involving the United States in these talks, they did accept an initiative by 
Cuban leader Fidel Castro to act as an intermediary in organizing talks between the 
DRA government and Pakistan. They also accepted the possibility o f the US and Soviet 
Union being included in the discussions, but at a latter stage. The priority was finding 
an agreement between Pakistan and Afghanistan.137 Although this effort did not bring 
any immediate results, Pakistani President Zia-ul-Haq did not reject negotiations 
outright, saying that while he could not recognise the DRA government, he welcomed 
Castro’s mediation effort.138 The Afghan commission confirmed this approach a month 
later, adding that similar efforts by other non-aligned countries would also be
135 With Vladimir Zagladin o f the international department in place o f his boss Ponomarev
136 “The situation in Afghanistan and certain questions arising from it.” April 7, 1980 in Liakhovskii, 376. 
Archival reference APRF Fund 3, Opis 82, Delo 148.
137 “Regarding our further line o f foreign policy... and a reply to F. Castro” March 10, 1980 Fund 89, 
P.34, D.5, in Sowjetishce Geheimdokumente 304-306.
138 Confidential Note for the Secretary General March 27, 1980 UN Archive, NY, S-0904-0089-05-1
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welcome.139 Nevertheless, Soviet leaders rejected efforts at mediation by the UN, as 
well as various resolutions from the Islamic Conference or the European Community. 
At the same time, initiatives similar to Castro’s by other communist leaders, such as 
Romania’s Ceacescu, were unacceptable to Pakistan.140 Thus during the first year of the 
intervention diplomacy did not play an important role in Moscow’s efforts to stabilise 
the Kabul government.
In the first half-year after the invasion, the Soviet leadership avoided any 
diplomacy that could, in the short term, limit its activities in Afghanistan. This is 
because the Afghan commission had come to believe that before the USSR could pull 
back its troops, much work would have to be done to build up the Karmal government. 
As Vasili Safronchuk, an advisor at the Kabul embassy in 1980-1982 put it, Karmal 
stalled to avoid the start of negotiations, “and Moscow helped him in this so as to win 
some time to strengthen the new regime in Kabul and increase the fighting ability of the 
army.”141 The only diplomatic initiatives that could be considered were ones that might 
enhance the legitimacy of the Karmal government -  such as Castro’s proposal to 
mediate in direct talks between the Pakistani government and the DRA.
Efforts for stabilization within Afghanistan
This section will briefly discuss the Soviet leadership’s efforts in 1980-1984 to create 
the conditions under which Soviet troops could withdraw from Afghanistan. Moscow’s 
strategy aimed at uniting the PDPA, giving it greater legitimacy through the use of  
traditional Afghan institutions, including tribal councils and the clergy, and making the
139 “The situation in Afghanistan and certain questions arising from it.” April 7, 1980 in Liakhovskii, 377.
140 Notes on a meeting between Mr. Agha Shahi, Minsiter for Foreign Affairs o f Pakistan, and the UN 
Secretary General 11 September 1980 UN Archive S-0904-0089-05-1
141 Vasili Safronchuk “Afghanistan Pri Babrake Karmale i Nadzhibulle: Dolgiy put’ k zhenevskim 
soglasheniam.” [Afghanistan under Babrak Karmal and Najibullah: The Long Path to the Geneva 
Accords.] Azia i Afrika Segodnia 1997, No. 1, 36.
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regime more attractive through infrastructure programs and other aid. 142 The so-called 
Policy o f  National Reconciliation, launched in January 1987 with enthusiastic support 
from Gorbachev and discussed in chapter 3, was largely a reformulation of the policy 
described below. At the same time, the domestic and international situation that had 
developed as a result of Amin’s repressive rule and the Soviet invasion meant that the 
new Karmal government was greatly dependent on Soviet aid, trade, and specialists.
Contemporary western commentators interpreted “the Sovietization” of 
Afghanistan after the invasion as part of a broader plan to make Afghanistan a virtual 
republic of the USSR. They noted the growing share o f Soviet exports and imports in 
Afghanistan’s foreign trade, the ever growing number o f Soviet specialists, the extent to 
which Afghan government and enterprises were organised on Soviet models. In fact, 
this was due to the fact that the Karmal government had few friends outside of the 
Soviet Union and its allies. Pakistan and Iran’s hostility to meant that trade with these 
natural (in terms of geographical proximity) partners was severely restricted. So was 
trade with other traditional partners, like India, that had to cross hostile territory.143
The USSR became not only the major trade partner, but also a clearinghouse for 
Afghan goods destined for third countries and for imports arriving from those 
countries.144 Besides non-repayable aid (which in terms o f consumer goods alone 
amounted to $210 million rubles in 1986, for example) the USSR also provided 
Afghanistan with credits that were to be used for buying Soviet products and repaid 
with Afghan exports. Since demand for Afghan exports other than natural gas (such as
142 Both this section and chapter III, which deals with the Policy o f National Reconciliation, will focus on 
Soviet decision-making, rather than the process in Afghanistan itself. For an analysis o f the effort during 
the first years o f the Soviet occupation, see Giustozzi, War, Politics and Society in Afghanistan, 33-64.
143 “Record of conversation between I.T.Grishin, USSR Deputy Minister o f Foreign Trade, and M.H. 
Jalalar, DRA Minister o f Trade,” August 6, 1980. RGAE Fond 413, opis 2, delo 739.
144 “Record o f conversation between I.T.Grishin and M.H.Mangal, DRA Ambassador to the USSR,” 
October 14, 1982. RGAE Fond 413, opis 2, delo 2214.
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rugs, wool, and dried fruits) was low, the DRA was never able to repay these credits, 
which, however, were generally extended or forgiven by Moscow.145
Trade and material aid was only one of the ways that Moscow tried to help the 
Karmal government. The Soviet leadership understood that to stabilise the country, 
Karmal would need to unify the party as well as convince the rest o f the country to 
accept PDPA rule. The Afghanistan commission presented a plan of action at the end of 
January 1980. It called for measures to spread the PDPA’s influence into the 
countryside, including the use of youth organizations. At the same time, it tried to take 
into account the specifics of Afghan power structures. The document called for efforts 
to reach out to tribal leaders, the use of jirgas (traditional tribal councils), and a “long 
term plan for work with Muslim clergy.”146
Before the PDPA could spread its influence into the countryside, Karmal would 
have to achieve a degree o f unity within the party that had been elusive since its 
foundation and that had been further undermined by Amin’s purges. Moscow’s concept 
of unity did not always match up with Karmal’s, however. Soviet leaders wanted 
Karmal to form a government that included Khalqis, and helped broker a deal between 
him and several Khalqi ministers in Moscow before bringing him to Afghanistan. Once 
in power, Karmal began to edge out Khalqis, even executing some o f Amin’s closest
147associates.
The only reason a full scale purge did not take place was that Moscow made it 
very clear it would be unacceptable. Party advisers pressed Karmal to stop the removal 
of Khalqi’s from party and administrative posts, and a formal CC CPSU request was
145 Memroandum of conversation between USSR Minister o f Trade I Aristov and M.H.Jalalar, February 
13, 1986. RGAE Fond 413 op 32 delo 4607; Survey o f Soviet trade with Asian countries, January 10, 
1986 RGAE F 413 op 2 d 4677.
146 CC CPSU Memorandum “Regarding further measures...in connection with events in Afghanistan” in 
RGANI Fund 89, Perechen 34, 3. Liakhovskii, Tragedia i doblest’, 344.
147 Liakhovskii, Tragedia i doblest’ 348, 350.
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directed to him sometime in January.148 Karmal, for his part, kept trying to gain a free 
hand, telling Soviet advisers “As long as you keep my hands bound and do not let me 
deal with the Khalq faction, there will be no unity in the PDPA and the government 
cannot become strong.. .They tortured us and killed us. They still hate us! They are the 
enemies o f the party!”149
To stabilise the government and broaden its base of support, the Soviet Union 
sent thousands of advisers. Some were Soviet party workers sent to advise the party in 
Kabul and in the provinces. Many more were sent to factories, enterprises, and even 
universities. Reports that there were Soviet advisers at every level of the Afghan 
government began to appear in the western press as early as January 1980. Karmal 
himself later confirmed this, admitting that many Afghans had largely stopped working, 
preferring to “lay all the burden and responsibility for practical work on the shoulders of 
the advisers.”150 Soviet embassy employees joked about the “limited contingent of 
Soviet party advisors in Afghanistan”.151
It did not help that the advisers generally had no special preparation for the kind 
of work they were sent to do. The most numerous were communist party advisers, who 
often proved doctrinaire in their suggestions, ignorant and insensitive to local customs. 
In one incident, an advisor posted to a small town had the mosque shut down and 
Marxist dialectics played through its loudspeakers. Some KGB advisers, despite their 
tendency to follow a policy different from that being pursued by the military or Foreign 
Ministry, were better trained. They underwent serious preparation before being sent to 
Afghanistan, including “two years o f Dari or Farsi, Afghan history, economy, culture,
148 Ibid, 350.
149 Christopher Andrew and Vasili Mitrokhin, The World Was Going Our Way, (Basic Books, 2006), 407.
150 Thomas T. Hammond Red Flag Over Afghanistan: The Communist Coup, the Soviet Invasion, and the 
Consequences (Boulder, 1990), 152.
151 O. Zharov “Sleptsi, navizivavshie sebia v povodyri” Azia i Afrika Segodnia No 12, 1992, 29.
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customs and traditions, religion, and so forth.” On the whole, however, such well-
1 Otrained advisers were hard to come by.
The presence o f Soviet troops and advisers seemed to cause paralysis among 
Afghan politicians. This may have been due to a sense that the Soviet advisors could do 
the job better, or it may have been a response to the generally imperial attitude adopted 
by some advisors. Often, Soviet advisers preferred to carry out a task themselves, rather 
than training their subordinates.153 It was common practice, for example, to write 
speeches in Russian for translation into Dari and Pashto. This practice apparently 
included party documents and, later, the new constitution adopted under Najibullah.154 
A Soviet assessment of the PDPA from 1983 noted that even at the highest level of the 
Party, there was a tendency to shy away from decision-making. Karmal, Keshtmand, 
and the other members lacked initiative, the assessment said, and “turn to advisor not 
just for counsel, but also to transfer to them their own functions for the composition of 
working documents, instructions, especially texts of reports and articles.” 155
The Khalq/Parcham split continued to pose a major dilemma for Soviet advisors 
and for Moscow. Amin had been a member o f the Khalqi wing o f the PDPA, Karmal 
the leader o f Parcham. The army was primarily Khalqi, and its loyalty to Karmal was 
often in question. Moscow could not allow a purge of Khalqis, but also realised that 
Babrak Karmal and his Parcham faction were weak. A new security agency, the KhAD, 
was created to replace the one that functioned under Amin. The new agency had several 
purposes. First, it was meant to dissociate the security service from Amin’s repressive 
rule. Second, it was meant to be a security service loyal to Karmal, not one in which 
Amin loyalists would undermine his rule. Mohammed Najibullah, a KGB agent and
152 Plastun & Adrianov, Najibullah. Afghanistan v Tiskah Geopoliti, 68. Author’s interviews with 
Ambassador Yulii Vorontsov, Moscow, September 11, 2007, and Leonid Shebarshin, Moscow, 
September 17, 2007.
153 Valery I. Mitochkin, Afganskie Zapiski [Notes from Afghanistan] (Saransk, 2004), 66-67. Mitochkin, 
a KGB officer, served as an advisor in Afghanistan.
154 Interview with Yulii Vorontsov, Moscow, September 11, 2007
155 “Report on the Condition o f the PDPA” 1983, Personal Archive o f Marshal Sokolov. Provided to the 
author by General Aleksandr Liakhovskii.
Parcham member, was installed as its head, and KGB advisers sent to help him build up 
the agency.156
Although Parcham increasingly occupied the most senior positions, many lower-
i c n
tier members, particularly in the army, were Khalqis . This created additional friction 
within the party that made top-down leadership difficult. Kim Tsagalov, a military 
adviser, told the deputy chief of the international department in 1982 that installing 
Karmal was a mistake, “not because Karmal is not worthy o f being a leader -  he is a 
founder of the PDPA, but because there are many more Khalqis, and they are the ones 
spilling their blood, while many Parchamists are sitting in government offices,
« c o
preferring to become apparatchiks.”
Soviet advisers also began to split, some o f them being more inclined to support 
Khalqis and others Parchamis. The KGB, on the whole, supported the latter, while the 
military supported the Khalqis, perhaps because they were the ones, as Tsagalov put it, 
“doing the fighting.”159 This split was noticeable in the early years of the war, but would 
become especially apparent even at the Politburo level when Najibullah took over and 
Soviet troops were withdrawing.
Of course, even if party unity had been achieved, it is far from certain that this 
would have led to the party making big gains with the population and attaining the kind 
of legitimacy that would allow it to run the country peacefully. The party continued to 
exist primarily in cities; its presence in the countryside was largely on paper. At a 
meeting with Marshal Sokolov and Fiakrat Tabeev, the Soviet Ambassador, in March 
1984, one party adviser admitted that in his region only 10% of the villages had any sort 
of PDPA presence. At the same time, he lamented, the centre did not seem to mind that
156 Andrew and Mitrokhin, The World Was Going Our Way, 408.
157 According to Giustozzi, between 60 and 70% of PDPA members in the army were Khalqi. Giustozzi, 
War, Politics, and Society, 82.
158 Gai and Snegirev, Vtorzhenie, 195.
159 Author’s interview with Leonid Shebarshin, Moscow, September 17, 2007.
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PDPA functionaries were not making their way into the countryside.160 The figure of 
10% was probably an estimate, and it covered only one region, not the country as a 
whole.161 Nevertheless, it is clear that in the fourth year o f the occupation very little 
progress had been made in terms of “widening the social base of the party,” a goal that 
Politburo leaders in Moscow had set in January 1980.
The difficulties in political work were similar to the ones that the Soviets faced 
in their effort to improve the military situation. The more Soviet advisors or troops 
became involved, which they were doing to stabilise the DRA government, the less the 
DRA government seemed able to act independently. The problem of restoring the 
Afghan army’s ability to fight independently, or encouraging leaders to make decisions 
without turning to their Soviet tutors for help, discussed further later in this chapter as 
well as chapter 3, was one of the major stumbling blocks in effecting a successful 
withdrawal.
The “nation-buildling” described above was part o f the Soviet Union’s broader 
strategy in the first years of the war to stabilise the country. Moscow aimed to secure 
Karmal’s position in the party while simultaneously building up the army and spreading 
the regime’s influence. To achieve this goal, Moscow sent thousands of advisers to 
work alongside the Afghans, advising them on everything from party organization to 
infrastructure works. The limits o f this approach were becoming evident early on, and 
by 1984 it was clear that the efforts was giving only minimal results. The Soviet effort 
was stalemated on all fronts: unable to reach an accommodation through Geneva, 
decisively beat the mujahadeen, or work with its Afghan clients to make their regime 
acceptable to the population.
160 Meeting with Party Advisors, handwritten notes, March 31, 1984 Personal Archive o f Marshal 
Sokolov. Provided to the author by General Aleksandr Liakhovskii.
161 For a broader overview, see Giustozzi, War, Politics, and Society, 36-40.
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Opposition to the intervention within the Soviet Elite
Georgii Kornienko, a Soviet deputy foreign minister who would later became directly
involved in Afghan affairs, wrote that at the June 1980 plenum no one had spoken out
against the invasion or even raised a question about it. Perhaps, he suggests, if they had,
the Politburo would have started looking for a way out earlier.162 In fact, although there
had been no opposition at the plenum, by June 1980 a number o f party and state
1officials as well as leading figures of the academic world had made their concerns 
known to Brezhnev and others in the leadership. There was also dissatisfaction in the 
military, not just among those who had opposed the invasion in the first place, but those 
went to Afghanistan later and took part in the fighting. Over the next several years such 
reports would accumulate, and by early 1981 even the defense minister, Ustinov, a 
supporter o f the intervention in 1979, was willing to approach other members of the 
leadership with the idea of withdrawing troops.
The evidence of discontent came as early as January 20, when the Institute of 
Economics of the World Socialist System sent a memorandum to the Central Committee 
of the CPSU as well as the KGB. The memorandum, signed by Academician Oleg 
Bogomolov, argued that the invasion had done great damage to Soviet interests and 
detente, as well as giving new stimulus to the opposition, which was now able to call 
the population to resistance “against a foreign invader.” The regime was isolated, able 
to count on support only from the socialist camp, primarily from the USSR. The 
memorandum listed eleven ways in which the invasion had damaged Soviet interests, 
including the effect it would have on the arms race, the economy, as well as Sino-Soviet 
relations. Coming at a time when the extent of resistance was perhaps not yet clear, it 
included a prophetic note: the leadership needed to maneuver for a way out prior to the
162 Georgiii M. Kornienko, Kholodnaia Voina: svidetelstvo ee uchastnika (Moscow: 2001), 249-250.
163 In particular, institutes whose function was to advise the central committee, such as IMEMO.
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start of spring, when warmer weather would bring increased attacks and Soviet troops 
would be drawn into the fighting.164
Anatolii Chemiaev’s diary entries for the winter and spring of 1980 record the 
disgust and worry among his circle of “party intellectuals,” historians and others with 
academic training working in the International Department and elsewhere in the 
apparatus.165 Although many of these people probably never made their views known 
outside a small circle of friends, some appealed to the central committee and even to the 
General Secretary himself.166 Those who traveled abroad experienced first hand the 
strength of the international reaction. Georgii Arbatov and Pravda correspondent Yurii 
Zhukov, returning from a trip to Italy where they were meeting with American 
academics, secured a meeting with Brezhnev in May 1980 in which they tried to
1 fk  7convince them of the damage the invasion had done to US-Soviet relations. Similar 
efforts were undertaken by specialists on the region.168 Yet the effect o f these early 
petitions was clearly minimal. The views of even the most respected academics could 
not compete with the views of the party’s most senior leaders.169
Troubling information also came from Soviet journalists that were sent to 
Afghanistan to report on the progress of the revolution. Although they were limited in 
terms of what they could actually publish, some of them sent more truthful accounts
164 The memorandum is excerpted, almost in full, in Liakhovskii, Tragedia i D oblest’, 337-340. A 
shorter excerpt is in CWIHP Bulletin 14/15 241-242. In fact, Bogomolov later told Gai and Snegirev that 
he wasn’t sure the memorandum had ever reached Brezhnev’s eyes. Gai and Snegirev, Vtorzhenie, 115.
165 Anatolii Chemiaev “Afganskii Vopros ” [The Afghan Question] Svobodnaia M ysl’ XXI, No 11 2000
166 Vadim Kirpichenko, at the time a Deputy Chief o f the First Directorate o f the KGB, notes that even in 
the upper echelons of the KGB there was a sense that the invasion had been a mistake. Vadim 
Kirpichenko Razvedka: Litsa i Lichnosti [Intelligence: Faces and Personalities] Moscow: 1998, 358.
167 Arbatov, Chelovek Sistemi, 292; Chemiaev diary entry for June 21,1980, “Afganskii Vopros,,” p. 73..
168 Kirpichenko, Razvedka, 358-359. See also Yurii Gankovskii “Afghanistan: from intervention to 
National Reconciliation,” The Iranian Journal o f International Affairs, vol. IV, no. 1 (spring 1992).
169 Although there was no public demonstration by dissidents as there had been in 1968, when prominent 
intellectuals like the poet Yevgeny Evtushenko protested the invasion of Czechoslovakia in Red Square, 
some, like the physicist Andrei Sakharov, expressed their discontent in letters addressed to the central 
committee. Gai and Snegirev, Vtorzhenie, 100. The opinions o f dissidents generally had even less o f an 
influence on policymakers at this time than did those o f intellectuals like Bogomolov or Arbatov. It was 
all too easy to write these petitions off as the views o f the “intelligentsia,” never to be fully trusted when 
matters o f state interest were concerned. See Andropov’s comment to Boris Ponomarev following 
Arbatov’s interview with Brezhnev, in Chemiaev “Afganskii Vopros,” 73.
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using confidential channels. One correspondent wrote a scathing assessment, addressed 
to the CC CPSU, almost two years into the Soviet occupation, saying that military 
operations were largely counterproductive. Although the PDPA still controlled only 
15% of the country, the operations against rebels only aggravated the relationship with 
the peasantry:
.. .the tactics of hot pursuit of the rebels and that of destruction 
of rebels’ nests on their own territory is facing growing 
criticism on the part of the local population. In the course of 
those operations, the housing and the agricultural fields are 
often destroyed, the civilian population is killed, and in the end 
everything remains the same. The rebels return and control the 
territory again.170
The letter also contained some lightly disguised criticism of the attempts to paint the 
war as a battle against outside aggression, pointing out that this was in fact a “civil war” 
before anything else.171 With its stark description o f the Soviet army fighting against the 
civilian Afghan population, the letter echoed the nightmare scenario discussed at at 
Politburo meetings in March 1979 when Soviet leaders decided not to send in troops.
The most difficult to ignore were the concerns o f senior officials in the Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs or the military. Mikhail Kapitsa, a long serving diplomat and Deputy 
Minister at the time o f the invasion, pointed out at a Foreign Ministry collegium 
meeting that the Soviet intervention would face enormous difficulties, citing the 
experience of British troops in the 19th century.172 A number of other senior officials
|  n'y
also expressed their concern either to the Minister personally or in written form.
Senior commanders had expressed their opposition even prior to the invasion.174 As 
early as 1980 there was some consensus between Marshal Ogarkov, General 
Varennikov, and General Sergei Akhromeev that there was no military solution to the
170 “Pravda” Correspondent I.Schedrov’s letter to the CC CPSU on the Situation in Afghanistan, 
November 12, 1981. Translated by Svetlana Savranskaya, National Security Archive, Washington, DC.
171 Ibid.
172 Gromyko reportedly asked: “Do you mean to compare that our internationalist troops with imperialist 
troops?” Kapitsa replied: “No, our troops are different -  but the mountains are the same!” Kapitsa 
interview with O. Ame Westad.
173 Author’s interview with Nikolai Kozyrev, November 15, 2008.
174 See introduction.
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1 75unfolding situation. Yet negative assessments did not always make it all the way to 
the Politburo. General V.A. Merimksiy, deputy chief o f the Ministry o f Defence 
operational group in Afghanistan, who was in Afghanistan in the early years of the war, 
writes that although Sokolov agreed with the assessments of field commanders who 
thought there was no military solution, the Politburo was not willing to consider a pull 
out.176 At times, however, senior officers were more optimistic about their prospects for 
defeating the insurgency. At a meeting in the Soviet embassy in Kabul in January 1980, 
Marshal Sokolov said that the “counterrevolution” would be defeated by June 1st o f that 
year.177 Aleksandr Maiorov, the Chief Military Advisor in 1980-1981, also noted that he
1 7ftbelieved the war could be won by the end of 1981.
It is difficult, if  not nearly impossible, to evaluate which o f these reports, if  any, 
had an impact on the key decision makers: Andropov, Gromyko, Ustinov, Brezhnev, 
and to a lesser extent, Ponomarev. It is not even clear which reports traveled up the 
bureaucratic chain, Leonid Shershnev, a lieutenant colonel and political officer sent to 
Afghanistan in 1981, sent numerous reports to his superiors (and, he later said, straight 
to Moscow) arguing that the Soviet army was doing more harm than good. There were 
no replies, and he was repeatedly warned not to go around his superiors. Even 
Akhromeev, who seemed to agree with him, told him to steer clear o f politics, which 
were not the army’s business.179 Since Akhromeev was one o f the officers expressing 
his doubts to Sokolov, Ogarkov, and Ustinov, it is possible that Shershnev’s concerns 
were made known, at least indirectly, even at the Politburo levels. But it is also likely 
that many o f these reports never made it all the way to the top decision makers,
175 Yurii Gankovskii “Afghanistan: from intervention to National Reconciliation,” The Iranian Journal o f  
International Affairs, vol. IV, no. 1 (spring 1992), 133.
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Geopolitics] (Moscow: 1998), 80.
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intercepted along the way by “gatekeeper” subordinates who did not wish to anger their 
bosses with bad news.
Clearly, however, at least some of these views were filtering through to top 
Soviet leaders. By early 1981 doubts about continuing the intervention had started to 
form among Politburo members. Minister of Defense Ustinov, who had rejected the 
officer’s concerns prior to the invasion, now started to take them to heart. He was the 
one receiving assessments regularly from commanders in the field and knew first hand 
the difficulties they were facing. In an interview with journalist David Gai, General Ter- 
Grigoriants recalled a meeting with Ustinov early in 1981 when the latter asked “in all 
honesty, when will we end the war there?” Ter-Grigoriants replied that it was 
impossible to “resolve the Afghan problem by military means” and recommended the 
formation o f a coalition government.180 In February o f that year, Ustinov circulated a 
letter in the Politburo that stated that “no military solution to the war was possible and 
that it was necessary to find a political and diplomatic way out.” However, no one else 
on the Politburo backed Ustinov, and the letter was never put on the agenda of a 
Politburo meeting.181
It is also clear that Brezhnev himself was troubled by the prospect of a long term 
intervention and gravely upset at the deterioration in east-west relations that had taken 
place. Throughout the 1970s he had been passionate about detente, even facing down 
Politburo colleagues when they opposed concessions he was willing to make in 
negotiations with the U S182 He hoped that Soviet troops could be brought back within a 
few months.183 At a meeting in May 1980, Brezhnev listened to Valerie Giscard 
d’Estaing criticism of the Soviet invasion and to Gromyko’s formulaic retorts, then
180 Harisson and Cordovez, 65. David Gai, “Afganistan: Kak Eto Bylo: Voina Glazami Ee Uchastnikov” 
[Afghanistan the way it was: the war through the eyes of its participants], Vecherniaia Moskva, October 
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181 Quoted in Harisson and Cordovez, 65.
182 Zubok, Failed Empire, 220-221, 245.
183 Liakhovskii, Tragedia i doblest', 356.
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asked to the French president in private. When the two were alone he told d’Estaing that 
he agreed with the latter’s views. While justifying the need to remove Amin, Brezhnev 
added that he knew Soviet troops could not stay in Afghanistan. A political solution was 
necessary, an emotional Brezhnev went on: “I also wanted to tell you this one on one. 
The whole world is not in agreement [with our actions.] I will make it my personal 
business to impose [a political solution. You can count on me!”184 Most likely, 
Brezhnev really did believe that Soviet troops should leave Afghanistan as quickly as 
possible. But he also listened to his main foreign policy advisors, who, as we saw 
earlier, did not believe that withdrawal was possible at this stage.
As time went on, however, new reasons emerged for Soviet leaders to consider 
withdrawal. It was becoming more difficult to keep the war a secret from Soviet 
citizens. Although the press still spoke only of limited Soviet aid and there was a news 
blackout on the 40th army’s activities there, rumors had begun to spread. These rumors 
were perpetuated by citizens who listened to foreign broadcasts. Another source were 
the parents of soldiers who wounded or had died in Afghanistan. By July 1981 the 
Politburo Soviet leaders were worried about the consequences of this and unsure how to 
handle the letters coming to the central committee from parents and relatives of the 
fallen.185 Even gravestones for fallens soldiers were to exclude any information about 
how or where they died. Mikhail Suslov, the chief Soviet ideologist, pointed out that 
any mention of the war on the headstones could have unwelcome consequences: “if we 
perpetuate the memory o f soldiers who died in Afghanistan, what will we write about 
this on the epitaph of the headstone? In some cemeteries there could be several such 
headstones, so from the political point o f view this would not be entirely correct.” 
Andropov agreed.186
184 D’Estaing, Ponvoir et la Vie, 432-33.
185 Working Record o f CPSU Central Committee Politburo Meeting, July 30, 1981, published in 
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By the end o f 1981 a significant shift had taken place in how the USSR’s top 
foreign policy decision-makers thought about the war. The intervention o f December
1979 had now lasted two years, and the concerns of their subordinates became harder to 
ignore. The illusion that the invasion could help Moscow achieve its goals in a 
reasonable time-frame faded. Between January 1980 and the end of 1981 there were 
plenty o f indications that the war was going poorly and that the intervention had not 
been worth the strain it had put on the Soviet Union’s relationship with the United 
States, other western countries, and the Muslim world. The concerns of mid level 
officers, generals and marshals had filtered through to the Minister o f Defence, while 
party members and intellectuals had made their concerns clear to the leadership, 
sometimes appealing directly to the Politburo. The country’s leaders were also 
becoming aware that with the secret operation having grown into a war it would be 
difficult to keep it secret from the public, which was showing signs o f discontent. All of 
these factors encouraged Soviet leaders to go beyond the initial propaganda efforts of
1980 and look for other avenues to resolve the conflict, namely through the UN.
Towards a UN Role
With the situation in Afghanistan becoming more difficult and the military becoming 
even less confident regarding its chances o f stabilizing the Karmal regime, the Soviet 
leadership became more open to a possible multilateral solution. Gradually the policy of 
supporting only direct DRA-Pakistan talks gave way to a UN-mediated four party 
discussion which provided the legal framework for the Soviet withdrawal that began in 
1988. Although there were still some key outstanding issues when Gorbachev came to 
power in March 1985, the accords had largely been prepared before the death o f his 
predecessor, Konstantin Chernenko.
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The first indications that Moscow was becoming more interested in a diplomatic 
initiative came in the winter of 1980-1981. President Zia ul-Haq o f Pakistan and the 
Soviet ambassador in Islamabad, Vitaly Smirnoff, held several discussions regarding the 
format of possible talks under the auspices o f a UN representative. Moscow responded 
positively to the idea, but the initiative broke down because o f a misunderstanding: the 
Soviets thought that ul-Haq wanted a UN representative present, while in fact the 
Pakistani president had wanted a Special Representative who would organize the talks. 
The Soviet ambassador told UN Secretary General Kurt Waldheim not to take this 
failed initiative as a sign that the USSR and Afghanistan were ready to accept a 
“trilateral” meeting.187
Although this initiative had gone nowhere, it opened the door for further UN 
efforts. When Waldheim traveled to Moscow in May 1981, he found Brezhnev and 
Gromyko more open to diplomacy and even to a more prominent role for the United 
Nations.188 Gromyko said that the Secretary-General’s efforts should continue “at a 
cautious pace,” but added that Moscow supported his efforts and was prepared to accept 
the participation of special representative in the negotiating process. Gromyko also 
added that Moscow “would cooperate with those efforts by advising the Afghan 
Government to act likewise in this direction.”189 Javier Perez de Cuellar, acting as the 
personal representative o f the UN Secretary-General, also found that both Kabul and 
Islamabad were showing more interest in the possibility of a negotiated solution when 
he traveled there in August 1981. While in his previous visits he had found little hope of 
finding a way for the two sides to negotiate, he was now been able to secure agreement 
on an agenda for negotiations: withdrawal of foreign troops, non-interference,
187 Notes on a meeting between the Secretary General and the Soviet Charge d’Affaires Richard S. 
Ovinnikov, January 9, 1981 UN Archives S-0904-0089-6-1
188 Harisson and Cordovez, Out o f  Afghanistan, 77.
189 “The Soviet position as it emerged during the Secretary-General’s Visit to Moscow, May 4-7, 1981” 
May 21, 1981 UN Archives S-1067-1-1.
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guarantees and refuges.190 However, when de Cuellar mentioned this to a New York 
Times reporter, there was an angry reaction from Pakistan, which was still wary of 
letting it be known that it was interested in such negotiations.191 There would still be a 
considerable amount of such back and forth between the UN representative and 
Pakistani, Afghani, and Soviet officials before actual negotiations could get started.
In the meantime, however, Moscow showed increasing willingness to accept a 
UN role. Although earlier in the year Ustinov’s letter questioning the wisdom of 
continued Soviet occupation had not even been considered by the Politburo, other 
members of the Afghanistan Commission were now beginning to accept the importance 
of finding a diplomatic solution through negotiations. Kornienko recalls that in the 
Autumn of 1981 the Ministry of Foreign Affairs prepared a memorandum, with 
Andropov’s and Ustinov’s support, that proposed the acceptance o f proximity talks 
between Afghanistan and Pakistan. The hope was that the resulting agreement would 
lead to Pakistan ceasing its support o f the opposition in Afghanistan. The proposal was
1 09approved by the Politburo.
After Perez de Cuellar was elected Secretary General, he appointed Diego 
Cordovez, an Ecuadorian lawyer and international official with 20 years o f experience, 
his Personal Representative on Afghanistan. Cordovez had already been involved in the 
preliminary efforts to start talks under Kurt Waldheim, but with the new appointment he 
would become the main UN official dealing with Afghanistan. After another trip to the 
area in April 1982, Cordovez was able to announce the start of talks at Geneva on June 
1 5 ,1982.193
The press was not optimistic about the chances for the accords to produce any 
visible results, and Cordovez’s optimism earned him a certain amount of ridicule in the
190 Memorandum from Cuellar to Waldheim, “Mission to Pakistan and Afghanistan,” 10 August 1981 UN 
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press.194 Indeed, for the time being, the new attitude toward negotiations was more a 
tactic than a profound change in strategy. Moscow remained committed to the Kabul 
government, and saw the main purpose of the accords as finding a way for that 
government to gain legitimacy and strengthen its ability to fight the opposition. 
Nevertheless, the Soviet interest in negotiating was genuine. During the first round of 
negotiations, Moscow sent a senior MID official who was also a specialist on the region 
to act as a liaison with Cordovez. According to his superior at MID Vasili Safronchuk, 
Gavrilov was known to have a low opinion of the Kabul government and considered the 
invasion a tragic mistake.195 That Moscow sent him as a “minder” of the Kabul 
representative confirms that the attitude towards the Kabul government was changing.
The first round o f the talks was held on June 16, 1982 in the Salon Francais of 
the Palais des Nations in Geneva. With Cordovez acting as a go-between (the two sides 
never actually met in the same room), the Afghan and Pakistani foreign minister’s made 
the first tentative moves towards an understanding on key issues: the withdrawal of 
Soviet troops and the cessation of “interference.” The results were minimal. As 
Cordovez put it, “the main significance of the talks was that they were held at all.”196
There were both technical as well as historical issues to overcome. For example, 
Pakistan refused to admit that it was responsible for any interference. Shah Mohammed 
Dost, the Afghan foreign minister who represented his country at the talks then 
presented maps, provided by the Soviets, which showed the locations of mujahedeen 
camps on Pakistani territory. Yaqub Khan, the Pakistani Foreign Minister, told 
Cordovez that though this was true Pakistan could never admit it publicly. Cordovez
194 Ibid.
195 Safronchuk “Afghanistan pri Babrake Karmale..” Part IV, 41.
196 Harrison, Cordovez, Out o f  Afghanistan, 84.
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eventually came up with a formula that bound both sides to stop interference, thus
107getting around an awkward problem.
A more serious problem was the issue o f the Durand Line, the border between 
Pakistan and Afghanistan. The line had been demarcated in 1893 by Sir Mortimer 
Durand, the Foreign Secretary of the Indian Government, but it cut through what were 
traditionally Pushtun lands. Tribes had continued to move across the border as if  it 
didn’t exist. However, the Durand issue had caused friction between the state of 
Pakistan and Afghanistan, even leading to a major diplomatic crisis in 1953.
Afghanistan refused to recognise the line as its proper border. Yaqub Khan argued that 
in order to cease interference, it was first necessary to define borders. The Afghan side 
refused, arguing that this issue should not be part of the discussion but should be solved
1 Q f ilater on a bilateral basis.
After the first round (and several more discussions during the following UN 
session) Cordovez was able to produce a preliminary draft agreement. Although many 
of the details were left blank, the framework for a future accord had been laid down.
The four sections covered the withdrawal o f troops, provisions on nonintervention and 
noninterference, a declaration of guarantees (with no mention on who would provide 
them) and a provision for the return of refugees. 199
The first round of talks was very preliminary, but it seemed to give the Soviets 
hope. Kabul’s participation in the talks and Moscow’s support of the UN effort were not 
simply propaganda tools. The Soviet leadership sincerely hoped that Cordovez’s effort 
would help them find a way out. After Safronchuk briefed Gromyko on the talks, at the 
end o f June, the latter instructed him to find a solution to get over the Durand issue.200
197 Safronchuk “Afghanistan pri Babrake Karmale.. .” Part V, Azia i Afrika Segodnia No.5 (1997), 37. 
There was, o f course, no actual interference on Afghanistan’s part.
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Similarly, when Cordovez and Perez de Cuellar came to Moscow in September 1982, 
they received some encouraging words from Brezhnev. Reading from a prepared 
statement and pausing for breath, the ailing leader told them “as far as Afghanistan was 
concerned, the negotiations between Afghanistan and Pakistan had made a good 
beginning.”201
In fact, the Soviet leadership was actively considering ways to withdraw from 
Afghanistan within a short period of time. Several weeks before Brezhnev’s death 
several senior officers serving in Afghanistan were summoned to Moscow to report to 
the Politburo. There were several delays, and the session finally took place on 
November 27th, with Gromyko chairing. At the end of the meeting Gromyko asked all 
relevant bodies involved to prepare a plan to withdraw Soviet troops from 
Afghanistan.202
The goal of any settlement for Moscow was the preservation of the Karmal 
regime. This meant that enthusiasm for the talks would be measured, particularly while 
the regime itself remained weak. Brezhnev told Cordovez that the key issue remained 
outside powers interfering in Afghanistan.203 In some ways, the rhetoric had not 
changed. In his own memoirs, Perez de Cuellar writes that when he suggested that a 
regime change might be necessary in Afghanistan, the suggestion did not even get a 
response.204 At the same time Moscow was more than willing to press its clients on 
issues that it deemed of lesser importance, like the Durand line.
We cannot be sure if all o f the senior leaders who sat on the Afghanistan 
commission were equally enthusiastic about the UN effort, but there is evidence that 
each one individually was aware that a diplomatic track was necessary. Ponomarev,
201 Note on the Secretary General’s Meeting with President Brezhnev, Thursday 9 September 1982, UN 
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according to his subordinates, had been the most skeptical o f the invasion from the 
beginning. Ustinov had already written that there was no military solution in early 1981. 
Gromyko’s instructions to Safronchuk seem to suggest that he, too, saw the talks as 
important, his reserved attitude at the meeting with Perez de Cuellar and Cordovez not 
withstanding. Kornienko, Gromyko’s deputy, also confirms that in 1981 Gromyko had 
given his “blessing” for finding a diplomatic solution.
Yurii Andropov’s enthusiasm for the talks became clear once he became the 
General Secretary following Brezhnev’s death in November 1982. Perez de Cuellar 
writes that Andropov was already hinting at his interest in a political settlement when 
the two spoke at Brezhnev’s funeral.206 Even more dramatic was Cordovez’ and 
Cuellar’s meeting with Andropov in March 1983. While emphasizing that 
“noninterference” was still the key issue, he complimented Cordovez on his efforts and 
told him that once there was an agreement on non-interference, all the other issues,
707 •including the withdrawal of troops, could be settled. Setting aside his notes 
(something that Brezhnev did very rarely, particularly in his later years), Andropov said 
that, interference aside, the Soviet Union had no intention o f keeping its troops in 
Afghanistan. Then, counting off on his fingers, he listed the difficulties the presence of 
Soviet troops had created: problems in relations with the United States, the Third 
World, and the Islamic World, as well as having a negative influence on the internal
A A O
situation within the USSR, being a drain on the economy and society.
Not surprisingly, some of the problems encountered at Geneva I were settled by 
the end of the next round at Geneva in June 1982. This included the issue of the Durand 
line, where Cordovez was able to secure a text mutually acceptable both to the DRA and
205 Kornienko and Akhromeev, Glazami Marshala i Diplomata, 47.
206 Ibid.
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Pakistan.209 The key issues that remained were refugees, non-interference, and the time­
frame for withdrawal. Refugees were the only remaining major problem that did not 
require the direct involvement of the Soviet Union or the United States.210 For the talks 
to be successful, however, it was now necessary to involve the two great powers
911directly, since they would have to act as guarantors.
The Afghan situation had always been connected to the US-Soviet relationship, 
and this came to the fore again as issues that could be settled directly between Pakistan 
and Afghanistan were resolved. The crux of the problem was that Moscow did not want 
to commit to a time-frame until Pakistan made a “formal commitment” to end 
interference. Similarly, Pakistan refused to commit to non-interference until Moscow 
agreed to designate a date for the start of the withdrawal and accept a suitable timeframe 
for it too be completed. Inevitably these issues would have to involve parallel 
negotiations with the United States, which was by far the biggest supplier of arms to the 
mujahadeen and in many ways led the multi-nation effort to support the resistance. As 
Andropov put it to his Politburo colleagues, “The problem is not Pakistan’s position. It 
is American imperialism that is giving us a fight...we cannot retreat.”212 There could be 
no agreement with Pakistan until there was an accommodation with the United States.
With the collapse o f detente at the end of the 1970s, US-Soviet relations had 
been at a continuous low point. The Carter doctrine had been enthusiastically adopted 
and even enhanced by the Reagan administration, which took office in January 1981. 
The US showed little interest in the Secretary-General’s early efforts, calling on the 
Soviet Union to withdraw troops as a precondition for an improvement in relations. By
209 Although the issue would be re-opened at the last minute in 1988 by the Afghan Foreign Minister.
210 It was, however, an issue o f major importance for Pakistan, which had accepted some three million 
Afghan refugees. Afghan representatives claimed that many o f these were nomads, and that Pakistan was 
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Spring of 1983 the US attitude seemed to change. In May US Secretary of State George 
Shultz sent a personal letter to Gromyko supporting the United Nation’s efforts.
Unfortunately, US-Soviet relations soon hit another rough spot with the downing 
of Korean Airlines Flight 007 in September 1983. The strong condemnation from the 
United States and the inept response of Soviet leaders meant that US-Soviet relations 
would remain at a high level of tension throughout the year. The US invasion of 
Grenada in October 1983 did not help. Soviet intelligence, meanwhile, had apparently 
received word that Pakistani intransigence in negotiations was influenced by the United 
States.214 Even under these conditions, however, Moscow continued to support 
negotiations, actively pressuring Afghan diplomats to cooperate with Cordovez’s efforts 
over Karmal’s objections.
By the time of Andropov’s death in 1984 a draft of the agreement was nearly 
ready. Despite the problems in US-Soviet relations, Andropov continued to maintain a 
strong interest in the Geneva talks and finding a diplomatic solution. Kornienko goes so 
far as to say that were it not for Andropov’s illness, the question o f a time table for 
withdrawal would have been solved by the end of 1983.216 This is probably too 
optimistic, since this question was closely linked to the question of guarantees. Its 
resolution depended on an improvement in US-Soviet relations. Nevertheless, 
Kornienko’s comment confirms that in 1983 the Soviet leadership was looking for a 
way out through diplomacy. Questions regarding the timetable and non-interference 
would continue to be the main obstacles under Gorbachev and would not be resolved 
until March 1988.
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Conclusion
By the end o f 1983 the UN sponsored negotiations were once again stalemated. 
Although several key issues had been resolved, there was no agreement on guarantees 
or a timetable for the withdrawal. Nor would there be any movement on these issues 
under Konstantin Chernenko, the ailing leader who succeeded Andropov in February 
1984 and stayed in power (if only nominally) until March 1985. Although negotiations 
continued through Cordovez, there was been no progress on the key issues. A new
7 1 7  •Geneva round had taken place in August, but it had been inconclusive. With no 
movement in US-Soviet relations, it would have been very difficult to get past these two 
key issues.
During the first months of 1980 the key Soviet foreign policy decision-makers 
came to a consensus that Soviet troops would have to play an active role in Afghanistan 
and remain there indefinitely. Having taken the momentous step o f intervening in the 
country Soviet leaders also raised the stakes. Now a withdrawal before Moscow’s goals 
were achieved, or one followed by a collapse o f Karmal’s government, might be seen as 
a defeat of the Soviet military. Such a defeat would be a blow to Moscow’s prestige in 
the Third World and its sense of parity with the US, both of which Soviet leaders valued 
highly.
Between the invasion in January 1980 and the death of Konstantin Chernenko, 
Moscow pursued a three track policy to stabilise the Karmal regime and normalise the 
situation in Afghanistan. The first track was military. Soviet leaders accepted the need 
for Soviet troops to engage the Afghan opposition directly so as to protect their client in 
Kabul. They accepted that it would be necessary to do this until such a time when 
Afghan security forces could fight on their own. The second track was the effort to 
unity the PDPA and make it more acceptable to the population. The third track was
217 Harisson and Cordovez, Out o f Afghanistan, 177. See also Perez de Cuellar, Pilgrimage for Peace, 
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diplomacy, which in this period meant participation in the UN effort. Diplomacy could 
secure greater recognition for the regime as well as stop interference from Pakistan.
The Soviet “nation-building” campaign reflects the confidence of Soviet leaders 
that their experience o f exporting modernity could help them win in Afghanistan. Soviet 
advisors had been active in Asia, the Middle East, Africa, and Latin America since the 
1950s, and particularly during the 1970s. Soviet economic aid and expertise helped 
post-colonial governments gain and maintain legitimacy. It is not surprising that Soviet 
leaders tried to draw on this experience in Afghanistan. Thus while political advisers 
made sure the PDPA followed a moderate path and helped Afghan activists spread the 
governments influence in the countryside, technical specialists and economic advisers 
tried to bring some of the benefits of modernity to the Afghan people. Yet while these 
efforts did bring some real benefits to many Afghans, the overall strategy failed to make 
the Kabul government legitimate to most Afghans.
By the end o f 1981 Soviet leaders had realised that their counter-insurgency 
strategy was not doing enough to prop up the Kabul regime. On the military front, they 
faced difficulties familiar to other regular armies fighting guerillas. They were often 
able to push opposition fighters from a village or stronghold, but as soon as they pulled 
back or were ordered to another location those fighters regrouped. They also found it 
impossible to completely close off the borders, meaning that supplies to the mujahadeen 
continued to flow from Pakistan.218 The political side o f the counter-insurgency strategy 
also failed. The Amin period had deepened the divide between the Khalq and Parcham 
factions of the PDPA. Karmal seemed to approach the question of unity only half­
heartedly, preferring to purge Khalqi politicians and officers. As late as 1984 there was 
still very little PDPA presence outside of the urban centers. At the same time PDPA
218 In 1984 Sokolov said that closing off the borders was something the 40th army and DRA forces could 
not do, although they could try to cut off the most important routes. Meeting with Party Advisors, 
handwritten notes, March 31, 1984 Personal Archive of Marshal Sokolov.
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officials at all levels took very little initiative, preferring to let their Soviet advisers do 
the work.
Moscow came to support UN diplomacy because it had lost faith that its goals in 
Afghanistan could be achieved militarily; at the same time, they hoped that negotiations 
would lead to a cessation of arms supplies from Pakistan (crippling the Afghan 
insurgency) and much broader recognition for the DRA government. After Moscow 
recognised the need to involve the UN, the diplomatic track achieved some success. By 
the time o f Chernenko’s death the main bilateral issues between Pakistan and 
Afghanistan had been resolved. The remaining issues, that o f a timetable for the 
withdrawal and a guarantee of non-interference, could not be resolved without some 
significant improvement in US-Soviet relations. The KAL 007 incident and the death of 
Andropov ended any chance of those relations improving in the short term.
The myriad difficulties Soviet leaders encountered as a result of their 
introduction of troops into Afghanistan had an effect that went beyond their decision 
making with regard to that unfortunate country. Not only had it brought east-west 
confrontation to an uncomfortable level and complicated relations with Third World 
allies, it also threatened to embarrass the Soviet military and its ability to defend 
socialism abroad. When the Polish crisis erupted in 1980, Soviet leaders felt strongly 
that they could not afford to “lose” Poland, but they were far less confident about using 
Warsaw Pact forces to crush the “counterrevolution.”219 Soviet leaders began to see the 
costs o f interventions as outweighing the benefits.220 There was also a clear sense of 
hangover from the support of Marxist and quasi-marxist regimes in the 1970s and a 
feeling of frustration regarding Soviet aid efforts, as evidenced by Andropov’s
219 Vojtech Mastny, “The Soviet Non-Invasion o f Poland in 1980-81 and the End o f the Cold War” 
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statement in 1983: “It is one thing to proclaim socialism as one’s goal, and it is quite
another to build it”. The fate of progressive states, he went on, depended on ‘work by
0 0 1their own people, and of a correct policy on the part of their leadership.”
This was the situation that Mikhail Gorbachev inherited when he became 
General Secretary in 1985. The remaining five chapters will discuss his policies both 
before and after the signing of the Geneva Accords in April 1988 and the start o f the 
Soviet withdrawal. Although Gorbachev was not generally involved in foreign policy 
decisions before he became General Secretary, he was present at many o f the Politburo 
meetings where Afghanistan was discussed and must have kept abreast of developments 
there. Nevertheless, his policies in 1985-1987 continued to be shaped largely by the 
initiatives undertaken in 1980-1985, although they were modified and pursued with 
renewed intensity.
This is not surprising, since there were few alternatives to these policies which 
did not involve abandoning the PDPA regime and accepting a government dominated 
by the opposition. Such a scenario would have been too big o f a blow to Soviet prestige 
as well as the interests of conservative leaders such as Brezhnev, Andropov, Gromyko, 
and Ustinov to consider. Paradoxically, the realization that the PDPA continued to be 
weak seemed to draw Soviet leaders deeper into the quagmire, as they assumed the 
Afghan government’s functions on the military and political levels.
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Chapter 2: New Thinking, Old Commitments: Gorbachev and the Afghan War
By the time of Konstantin Chernenko’s death and Mikhail Gorbachev’s ascent to the top 
of the Soviet hierarchy in March 1985 the Afghan War was in its fifth year. Soviet 
citizens still had very little official information about the war available to them. 
Although letters coming into the central committee offices suggest that a growing 
number o f people knew more about what young men were being sent to do in 
Afghanistan than they could have known from the Soviet press, the official line had 
changed little since 1980. By October 1985, Gorbachev had decided to seek a 
withdrawal from Afghanistan and had the support of the Soviet leadership to do so. 
Support for withdrawal stemmed not so much from the military and economic costs of 
the war, nor the domestic political effects, although these were undoubtedly important. 
Rather, Gorbachev’s decision to seek a withdrawal from Afghanistan stemmed in large 
part from his desire to make the transition to a new era o f Soviet foreign policy making 
which would see a lessening of international tensions. His colleagues supported him 
because even when they did not share his broader reform goals they agreed that the 
continued presence of Soviet troops was unlikely to bring victory in Afghanistan. 
Gorbachev’s failure to end the Soviet involvement before 1989, however, stemmed 
from a belief that a perceived defeat in Afghanistan would be a major loss o f face, one 
that would not be well accepted by the Soviet Union’s Third World allies.
Although Mikhail Gorbachev, a Politburo member since 1979, had already 
earned a reputation with some Western observers as a reform-minded politician, it took 
him almost four years to withdraw Soviet troops from Afghanistan. One might assume 
that he needed time to ease out his more conservative colleagues before taking a 
decisive step on Afghanistan, and indeed several scholars have made this argument. 
Gorbachev did change the composition of the Politburo in his first few years, bringing 
in reformers like Aleksandr Iakovlev, and replacing the conservative Foreign Minister
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Andrei Gromyko with Eduard Shevardnadze. One of the reasons that the war dragged 
on is that it was a limited war, both in a military and a socio-political sense. While the 
point may seem obvious, it is none the less is important to highlight. Keeping the war 
within certain limits (for example, never engaging more than 120,000 Soviet 
servicemen at any one time) gave politicians freedom of maneuver.
Gorbachev absorbed the ideas of new thinking and sided with those who 
supported Soviet initiatives to ease the Cold War confrontation. In formulating policy 
on Afghanistan, however, he had to balance his genuine desire to end the conflict with 
the immense legacy of support for the Third World that Gorbachev and his team 
inherited. While he came to the conclusion that the war needed to end, he hesitated to 
move too quickly for fear o f undermining his country’s prestige. Rather than pushing 
for an immediate withdrawal, he spent several years looking for ways to reform the 
military, political, and diplomatic efforts meant to stabilise the country and gain 
legitimacy for the regime. Gorbachev could bide his time, because, like his 
predecessors, he was dealing with a limited war. The Soviet military adjusted to the 
demands o f a prolonged counterinsurgency campaign that it had not planned for, and 
military losses remained at a tolerable level throughout. Similarly, the wars effect on 
Soviet society during the period in question was still restricted enough that it did not 
force the country’s leadership to take drastic measures. While knowledge about the war 
and dissatisfaction with the Soviet involvement grew during the 1980s, this did not 
translate into public pressure on Gorbachev or his colleagues to end the war 
immediately. Soviet Muslims did not become “infected” with a desire to wage jihad  on 
the Soviet state, despite the prediction of some Western experts. The war remained 
limited both in its effects within the Soviet Union and in terms of the military and 
economic resources it required, a crucial point in understanding why Gorbachev did not 
bring the troops home in 1985.
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Old Commitments and New Political Thinking
It is impossible to understand Moscow’s Afghan policy in the Gorbachev era without 
looking at the battle between old and new thinking that characterised the Soviet foreign 
policy debate from 1985 through 1988. One obstacle to withdrawing Soviet troops 
from Afghanistan was the general climate o f the Cold War in the early 1980s. The 
collapse o f detente at the end of the 1970s, the heightened rhetoric of confrontation 
coming from Soviet and US leaders, as well as various accidents and misunderstandings 
in this period threatened to reduce relations between the two superpowers to a level they 
had not reached since the Stalin era. Heightened tensions not only bolstered a 
confrontational approach to foreign policy within the Soviet leadership, they made it 
more difficult to reach some accommodation once the leadership started to look for a 
way out o f Afghanistan. Andropov’s genuine desire to seek an accommodation for 
withdrawal was hampered, in part, by the difficulty in making a diplomatic opening to 
the United States.
In contrast to the “confrontational” approach o f the late Brezhnev era and the 
brief Chernenko interregnum, the Gorbachev period was characterised by a greater 
effort to reach out to the West, restart stalled arms control negotiations, and create a 
new basis for relations. This shift in foreign policy was conducted under the slogan of 
“New Political Thinking.” The concept was less formal policy and more an emerging 
philosophy that, over time, came to characterise the conduct of foreign affairs under 
Gorbachev. It emphasised that confrontation was not inevitable, and crucially, that the 
Soviet Union could take major initiatives towards a lessening of tensions, thus 
differentiating from the by now discredited calls for “peaceful coexistence o f the 
Brezhnev era.”1 Taking strong, often unexpected initiatives in negotiations with the US
1 Chemiaev, Six Years with Gorbachev, 44-45.
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on issues like nuclear testing, force reduction, and regional problems, became a key 
aspect o f Gorbachev’s own style in foreign policy.
The roots of New Thinking go back to the Khruschev era and the political and 
intellectual thaw that began with the secret speech in 1956. Khruschev’s denunciation of 
Stalinism ushered in an era of relative intellectual freedom and debate that had not 
existed in the Soviet Union since the 1920s. New directions were taken in history and 
the social sciences, where many of the assumptions of the Stalinist period were 
challenged or pushed aside.2 The period was also marked by the exposure of young 
social scientists and party members to western ideas, scholarship, and general way o f  
life. This took place through the creation of research institutes, such as the Institute o f 
World Economy and International Relations (IMEMO), the Institute o f the Economy of 
the World Socialist System (IEMSS) or the Institute o f the USA and Canada (ISKAN). 
Scholars at these institutes were given unprecedented access to western scholarship as 
well as an opportunity to study experiments with economic policy in east-bloc countries 
like Hungary and Czechoslovakia. Many of Gorbachev’s advisers had also worked on 
the Prague-based journal Problemy Mira i Sotsializma, where they were also exposed to 
“European” ideas while working alongside French and Italian communists. Not 
surprisingly, representatives of this group, including Georgiii Arbatov and Oleg 
Bogomolov, were the most vocal critics of the intervention and the biggest supporters of 
a speedy Soviet withdrawal.4
Although Gorbachev did not belong to this group of young intellectuals, he was 
influenced by the ideas they shared and developed. Gorbachev had attended Moscow
2 See Robert D. English Russia and the Idea o f the West: Gorbachev, Intellectuals, and the End o f the 
Cold War (New
York: 2000), 49-80. English traces the origins of new thinking as far back as Peter the Great’s 
westernizing project and the debate between Slavophiles and Westemisers in the 19th century. For our 
purposes, understanding the context in which Gorbachev’s foreign policy advisers underwent their 
political education is sufficient.
English, Russia and the Idea o f the West, 71.
4 It will be remembered that when Oleg Bogomolov criticised the Soviet invasion o f Afghanistan in 
January 1980, he did it from the platform of the IEMSS.
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State University in 1950-55, at a time when Stalin was still revered for leading his 
country to victory in the Great Patriotic War. Still, he made some important friendships 
with future reformers, including a leader o f the “Prague Spring” movement, Zdenek 
Mlynar.5 After his move to Moscow in 1978 he became acquainted with some o f the 
reform-minded intellectuals working in the central committee and the institutes, 
including Georgii Arbatov and Anatolii Chemiaev. Gorbachev’s interests quickly 
evolved beyond the agricultural sphere, his official domain, to larger questions of 
domestic and foreign policy.6 Reform minded thinkers like Georgii Shakhnazarov 
helped develop the idea o f a foreign policy guided by universal values and interests (as 
opposed to the idea of class conflict), which Gorbachev absorbed and eventually made a 
part of his own approach to external relations.
New Thinking, with its emphasis on cooperation with the West, helped lay the 
intellectual groundwork for the detente of the late 1960s and 1970s. But parallel to the 
development o f “New Thinking” in the 1950s there was also a re-evaluation of the 
Soviet Union’s role in the Third World. Soon after coming to power, Nikita Khrushchev 
criticised Stalin’s failure to take note of the Third World in the worldwide communist 
struggle. With rapid decolonization changing the political map o f the world starting in 
the late 1950s, Moscow became increasingly involved in the transformations taking 
place in the Third World, including Afghanistan, where it helped King Zahir Shah and 
his Prime Minister Mohammed Daoud build modem infrastructure.8
The competition in the Third World became a three way contest. Moscow had 
to prove not only that communism was a better path to modernity than liberal 
capitalism, but that Soviet communism was better than the Chinese model. In the 1970s
5 Brown, The Gorbachev Factor, 29.
6 English, Russian and the Idea o f the West, 183; Anatolii Chemiaev Shest ’ let s Gorbachevym, 9.
7 Brown, Gorbachev Factor, 221-225.
8 O.A. Westad The Global Cold War, 68-72., 300. For Khruschev’s trip to Afghanistan and the resulting 
aid package, see Aleksandr Fursenko and Timothy Naftali Khruschev’s Cold War (New York: 2006), 81- 
82.
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the Soviet Union would find itself involved in a number of situations where the US and 
China backing the rivals of Moscow’s ally.9 The trend continued into the 1980s. 
Between 1982 and 1986, the USSR was providing $78 billion in arms to developing 
states. Some o f the biggest recipients were Ethiopia, Angola, Vietnam, North Korea and 
Cuba. India, Syria, and Lybia were also major recipients.10
Support for the Third World, particularly when it was part of a competition with 
the US and China, was a legacy Gorbachev and his allies in power could not easily 
shake off. While those who laid the intellectual groundwork of New Thinking at some 
distance from government could argue for a more radical reassessment o f Soviet foreign 
policy, Gorbachev and Shevardnadze had to contend with the expectations of a large 
part of the communist world. During their first years in power they did little to 
significantly change Moscow’s relationship with Third World states. Even as the USSR 
underwent fundamental transformations in its domestic political and economic system 
and in its relationship with the US, China, and other former adversaries, it did not break 
its links with former Third World allies. Aid to the Third World continued well into 
1990-1991, when the Soviet economy was nearing total collapse, and actually increased 
in the period 1987-89.11 It did not help that even after Gorbachev hinted at a more 
conservative Soviet role in the Third World, Reagan spoke openly about rolling back 
Soviet influence there and telling “freedom fighters” in Afghanistan, Cambodia, 
Nicaragua, and Angola that they would have US support.12 Although the Soviet 
relationship with its Third World clients began to change after 1986, with the Soviet 
Union even helping negotiate a peace deal in Angola, on the whole this change o f pace
9 Examples being Ethiopia, where Moscow backed the Mengistu government against the Chinese-backed 
Tigrayan People’s Liberation Front, and Angola, where China was one o f the backers o f UNITA. China 
was also a backer, although a relatively minor one, o f the Afghan resistance.
10 Campbell and MacFarlane, ed. Gorbachev's Third World Dilemmas (1990), 73. These numbers are 
based on western calculations; it should be noted that the equipment sent in these cases was often second­
hand.
11 Celeste A. Wallander “Soviet Policy Toward the Third World in the 1990s” in Weiss, Thomas G. and 
Kessler, Meryl A. eds., Third World Security in the Post-Cold War Era (London, 1991), 54-55.
12 Garthoff, Great Transition, 270-271.
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was glacial, especially compared with the rapid downward spiral o f the domestic 
economy. It was only after 1990, when the Soviet Union entered a serious economic 
crisis, that the foreign aid budget decreased significantly.13 As we will see later in this 
chapter, commitment to the Third World played an important role in Gorbachev and the 
Politburo’s thinking about Afghanistan.
Gorbachev’s contacts with the “new thinkers” in the years before he came to 
power not only had Andropov’s blessing, they were in part ordered and supervised by 
the former KGB chairman. Aside from the informal discussions Gorbachev had with 
individuals like Arbatov or Iakovlev, acting on Andropov’s instructions he also 
commissioned some 110 papers from them on various domestic and foreign policy 
issues. Some o f these reports addressed the issue o f Afghanistan. These papers together 
provided the intellectual core of Gorbachev’s program when he came to power. As he 
put it in 1989, these conversations and papers “formed the basis o f the decisions o f the 
April [1985] plenum and the first steps thereafter.”14
Once Gorbachev was in power, he moved quickly to bring these young advisers 
into the fold and raise the profile of their institutes. Many o f them had been among the 
war’s strongest opponents from the beginning, but during the later Brezhnev era had 
they lost much of their already limited ability to provide input into the decision-making 
process.15 These advisers now took advantage of having a reform-minded General 
Secretary as a patron and immediately began offering their prescriptions for changing 
Soviet foreign and domestic policy. Gorbachev had shown a consistent interest in 
reforming the Soviet system during his days as Stavropol party secretary and as a junior 
member o f the Politburo and Central Committee. Now, as General Secretary, he was in
13 Margot Light, ed. Troubled Friendships: Moscow's Third Word Ventures (London, 1993), 17-22.
14 Sarah Mendelson Changing Course: Ideas, Politics, and the Soviet Withdrawal from Afghanistan 
(Princeton, 1998), 82. Gorbachev made this comment to a group o f scholars in January 1989 - see 
Pravda, January 7, 1989.
15 Although Brezhnev and Andropov were willing to hear their views, and even agreed with them to some 
extent, the climate o f the Cold War and the dominance o f “old thinking” meant that their influence was 
very limited. Thus, for example, a major policy memorandum like the one submitted by Bogomolov in 
January 1980 went completely unanswered and unacknowledged.
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a position to provide the space for reformist thinkers to offer their views, a space that 
was threatened during the the later Brezhnev years and the Chernenko interregnum.16
With Gorbachev in power, these new thinkers did not hesitate to once again 
voice their views on the war and make their recommendations. Soon after Gorbachev’s 
election, Arbatov submitted a lengthy memorandum entitled “Toward a Revised 
Approach to Foreign Policy,” which argued for an immediate withdrawal from 
Afghanistan. Other “new thinkers” agreed. Anatolii Chemiaev, soon to become 
Gorbachev’s foreign policy aide but for the moment still working at the International 
Department, noted in his diary that if  Gorbachev were to move quickly on Afghanistan, 
it would give him a major political boost: “Such an action would provide him with a 
moral and political platform, from which he could later move mountains. It would be 
equivalent to Khrushchev’s anti-Stalinist report at the XX Congress. Not to mention the 
benefits the withdrawal would give us in foreign policy.”17 A good example of the 
“new thinking” approach comes from a memorandum on necessary reforms submitted 
by a Gorbachev aide sometime in 1987. Discussing the nationalities issue in the USSR, 
the memo stated:
Our military presence in Afghanistan places an enormous financial burden on the 
USSR, and can lead to serious ideological consequences (the families o f  the dead), 
it damages our relations with the Muslim world, and gives the Americans an ideal 
opportunity to exhaust us by forcing us to lead an endless war. O f course, the 
withdrawal o f  troops and an agreement for some form o f  political settlement does 
not guarantee the survival o f  a socialist regime in that country. But however 
significant the survival o f a socialist oriented regime in that country is, in the end 
we will win. And the faster we leave that mousetrap, the better.18
To the new thinkers, neither the survival o f the PDPA regime nor the loss of prestige 
outweighed the costs of the war for the USSR.
16 The last few years o f Brezhnev’s rule saw attacks by conservative Politburo members on institutes like 
IEMSS. While Andropov, who had been the patron o f “new thinkers” like Arbatov in the 1960s was also 
interested in reformist views, the Chernenko interregnum saw a return o f the “old guard” to dominance.
17 Diary o f Anatolii Chemiaev, April 4, 1985, posted on the National Security Archive website 
http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/. cited hereafter as Chemiaev Diary, NSA.
18 Memorandum: “Regarding certain timely measures,” undated, but not earlier than 1987. GFA, #17923.
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As a philosophy, “new thinking” was poised for a resurgence with Gorbachev’s 
election. Not only was Gorbachev himself partial to the view of the “new thinkers,” 
many of their hard-line opponents had either left the scene or were pushed aside. The 
conservative champion o f the military-industrial complex, Dmitrii Ustinov, had passed 
away in 1984. Viktor Grishin and Grigorii Romanov, both staunch conservatives, were 
removed from the leadership and sent into retirement during the July 1985 plenum, and 
Andrei Gromyko was asked to give up his job at the Foreign Ministry.
In spring 1985, then, major political forces were aligned in favour of 
withdrawal, at least in principle. On the one hand, some of the key pro-interventionists 
were now gone and reform-minded leaders and advisers were gaining influence. On the 
other hand, some of the more conservative figures in the Politburo recognised that the 
war had become a quagmire and agreed that there was no military solution to the 
Afghan problem. The Afghanistan commission, which under Gorbachev’s predecessors 
had guided Afghan policy, still included Andrei Gromyko, but it also included the new 
minister of defense, Marshal Sokolov, and the new head of the KGB, Viktor Chebrikov. 
These men were conservatives, not new thinkers. As the previous chapter showed, 
however, Sokolov had become disillusioned with the war before he took over the 
defense portfolio from Ustinov. Chebrikov’s views are unclear, but it is worth noting 
that he came up in Andropov’s footsteps, and thus probably shared Andropov’s belief 
that the Afghan war was a mistake.19 As the next section will show, new political 
thinkers played an important role in convincing Gorbachev to withdraw from 
Afghanistan and helped him shape the arguments for withdrawal. His own caution and 
fear o f a Soviet “failure” in Afghanistan, however, meant that Gorbachev would spend
19 Chebrikov never wrote a memoir and gave few interviews. In one, however, he does say that as a KGB 
chief he tried to “follow Andropov’s line.” It is worth noting that, unlike Andropov, Chebrikov had little 
foreign policy experience, having spent most of his KGB career dealing with organizational and domestic 
issues. See his interview with Aleksandr Hinshtein, Moskovskiy Komsomolets, December 23, 1998.
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several years looking for ways to avoid having the withdrawal become a defeat before 
bringing the troops home.
A decision , but not a plan
Gorbachev came to power with a desire to end the Soviet intervention, but without any 
well-defined ideas about how to handle the Afghan situation, and he gave no immediate 
signs that he would seek a quick withdrawal. During his first year in power, he largely 
let the war run its course, although he gradually became more involved in decision 
making. Even after he became convinced that disengagement from Afghanistan would 
require more direct intervention on his part he moved cautiously, preferring to try every 
option available before finally giving up on helping the Afghan regime win the war.
Gorbachev had been a candidate Politburo member since 1979 and a full 
member since 1980. Although he was not privy to the work o f the Afghan commission, 
he was certainly familiar with its reports and discussions o f the problem at Politburo 
meetings, which he often chaired when Chernenko was ill.20 Indeed, we know from 
Chemiaev’s diary of at least one Politburo meeting chaired by Gorbachev where the 
main subject o f discussion was Afghanistan. Ustinov and Chebrkikov, back in Moscow 
after talks with Karmal, painted a devastating picture o f affairs there. The Afghan 
officer corps was still tom by the Khalq/Parcham split, almost half of the border with 
Pakistan was a “hole,” and 80% of the territory was controlled by the “bandits.” Yet 
neither Ustinov, Chebrikov, nor any of the other members o f the Politburo suggested a 
radical change o f course was necessary. With the political situation uncertain, matters
lwere allowed to drift.
20 In fact, Gorbachev’s name appears on records o f Politburo discussions of the situation in Afghanistan 
going back to January 1980.
1 Chemiaev Diary entry for August 12, 1984. Chemiaev was present at the Politburo meeting. Chemiaev, 
Dnevnik, 570-571.
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Gorbachev’s first months in power saw similarly little movement on 
Afghanistan. On other foreign policy issues, Gorbachev moved more quickly. At 
Chernenko’s funeral he had already begun dismantling the so-called “Brezhnev 
doctrine”, telling East-bloc leaders that they could not rely on Soviet troops to keep 
them in power. Gorbachev’s comments during his first meeting with Karmal reflected 
some skepticism regarding the Afghan revolution, but it did not represent a radical 
break with policy. With Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko, the last surviving member 
of the old Afghanistan Commission, at his side, Gorbachev spoke about the need to 
expand the PDPA’s base of support. The party had to attract a wider sector of the 
public, allowing for a “stabilization of the situation, consolidation of the revolution’s 
victories, and solving some of the most difficult problems” facing the country. While he 
mentioned that Soviet troops “would not be in Afghanistan forever”, he avoided
99specifics on how and under what circumstances they would be brought home.
Significantly, Gromyko’s only comment during this meeting sought to highlight 
the need for Soviet troops. When Karmal said that while his party was working hard (as 
Lenin had taught them!) to improve its ties with the masses, closing off the borders with 
Pakistan and Iran was even more important, as it would “deliver a strong blow to the 
plans of American imperialists, Chinese hegemonists, and Pakistani reactionaries and 
other hostile powers,” Gromyko agreed. Closing the borders, he said, “remained one of 
the most important problems.”23 Even before a policy was formulated, different 
emphasis was being placed by the representatives of the old guard and the new.
In 1985 Gorbachev was already looking for a change of course, but was not sure 
what shape it would take. During his first months in power, as he solicited advice and
22 Record o f meeting between M.S. Gorbachev and Chairman o f the Revolutionary Council o f the DRA 
B. Karmal, 14 March 1985. Volkogonov Papers, Library o f Congress, Regional File, Box 26, Reel 17
23 Ibid. Karmal’s comments were on the whole quite superficial, and mostly defended the progress 
already made by the party. In concluding, Gorbachev expressed the hope that by their next meeting the 
party would have some new “successes and progress” that they could discuss. The issue o f Gorbachev’s 
disillusionment with Karmal will be discussed further in the next chapter.
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tried to formulate a new approach, he defended Soviet policy in Afghanistan. In May 
1985 Gorbachev told Italian Prime Minister Benedetto Craxi that “there is a certain 
process underway in this country, the point of which is to get rid o f centuries-old 
backwardness. It is difficult to say when this will be completed.”24 Gorbachev defended 
the Soviet intervention: “Someone decided to interfere in Afghanistan’s internal affairs. 
Under these conditions the USSR... introduced a limited contingent of its troops.”25 
Indeed Gorbachev had already decided the limited contingent’s time in Afghanistan had 
to end sooner rather than later. Supposedly on his first day in office he had already 
made a note for himself that Soviet troops had to leave Afghanistan, although this had to 
be done in stages.26 Some time in March or early April, Gorbachev requested a policy 
review from the sitting Afghan commission, now composed of Marshal Sergei Sokolov 
(elevated to Minister of Defence after Ustinov’s death), Andrei Gromyko, and Viktor 
Chebrikov, the head of the KGB. The commission was told to look into “the 
consequences, pluses, and minuses of a withdrawal.”27 To Arbatov’s call for a 
withdrawal, Gorbachev apparently replied that he was “thinking it over.”28
For the next few months the new General Secretary continued to discuss the 
Afghan problem, soliciting proposals from the likes o f Arbatov as well as the Foreign 
Ministry and the military. Crucially, new thinkers like Arbatov and the hard-boiled 
military men agreed that the war was hopeless. A report from General Valentin 
Varennikov, the head of the Ministry o f Defense Operating Group in Afghanistan,29 
noted that military successes had no long-term effect on the opposition, which 
continued to grow. The DRA government failed in the key counterinsurgency strategy 
of establishing a presence in an area cleared of guerrillas. As a result “the combat
24 From M.S. Gorbachev’s conversation with B. Craxi May 29, 1985 GFA Fond 3, Opis 1, Document 
4771.
25 Ibid.
26 Gorbachev interview on the radio station Ekho Moskvy, February 15, 2009.
27 Ibid, Liakhovskii, Tragedia i doblest', 521. Interview with Marshal Sergei Akhromeev, 2RR, 1/4/12, 
p.3.
8 Chemiaev Diary, April 7, 1985, Dnevnik.
29 Marshal Sokolov’s post until he was promoted to Minister o f Defense.
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actions for stabilizing the situation in the country can have only a temporary character. 
With time the insurgents in these districts are capable o f re-establishing lost 
positions.”30
Gorbachev’s early aloofness from the Afghan problem did not last long. Some 
time in June 1985 he issued instructions to prepare a proposal on “resolving the Afghan 
question.”31 Gorbachev’s reactions to his aides’ proposals on Afghanistan also changed. 
One morning in the third week of June, Gorbachev even summoned Arbatov for a one 
hour conversation that focused primarily on Afghanistan. Whereas previously he had 
told Arbatov that he was “thinking” about the Afghan problem, now he said that he
T9agreed that a quick withdrawal was necessary.
Gorbachev spent the summer of 1985 pondering the problem and soliciting 
advice on the Afghan problem. By fall he was ready to start acting on the 
recommendations of “new thinkers” and others who urged withdrawal. In October 
Babrak Karmal was secretly called to Moscow. Gorbachev put the problem in stark 
terms: the Afghan revolution had little popular support and needed a quick turn around. 
He recommended a return to “free capitalism, Afghan and Islamic values, to sharing
TT •power with oppositional and even currently hostile forces.” Gorbachev’s advice to 
Karmal was not a complete departure from what his predecessors had advocated. Soviet 
leaders had long urged Afgans to adopt a slower approach that emphasised the 
establishment of political power over revolutionary rhetoric or programs. Gorbachev 
was going further than his predecessors, however. His advice to Karmal may have been 
the first time a Soviet leader urged a client to turn to capitalism and religion, and it 
foreshadowed his own increasingly radical views after 1988. The record, such as it is, of
30 Report by General Valentin Varennikov June 6, 1985, Liakhovskii, 513-514.
31 Chemiaev Diary, April 20, 1985. Chemiaev records that Georgiii Kornienko, the deputy foreign 
minister, made this comment to Karen Brutents, an international department official and personal friend.
32 Ibid.
33 Chemiaev Diary, October 16, 1985, posted on the National Security Archive website 
http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/ Chemiaev was not present at the conversation but saw the transcript right 
after. See also B. Padishev, “Najibullah, president Afganistana” International Affairs (Moscow) Jan.
1990, 19-27.
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Gorbachev’s conversation with Karmal shows a leader who has spent some time 
studying the problem and trying to understand the situation on the ground.34
Gorbachev also made it clear that Soviet troops were not going to stay in 
Afghanistan much longer. In fact, in this conversation, Gorbachev set the first o f several 
deadlines for the withdrawal of Soviet troops: by summer 1986 Soviet troops would be 
out and the Afghans would have to “defend the revolution” themselves.35 Najibullah, 
who was at the meeting, later said that Karmal’s face went white when he heard this. 
Taken aback, he exclaimed “if you leave now, next time you will send in a million 
soldiers!”36 Gorbachev told his Politburo colleagues that Karmal “in no way expected 
such a turn, was sure that we need Afghanistan more than he does, and was clearly
0*7
expecting that we will be there for a long time, if not forever.” Gorbachev was 
learning the hard way that the Afghan communists would try to sabotage any 
withdrawal plan he could devise.
The next day Gorbachev addressed the Politburo. After briefing his colleagues 
on the conversation with Karmal, he began reading out loud some of the letters that had 
been coming in to the Central Committee. Gorbachev not only cited letters about 
crippled soldiers or maternal grief about lost sons, he also quoted from letters that 
blamed the Soviet leadership directly: “the Politburo made a mistake and it should be 
rectified, the sooner the better, because every day is taking lives.” He concluded with a • 
phrase that conveyed his disappointment in the Afghan leader: “With or without Karmal 
we will follow this line firmly, which must in a minimally short amount o f time lead to 
our withdrawal from Afghanistan.” There was no objection to what Gorbachev said,
34 In fact, Karmal had already been in Moscow in July, ostensibly for “medical treatment.” Although he 
probably met with Gorbachev at least briefly, it does not seem that a substantive discussion took place. 
See BBC Summary o f  World Broadcasts, July 31, 1985. The meeting was likely intended for the two 
leaders to become better acquainted. By October, however, Gorbachev was more secure in what he 
wanted to say on the topic of Afghanistan, and this was reflected in his long statement to the Politburo the 
day after the meeting with Karmal.
35 Chemiaev Diary, October 17, 1985, NSA .
36 Padishev, “Najibullah, President Afganistana.”
37 Chemiaev Diary, October 17,1985 NSA. Chemiaev was present at this Politburo meeting. See also 
Chemiaev, My Six Years With Gorbachev, pp.42-43.
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and Marshal Sokolov, the defense minister, supported moving towards a withdrawal.
Gorbachev’s approach with his Politburo colleagues reflected a desire to 
establish a consensus on the Afghan problem. No doubt he had concerns about the 
reaction of some o f his more conservative colleagues. Andrei Gromyko was still a 
supporter of continued intervention, as was evident at the meeting with Karmal in 
March. The Politburo’s reaction, as recorded by Anatolii Dobrynin, seemed to justify 
his approach: “there was no objection and no strong endorsement, but rather reluctant 
silent agreement.”39 By reading out loud letters from the public he was raising the 
“emotional tension,”as Chemiaev put it, and at the same time showing his colleagues 
that the public’s tolerance for the war was limited.40 No matter the private concerns 
about the war o f individual members, it was Gorbachev’s task to take the lead and form 
a consensus. He would need this consensus if critics later raised concerns about his 
handling of the problem.
In 1980, the most senior members of the Politburo had sought a Central 
Committee plenum to ratify their decision to send troops into Afghanistan and keep 
them there to fight on the side of the government. The plenum had ratified the decision 
unanimously, as expected, giving the Politburo a “mandate” to continue its Afghan 
policy. Now that a new direction was being set for Afghan policy, it would have to be 
ratified by the party as well. This “ratification” took place at the 27th Party Congress in 
February-March 1986. Apparently placing the need to withdraw troops from 
Afghanistan on the political agenda was given serious consideration. Eduard 
Shevardnadze, who barely mentioned the war in his first memoir,41 wrote that the topic 
was in the early drafts of the Congress’s Political Report, but had been removed,
38 Chemiaev Diary, October 17, 1985 NSA. See also Chemiaev, Six Years with Gorbachev, 42-43.
39 Dobrynin was still ambassador to Washington but in Moscow at the time and present at the meeting. 
Anatolii Dobrynin, In Confidence..., 447.
40 Chemiaev, Six Years with Gorbachev, 42.
41 He is said to be writing another one at present.
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presumably at the insistence of more hard-line advisers or Politburo members.42 In his 
key-note speech, Gorbachev still called the Afghanistan war a “bleeding wound,” thus 
telling the assembled delegates, the nation, and the world that the Soviet leadership saw 
the war as a drain.43
The winter o f 1985-1986 was a critical point in Gorbachev’s evolution as a 
leader and in his conceptualization of reform in both the domestic and international 
spheres. Publicly, Gorbachev still often used the language of the Brezhnev period, for 
example referring to Stalinism as “foreign propaganda.”44 Following the disappointing 
meeting with Reagan at Geneva, Gorbachev and his advisors sought new approaches. 
Ultimately, they rejected the “two camps” formula with a focus on integrity and 
interdependence. Despite skepticism from some of Gorbachev’s Politburo colleagues, 
these new ideas about foreign policies became crucial components o f his report to the 
27th Party Congress in February 1986.45 We may never know who pushed for the 
withdrawal item to be removed from the Political Report, but in light o f what was said, 
it is not o f great importance. It may very well have been a tactical decision; by making 
the point in his speech but not putting on the agenda officially, Gorbachev was 
indicating that ending the war was now a priority but also leaving room for the USSR to 
do it on its own terms.
Still, there was no firm decision on how Afghan policy should be conducted in 
order to make a Soviet withdrawal possible. A decision to withdraw in principle, which 
the Politburo had approved in October 1985, was neither a strategy nor a plan in 
practice. In fact, while Gorbachev clearly wanted to move Soviet policy toward a 
withdrawal, he did not yet have any particular scheme in mind. This may explain why,
42 Eduard Shevardnadze, The Future Belongs to Freedom (New York: 1991), 47. Author’s interview with 
Eduard Shevardnadze, Tbilisi, Georgiiia, May 9, 2008.
43 Brown, Gorbachev Factor, 220-21.
44 Brown, Gorbachev Factor, 92-93.
45 Zubok, Failed Empire, 284-286; Brown, Gorbachev Factor, 220-222; Garthoff, Great Transition, 256- 
260.
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for example, he did not respond to Reagan’s initiative in 1985 to discuss Afghanistan 
after Geneva.
Although it is no surprise Reagan’s idea of a “coalition of Islamic states” to 
supervise the installation of a new Afghan government,” proposed at the Geneva 
Summit, was rejected, Reagan’s follow-up letter was more conciliatory: “I want you to 
know that I am prepared to cooperate in any reasonable way to facilitate such manner 
which does not damage Soviet security interests. During our meetings I mentioned one 
idea which I thought might be helpful and I will welcome any further suggestions you 
may have.”46 In a follow-up letter, Reagan went further, telling Gorbachev that 
“withdrawal o f your forces” remained the only sticking point47 According to Jack 
Matlock, US Ambassador to the USSR and a staff member on the National Security 
Council during Reagan’s first term, the United States was prepared at this stage to stop 
aid to the mujahadeen if  Soviet forces withdrew, without insisting that the Soviets cut 
off aid to the PDPA. Gorbachev’s failure to respond directly to Reagan may have 
extended the war unnecessarily for several years, and helps confirm that Afghan policy 
was not well-defined at this stage.48 Further, Gorbachev did not yet trust the Americans 
sufficiently to engage with them directly and overcome the hurdles that had stalled the 
Geneva talks in Andropov’s day. Finally, he did not believe that his relationship with 
Reagan had reached the point where they could profitably discuss regional issues.49
More generally, Gorbachev operated on the assumption that the Soviet Union 
needed to withdraw from Afghanistan, but without “losing face.”50 In April 1986, two 
months after labeling the war a “bleeding wound,” Gorbachev told a special Politburo
46 Reagan to Gorbachev, Draft of Private Letter, December 1985, National Security Archive 
http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB172/Doc29.pdf (Accessed July 22, 2009).
47 Reagan to Gorbachev, December 16, 1985. Reagan Library, Executive Secretariat, Head o f State File, 
Box 40
48 Author’s telephone interview with US Ambassador Jack Matlock, January 1, 2008.
49 According to Chemiaev, Gorbachev drafted guidelines on dealing with Reagan in late 1985 that 
included “not to get into regional issues; not to forgo our right to ‘solidarity’ with ‘fighters for 
independence; not to recognise US ‘vital interests’ indiscriminately, where it suits [the US]” Chemiaev, 
Six Years with Gorbachev, 43.
50 Author’s interview with Soviet Ambassador Yulii Vorontsov, Moscow, September 11, 2007.
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meeting that a poor withdrawal from Afghanistan would do great harm to Soviet
relations with its client states. In the presence o f Varennikov and Ambassador to Kabul
Fiakrat Tabeev, Gorbachev said he believed “we must under no circumstances just clear
out from Afghanistan, or we will damage our relations with a large number of foreign
friends.”51 With the weight of the Soviet Union’s commitments to the communist world
on his shoulders, Gorbachev feared acting precipitously. Perhaps nothing highlights this
better than the statement he made in a February 1987 Politburo meeting:
We could leave quickly...and blame everything on the previous leadership, which 
planned everything. But we can’t do that. They’re worried in India, they’re worried 
in Africa. They think that this will be a blow to the authority o f  the Soviet Union in 
the national-liberation movement. Imperialism, they say, if  it wins in Afghanistan, 
will go on the offensive.52
Despite general consensus that the war had to end, it was clear that the 
Soviet effort there was too closely associated with Soviet efforts elsewhere in the 
Third World and its reputation as a guarantor o f friendly regimes. Bringing home 
the troops was not in itself a problem, but if the withdrawal was followed by a 
collapse o f the government or a mujahadeen victory there could be manifold 
consequences for the prestige of the Soviet military, for the USSR’s reputation as 
an economic benefactor and political role model. As much as Gorbachev’s views 
on foreign policy by early 1986 were already a significant departure from those of 
his predecessors, he was not about to unravel the entire fabric o f Soviet foreign 
policy and its attendant myths. He sought a breakthrough with the US, but 
specifically left out “regional” issues and “solidarity” with “fighters for 
independence” off the agenda. And Gorbachev knew that were the worst to 
happen as a result o f a withdrawal he initiated, it would be great fodder for the 
conservatives who were already growing suspicious o f his turns in foreign policy. 
Meanwhile, as we shall see in the section below, the war remained within
51 Liakhovskii Tragedia i doblest’ Afgana, 523. Unfortunately, the record of this meeting is unavailable.
52 Politburo meeting, February 23, 1987 GFA PB 1987, p.l 14
53 Chemiaev, Six Years with Gorbachev, 43.
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boundaries that the Soviet state could tolerate -  the wound may have been 
bleeding, but the patient was not in danger of massive blood loss.
Fighting a limited war
Moscow’s military and politial approach to the war sought to minimise its impact while 
preserving freedom o f action. The military strategy was typical for counter-insurgency 
warfare: protect main routes, cities, air bases, and logistic sites; support the Afghan 
forces with superior air, artillery, intelligence, and logistic capabilities, and strengthen 
DRA forces so that they could fight without Soviet support.54 The USSR avoided 
becoming over-committed by limiting its presence in Afghanistan to 120,000 troops, 
and it never expanded the war into neighbouring Pakistan, thus avoiding some of the 
pitfalls o f US strategy in Vietnam. It faced domestic pressures and international 
criticism, but not at a level that made an immediate change o f course obligatory. 
Appreciating the limits and costs o f the war is crucial to understanding why Gorbachev 
could afford to spend several years tinkering with the Afghan problem before bringing 
home the troops.
From the beginning, the intervention in Afghanistan had put Moscow under 
significant pressure. The invasion had isolated the Soviet Union diplomatically, with the 
1980-84 period seeing some of the greatest tension in the Cold War era. The 
intervention quickly turned into a long-term military commitment, the costs of which 
added to the cost of the military supplies and civilian aid provided to the Kabul regime 
by Moscow. There were domestic social and political concerns as well. The Politburo 
had decided to conduct the war in secret, keeping press coverage to a minimum and 
even, as we saw in the last chapter, restricting information on the gravestones of soldiers 
who had fallen in Afghanistan. Still, some details filtered through, and Andropov even
54 Lester W. Grau and Mohammand Yahya Nawroz “The Soviet Experience in Afghanistan” Military 
Review 1995 75(5): 17-27.
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expressed his concern about the social effects of the war to UN mediator Diego 
Cordovez. There was also the problem of the Soviet Union’s large Muslim population 
and how it might react to the war once the Soviet involvement became more widely 
known.
It would be a mistake to focus too much attention on the effects o f any of these 
pressures as the reason for Moscow to seek a way out o f Afghanistan. Firstly, the 
Brezhnev leadership in particular seemed willing to weather the diplomatic isolation 
and seemed to believe that it would eventually pass. Secondly, militarily and 
economically, the war was costly but well within the means o f the USSR’s military- 
industrial complex. In fact, from a tactical point o f view, the army only improved at 
fighting the mujahadeen as the war went on and adjusted well to the introduction o f new 
weapons such as the Stinger.55 Thirdly, the Soviet leadership was certainly not 
completely ignorant o f public opinion, and in fact studied it through various institutes as 
well as the KGB. Still, it did not face the same pressures from its population that the US 
did in Vietnam, and would have probably withstood the anger of military families if  it 
had decided to stay in Afghanistan. Finally, the fear o f a Soviet Muslim revolt sparked 
by the Soviet invasion was largely a fantasy of the CIA and some sympathetic scholars 
in the West -  in practice the Afghan war did not greatly change the religious climate in 
the Central Asian republics, and the two issues never seem to have become associated in 
the minds of the Soviet leadership.
It is almost axiomatic among senior Soviet officers who fought in the Afghan 
conflict, and then spoke or wrote about it, that the military was able to carry out its duty. 
Aleksandr Liakhovskii, who served in Afghanistan as part o f the military advisory staff 
and later emerged as the most authoritative Russian writer on the topic, concludes that
55 For example, the Soviet military set up specialised training courses for Afghan-bound soldiers in the 
Turkestan Military District where conditions were similar to those found in Afghanistan. Similar training 
sites were set up in other parts o f Central Asia. See Aleksandr Alexiev “Inside the Soviet Army in 
Afghanistan,” RAND Publication Series, (Santa Monica: May 1988), 15.
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the Soviet military did not lose the war: “It would be wrong to say that the 40th army 
sustained a military defeat. It is just that the army was faced with tasks which it was not 
in a position to carry out, since a regular army cannot radically solve the problem of 
revolt.”56 Lieutenant-General Boris Gromov, the last commander o f the 40th army in 
Afghanistan, goes further: “There is no basis to say that the 40th army suffered a defeat, 
just as there is no basis for saying we carried a military victory in Afghanistan.” Nobody 
had ever asked the 40th army to bring about a military victory, Gromov writes. Rather, 
the limited contingent was tasked with protecting the government o f Afghanistan and
C H
preventing an invasion from outside, which it did.
It is indeed true that the Soviet military never lost a battle or gave up a position 
in its war with the mujahedeen. Yet the decisive blow that the Soviet leadership hoped 
to strike at the opposition never came. Senior officers who served in Afghanistan were 
being asked to carry out what they felt was an impossible task. Colonel V.A. Merimskii, 
who served in Afghanistan in the early years o f the war, writes that he repeatedly asked 
Marshal Sokolov, then the senior commander on the ground, to take this up with the 
Defense Minister, Dmitrii Ustinov. When Sokolov eventually did, Ustinov seemed to 
agree, but asked Sokolov to at least find a way to close the borders and stop arms from 
entering Afghanistan: “all right, you can’t deal with the counterrevolution, but can you
c o
defend from penetration from the outside?” Sokolov apparently replied that he could.
Responses like Sokolov’s probably helped to prolong the war, giving the 
Politburo reasons to believe that it would yet be possible to change the military situation 
for the better. In fact, the Soviet military was having trouble dealing with a task that 
could seem simple only to someone who had little idea of how weapons were crossing 
the border. Afghanistan’s long mountainous border with Pakistan was almost 
impossible to control. Historically, Afghan kings secured alliances with Pushtun tribes
56 Liakhovskii, Tragedia i doblest 744.
57 Gromov, Ogranichenniy Kontingent, 330-332.
58 V.A. Merimskii “Afganistan: Uroki i vivody” Voenno-Istoricheskiy Zhurnal 1994(1), 24-29.
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living in the area and rarely sent their own regular army to guard the border with British 
India. Even then it was assumed that Pushtun tribes, who lived on both sides of the 
“Durand line” would be able to migrate back and forth as they saw fit. Ustinov’s request 
to “close the border” was a deceptively easy one.
Moreover, Sokolov himself knew that even this “simplified” task was all but 
impossible to carry out. The Soviet military and the DRA tried to secure the border as 
best they could using a combination o f military units, Afghan secret police detachments, 
and border patrol. This still left gaps for penetration, on top of which the reliability of 
Afghan forces was always in question. In a meeting with Soviet advisors in March 
1984, Sokolov admitted that, as far closing off the borders was concerned, “at the 
current moment we cannot do it. Right now we have to close off the most important 
sectors.”59 In fact, arms continued to flow into Afghanistan from Pakistan, completing a 
long supply chain that included US and Saudi funding and weapons, sometimes 
acquired from countries such as China, Egypt and Israel.
The 40th Army tried to compensate for its inability to close the borders by trying 
to interrupt the supply lines on the Afghan side o f the border.60 In the early years of the 
war, this involved a heavy reliance on fixed-wing aircraft to provide air support in raids 
on mujahadeen supply lines. Bombardment was supplemented by attacks from 
helicopter gun-ships and by means of mines, which were often dropped from the air 
along supply routes. These had the effect of wounding mujahadeen as well as crippling
59 Notes o f a meeting with party advisors. March 31, 1984. Private Archive o f Marshal Sokolov, provided 
to the author by General Aleksandr Liakhovskii. That Sokolov, apparently, was ready to admit to his 
subordinates and colleagues in Afghanistan that the border issue could not be solved but found it difficult 
to tell the defense minister the same is indicative o f some o f the problems o f communication even near 
the top o f the Soviet hierarchy. It seems to confirm that even as Soviet leaders learned about the 
difficulties o f the conflict, they were sometimes spared the complete picture.
60 Not surprisingly, the vast majority o f Soviet military operations took place near the border with 
Pakistan, such as Kandahar. Some o f these were efforts to disrupt the mujahadeen supply chain but others 
were engagements with entrenched opposition groups. The distribution o f fighting within Afghanistan as 
seen by Soviet military planners is well illustrated by the maps provided in Maiorov, Pravda ob 
Afganistane.
108
mules and camels that might be carrying supplies.61 As with other cases when mines 
were used in warfare, they became a lasting hazard for civilians, yet another of the 
tragic legacies of the war. According to Major General Oleg Sarin and Colonel Lev 
Dvoretskii, some three million such mines were dropped or laid between 1980 and 1984 
alone.62
Another major preoccupation was protecting Soviet-DRA lines of 
communication, which supported both the 40th Army as well as DRA forces and cities. 
The only reliable overland route was a highway that ran from Termez to Kabul and 
connected that city with urban centers like Jalalabad and Herat, forming a horse-shoe 
through Afghanistan.63 Typically for guerrilla warfare, mujahadeen often attacked 
supply lines, which were particularly vulnerable on the difficult roads.64 Even the 
Kabul-Termez highway was a major challenge to drivers, particularly in winter. One 
Soviet source described it as a road that winds “in steep and narrow hairpin turns, with a 
perpendicular cliff on one side and an abyss on the other.”65 Not only were Soviet 
soldiers vulnerable in such conditions, they often found it difficult to attack mujahadeen 
who seemed to melt away into the mountains above.66 At the same time, the 
vulnerability o f the roads and their importance for Soviet military and economic aid 
meant that the number o f troops that could actually be used for operations was often 
quite limited -it is estimated that some 35% of Soviet troops were being used to guard
61 See Edward W. Westermann “The Limits o f Soviet Airpower: The Failure o f Military Coercion in 
Afghanistan, 1979-89” The Journal o f  Conflict Studies XIX (Fall 1999), 41-43.
62 Sarin, Oleg and Dvoretskii, Oleg The Afghan Syndrome: The Soviet Union’s Vietnam (Novato: 1993), 
120.
63 The highway was a relic o f an earlier era of Soviet-Afghan friendship. The road was built by Soviet 
engineers in 1950s, a result o f the USSR’s push into the Third World under Premier Nikita Khrushchev. 
Earlier Afghan Kings had resisted British and Russian offers to build communications in Afghanistan, 
fearing that these would then be used to invade the country. See Vartan Gregorian The Emergence o f  
Modern Afghanistan: Politics o f  Reform and Modernization, 1880-1946. (Stanford University Press, 
California, 1969).
64 See Soviet Afghan War, 64-67.
65 Quoted in Westermann, “The Limits o f Soviet Airpower,” 41.
66 Feifer, The Great Gamble, 100-105.
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roads.67 This, and the high rate of hospitalization due to disease among Soviet troops,
ZQ
limited the number of soldiers available for combat operations.
Both fixed wing aircraft and helicopters were o f major importance in other kind 
of attacks on mujahadeen positions. In the early years o f the war in particular, Soviet 
strategy relied on “hammer and anvil” operations involving massive attacks from the air
i t
and mechanised advances on the ground. By the third year o f the war the 40 Army was 
relying increasingly on the helicopter-gunships, which could drop bombs from a lower 
altitude (and thus with greater precision) than fixed-wing aircraft and could also strafe 
rebel fighters. Over time, too, the 40th Army increased its use of special forces (voiska 
spetsalnogo naznachen ’ia, or spets-naz), which could be used for targeted attacks 
against bands of fighters. On the whole, the Soviet military, which was geared towards 
conventional warfare with an eye on central Europe, adjusted well to the requirements 
of mobility that came with a guerilla war in a mountainous terrain.69 Nevertheless, air 
power remained a key feature of Soviet combat tactics as well as a way to supplement
70transport by road.
The larger dilemma Soviet generals faced was how to use force against the 
insurgency without alienating the Afghan population. While Soviet forces were 
generally able to achieve objectives set out in operations, Soviet tactics often 
undermined the broader efforts to pacify Afghanistan. Attacks from the air, even well 
targeted ones, inevitably hit civilians as well fighters. Even with the transition from
67 Sarin and Dvoretskii, The Afghan Syndrome, 92.
68 Lester Grau, the most prolific military analyst o f Soviet fighting in Afghanistan, has suggested that the 
high rates o f disease, highly unusual for a modem army, contributed to the falling morale of the troops 
and the undermining o f the Soviet army’s prestige within Soviet society as a whole. See Lester W. Grau 
and William A. Jorgensen “Beaten by the Bugs: The Soviet-Afghan War Experience” Military Review 
1997 77(6): 30-37 and Grau and Nawroz “The Soviet Experience in Afghanistan.” It is not an 
unreasonable argument -  the number o f soldiers incapacitated by disease was over 400,000 (as opposed 
to the official figure of wounded, released in 1989, o f 14,000). Nevertheless, there has as yet been no 
study of how this affected the military’s standing in the longer term.
69 This is not to say that the adjustment was easy. The Red Army had last engaged in a similar campaign 
in its battle against the basmachi in the 1920s, but had since largely abandoned counter-insurgency 
training or planning. After the invasion, Soviet generals did turn to some o f the military texts written 
during the basmachi campaign as they tried to reorient the 40th army to partisan warfare in mountainous 
conditions. Liakhovskii, Tragedia i doblest’, 386-87.
70 Westermann, “Limits o f Soviet Airpower,” 44-50.
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fixed-wing bombing to helicopter gunships civilian casualties remained high. Soviet 
officers might say that the war had to be won politically, not militarily, but their tactics 
contributed to the political problem. Considering the restraints imposed by the situation 
and by Soviet leaders themselves, however, there weren’t many options available. A 
major decrease in the use of airpower would have meant a much larger invasion by 
ground troops, particularly considering how many were used to guard the supply routes 
and for other support functions. More boots on the ground could have created its own 
political difficulties within Afghanistan as well as within the USSR.
Although the war was frustrating to senior Soviet commanders, the conflict 
never amounted to a serious military or strategic challenge to the USSR. There are 
several reasons for this. Firstly, while the material costs o f the war were significant, 
they were little more than a dent when viewed in comparison to the overall Soviet 
military budget. Aid to Afghanistan constituted a significant, but not overwhelming, 
portion o f the aid given to Third World at this time -  estimated at $78 billion between 
1982 and 1986. Taken together, aid to the DRA military and the expenses associated 
with Soviet military amounted to 1578.5 million rubles in 1984, 2623.8 in 1985, 3197.4 
in 1986, and 4116 in 1987, or roughly $7.5 billion over the four years.71 By comparison, 
the entire Soviet military budget as late as 1989 was $128 billion.72 Similarly, according 
to Russian government records, Afghanistan’s debt to the USSR by October 1991 was 
4.7 billion rubles, roughly half o f India’s, and about a tenth o f the total debt owed by
7Tdeveloping countries.
Further, while the war certainly required the exertion of military power and 
consequent loss of life at level higher than any since the Second World War, it was far
71 GosPlan USSR [State Planning] Memorandum Regarding Expenses in Afghanistan, January 1988, 
Volkogonov Papers, Regional File, Box 26, Reel 17. The calculation is based on the official exchange 
rate at the time o f .65 dollars to the Soviet ruble.
72 “Soviet Military Budget: $128 Billion Bombshell” New York Times, May 31, 1989. According to 
Stanislav Menshikov, a Russian economist, the military budget represented some 20-25% of GDP. 
However, it is not clear what methodology he uses to get at this number. Stanislav Menshikov “Stsenarii 
Razvitia VVP” Voprosy Ekonomiki (1999), no.7, 86.
73 “Repayment o f developing countries’ debt” October 1991, GARF Fond 10026, op.5, d. 640.
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from unmanageable. The official tally, presented to the Central Committee the day after 
the last soldier left Afghanistan, counted 13,826 dead, 1977 of those being officers. The 
40th Army had also suffered 49985 wounded, of whom 7281 were unable to return to 
duty.74 As Fred Halliday has pointed out, Soviet casualties were comparable to 
peacetime losses due to accidents.
Finally, even though Afghanistan was on the Soviet border, there was little fear 
that the conflict would escalate to the point that the Soviet Union itself would be 
threatened. It should be noted that this was not for lack of trying on the part o f the 
mujahadeen. From 1985 onward, in particular, the Pakistani ISI formulated plans to 
attack targets within the Soviet Union. For example, in 1986 the ISI trained fifteen 
Afghan resistance commanders to launch attacks within Soviet territory that would help 
disrupt the Soviet supply chain. While several attacks on the rail link between 
Samarkand and Termez, the last outpost on the Soviet border, were successful, others
•  •  •  •  •  7  f%failed. In December 1986, there were also attacks on a power station in Tajikistan.
On the whole, however, these successes were very limited precisely because of 
US and Pakistani fears that the war could potentially escalate into a wider conflict as a 
result. The USSR responded with force to these incursions, bombarding the Afghans 
side of the border heavily. When the ISI commander in charge of aid to the resistance 
devised a plan to hit the “Friendship Bridge,” which provided a road link between 
Afghanistan and the USSR, it was called off by President Zia ul Haq, who feared
74 CC CPSU Memorandum “Regarding the completion o f the withdrawal o f Soviet troops from the 
Republic o f Afghanistan.” February 16, 1989. Volkogonov Papers, Regional File, Box 26, Reel 17. The 
memorandum makes no mention o f psychological trauma. There is also some controversy about the 
numbers -  for example, a book by the Soviet General Staff cites a figure o f 26,000 dead. However, it is 
not clear what sources are used to reach that number or why it differs from the official tally. See Grau, 
Lester W., and Gress, Michael A., trans & ed. The Soviet Afghan War: How a Superpower Fought and 
Lost (The Russian General Staff) (Lawrence: University Press o f Kansas, 2002), 44.
75 Fred Halliday “Soviet Foreign Policymaking and the Afghanistan War,” 691.
76 Mohammad Yousaf and Mark Adkin, The Bear Trap: Afghanistan’s Untold Story (London: L. Cooper, 
1992), 199.
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escalation of the conflict.77 An April 1987 attack which destroyed several buildings on 
Soviet territory led to a Soviet protest which apparently caused some panic in the 
Pakistani Foreign Office. According to Yousaf, the Soviet ambassador to Islamabad 
relayed the message that “if any further operation was conducted in the Soviet Union
• j o  •
the consequences for the security and integrity o f Pakistan would be dire.” This 
prompted the local CIA official to ask Yousaf “not to start World War III” by 
conducting operations in Soviet territory. Eventually the attacks were called off 
completely.79
The possibility of the conflict moving on to Soviet territory never became a 
major concern for the Soviet leadership or even a reason to seek withdrawal. Similarly, 
the resource drain never became sufficiently serious to be a major factor in Soviet 
decision-making on the war. Although the war was costly in both men and materiel, it 
was well within the limits the Soviet Union could manage.
Special mention needs to be made regarding the Stinger missiles and their 
supposed effect on the Soviet decision to withdraw from Afghanistan. Early in the war 
the Soviet army came to rely quite heavily on close air-support; that is, helicopter gun- 
ships, such as the Mil Mi-24 helicopters. The mujahadeen, fighting with small arms, 
had almost no way to counter against the use of this strategy. It was in response to this
77 Yousaf and Adkin, The Bear Trap, 197-198. Another attack in Kharga using Chinese-made missiles on 
timed ignition destroyed a storage facilities with an estimated $250 million worth o f Soviet militaiy 
equipment. The video footage was replayed on television for several days. See Milton Bearden The Main 
Enemy: The Inside Story o f  the CIA's Final Showdown With the KGB (2003), 228-231.
78 Ibid, 205.
79 Ibid, 206. See also Steve Coll, Ghost Wars 161-162 and Scott, Deciding to Intervene, 46-47. Attacks 
from mujahadeen near border areas were felt from time to time in Soviet territory even in 1987, with 
Soviet civilian dead as a result. See, for example, Artem Borovik, The Hidden War, 42.
80 It should be noted that one of the limits evidently set by Soviet planners was o f not taking the war to 
Pakistan, although there was at least one strike by Soviet special forces that crossed the border, apparently 
without authorization. See Lester W. Grau and Ali Ahmad Jalali, “Forbidden Cross-Border Vendetta: 
Spetsnaz Strike into Pakistan During the Soviet-Afghan War” Journal o f  Slavic Military Studies 2005 
18(4): 661-672. Although Pakistan did complain on occasion about Afghan Air Force jets violating its 
airspace, there does not seem to have been an organised effort on the part o f the DRA and the Soviet 
Union to take the war into Pakistan, even though aerial bombing on the Pakistani side o f the border could 
have helped stopped the flow o f arms into Afghanistan. Soviet records o f Pakistani complaints are 
unavailable, but those lodged with the UN Secretary General can be found in the UN Archives, Secretary 
General’s papers, Problem Area: Afghanistan files.
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situation that the CIA, after offering several inadequate Surface to Air Missiles (SAMs) 
agreed to provide the Stinger, a powerful heat-seeking anti-aircraft weapon that was 
mobile enough to suit the conditions of guerrilla warfare.81
Yet while the Stinger, first introduced on the field in September 1986, did give 
the mujahadeen an important anti-aircraft tool, it hardly changed the course of the war. 
It is true that Soviet pilots now had to fly higher and occasionally abandon their 
missions, whilst all civilian and military visitors to Kabul from that point onwards recall 
with some horror the “screwdriver” descent into the Baghram airbase meant to evade 
the new weapon. Yet it is also true that the Soviet military and pilots adjusted, fitting 
aircraft with various devices to disorient the missiles, flying at night, or staying so low 
to the ground as to make the missiles unusable. Although this adjustment allowed the 
Soviets to limit damage caused by the Stingers, it meant sacrificing accuracy and 
precision, and relying on even more damaging higher-altitude bombing.82
Gorbachev’s first few years in power saw some of the fiercest fighting of the 
war. American analysts at the time noted a major “escalation,” and this may have been 
one of the reasons Reagan did not believe Gorbachev was serious about withdrawing. 
The “escalation” had actually begun under Chernenko, bringing troop levels up to 
120,000 from 100,000 and relying more heavily on special forces.83 While perceived as 
an escalation because of the increase in troop numbers, it was more o f a change in 
tactics that deemphasised attacks from the air and sought to involve more highly trained
a  a
troops for surgical strikes. Nevertheless, the fact that the number o f troops was 
sustained through the first half of 1986 further points to the fact that Gorbachev did not
81 Milton Bearden, The Main Enemy: The Inside Story o f  the CIA’s Final Showdown With the KGB 
(2003), 207. For more on the US decision to supply the Afghan opposition with the Stinger, see Alan J. 
Kuperman “The Stinger Missile and US Intervention in Afghanistan” Political Science Quarterly, Vol.
114, No.2 (Summer, 1999), 219-263; George Crile Charlie Wilson’s War(New York: 2003), 403-439.
82 Harrison and Cordovez Out o f  Afghanistan, 194-201; Kuperman, “The Stinger Missile,” esp 244-249. 
See also the exchange between Kuperman and Milton Bearden, “Stinging Rebukes” in Foreign Affairs 
January/February 2002.
83 Kuperman “The Stinger Missile,” 237-239.
84 Liakhovskii, for one, denies the notion that the military was given “two years” to win the war. 
Liakhovskii, Tragedia i doblest ’ Afgana, 518-519.
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have a plan for withdrawal. Though there is no solid evidence that Gorbachev gave the 
military a certain time frame to win, it is likely that he did not want to dictate an 
immediate withdrawal before trying to achieve a settlement through diplomacy and new 
political strategies within Afghanistan. Withdrawing troops soon after he came to power 
would have meant negotiating from a weaker position.
In every sense, the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan was a limited war, much 
more so than the US involvement in Vietnam. The Soviet Union never expanded the 
war outside o f Afghanistan, even though it may have helped destroy mujahadeen camps 
and intercept arms convoys before they crossed the border. Nor did Soviet leaders 
increase the number o f troops send to fight it above a limit reached early in the war, 
even though it was clear that there were often not enough troops to carry out the “hold” 
part of their clear and hold strategy. There were several good reasons to maintain those 
limits. Soviet leaders maintained these limits because they saw their role as helping the 
Kabul government establish its own defensive capability, pot to fight the war on their 
behalf; because taking the war to Pakistan would have undermined their goal of gaining 
international legitimacy for their client and exacerbating the tensions caused by the 
intervention itself; and because, as will be discussed below, they needed to keep the war
Off • •
limited enough to keep it semi-hidden from the Soviet public. Keeping the war limited 
allowed the Soviet leadership to maintain greater freedom of maneuver in its decision­
making, as well as insist that the intervention was a “private affair” between two 
friendly states. Along with the (relatively) limited impact o f the war within the USSR 
itself, keeping the war itself limited allowed Soviet leaders to delay the discussion about 
withdrawal.
85 The Soviet decision to limit the extent o f the war seems to have been recognised by the US Army in its 
internal assessment in 1989. One section, unfortunately mostly redacted, is called “Limited Goals,
Limited Commitment.” US Army, "Lessons from the War in Afghanistan," May 1989 (Army Department 
Declassification Release), NSA Afghanistan: Lessons from the Last War: 
http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB57/us.html (Accessed July 22, 2009).
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Social effects of the war
After the US became heavily involved in Vietnam, political elites in Washington came 
under pressure from a highly motivated anti-war movement and from wide-spread 
disaffection with the war. The war brought about the downfall of an otherwise popular 
president, Lyndon B. Johnson. As this section will show, Moscow never faced similar 
pressures to withdraw its troops from Afghanistan. Although there were calls from 
dissidents and relatives o f soldiers to end Soviet fighting, this never amounted to a 
broad-based movement. Nor did Soviet Muslims, who might have been expected to 
protest a war against their co-religionists, use the invasion as an opportunity to mount 
resistance against the Soviet state.
After the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, some Western scholars speculated that 
Soviet Muslims might rise up and rebel against the state. There were several reasons to 
suspect that the war in Afghanistan would cause unrest among the Soviet Union’s large 
Muslim population. The first is that the Soviet house always stood on a somewhat shaky 
foundation when it came to maintaining harmony among the nationalities and keeping 
those nationalities loyal to the state. The second was that eradicating Islam and bringing 
it within the control o f the state had always been more difficult than doing the same 
with Orthodox Christianity. Thirdly, three Central Asian Soviet republics shared a 
border with Afghanistan: Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and Turkmenistan. In all three cases 
the dominant ethnic groups of the republic lived on both sides of the border and could 
migrate with relative ease.86
86 See, for example, Alexandre Bennigsen and Marie Broxup, The Islamic Threat to the Soviet Union 
(New York, 1983). Others were more skeptical. Muriel Atkin, a Central-Asia specialist, noted a certain 
tendency among western scholars to “demonise” the treatment o f Soviet Muslims. (See Muriel Atkin, 
“The Islamic Revolution that Overthrew the Soviet State,” Contention 2 (Winter 1993): 94. Fred 
Halliday, writing several years earlier, pointed out that the idea o f an Islamic challenge to the USSR, as 
developed by Western scholars, arose in part from “cold war wishful thinking about the possible 
challenge to the USSR o f politicised Islam, a process in which academic industry and state finance have 
joined enthusiastically.” See Fred Halliday “Islam and Soviet Foreign Policy,” Arab Studies Quarterly 9 
(Summer 1986): 218.
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Before discussing the possible effects of the Afghan war on Soviet Muslims it is 
worth considering the relationship of the state and Islam within the Soviet Union more 
generally. The peoples of the Central Asian republics had been incorporated into the 
Soviet State in the 1920s through a mixture of co-option and often brutal counter­
insurgency.87 In the post-war era, a certain equilibrium had been established. The Soviet 
state set up institutions to monitor and supervise religious activity. One o f these was the 
Council on Religious Affairs, which had offices throughout the USSR and reported to 
the Central Committee.88 The CRA supervised and kept watch over official Muslim 
organizations like the Spiritual Administration o f the Muslims of Central Asia and 
Kazakhstan, or SADUM, or the Spiritual Administration o f Muslims in the North 
Caucasus, DUMSK. SADUM and DUMSK clergy were trained in officially sanctioned 
religious schools, but they were also employees o f the state. Their sermons often 
included comments on nuclear peace and Lenin, as well as denunciations o f the Western
OQ
imperialist intervention in Afghanistan.
Soviet Muslims responded to “official” religion in different ways. Many turned 
to “parallel” Islam, praying in unregistered mosques set up in apartments or abandoned 
buildings, or by joining unsanctioned religious groups, such as Sufi circles. On the 
whole, however, this opposition was quietist. The religious groups rarely engaged in 
political activity per se. Their challenge to the Soviet state was limited to their existence 
outside o f bureaucratic and ideological pontrol. Religious groups also fulfilled certain 
functions like conducting wedding and funeral ceremonies which were normally carried
87 In fact, Andropov recalled this episode o f Soviet history in a 1983 Politburo meeting: “Miracles don’t 
happen. Sometimes we are angry at the Afghans...but lets remember our fight against the basmachi. Back 
then almost the entire Red Army was concentrated in Centra Asia, and the fight with the basmachi went 
on into the 30s.” Record o f Politburo Meeting, March 10, 1983, Sowjetische Geheimdokumente, 410.
88 The CRA was created in 1965 by consolidating several other institutions. The Council, like its 
predecessors, was supposed to enforce laws regarding religion and report any irregularities to the 
government. The council was also responsible for distributing buildings to properly registered religious 
organizations.
89 ’’Short summary o f the sermon given at a prayer meeting o f Muslim believers o f the town o f Votkinsk 
on the day o f the ‘Qurban-Bayram’ holiday,” October 8, 1981, GARF Fund 6991, Perechen 6, Delo 
2070.
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out by government offices. At the same time, many local communists in Central Asia 
and the Caucasus also participated in “parallel” Islam.
While primarily quietist, “parallel” Islam could provide a forum for more overt 
anti-Soviet activity. One example o f this was the “samizdat” which circulated in both 
Central Asia and the Caucasus and often carried truly anti-Soviet messages, including 
calls to avoid military service.90 The implications of these messages were highlighted 
during the Afghan war. On several occasions there were reports of violence breaking 
out between Muslim recruits and military authorities. In June 1985, there were reports 
of clashes between Chechen recruits and officers when the former refused to go to 
Afghanistan and fight their “Muslim co-religionists.”91 This was not an isolated 
incident. Later that summer, a military train carrying conscripts from the North 
Caucasus to the Afghan border was delayed when a fight broke out between Muslims 
and Russian soldiers, with arguments about religion fueling the entire incident.92
Cross-border ethnic and religious ties on the one hand and the existence of a 
“parallel” religious.network on the other gave Soviet Muslims, particularly in Central 
Asia, the ability to discuss the war in a more open way than others in the Soviet Union, 
Not surprisingly, some o f the earliest strong negative reactions to the war came from 
among Central Asian Muslims. In 1983, for example, the CRA reported to the CPSU 
Central Committee that in Tajikistan, some unregistered mullahs were issuing
90 For example, an investigation in the Chechen-Ingush ASSR in 1979 uncovered 19 “official” and 
dozens o f “unofficial” recording studios that were copying and distributing such tapes, which included 
prayers, religious instructions, and admonishments for young men not to join the Soviet army. “Regarding 
the samizdat o f ideologically improper musical compositions in the Chechen-Ingush ASSR,” May 11, 
1979. RGANI Fund 5, Opis 76, Delo 124. See also Yaacov Ro’i Islam in the Soviet Union (London, 
2000), 426.
91 Taras Kuzio “Opposition in the USSR to the occupation o f Afghanistan” Central Asian Survey Vol.6, 
Issue 1,(1987), 114.
92 Chemiaev Diary, NSA, August 27, 1985. Chemiaev read about the incident in the Central Committee 
Secretariat protocol.
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statements saying “it is forbidden to bury Soviet soldiers killed in Afghanistan 
according to Muslim rites, as they fought against true Muslims.”
The war permeated Central Asian Muslim communities in other ways as well. 
Some of the resistance organizations in Afghanistan were able to find supporters north 
of the Soviet-Afghan border. In 1983 the Tajik-dominated Jemiat-e Islami claimed to 
have 2500 members in Soviet Tajikistan.94 The number may have been an exaggeration, 
but any presence at all is significant and would have been of concern to Soviet 
authorities. Later in the decade, thousands of Central Asian Muslims would travel, 
clandestinely, to madrasas of the Deobandi school in North-West Pakistan, where they 
were supported and even given scholarships.95
The potential to stir trouble among the Central Asian Muslims proved tempting 
for the CIA and the Pakistani ISI. In 1982 pamphlets with titles like “The Life of the 
Great Muhammad,” and “How to Pray,” as well as Islam and Social Justice by the 
Pakistani Islamist Sayed Abul-ala al Mawdoodi, were being printed in Peshawar in 
Russian and smuggled into Central Asia. Their existence came to light when they were 
criticised in a Kyrgyz newspaper by a local academic.96 The CIA decided to back these 
efforts as part of its support for the anti-communist resistance. As CIA Chief William 
Casey put it, the Muslims of Central Asia “could do a lot o f damage to the Soviet 
Union.”97 The intelligence agencies experimented with a small-scale infiltration with 
Mohammad Yousaf coordinating the effort. With CIA help, some ten thousand copies 
of the Koran were prepared in Uzbek along with books describing Soviet atrocities 
against Uzbeks. During the summer o f 1984, dozens of mujahadeen, primarily ethnic 
Uzbeks, made the night journey across the Amu Darya to bring the books into
93 V.A. Kuroedov (CRA) to the CPSU Central Central Committee, September 16, 1983 RGANI Fund 5, 
Opis 89, Delo 82, p.60; Ro’i Islam in the Soviet Union, 346.
94 Ro’i, Islam in the Soviet Union, 717.
95 Ahmed Rashid Jihad: The Rise o f  Militant Islam in Central Asia (New Haven, 2002), 44.
96 Aleksandr Bennigsen “Afghanistan and the Muslims o f the USSR” in Rosemary Klass, ed., 
Afghanistan: The Great Game Revisited (New York: 1987), 298.
9 Steve Coll Ghost Wars: The Secret History o f  the CIA, Afghanistan, and Bin Laden, from the Soviet 
Invasion to September 10, 2001 (New York, 2004), 104-105.
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Uzbekistan. According to Yousaf, the Koran was well received, but there was little 
interest in the books on atrocities.98 A March 1984 CRA report noted that growing ties 
with Afghanistan had led to an increase in religious literature coming into the Tajik 
SSR."
Soviet officials at all levels were certainly aware that the Afghan war could 
make the situation in Central Asia and other Muslim republic more difficult. The 
possibility o f the “Islamic Factor” being used by “enemies” to destabilise the Soviet 
Union was the subject of a 1981 Central Committee resolution, and the CRA was tasked 
with helping to neutralise the threat.100 Officials in Uzbekistan also noted with alarm 
that “agents of imperialism” were trying to use the “Islamic factor” in the republic, not 
only stirring up religiosity, but giving it an “anti-Soviet, nationalist direction.”101
Yet Moscow did not respond to these reports with any great alarm. At most, 
officials in Moscow felt some concern, and passed resolutions suggesting better 
propaganda and educational efforts. None of the available Politburo records suggest that 
this was a primary concern for leaders in the 1980-86 time periods.102 In light o f what 
has happened in Central Asia since 1991, particularly in Tajikistan, it may seem strange 
that Moscow did not respond with greater alarm to the possibility of “blowback.” There 
are several important factors to consider, however: first, the problem of religiosity 
among Soviet Muslims predated the Afghan war and had reached an equilibrium that 
seemed to satisfy both the state and the religious community. The permeation o f
98 Yousaf, Mohammad and Adkin, Mark The Bear Trap: Afghanistan’s Untold Story (London: L. Cooper, 
1992), 192-95.
99 Memorandum to CRA official V.A. Nurullaev, March 1984 GARF. F.6991, op.6, d. 2761.
100 CRA memorandum, January 19, 1982 GARF F.6991, op.6, d. 2306.
101 Information regarding a CRA conference in Tashkent, April 18, 1984 GARF F.6991, op.6, d. 2762.
102 Which is not to say that they did not consider certain manifestations o f Islam as dangerous. There were 
numerous resolutions on ways combating Islam before and after the Soviet invasion. In July 1986 the 
question was discussed at a Politburo meeting, where Gorbachev called Islam a “dark religion” and 
admitted that its influence seemed to be growing. The question was not connected to the Afghanistan war, 
nor did Gorbachev seem particularly alarmed. See Politburo discussion July 24, 1986, Gorbachev 
Foundation Archives, Notes o f Politburo Discussions, 1986, p. 149.
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literature from Afghanistan did not affect it only significantly. Secondly, while Soviet
Muslims were probably not supportive of the war, this did not mean they were ready to
launch a holy war against the Soviet state or indeed to upset the social order from which
they in some ways benefited. Finally, to the extent that officials were concerned about
the “Islamic factor” being a destabilizing consequence of the war in Afghanistan, they
believed that the best way to prevent it was to win the war and establish a stable
government in Kabul.104
Of course, it was not just Soviet Muslims who were unhappy with the war.
During the course o f the war, the broader Soviet public, through unofficial channels,
learned about the war and began to voice its disapproval. Soviet leaders were not
unaware o f this unrest. As Chapter 1 showed, in July 1981 the Politburo was already
considering how to handle the letters coming to the central committee from parents and
relatives of the fallen.105 As early as 1983, Yurii Andropov was worrying about the
effect o f the war on Soviet society. Yet it is one thing to say that the effect of the war on
public opinion concerned Soviet leaders, and quite another to say that it constituted an
urgent need for Soviet leaders to consider withdrawal. The nature of the pre-glasnost
Soviet system meant that it was possible to keep the details o f a “limited war” from
Soviet society, at least for a few years. When the Politburo considered “perpetuating the
memory o f soldiers who died in Afghanistan,” its members seemed to have few qualms
about keeping any potentially sensitive information off their gravestones, since “from a
political point o f view this would not be entirely correct.”106
Indeed, in the early years of the war, its presence was only clearly felt in a few
areas. In Tashkent, often the first stop for returning veterans as well as troops bound for
103 Atkin, writing in 1989, noted that the public attitude regarding Islam of Soviet officials actually 
changed little during the early 1980s in comparison with the pre-invasion period. Atkin, Muriel The 
Subtlest Battle: Islam in Soviet Tajikistan (Philadelphia: 1989), 39-40.
104 Author’s interview with Leonid Shebarshin, March 19, 2008.
105 Working Record o f CPSU Central Committee Politburo Meeting, July 30, 1981, published in 
Krasnaya Zvezda February 15, 2000. Translated by Gary Goldberg. CWIHP Bulletin 14/15, 245.
106 Ibid. See Chapter 1.
121
Afghanistan, the sight of wounded young men was familiar. Svetlana Alexievich, the 
well-known Russian human rights activist and author, described the city airport in 1986 
as a place where “Young soldiers, no more than boys, hop about on crutches amidst the 
suntanned holiday crowds.” She goes on to say that nobody noticed the soldiers, they 
were “a familiar sight here, apparently.”107 Most cities were not so closely connected 
with the war, however.
As more and more soldiers completed tours of duty and returned home, 
sometimes as wounded veterans, sometimes as bodies for burial, but almost always
10Rmarked by the war, it became increasingly difficult to keep a secret. In the early 
years o f the war it was mostly discussed on the pages o f dissident samizdat publications, 
such as the Chronicle o f Current Events. Anti-war posters and leaflets were noted in 
1981 in several major cities, including Moscow and Leningrad.109 By 1985, the scope of 
open opposition to the presence o f Soviet troops in Afghanistan from a wider sector of 
the public was on the rise. Chemiaev noted early in April of that year that a “torrent of 
letters” about Afghanistan was coming in to the Central Committee and the editorial 
offices o f the daily newspaper Pravda. Unlike earlier letters, which were often 
anonymous, these letters were signed. Letters came not only from relatives of soldiers 
but wider members of the public. Soldiers and even senior officers were writing as well, 
and one General wrote that he could not explain to his subordinates why they were 
there.110
It was Gorbachev’s own initiative to open up the press coverage that really 
began to change the way the war was perceived nationwide. A Pravda editorial from 
February 1985 was typical of earlier coverage. Focusing on the US-led effort to supply 
the mujahadeen with arms, the editorial explains the USSR’s involvement as not only a
107 Svetlana Alexievich Zinky Boys: Soviet Voices from a Forgotten War (London, 1992), 3.
108 For the wars effects on veterans and society, see Mark Galeotti, The Soviet Union’s Last War (London, 
1994).
109 Taras Kuzio “Opposition to the War,” 104.
1,0 Chemiaev Diary, NSA, April 4, 1985.
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question o f support for the Afghan revolution, but also of national interest. American
policy was “one element of imperialism’s anti-Soviet strategy” and the Afghan
opposition was fighting on the side of the US:
If it succeeded in strangling the Afghan revolution and 
replacing the people’s government in Kabul, the American 
generals, with the aid of the ringleaders of the Afghan 
counterrevolution, would not fail to take root in Afghanistan 
and provide themselves with bases there, and they would 
reconstitute the electronic reconnaissance centers that 
Washington lost in Iran. After all, one should not forget that the 
Soviet-Afghan border is almost 2400 km. long... It is known 
that the CIA and the Pentagon have long attached great 
importance to espionage concerning these regions.”111
When the press reported on the war directly, it was to highlight individual heroic deeds 
of certain soldiers.112
Changes in how the war was covered began as early as the summer o f 1985. In 
June, General Varennikov drafted a new set o f guidelines that significantly expanded 
what aspects o f the fighting could be addressed in print and other media. For the most 
part the memorandum, approved at the end o f July, focused on widening the reporting 
of acts o f individual heroism as well as small unit combat engagements. That same
month, even before the final approval of Varennikov’s memorandum, Soviet television 
showed footage o f fighting in Afghanistan for the first time. For two and a half minutes 
Soviet viewers were shown young conscripts and burning vehicles.114
The fall and winter saw by far the most frank writing on the war to date. In 
August Aleksandr Prokhanov, a journalist and novelist, published a long piece in 
Literaturnaia Gazeta entitled “Notes from an Armored Personnel Carrier.”115 While 
Prokhanov went on at length about the connection between the soldiers fighting in
111 “Why the Undeclared War Against Afghanistan is Being Waged” Pravda, February 14, 1985, Current 
Digest o f  the Soviet Press, VOL. XXXVII, No.7, 4.
112 See, for example, “This Kind Doesn’t Surrender” Sovetskaia Belorussia, January 6, 1985 CDSP VOL 
XXXVII, No.7, 5.
113 “Regarding publication in the mass media of material relating to the activity o f the limited contingent 
of Soviet troops in Afghanistan” CC CPSU Document and draft by Varennikov and Kirpichenko RGANI 
Fund 89, Perechen 11, Doc 103; Geheimdokumente Sowjetische, 414-422.
114 “Soviet TV gives its viewers rare glimpse o f Afghan war” New York Times July 24, 1985.
1,5 Aleksandr Prokhanov, “Note from an Armored Personnel Carrier” Literaturnaia Gazeta, August 28, 
1985 in CDSP VOL XXXVII No. 43, 7-9.
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Afghanistan and the internationalists who had fought in Spain and the patriots who 
defeated the Nazis, he did not include the standard line about the importance of the 
revolution to the Afghan people. In fact, Prokhanov wrote, after five years “any 
illusions have disappeared.”116 Other, more explicit articles followed. Published letters 
and reports highlighted the difficulty young veterans had readjusting to life back in the 
Soviet Union while also pointing to the futility of the Soviet mission. One letter from a 
communist party official spoke about a meeting with a young, recently demobilised 
veteran, who had been “tormented by the fact that he was powerless to alleviate their
117suffering” and now was enraged by corruption at home.
By 1985, then, a certain amount of social pressure had built up that forced 
Moscow to reconsider how the war was presented to the public. Gorbachev’s decision to 
bring it out in the open was part of his early effort to democratise the Soviet media, but 
it was also had the effect o f making the war an open part of public discourse. Some of 
the negative effects of the war could now be openly discussed. This may also have been 
part o f Gorbachev’s effort to change the discourse on the war in the leadership: by 
appealing to public discontent, he could emphasise the need to withdraw. Crucially, 
however, Gorbachev was not in a position, at any point between 1985 and the start of 
the withdrawal in 1988, where public pressures or social problems were such that he 
was reacting to them in forming his Afghan policy. Instead, he was able to use such 
pressure as did exist to give himself freedom of maneuver and pre-empt criticism from 
potential conservative critics.
Conclusion
This chapter has argued that Gorbachev’s desire to bring Soviet troops home stemmed 
not just from considerations about the wars military, economic, and social costs, but
1,6 Ibid, 7.
117 Komsomolskaia Pravda, January 8, 1986. CDSP Vol XXXVIII, No. 1,1; See also “We Wear Masks,” 
Komsomolskaia Pravda September 24, 1985, CDSP Vol. XXXVII, No.40, 24.
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also because o f the influence of party members intellectuals that were opposed to the 
war from the beginning. Even before he became General Secretary, Gorbachev was the 
Politburo’s point-man for interacting with these intellectuals and soliciting reform ideas 
from them. They in turn shared their belief that the war was a mistake, both formally, 
through policy papers, and informally, when they were invited to brief Gorbachev or 
offer advice. These new thinkers had a view of international relations quite different 
than the confrontational one that had dominated since the fall o f detente at the end of 
1979, and saw the Afghanistan war as the worst o f the Brezhnev eras foreign policy 
mistakes. Gorbachev seems to have agreed. Further, by the time Gorbachev came to 
power, the war had been dragging on for five years without any significant result.
Gorbachev and the team he assembled around him inherited not only a system 
but an entire legacy o f foreign policy making, with the attendant history, myths and 
commitments. Whatever may be said about Gorbachev with hindsight, he was neither 
set to end the Soviet empire nor dismantle the Soviet state. A reformer rather than a 
revolutionary by nature, the consequences o f his actions worried him greatly. Thus even 
while calling the war a “bleeding wound,” Gorbachev worried about the effects on 
Soviet relations with its other client states if it was seen as suffering defeat in 
Afghanistan. Crucially, while Gorbachev saw the war as a tragic mistake, this was not 
how he viewed the broader Soviet policy o f “solidarity” with Third World states and 
national-liberation movements. He believed in Moscow’s obligations and the 
importance o f maintaining its role as guarantor. Though his attitude would start to 
change in mid-1987, in 1985 and 1986 he saw himself as carrying the mantle o f Soviet 
leadership in the Third World as it had evolved since the 1950s.
Such ideas, which some might call sentimental, might have mattered little if the 
military, economic, or social costs o f the war were so staggering that Gorbachev and his 
colleagues would have recognised the need to cut their losses and bring the troops
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home. Yet the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan never put that sort o f pressure on the 
Soviet state. That the war dragged on for years after Gorbachev (and the Politburo) 
agreed that it was time to leave is explained by the legacies of old commitments as well 
as the nature o f the war. A “bleeding wound” it may have been, but the flow came from 
a small vein o f a large animal. The military costs o f the war were significant, but only a 
percentage of the Soviet Union’s foreign aid, even less so o f total defense expenditure. 
The war at no time posed a security risk to the Soviet state. Similarly opposition to the 
war, whether on religious, personal, political, or moral grounds, never expanded beyond 
what the Soviet state could control. Local officials in Central Asia may have worried 
about the penetration of Islamist tracts, but this did not seem to bother Moscow too 
greatly. Like the military costs, the social costs of the war were a worry to Soviet 
leaders, but not enough to end the war. Certainly these factors were small when weighed 
against the risk of a Soviet defeat in the eyes of the world.
126
Chapter III: Reforming Counterinsurgency: The Replacement of Karmal and the
National Reconciliation Campaign, 1986-1987
“The problem for both Gorbachev and 
Shevardnadze was that they could not 
just abandon the commitments and the 
people that, as they understood about 
this time, 1988 and afterward, already 
belonged to the past. They were looking 
for a more or less smooth way to 
dismantle those commitments.”1
Pavel Palazchenko, 1997
By the spring of 1986 there was a consensus in the Soviet leadership that the Soviet 
military involvement in Afghanistan had to end. In October 1985 the Politburo had 
agreed with Gorbachev that it was time to pull out and at the party congress in February 
1986 the Soviet leader had publicly called the war a “bleeding wound.” The withdrawal 
started in May 1988. What took place in between? As the last chapter showed, the war 
was not going so badly that an imminent withdrawal was necessary, particularly when 
such a withdrawal would be balanced against the potential political costs. But somehow 
the war had to be finished without the potential negative consequences. As one of his 
aides put it, “Gorbachev hoped that he could right the mistakes of his predecessors 
while paying no political price.”
This meant, first o f all, that the Soviet involvement could not end in porazhenie, 
a Russian word literally meaning defeat but suggestive of something more shattering 
than a military reversal. In fact, Moscow’s demands at this time differed little from 
Yurii Andropov’s three years earlier. First, outside interference had to stop, which 
required an agreement with the US and Pakistan. Second, there had to be some 
international recognition of the DRA regime, even if it was acceptable for the character
1 Pavel Palazchenko Six Years with Gorbachev and Shevardnadze (University Park, 1997), 89.
2 Andrei Grachev, International Department official, Gorbachev aide and press secretary from September- 
December 1991. Author’s interview, London, February 1, 2008.
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o f that regime to change, at least within certain bounds. Third, the DRA regime had to 
outlast the Soviet troop presence. At no point could the USSR be perceived as bowing 
to international pressure.
As this chapter will show, not only were Moscow’s demands and preconditions 
for withdrawal in 1986 similar to those issued in 1983, its approach to the Afghan 
problem was similar as well. Beginning in 1985 there was renewed emphasis on the 
four-party talks at Geneva which had previously stalled. From 1987 Moscow also 
undertook a renewed effort to stabilise the Kabul government, and to make it more self- 
reliant and acceptable to the Afghans. The new initiative, baptised “National 
Reconciliation,” stressed reaching out to the clergy and to peasants, winning over 
elements o f the opposition, and using Afghan traditions to secure legitimacy for the 
government. It was a case, as Yulii Vorontsov later recalled, of “doing everything 
possible to withdraw in good order.”3
This is not to say that the 1985-88 period was just a repeat of 1982-83. Indeed, 
while the initiatives, plans and hopes were similar in the broad outline, there were 
significant differences. National Reconciliation attempted to go further and deeper, in 
terms of transforming the Kabul government, than anything undertaken between 1980 
and 1985, and Moscow’s efforts in Geneva showed more flexibility than similar efforts 
under Andropov. There was an effort, too, to change the manner o f Soviet involvement 
in Afghanistan, aimed at improving the DRA government’s self reliance. And o f course, 
Moscow initiated a key personnel change with a good deal o f support within 
Afghanistan, replacing Babrak Karmal with Mohammed Najibullah.
In the end, these efforts proved insufficient, and in 1988 Moscow accepted a 
withdrawal on terms much less favourable than those it had initially sought. It is 
impossible to understand either the progress of the war between 1985-88, or the
3 Author’s interview with Ambassador Yulii Vorontsov, Moscow, September 11, 2007.
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progress of events after the withdrawal, without looking at Moscow’s hopes and efforts 
with regard to what it could accomplish in Afghanistan.
Exit Karmal, Enter Najib
Moscow’s goal in Afghanistan had always been to create a government stable enough to 
function without Soviet troops. Under Gorbachev this effort was renewed with greater 
force. When it became clear that few changes could be expected while Babrak Karmal 
remained in power, the Politburo sought to replace him. The replacement o f Karmal 
became the first o f several steps Moscow took between 1985 and 1987 in the hope of 
reforming the DRA government.
In March 1986 Babrak Karmal went to Moscow for a month of medical 
treatment. He arrived seemingly sure of his position at the top of the DRA-PDPA 
hierarchy, and of Soviet support for his position. However, upon his return he was 
edged out, and by the end of the year he had been completely removed from any role 
within the Afghan leadership. The reason for this abrupt change was that Moscow had 
decided, after six years o f bombing the country in order to help prop up his rule, that 
Karmal was the wrong person for the job. Instead, the honour now passed to 
Mohammed Najibullah, nicknamed the “Ox” both for his physical strength and forceful 
personality. And it was this “Ox,” Moscow hoped, that would help plough the exit road 
for Soviet troops.
Soviet leaders had decided to install Karmal because they saw him as a moderate 
and conciliatory figure, but soon grew disappointed with him. As we saw in chapter 
one, there were limitations to his efforts to stabilise the situation in the country and 
expand his party’s control. For all his oratorical skills, Karmal proved indecisive, unable 
to push either his party or his country in any particular direction. Moscow should have 
known better: a profile compiled by Soviet military intelligence, the GRU, in December
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1979, noted that Karmal was “a skilful orator” but “emotional, with a tendency towards 
generalization rather than concrete analysis. He has a poor command of economic 
problems, only interested in their general outline.”4 It was also rumoured that Karmal 
drank rather heavily, despite warnings from his Soviet advisers. In an interview with 
Ogonyok in 1989, Varennikov described him as “a demagogue o f the highest class” who 
“deserved the trust neither of his own colleagues, nor of his people, nor o f our 
advisers.”5
It is not clear at what point Moscow first began to seriously consider replacing 
Karmal. One interesting clue comes from the archives of the UN-Secretary General, 
which reveals that in 1982 the possibility of removing Karmal was discussed by Perez 
de Cuellar and Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko, although it is not clear how 
supportive the latter was of the idea.6 In any case, Soviet leaders had almost certainly 
considered the possibility of getting rid of Karmal before 1985. Indeed, it is possible 
that by 1983 or thereabouts there was a general agreement that Karmal would need to be
n
replaced at some point.
Ultimately, however, it was Gorbachev who pushed for Karmal’s dismissal. 
Gorbachev’s disapproval of Karmal was clear in October 1985, when the two had what 
seems to have been their first substantive discussion. Karmal’s face apparently grew 
dark when he was told that Soviet troops would withdraw. He tried to convince his 
patrons that a withdrawal would be more costly for them in the long run, saying “next
4 “GRU Dossier on B.Karmal,” 1979, in Liakhovskii, Tragedia i doblest’ Afgana, 308-309.
5 Author’s interview with Ambassador Yulii Vorontsov, Moscow, September 11,2007; See also 
Washington Post March 20, 1989; Varennikov’s interview with journalist Artem Borovik in Ogonek, 
March 1989, p.6-7; Plastun and Adrianov disagree with the assessment o f Karmal given by Varennikov, 
Gromov, Liakhovskii, and others, stating that it was the attitude o f Soviet advisers as well as the time that 
he had spent in opposition that limited his effectiveness as a leader. See Plastun & Adrianov, Najibullah. 
Afghanistan v Tiskah Geopolitiki, 70.
6 Gianni Picco to Cuellar, Perez de Cuellar Papers, Sterling Memorial Library, Yale University, Box 9, 
Folder 96. UN officials may have been reacting to some unofficial expressions o f discontent heard from 
Soviet representatives. Author’s interview with Selig Harisson, January 3, 2008.
7 Author’s interviews with Leonid Shebarshin, September 17, 2007 and Andrei Grachev, January 31, 
2008. Liakhovskii, Tragedia i doblest’ Afgana, 495.
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time you will have to send in a million!”8 Gorbachev got the impression that Karmal 
expected Soviet troops to remain in Afghanistan indefinitely. If Gorbachev had any 
hope of progress during Karmal’s reign, that hope diminished after this meeting. At the 
next Politburo session after the meeting with Karmal, Gorbachev concluded his opening 
statement by saying “with or without Karmal we will follow this line firmly, which 
must in a minimally short time lead to our withdrawal from Afghanistan.”9
Although in the fall o f 1985 Karmal did take some steps to implement 
Gorbachev’s recommendations, preparations were soon underway to replace him with 
Mohammed Najibullah. Najib, as he preferred to be known, was the son of a wealthy 
civil servant, graduate o f the prestigious Habibia College10 and the medical faculty of 
Kabul University. Like Karmal, he joined the party at its creation and soon took charge 
of an underground university organization. After practicing medicine for several years, 
he turned to party work full time, joining the central committee in 1977, at the party’s 
“reunification.” His own exile during the period of Khalqi domination was to 
Yugoslavia, from where he returned in December 1979 to lead the State Information 
Service, KhAD, the secret police. In 1981 he entered the Politburo o f the PDPA, where 
he took charge of a commission on tribal relations, and also became part of the defense 
council.11
Najib had caught the eye o f Soviet agents in Kabul as well as leaders back home. 
They were impressed, in part, by his ability to establish links with Pushtun tribal 
leaders. He was well known to Ustinov, Andropov, and Ponomarev, all o f whom 
thought highly of him on similar grounds. Apparently at some point prior to 1983 they
8 B. Padishev, “Najibullah, president Afghanistana” International Affairs (Moscow) Jan. 1990, 20.
9 Chemiaev Diary, October 17, 1985, NSA.
10 A school set up under King Amanullah in the 1920s to educate the children o f elites according to a 
western curriculum.
11 Plastun & Adrianov, Najibullah. Afghanistan v Tiskah Geopoliti/ci 127-128.
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had already consulted former Khalqis, and come to the conclusion that the only viable 
replacement for Karmal, when the time came, would be Najib.12
Najib was neither the sole candidate to replace Karmal nor clearly the best 
choice. A GRU report from April 1986 pointed out that many in the PDPA leadership 
preferred Assadullah Sarwari, a Khalqi and head o f the KhAD under Noor Taraki. 
Sarwari, the report suggested, was a better candidate for uniting the party as well as 
being able to balance Pushtun interests with those of Tajik, Uzbeks and others. Najib, 
by contrast, was a Pushtun nationalist, unlikely to reach out to non-Pushtuns.13 Somce 
consideration was also given to General Abdul Kadyr, the military leader who sided 
with the PDPA in April 1978 and made the coup possible.14
It is not clear how much debate took place regarding Karmal’s possible 
replacement. In all likelihood, such debate was minimal. Najib had been groomed for 
the leadership for several years by the KGB, was both a Pushtun and a Parchamist, and 
was believed to have excellent organizational skills. His promotion in November 1985 
to secretary o f the PDPA Central Committee, where his portfolio included managing 
relations with Pushtun tribes, is further testament to the determination to remove 
Karmal and to the fact that Najib was chosen as a replacement quickly and without 
much debate.15
In March 1986, when Babrak Karmal was invited to Moscow for discussions 
and for “health” reasons, Soviet leaders tried to convince him that he had to step down, 
that his health was poor and he should make room for someone younger. Apparently 
there was some awkwardness when Soviet doctors treating Karmal told him he was in
12 Plastun & Adrianov, Najibullah. Afghanistan v Tiskah Geopolitiki 60.
13 “Insinuations regarding changes in DRA leadership.” GRU report, in Liakhovskii, Tragedia i doblest’ 
Afgana 532-534. This assessment would be proven correct later, when Najibullah proved reluctant to deal 
with the Tajik leader Ahmad Shah Massoud, whom the Soviet military believed was the most prominent 
commander with whom a deal could be made, preferring instead to reach out to Hekmatyar, a Pushtun 
seen as one o f the more “extremist” leaders.
14 Author’s interviews with Leonid Shebarshin, September 17, 2007.
15 Plastun & Adrianov, Najibullah. Afghanistan v Tiskah Geopolitiki 127-128.
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fine health.16 Karmal saw that he had little room to maneuver in Moscow and so did his 
best to be allowed to return to Kabul. He claimed to understand the situation and
1 7
promised act differently and pay greater heed to Soviet recommendations.
Karmal was allowed to return to Kabul on the condition that he step down as 
head of the party, remaining only Chairman of the Revolutionary Committee. In 
Moscow, he was not trusted to do this voluntarily and so Vladimir Kriuchkov, then head 
of intelligence at the KGB, was sent after him. According to available evidence, Karmal 
proved obstinate.18 In a lengthy and emotional monologue, he professed undying 
loyalty to Soviet leaders. A true Muslim, he explained, honored God, his prophet, and 
the four righteous caliphs. He proclaimed that his feelings to the Soviet Union and its 
leaders were close to this honour; it was, a principal foundation o f his life. Kriuchkov 
persisted, insisting that Karmal’s own colleagues wanted him out o f the way. Finally 
Kriuchkov left, asking permission to return the next day.19 A few hours later, the Soviet 
Minister of Defense and the security services came to see Karmal and insisted he had to
relinquish one of his posts. Finally, realizing he had no cards left to play, Karmal gave
•  20 m.
Following the 18th Plenum of the PDPA, held in May 1986, Najib became the 
chairman of the PDPA Politburo as well as the Defense Council. The plenary session 
“granted Comrade Babrak Karmal’s request that he be relieved o f his duties as General 
Secretary of the PDPA Central Committee for health reasons.”21 But Babrak Karmal 
still had influence and a good deal of support, and he used these to undermine Najib’s 
position. Prior to the 2nd party conference in 1986, Karmal’s supporters spread rumors 
that Najibullah would be removed and Karmal reinstated as general secretary. The
16 Author’s interviews with Leonid Shebarshin, September 17, 2007.
17 Dobrynin, In Confidence, 442-443; Mitrokhin and Andrew, The World Was Going Our Way, 416; 
Leonid Shebarshin Ruka Moskvi (Moscow, 2002), 229-231.
18 Shebarshin, Ruka Moskvy, 229-231.
19 Ibid, 232-236.
20 Ibid, 236.
21 Pravda, May 5, 1986, CDSP Vol XXXVIII, No. 18, 22.
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source o f these rumors was the MGB (formerly KhAD), which contained, thanks to an 
earlier Soviet initiative, a core of people devoted to Karmal. The MGB disliked 
Najibullah because he supposedly aimed to “clean it up” whereas under Karmal its 
agents had a free hand.
Karmal’s maneuvering did not meet with much sympathy in Moscow. At first, 
Soviet leaders preferred to proceed cautiously in replacing him completely. They must 
have realised that Karmal had significant support from sections o f the party. 
Furthermore, they had been his steadfast supporters for six years -  if they abandoned 
him too quickly now their patronage of other Afghan leaders would count for less. In 
September 1986 Gorbachev directed Yulii Vorontsov, the new Soviet ambassador, to 
ask Najib not to rush with firing Karmal. All the while Najib was earning quite a bit of 
respect and even loyalty among his Soviet interlocutors. A note submitted to the 
Politburo in November 1986 by Dobrynin, Sokolov, Shevardnadze, and Chebrikov 
noted “it is clear that he is disposed to finding real approaches to the problem [of 
National Reconciliation]. He needs our support in this, especially since indeed far from 
everyone in the PDPA accepts the idea of reconciliation.” For his part, Najibullah urged 
Moscow to support him in ousting Karmal completely, claiming that Karmal had 
“abandoned Party and government work,” and occupied himself with “fault finding” 
and “speaking out against National Reconciliation.” 24
The support was granted. At a meeting on November 13, 1986 the Politburo 
decided that Najibullah had to be given more leeway to act independently and Karmal 
had to be removed completely. Several Politburo members spoke out in favour of 
Najib, including Gromyko, KGB Chief Chebrikov, Shevardnadze, and Yulii Vorontsov. 
While Gromyko spoke in favour of leaving Karmal as a figurehead, others, including
22 Plastun & Adrianov, Najibullah. Afghanistan v Tiskah Geopolitiki 80.
23 Record o f Politburo Meeting, September 25, 1986, GFA PB 1986, p. 171.
24 CC CPSU Memorandum, November 13, 1986 CWIHP Afghanistan.
25 Plastun & Adrianov, Najibullah. Afghanistan v Tiskah Geopolitiki 73.
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Dobrynin, said that Karmal had to go.26 The November PDPA plenum relieved Karmal 
of his last remaining post. He soon left for Moscow, where he was given a state-owned 
apartment and dacha. Although he returned to Afghanistan in 1989, he never regained 
influence, and died in Moscow in 1996.
Although there may have been other candidates, Najib was ultimately acceptable 
to everyone in Moscow as well as Soviet officers and advisers in Afghanistan. Even the
77military tended to see him as a highly capable organiser with whom they could work.
Throughout 1987 Politburo members felt that in Najib they had found the right man for
the job. “He creates a very good impression,” Shevardnadze said after meeting him in
January 1987, “he is taking the initiative in his own hands.”28
Najib impressed Soviet leaders as a serious, pragmatic politician who
understood the Soviet desire and intention to disengage from Afghanistan. With Najib at
the helm, Soviet leaders wanted to give their efforts some more time to bear fruit. Over
time this faith in Najib came to have a complicated and even dangerous effect on Soviet
perceptions. Vadim Kirpichenko, Deputy Chief o f the KGB First Directorate, later
wrote that Najibullah’s success in establishing more control within Kabul and some
sectors of the government led them to believe that they had found a solution that could
be replicated everywhere in Afghanistan:
Faith in Najibullah and in the dependability of his security 
organs created illusions on the part of the KGB 
leadership... these dangerous illusions, the unwillingness 
to look truth in the face delayed the withdrawal o f Soviet 
troops by several years.29
For Shevardnadze and Vladimir Kriuchkov, director o f intelligence and later KGB
chief, faith in and commitment to Najibullah came to define Moscow’s relationship in
Afghanistan.
26 Record o f Politburo meeting, November 13, 1986, in Sowjetische Geheimdokumente, 434-450.
27 Author’s interview with General Aleksandr Liakhovskii, Moscow, July 2006.
28 Notes o f Politburo Meeting, January 21, 1987, GFA PB 987, 60.
29 Vadim Kirpichenko, Razvedfca: Litsa i Lichnosti [Intelligence: Faces and Personalities] (Moscow: Geia 
1998), 362.
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Gorbachev supported changing the Afghan leadership because he believed that
this would improve the situation there and allow him to bring the troops home. Trying
to draw lessons from Afghan history, Moscow backed an ethnic Pushtun who, they
hoped, would emerge as a friendly yet independent strong-man. Najib was a
communist, but undogmatic and fiercely proud o f his Pushtun identity. His succession
reflected the crucial role the KGB continued to play in Soviet-Afghan policy, one that
1would become even more obvious after the withdrawal. Later events would show that 
whatever his qualities as a leader (and these were considerable), he was a far from ideal 
candidate to lead Afghanistan in National Reconciliation. His desire to hold on to power 
and his distrust o f non-Pushtun politicians led him to reject alliances and truces 
favoured by his Soviet advisers. With the support o f the KGB and key figures in 
Moscow, however, Najib learned he could usually get his way.
National Reconciliation
The purpose of installing a new Afghan Communist leader, o f course, was so that he 
could make it possible for Soviet troops to leave. Gorbachev and many o f his colleagues 
still believed that they could create a successful government in Afghanistan as long as 
the regime gave up any effort to transform Afghanistan along Marxist lines and focused 
instead on gaining legitimacy through traditional Afghan institutions. In 1987 Moscow 
began changing its approach to counter-insurgency in Afghanistan. Previously, the 
emphasis had been on winning over the population through economic incentives and 
organizational work. The new initiative continued that policy but placed a much greater 
emphasis on pacification through winning over rebel commanders.
30 This came up repeatedly in my conversations with former Soviet officials. The parallel they had in 
mind was generally Amir Abdur Rahman Khan, (ruled 1880-1901). Although he had to accept British 
control o f Afghan’s foreign affairs, he is remembered as a strong leader who did much to strengthen 
centralise authority, subdue rebellious tribes, and' limit the power o f traditional chiefs.
31 See chapter 5.
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The Policy o f National Reconciliation was planned and written by Soviet 
advisers, with representatives o f the military, foreign ministry, and KGB all taking 
part.32 National Reconciliation was largely what Moscow had been preaching, and the 
PDPA had theoretically been doing, since 1980. The principles o f what Moscow urged 
Karmal and Najib to do were quite similar. Gorbachev’s injunctions to Karmal in 
October 1985, cited above, were part of a continuing leitmotif: “Widen your social base. 
Learn, at last, to lead a dialogue with the tribes, to use the particularities [of the 
situation]. Try to get the support o f the clergy. Give up the leftist bend in economics. 
Learn to organise the support of the private sector...”
Broadly speaking, National Reconciliation embodied not just a set of guidelines 
for Afghan leaders, but a set of instructions for Soviet agencies as well. Some o f these 
reflected newer approaches to old efforts -  the KGB, the ministry o f the interior, and the 
ministry of defense, for example, were tasked with engaging with frontier tribes to help 
close the border with Pakistan. Both the KGB and the Ministry o f Foreign Affairs were 
to take part in encouraging opposition groups to come over to the government side. 
Overall, a dozen Soviet ministries, party committees and government offices were 
drafted to take part in National Reconciliation.34
One of the reasons Moscow replaced Karmal was fear that he would be resistant 
to this new policy. Najib, who had first gained the support of the KGB, quickly won 
over the rest o f the Soviet leadership and senior officials working on Afghanistan. He 
made his first official trip to Moscow as the uncontested leader o f the PDPA in 
December 1986. The Politburo protocol assessing his visit noted that Najib could be 
expected to begin a major restructuring of his party and government: “the ideas
32 The term itself was borrowed from the process taking place in post-Franco Spain at the time and 
apparently the christening took place on a flight from Kabul to Moscow. Author’s interviews with Leonid 
Shebarshin, September 17, 2007.
33 Aleksandr-Agentov quoted in Gai & Snegirev, Vtorzhenie, 367.
34 “Regarding the talks with Comrade Najib,” Politburo Protocol, December 25, 1986, Volkogonov 
Papers, Box 26/Reel 17.
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expressed oriented the Afghan government towards a perestroika in the shortest 
possible term in all spheres of party-govemment, military, political and economic 
activity, towards a decisive turn in practical policy and in the direction of achieving 
national reconciliation in Afghanistan.” Najib was the person to carry this out, as he had 
shown that his understanding of “the necessity of perestroika, moving towards new 
thinking, taking and fulfilling decisions directed at settling the Afghan problem through
i f f
political means.”
The development of National Reconciliation within Afghanistan is a separate 
topic that has been developed elsewhere and will not be dealt with in depth here. 
However, it is worth looking both at what National Reconciliation was supposed to 
achieve from Moscow’s point o f view, and how radically Moscow began to change the 
nature of its involvement in Afghanistan at this time. Part o f Moscow’s strategy in late
1986 and 1987 focused on soliciting more funds and support from itsEastem European 
allies, an appeal reflected in the documentary record that has become available in those 
countries’ archives. For example, Bulgaria, which had already provided many millions 
in aid, agreed in 1987 “to respond to the Soviet comrades’ proposal, and respond to 
PDPA’s appeal to provide assistance to the PDPA’s policy o f national reconciliation in 
Afghanistan.” Moscow made similar appeals to other Eastern European allies, all in 
the name of “furthering the goal of National Reconciliation.”38
The biggest aid package, of course, came from the USSR itself. In February
1987 the Politburo agreed to provide 950 million rubles worth of gratis aid, more than 
the USSR had ever given to any one country.39 This was as much a political as an 
economic move. Najib needed to show supporters and rivals in the DRA that the Soviet
35 Ibid.
36 See, in particular, Giustozzi, War, Politics, and Society in Afghanistan, and Barnett R. Rubin, The 
Fragmentation o f Afghanistan (1995), 146-175.
37 Memorandum of the CC BCP Department o f Foreign Policy and International Relations, CWIHP 
Documents on Afghanistan.
38 Presidium of the CC o f the Communist Party o f Czechoslovakia, 35th session, May 6, 1987, CWIHP
39 Politburo Meeting, February 28, 1987, GFA PB 1987, 125.
138
Union would support him.40 In March, Gorbachev also promised Najib that after the 
withdrawal had taken place absolutely all of the military infrastructure would be handed 
over to the DRA armed forces to help them protect the “independence and sovereignty” 
of Afghanistan* Some o f the economic aid would even go to helping Najib develop the 
private sector, which was considered a necessary precondition for the success of 
National Reconciliation.41
Moscow also sought to make Afghan politicians more independent and to 
change the way Soviet advisers there operated. As discussed in Chapter One, Moscow’s 
policy had fallen into a trap: on the one hand, the presence o f advisers seemed to 
discourage Afghan officials from taking any initiative either in decision-making or in 
policy execution. Readers will remember that an assessment o f the PDPA from 1983 
noted that this tendency reached the highest levels o f the party.42 On the other hand, the 
PDPA’s seeming impotence only encouraged Moscow to send more advisers.
The domination of advisors in the Afghan party and government was thorough.
Najibullah later described a typical meeting o f the Afghan council of ministers:
We sit down at the table. Each minister comes with his 
own [Soviet] advisor. The meeting begins, the discussion 
becomes heated, and gradually the advisors come closer 
and closer to the table, so accordingly our people move 
away, and eventually only the advisors are left at the 
table.43
Even after Najibullah replaced Karmal, Soviet advisors continued to dominate the 
Afghan government. Soviet advisors were “everywhere, absolutely everywhere. It was 
the worst sort of colonial politics. Terrible.”44
40 See Rubin, Fragmentation o f  Afghanistan, 150, for the importance o f Gorbachev’s support for Najib’s 
battle for power within the PDPA.
41 Politburo Meeting, February 28, 1987, GFA PB 1987, 124; Notes for telephone conversation with 
Comrade Najib, March 3, 1987, GFA Document #577.
42 “Report on the Condition o f the PDPA” 1983, Personal Archive o f Marshal Sokolov. Provided to the 
author by General Aleksandr Liakhovskii.
43 B. Padishev, “Najibullah, president Afghanistana” International Affairs (Moscow) Jan. 1990, 23
44 Author’s interview with Ambassador Yulii Vorontsov, Moscow, September 11, 2007
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Even senior Soviet figures, like Ambassador Fiakrat Tabeev, were often guilty 
of imperiousness in their dealings with Afghans. A party man who had spent twenty 
years as the head o f the Tatar Autonomous Soviet Republic, he had been appointed in 
1979 in part because of his Muslim background.45 Over the years Tabeev had begun 
acting as a “governor-general,” and had apparently been telling the newly promoted 
Najib, “I made you a general secretary.” Such behaviour was inconsistent with 
Moscow’s emphasis on Afghan self-reliance.46 Several months later he was replaced by 
Yulii Vorontsov, a career diplomat with experience in South Asia.47
Vorontsov’s first task was to coordinate the work o f the various institutions 
involved in Afghanistan -  the KGB, the military, the Foreign Ministry, and the political 
advisors. Gorbachev was aware that there was a difficult relationship among these 
institutions and that their recommendations often conflicted. Vorontsov was given a 
“mandate” to coordinate their work and to provide the Politburo with recommendations 
on which all parties could agree. It was tough work -  the representatives o f these 
various institutions could become quite forceful in their disagreements. But the 
“mandate from the General Secretary” helped.48
The fractiousness of the PDPA by this point was not limited to the 
Khalq/Parcham split, but included intra-faction groupings that formed around the more 
senior members. Aside from the Khalq/Parcham divide, there were groups loyal to 
individual leaders: “Karmalists” “Nurovists” “Wakilists” and “Keshtmandists.” There 
were also those loyal to the deposed Hafizullah Amin, although most o f these were in 
prison until 1988. Many party leaders viewed National Reconciliation negatively 
because they believed their patrons’ position would not be secure in a coalition
45 Interview with Tabeev, December 2000 http://www.amorozov.ru/inviews/tabeev fikrvat/ Accessed 
February 3, 2008.
46 Politburo Session, May 29, 1986 GFA PB 1986, 75.
47 Prior to 1986, Vorontsov had enjoyed a long career at the top o f the Soviet diplomatic hierarchy. After 
earning his degree at the elite MGIMO, he served for many years in the Soviet mission to the UN, then as 
ambassador to India. In Afghanistan he was charged not only with overseeing the implementation of  
national reconciliation, but also changing the way Soviet advisors operated.
48 Author’s interview with Ambassador Yulii Vorontsov, Moscow, September 11, 2007.
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government. 49 Indeed, the party, reconstituted as a single entity only through KGB 
efforts, would probably have fallen apart without Soviet influence. As late as December 
1987 the head of Afghan army propaganda said that a formal split would almost be 
preferable, with each wing choosing its own leader and Najibullah remaining as 
president.50
Soviet policy in 1986 and 1987 aimed to address these problems. Measures were 
taken in the belief that without them the Afghan government would never be able to 
stand “on its own two legs.” Many advisers were withdrawn in 1986 and there was an 
effort to change the way relations with Afghans at every level were conducted. 
Experience showed that this would be far from easy, and the attitudes of Soviet advisors 
as well as the fractiousness among institution continued to be a problem. In May 1986 
the Politburo had discussed removing Tabeev so that relations with the Afghan 
leadership could be placed on a different footing; in June and July the Politburo moved 
to recall many the advisers and specialists.51
In 1986 and particularly in 1987, as Gorbachev’s domestic reforms seemed to 
stall, a new leitmotif entered Politburo meetings. Gorbachev and the reformers were 
frustrated that even as new approaches were adopted at the top of the Soviet hierarchy, 
the wheels of change ground slowly closer to the bottom, at the level of lower party 
organs, ministries, and enterprises. There were similar difficulties in reforming the way 
Afghan policy was conducted. Lack of unity in the PDPA made it difficult to guide the 
party toward a new path. Soviet military and political advisers also seemed slow to 
adopt the new approach that was supposed to bolster Afghan independence. 
Concurrently, the Policy o f National Reconciliation did not seem to have much support
49 Plastun & Adrianov, Najibullah. Afghanistan v Tiskah Geopolitiki 78-79; “Record of conversation with 
Colonel Mohammed Sarwari,” December 18, 1987, Plastun & Adrianov, Najibullah. Afghanistan v 
Tiskah Geopolitkii, 203-204.
50 Record o f conversation with Major General A. Wakhed, December 1, 1987, in Plastun & Adrianov, 
Najibullah. Afghanistan v Tiskah Geopolitkii, 201.
51 Records o f Politburo Discussions, May 25 and June 11, 1987. GFA PB 1986.
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among lower level PDPA cadres. In the view of Soviet officials, the Afghan 
communists avoided participating in PNR, not directing resources provided by Moscow 
to the population. At the same time, afraid of being punished for their party activity, 
governors, mayors, chairmen used whatever clan, family, or tribal ties they had to 
ensure their own safety.52 Over a year after Najib had taken the top party post and 
Moscow had begun to recall its advisers, Shevardnadze was forced to admit “in the 
work of our advisers [in Afghanistan], despite our instructions and our discussion at the 
Politburo, there has been no turning point.”53
In backing Najib the Soviet government hoped it had found a strong leader who 
would take charge of the party and government and not be seen by his own people as a 
puppet o f Moscow. Yet Najib’s draft speech to the 19th PDPA plenum, written with 
much input from Soviet advisers, was full o f references to Gorbachev’s “advice, 
recommendation and approval.” As Chemiaev wrote to Gorbachev, this was 
contradictory to what the Soviet Union was trying to do in Afghanistan, since “one of 
the factors o f a decisive change in Afghanistan and the widening o f the social base in 
Afghanistan is a demonstration o f ‘sovereignty’ of decisions taken by the new 
leadership and policies it conducts.”54
Even though National Reconciliation was supposed to attract opposition leaders 
to the regime, the character of Soviet and government propaganda changed little. 
Throughout the war, the Soviet army had an uneasy relationship with the population and 
the DRA. In August 1987, seven months after the start of PNR, Colonel Shershnev, 
who had argued for a change in the Soviet army’s approach as early as 1984, called 
together the entire propaganda division of the main political directorate (GlavPU) of the 
Afghan Army and suggested asking the “higher-ups” to stop calling the opposition a 
“band of killers,” “mercenaries o f imperialism” “skull-bashers,” and so forth. Only in
52 Plastun & Adrianov, Najibullah. Afghanistan v Tiskah Geopolitiki 76.
53 Records o f Politburo Discussions, June lm 1987. GFA PB 1986, 342.
54 Chemaiev Memorandum to Gorbachev, June 18, 1986. GFA Document 369.
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February 1988 did a response come from Glav PU saying that “from now on the 
counterrevolution would be called the opposition instead o f ‘armed band of 
hirelings.. .It took over a year after the proclamation of PNR for our military leadership 
to start calling the mujaheddin “opposition,” which is what it was.” 55 For Soviet 
officers who needed to lead their soldiers into battle, this was a war to be fought and 
enemy to be crushed, not a political project to unite enemies.
Soviet military officers sometimes seemed unwilling to alter their strategies 
radically to bring them in line with the principles of Moscow’s new policy. In 1987 
Plastun tried to convince Colonel-General Vostrov that military attacks on Kandahar 
province were counterproductive. He chided Plastun: “To hell with national 
reconciliation. Warriors receive medals on their chest and stars on their epaulettes and 
money not for reconciliation, but for conducting combat operations. This is something 
that you, expert, did not understand!”56 Although not all officers took such a hawkish 
approach, the military seemed reluctant to do its part in political work. In March 1988 
its most senior officer, General Valentin Varennikov, complained, “Our army is not just 
a warrior with a sword. It is a political warrior.. .over the last year meetings between 
Soviet and Afghan soldiers have ceased, as have those o f Soviet soldiers and the 
population.”57
Yet if the army often failed to grasp the political significance o f its operations, 
senior commanders were very active in efforts to co-opt certain opposition commanders. 
Along with Soviet diplomats, they tried to help the National Reconciliation process 
along by opening their own talks with leaders of the opposition. One leader that Soviet 
military leaders and some diplomats thought was particularly promising was Ahmad
55 Plastun & Adrianov, Najibullah. Afghanistan v Tiskah Geopolitiki 83-84.
56 Plastun & Adrianov, Najibullah. Afghanistan v Tiskah Geopolitiki 83.
57 Meeting of Political Advisors, March 9, 1988 in Plastun & Adrianov, Najibullah. Afghanistan v Tiskah 
Geopolitiki, 211.
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Shah Massoud, the Tajik “Lion of the Panjsher Valley.”58 The military had been 
successful in concluding a cease-fire with him on several occasions, which in turn had 
kept the northern area fairly quiet from 1981-83 period. Following the announcement of 
National Reconciliation, Massoud sent a feeler to representatives of the DRA 
government in the Panjsher valley, but the attempts at talks collapsed when Kabul 
insisted that he lay down his arms. Nevertheless, Massoud instructed his forces to 
maintain a virtual cease-fire and to undertake no offensive action.59 In October 1987 
General Varennikov succeeded in opening discussions with the Tajik commander, 
although these collapsed when news of the contact became public.60
Efforts to work with Massoud were not limited to the military. Soviet 
Ambassador to Kabul Yulii Vorontsov, who had been instructed to develop such 
contacts as part of his contribution to National Reconciliation, studied Massoud’s 
biography and speeches and concluded that his support was essential. Vorontsov was 
particularly impressed that Massoud seemed interested in, and capable of, organizing a 
development program, building schools, hospitals, and roads in his area. Vorontsov 
wrote to Moscow suggesting that the Soviet Union could offer to help Massoud 
financially in developing his region if he would ally with Kabul and received a 
favourable response. Vorontsov was able to arrange a meeting with Massoud, but it was 
sabotaged at the last minute. Apparently an Afghan Air Force jet had bombed the 
Panjsher valley, causing Massoud to call off the meeting. The Soviet command had not 
been informed of the attack - once again Kabul had sabotaged a Soviet effort to open 
contacts with Massoud.61 Nevertheless, Soviet efforts to make contact with Massoud
58 For an exccelent study of Massoud’s emergence as a major resistance leader, see Peter B. DeNeuville 
Ahmad Shah Massoud and the genesis o f the nationalist anti-Communist movement in Northeastern 
Afghanistan, 7969-/979 Thesis(PhD)--King’s College London, 2006.
5 Aleksandr Liakhovskii and Viacheslav Nekrasov Citizen, Politician, Warrior: The Memory o f  Ahmad 
Shah Massoud (Moscow, 2007), 153.
60 Liakhovskii and Nekrasov, Citizen, Politician, Warrior, 156-157. Massoud competed for resources and 
influence within the mujahadeen leadership, and was thus anxious that such contacts be conducted 
clandestinely.
61 Author’s interview with Ambassador Yulii Vorontsov, Moscow, September 11, 2007.
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continued, and would become particularly important in 1988 when the 40th army was 
withdrawing through Massoud’s territory.
It was not only the military that had trouble radically changing the course o f 
Soviet-Afghan relations. At every level there were vestiges of the “colonial” approach 
that had taken root since 1980. Although Tabeev had been removed, and there was 
much talk about making Najib “more independent,” it was much harder to cleanse the 
relationship of all manifestations of imperialism. General Ziarmal, chief of the political 
directorate of the DRA army, complained in January 1988 that the practice of having 
Najibullah meet the Soviet minister of foreign affairs at Kabul airport on his visits there 
only underlined the colonial nature of their relationsip. Perhaps this seemed like a minor 
point, Ziarmal said, but “in the eyes of international opinion makes Afghanistan a 
satellite of the USSR.” Ziarmal went on to complain that even the Soviet press did not 
take this point seriously: “Shevardnadze for us is a comrade, but Najib for 
Shevardnadze is -  your Excellency the President o f the Republic o f Afghanistan. The 
Soviet press needs to speak about him as a president, not the general secretary of the 
PDPA.”62
Soviet failures in this regard only compounded the enormous difficulties faced 
by Najib in trying to create legitimacy for his regime. The first, o f course, was that of 
party unity, already discussed above. In addition Najib had to face the residual support 
for Karmal in the party and government. On the day o f Najib’s election, teachers and 
students had marched in support of Karmal in Kabul. Pro-Karmal sentinemnt was strong 
even in the KhAD, even though Najib who had headed the organization before taking 
the reigns of the country. At the July 10, 1986 CC meeting, Najib added 44 members to
62 Record o f Conversation with General-Major Ziarmal, January 4, 1988, Plastun & Adrianov, Najibullah. 
Afghanistan v Tiskah Geopolitiki 226-227.
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the Central Committee, but it took over two years to purge the Politburo and the Central 
committee fully of Karmal’s allies.
In 1983 Andropov had spoken of scaling back Soviet efforts in Third World 
counries, insisting that those countries had to depend not on Soviet aid and advice but 
on “work by their own people, and of a correct policy on the part o f their leadership.”64 
In Afghanistan this principle was finally becoming policy. Soviet advisers were being 
pulled back and the regime was encouraged to be more independent. Rather than relying 
on Soviet “state-building,” the stabilization effort would now rely on an Afghan leader 
who would, it was hoped, patch together a government with enough non-PDPA and 
opposition support to be legitimate. The “Afghanization” of the war had begun, even if 
its progress did not quite match the expectations o f its planners.
The presence and protection of Soviet troops allowed the PDPA leaders to move 
slowly with regard to National Reconciliation. The pull-back, as well as disagreement 
among Soviet officials regarding what National Reconciliation meant and how it should 
be implemented, deprived Moscow of leverage over its clients. Najibullah found ways 
to sabotage Soviet-led outreach when he felt it suited his interests. After the Soviets 
withdrew the PDPA took much more courageous steps in terms of opening up the 
government and society, establishing links with tribal leaders, and shedding its 
communist image, all of which helped the DRA government survive into 1992. As we 
will see below, however, by mid-1987 Soviet leaders realised that the Policy of National 
Reconciliation would not be able to guarantee the survival o f a friendly regime in the 
near term, and Moscow would have to look elsewhere if it wanted to bring its troops 
home.
63 Rubin, Fragmentation o f  Afghanistan, 150.
64 Quoted in Patnam, “Reagan, Gorbachev and the emergence o f ‘New Political Thinking,’” 588.
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A return to diplomacy
The diplomatic effort to end the Afghan war, which had shown great promise in 1982- 
83 but which had largely stalled by the time of Andropov’s death, was restarted several 
months after Gorbachev came to power. By the end of the summer negotiators had 
made significant headway, but once again the lack of a Soviet-American dialogue 
limited further progress. However, Soviet diplomacy was not focused merely on the 
UN-sponsored Geneva talks. In the context o f National Reconciliation, the KGB, the 
military, and the Foreign Ministry all became proactive in making contacts with 
opposition leaders with the ultimate goal o f enticing them to join the government.
Gorbachev turned to the Geneva process because restarting the talks was the first 
logical step toward untying the Afghan knot. Indeed, the first Geneva round of the 
Gorbachev era were quite promising. Prior to the June 1985 talks, Soviet interlocutors 
managed to convince the Afghans to affirm that withdrawal and cut-off o f aid would 
take place simultaneously. In May Moscow had sent strong signals to Cuellar that they 
were interested in the new round. The Soviet-Afghan side also made it clear that it was 
prepared to link withdrawal formally to the entire package, “which they had refused to 
admit for the last two years, i.e., since Mr. Andropov’s exit from the political scene.”65 
In Geneva, the negotiators were also able to produce an agreement on international 
guarantees.66
On the whole, however, diplomacy continued to be difficult. While Moscow 
seemed to be more interested in dialog, the US was sceptical that there had been a real 
change in policy. US Undersecretary o f State Michael Aramost told UN mediator Diego 
Cordovez that he had noticed “a lot o f hints of a different Soviet style” but not a change 
in substance. Both Moscow and Kabul continued to insist that no real progress on the
65 Picco to Cuellar, “Update on the negotiations in Afghanistan,” June 14, 1985. UN Secretary General’s 
Files, S -1024-3-1.
66 Barnett R. Rubin The Search for Peace in Afghanistan: From Buffer State to Failed State (1995), 70- 
71.
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actual issue of withdrawal could take place until the Pakistani government was ready to 
sit down with the DRA.67
By August 1985, the texts of the first three instruments, including interference, 
the return of refugees, and international guarantees, had been completed. The main 
outstanding issues were the status of the Kabul government, which Pakistan did not 
want to legitimise, and the time-frame for the withdrawal.68 Yet the August round of the 
Geneva talks began with a stand-off about the format. Shah Mohammed Dost, the 
Afghan foreign minister, insisted that if Pakistan continued to refuse direct talks, he was 
prepared to wait “two or three years” before continuing negotiations. Ultimately the 
entire round was restricted to discussion of format issues and a review of the 
negotiations, an issue which frustrated UN officials as well as the Pakistanis greatly.69 
Throughout the fall Cordovez and Cuellar tried to convince Kabul and Moscow that 
having a procedural impasse at that point would discredit the entire Geneva process. In 
New York, Foreign Minister Dost continued to press for direct talks between Kabul and 
Pakistan, arguing that Islamabad’s refusal showed “that Pakistan did not really want a 
settlement.”70
US-Soviet discussion on Afghanistan moved no faster. The decline in US-Soviet 
relations in the fall o f 1983 had been a major factor in the Geneva process stalling in the 
first place. In June US and Soviet officials met for the first time to discuss the Afghan 
situation directly. The new Soviet leader was looking to move the relationship beyond 
the stalemate of the previous five years; Reagan had already moved beyond his own 
hawkish rhetoric and was interested in engagement with Moscow.71 The first
67 Harrison and Cordovez, Out o f Afghanistan, 214.
68 Ibid, 216. Rubin, The Search for Peace in Afghanistan 70-71.
69 Cordovez to Cuellar, September 27, 1985; Record o f meeting between Dost and Cuellar, September 28, 
1985; Cordovez to Cuellar, October 31, 1985. UN Secretary General’s Files, S -1024-3-1.
70 Record o f conversation between Cuellar and Dost, November 1, 1985. UN Secretary General’s Files, S- 
1024-3-1.
71 Beth A Fischer, The Reagan Reversal: Foreign Policy and the End o f  the Cold War (Columbia, MO: 
University o f Missouri Press), 2-5.
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Gorbachev-Reagan summit seemed like a good opportunity to commence a US-Soviet 
dialogue on Afghanistan at the highest level.
US officials came away from the Reagan-Gorbachev Geneva Summit feeling 
that the Soviet attitude was indeed changing. The White House spokesman told 
journalist Dan Oberdorfer that the US had felt “something new” in Soviet policy, while 
the New York Times reported that “Mr. Reagan came away convinced that Mr.
noGorbachev was looking for a diplomatic solution of the conflict in Afghanistan.” As 
we saw in Chapter 2, however, this did not yet translate into real bilateral discussions on 
the Afghan problem. In fact, the December 1985 round o f the Geneva talks on 
Afghanistan proved to be the most frustrating o f all. Despite renewed interest in 
diplomacy, neither Dost nor his Soviet interlocutor, Nikolai Kozyrev, showed any 
flexibility. In February 1986 Cordovez travelled to Moscow, where he met with 
Shevardnadze and Georgii Kornienko. Shevardnadze seemed to promise “his help to 
break the deadlock.” The round that took place after Karmal’s replacement was more 
successful, with some progress on the time-frame issue. Still, US officials came away 
unimpressed. To them, the USSR did not seem genuinely interested in disengaging.
Gorbachev did not yet trust the Americans sufficiently to engage with them 
directly and overcome the hurdles that had stalled the Geneva talks during Andropov’s 
tenure. Equally important was that Moscow was just embarking on the process that 
would become National Reconciliation and an overhaul o f its efforts within 
Afghanistan. For as long as Soviet officials held out hope that these efforts would pay 
dividends, diplomatic efforts continued to be primarily exploratory. At the same time 
Soviet interest in the Geneva process was genuine, and, throughout 1986, Moscow 
continued to look for ways to push the it along. The February 1986 “bleeding wound”
72 Harrison and Cordovez, Out o f  Afghanistan, 219.
73 Harisson and Cordovez, Out o f  Afghanistan, 220-241.
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comment was only the first of a series of calculated comments and decisions made to 
signal Moscow’s willingness to seek a diplomatic solution.
With the Geneva talks stalled, Moscow wanted to send another signal, one that 
showed the Soviet Union was serious about disengagement without weakening its 
bargaining position. At the end of June, following another unsuccessful Geneva round, 
the Politburo considered the possibility of withdrawing some troops. So far, Gorbachev 
noted, the effort to find a political settlement had not been working, the US seemed 
uninterested and was “picking on every little thing.” Maybe the thing to do was to 
withdraw five to ten thousand troops.74 Two weeks later the Politburo approved a 
proposal to remove 8000 personnel to show “that the USSR is not going to stay in
*JC
Afghanistan and did not want ‘access to warm waters.’” To underline the importance 
of this signal, Gorbachev announced the withdrawal during a major speech in
7 AVladivostok in July. In a speech often cited by policy-makers and historians as a 
turning point in Soviet relations with East Asia, Gorbachev highlighted the Soviet desire 
to get out of Afghanistan and the decision to withdraw six regiments “by agreement 
with the DRA:”
In taking such a serious step, of which we previously informed interested 
governments, including Pakistan, the Soviet Union aims to speed up the 
political settlement, to give it another push. This also comes [from the 
desire] that those who organise and carry out the military intervention 
against the DRA will understand and evaluate correctly this step. The 
response should be the end of such interference.. ,77
By the middle of 1986 all the textual issues regarding the Geneva Accords had 
been resolved and discussions regarding a time-frame for the withdrawal were 
becoming more concrete. Having supported a change of leadership and promoted
74 Politburo Notes, June 28, 1986, GFA PB 1986.
75 Politburo Notes, July 11, 1986, GFA PB 1986, 129.
76 Defense Minister Sergei Sokolov supported the decision, pointed out “we have experience: in 1980 we 
withdrew three divisions, but did not play it politically.” Politburo Notes, July 11, 1986, GFA PB 1986, 
129.
77 “Speech on the occasion o f Vladivostok being given the Order o f Lenin.” Mikhail Gorbachev Speeches, 
Vol. 4, 10-11; Pravda July 29, 1986, p. 1-3 in CDSP Vol XXXVIII no. 30, p.8.
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National Reconciliation, however, Moscow began following a separate diplomatic track, 
at once a part of and separate from the Geneva talks being carried on by Cordovez. As 
Riaz Khan, the Pakistani negotiator, put it, “the Soviets linked withdrawal to progress in 
achieving political reconciliation inside Afghanistan, thus forcing the negotiating
7 0
process into an entirely new arena.”
Soviet diplomacy was not limited to the Geneva process. Moscow placed 
increasing emphasis on opening a dialogue directly with Pakistan, a likely player in any 
effort at reconciliation. At the end of September 1986 the Politburo discussed 
conducting a “secret exchange of ideas” with Pakistan on the possibility o f expanding
70the Kabul government by inviting emigres to participate. These conversations began to 
expand towards the end o f 1986. At the end of September, Shevardnadze and Pakistani 
Foreign Minister Yakub Khan met in New York. That same month the Pakistani 
Foreign Ministry took note of a statement made in an informal setting by Georgiii 
Arbatov to the effect that Najib would have to accept refugees and some mujahideen in 
his government. The most productive discussions between Pakistani and Soviet officials 
began in December, when Yulii Vorontsov invited Foreign Secretary Abdul Sattar to 
Moscow. Vorontsov explained the forthcoming National Reconciliation plan and told 
Sattar that the Soviet Union had firmly decided to withdraw, but that a “cooling o ff’ 
period was required to avoid bloodshed. During that period various Afghan parties
OA
could observe a cease-fire and engage in discussions.
Throughout 1987, Moscow tried to use its new ties with Pakistan to promote 
National Reconciliation, all the while insisting that the final success of the Geneva 
accords was linked to progress on the “second track.” At the end of January 1987 
Deputy Foreign Minister Anatolii Kovalev, travelled to Islamabad to meet with senior
78 Riaz M. Khan Untying the Afghan Knot: Negotiating Soviet Withdrawal (Durham, 1991), 145.
79 Politburo Notes, September 25, 1986, GFA PB 1986, 171. From 1980-1984, Soviet-Pakistani contacts 
mostly took place before United Nations General Assembly sessions, but even these were discontinued in 
1984. Khan Untying the Afghan Knot, 180.
80 Khan, Untying the Afghan Knot, 180-181.
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officials and the president, Zia ul Haq. The conversations that took place were 
unprecedented, and they also revealed the gap that remained between Soviet and 
Pakistani positions.81 Kovalev said that “winds o f change were sweeping across the 
Soviet Union” which made it all the more imperative to untie the Afghan knot. But he 
also continued to insist that National Reconciliation had to be linked to withdrawal, and 
that it had to take place under Najibullah. The Pakistani idea, a neutral interim 
government not headed by anyone associated with the present regime, was unacceptable 
to Moscow.82
The next month Pakistani officials travelled to Moscow, meeting there with 
Shevardnadze and others. Prior to departure, Pakistan had been able to obtain some 
negotiating positions from a reluctant alliance group. While the alliance made it clear 
that they were willing to pursue a non-aligned Islamic foreign policy and provide safe 
passage during the withdrawal, they also insisted on direct negotiations with the USSR. 
The Soviets, sensitive to Afghan opposition to such direct talks which legitimised the 
opposition’s claim to power, could not agree to this. Although Shevardnadze did not 
completely reject the Pakistani idea of bringing back the King to head a government, the 
meetings in Moscow did not move far beyond what had already become clear the 
previous month in Pakistan: the Soviet Union was not prepared to see a coalition
0 1
government headed by someone from outside the PDPA.
Moscow’s efforts to re-open diplomacy in the summer of 1985 produced a level 
of dialogue on Afghanistan not seen during the course o f the entire war. The decision to 
engage with Pakistan was particularly important in this regard. Nevertheless, Moscow’s 
commitment to leaving behind a PDPA-led, and increasingly, Najib-led government in 
Kabul meant that an enormous gap remained between the Soviet position and the US-
81 Pakistani interlocutors had consulted the “Alliance o f Seven” leaders in Peshawar prior to the meeting, 
and would do so again before Pakistani officials travelled to Moscow at the end o f February.
82 Khan, Untying the Afghan Knot, 191-194.
83 Ibid, 197-199.
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Pakistani one. The US reluctance to respond positively to Soviet “signals,” such as the 
“bleeding wound” speech or the withdrawal o f six divisions in 1986 contributed to the 
stalemate.
Disappointment
By early 1987 Soviet leaders had started to rezlied that the situation in Afghanistan was
worse than they had thought when they replaced Karmal. The economy was ruined,
Najib was still isolated in the Kabul government, and a withdrawal was no closer than it
had been in October 1985. The term discussed for withdrawal in January and February
1987, two years, was almost the same as the one Gorbachev was calling for a year and a
half earlier, after Karmal’s visit. The year became a crucial turning point in the war
because month by month Moscow realised the depth o f the Afghan problem from
which, to some extent, it had been shielded before. Even more importantly, Soviet
leaders were becoming aware that their plans for saving the DRA government, which
had been planned in 1986, were insufficient.
Shevardnadze and Dobrynin travelled to Kabul soon after Najib’s visit to
Moscow in December 1986. Upon their return, Shevardnadze delivered a devastating
report on Soviet activity there to the Politburo:
Of friendly feeling to the Soviet people, which had existed in Afghanistan 
for decades, there is little left. Many people have died, and not all o f them 
were bandits. Not one problem has been solved in favour of the peasantry.
In essence, we fought against the peasantry. The state apparatus is 
functioning poorly. Our advice and help is ineffective.. .everything that we 
have done and are doing is incompatible with the moral character o f our 
country.84
What is striking about these meeting is how different they are from the discussions that 
took place before 1985. Euphemisms and comments regarding “significant progress 
despite certain difficulties” were noticeably absent. Shevardnadze was not the only one
84 Politburo meeting, January 21, 1987, GFA PB 1987, 60.
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to speak up in this way. Marshal Sokolov noted “the military situation has become 
worse of late. Incidents o f bases being shelled have gone up.. .such a war cannot be won 
through military means.” Nikolai Ryzhkov, Chairman o f the Council of Ministers, noted 
that for the first time the information provided to the Politburo seemed to be objective.85
Yet even as the situation seemed to grow more difficult, key members o f the 
Politburo dug in their heels. As Chapter 2 showed, a major issue for Gorbachev was 
how the Soviet Union would be seen in the Third World if  the DRA regime fell. 
Shevardnadze, perhaps influenced by Vladimir Kriuchkov, the chief o f the first 
directorate who often travelled with him to Kabul, became Najib’s biggest supporter at 
Politburo meetings. Indeed, in February 1987, it was Gromyko, a key player in the 1979 
decision to invade, urging a quick withdrawal, pointing out that “a half year more or 
less” of Soviet presence in that country would not make a difference. But Shevardnadze 
thought otherwise: “The most important thing is not to allow the Najibullah regime to 
fall. That is the most important thing!”86
Although Kriuchkov and Shevardnadze saw eye to eye on Afghanistan, they 
framed their arguments in slightly different ways. Kriuchkov’s arguments were formed 
in more traditional geo-political terms. If the Soviet Union withdrew too quickly, 
Afghanistan would become a base for “Iran, Turkey, and fundamentalists.” The Soviet 
Union could not just “leave, run dropping everything. First we did it [invaded] without 
thinking, and now we will drop everything.” Shevardnadze’s logic was more subtle. 
What he saw in Afghanistan convinced him that the USSR had done so much damage in 
that country there was almost no chance that a “friendly” Afghanistan could be 
preserved without a friendly leader. Although he opposed the war and supported the 
withdrawal, Shevardnadze did not see how Afghanistan would stay “friendly” or even 
neutral without a strong man too keep it that way. Najib needed to be trusted, since
85 Ibid.
86 Politburo meeting, February 23, 1987, GFA PB 1987, 114.
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“there is not a family or village that has not suffered as a result of our presence. Anti- 
Sovietism will exist in Afghanistan for a long time. Therefore we need to have our own
• 87strong person in charge of Afghanistan,” he told the Politburo.
When National Reconciliation was first being conceived, it was assumed that the 
PDPA would still be the key force in the government. At the 20th PDPA plenum, Najib 
assured his colleagues, “We will not retreat an inch from the achievements of the Saur 
revolution. That is to say in politics [those] who come to us should officially recognise 
the leading role o f the PDPA and the people’s power.”88 It was becoming clear, 
however, that even if Najibullah could somehow stay in power, the PDPA would not.
80Shevardnadze admitted that “the PDPA could collapse” at the next big turn of events. 
Moscow began to look for ways that it could preserve a role for Najib without having to 
rely on the PDPA.
Some of the ideas that the Soviet leadership began discussing in the late spring 
and summer o f 1987 seem to have been influenced by materials provided by academic 
specialists. One of these was Yurii Gankovskii, who had been trying to make his views 
heard by decision-makers since 1980. At that time, Gankovskii had warned that unless 
Karmal was able to broaden the base of the regime, a civil war would quickly break out. 
His cautionary remarks fell on deaf ears.90 In May 1987 he submitted a memorandum to 
Chemiaev, Gorbachev’s foreign policy aide, urging a more radical reformation o f the 
DRA government. It was a crucial moment, for Gorbachev and his colleagues were 
growing increasingly frustrated with Kabul and various efforts to improve the situation 
there. Gankovskii argued that Soviet interests would best be served if the PDPA could 
be made to move temporarily into the background. This would require a head o f the 
government without a clear party affiliation, someone who was respected within
87 Politburo meeting, June 11, 1987, GFA PB 1987, 342.
88 Khan, Untying the Afghan Knot, 184.
89 Ibid.
90 Yurii Gankovsky, “Afghanistan: From Intervention to National Reconciliation” Iranian Journal o f  
International Affairs Vol. IV, No. 1, Spring 1992, 134.
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Afghanistan as well as other Muslim countries. This person could then reach out to the 
Islamic Conference and Muslim states, gaining international recognition. Only this kind 
of politician, argued Gankosvky, could even have a chance o f making National 
Reconciliation successful.91
Given limited archival access at present, it is impossible to determine the extent 
to which Gankovskii or any other scholars had an impact on policy making, or for that 
matter at which point policymakers really began taking their views into account. 
Presumably the memorandum provided above was not the only one Gankovskii himself 
wrote on the matter, and he may also have made his views known through informal 
meetings. Nevertheless, it is worth noting that in May 1987 key decision makers in the 
Politburo began thinking along the lines proposed in Gankovskii’s memorandum. This 
would be consistent with the growing influence o f other “academics” under Gorbachev.
Soviet leaders were increasingly pessimistic regarding what they would be able 
to salvage in Afghanistan. At the May 21, 1987 Politburo meeting, Gorbachev outlined 
what he thought a new regime might look like. Sectarianism was leading nowhere and 
would have to be eliminated. Although Gorbachev made it clear that he preferred to see 
Najib rather than someone else leading Afghanistan, he insisted that Najib should hold a 
state post, as he might then have a chance of staying in power another year and a half. 
The Afghans would not follow Najib as a party leader, but “a president, a king they 
would respect.” Earlier discussions about opening 2-3% of government seats for Afghan 
emigres were unrealistic; it might have to be something closer to 50%.92 The emerging 
consensus in the Politburo was that the PDPA would be only one of the political forces 
in power after Soviet troops left. Even Kriuchkov agreed that reconciliation would have
91 Gankovsky to Chemiaev, “Regarding measures to settle the conflict in Afghanistan,” GFA Doc #729.
92 Politburo meeting, May 21, 1987, GFA PB 1987, 309.
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to take place not around the PDPA, but with its participation. Gromyko, too, said that 
the PDPA would be one of the parties, but not the leading one.93
Soviet leaders hoped that some sort of new political stability could be achieved 
before their forces withdrew, while Moscow could still apply pressure both on its 
Afghan allies and their enemies. Gorbachev was firm on the point of power-sharing in 
talks with Najib, telling the Afghan leader that the PDPA would have to give up 
government portfolios to opposition parties. The issue figured prominently during a July 
1987 conversation. Gorbachev told Najibullah not assume that the PDPA would stay in 
power but to begin inviting opposition figures into the government. This was the only 
way to face reality: “to count on the party keeping its current position after reaching 
national reconciliation would be completely unrealistic.” Gorbachev urged Najib to 
remain firm in the face o f attacks from party members who were reluctant to share 
power, who, in the spirit o f “Karmalism” preferred loud slogans about the revolution, 
and were quite happy to have the Soviet soldiers fight and die for them. Najibullah told 
Gorbachev he “agreed completely” and thought having the PDPA as a leading force was 
simply unrealistic in practice.94 Similarly, Najibullah expressed his agreement in 
November when Gorbachev insisted that he nominate a prime minister from the 
opposition.95
In practice Najib was reluctant to share power. He may have feared that if he 
alienated his party colleagues before securing some other source of power he would be 
left completely isolated. Kornienko, however, insists that this was because Najibullah in 
practice only offered empty portfolios rather than important government positions. 
According to Kornienko, in Najibullah-Shevardnadze conversations commitments 
previously made to Gorbachev were watered down with the Foreign Minister’s consent,
93 Politburo meeting, May 22 ,1987, GFA PB 1987, 319.
94 Record o f Conversation of MS Gorbachev with Com Najib, July 20, 1987, NSA READ/RADD Box 9.
95 Record o f Conversation o f MS Gorbachev with Com Najib, November 3, 1987 NSA READ/RADD 
Box 9
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allowing Najibullah to avoid making any real movement toward power-sharing.96 It is 
unfortunate that there are no records available o f Shevardnadze’s conversations with 
Najibullah which would allow historians to evaluate Kornienko’s accusations. It is 
clear, however, that promises made to Gorbachev often did not lead to concrete results. 
By the time of the Soviet withdrawal in 1989 the government was still controlled by a 
shaky PDPA.
By the summer o f 1987 it was becoming clear that National Reconciliation had 
failed to unite the party or to make the PDPA government more acceptable to the people 
of Afghanistan. Colonel Kim Tsagalov sent a long memorandum addressed to the 
Dmitrii Yazov, the Minister o f Defense, which touched on almost every major problem 
of the war, o f governance, and of Soviet hopes and illusions in Afghanistan. Not only 
had the Policy o f National Reconciliation failed to unite the PDPA, it had completely 
failed to find any support among the opposition or even other “democratic” parties. 
Tsagalov urged a radical change in course: “The PDPA is objectively moving toward its 
political death. No actions aimed at resuscitating the PDPA would produce any 
practical results. Najib’s efforts in this respect can only prolong the death throes, but
07they cannot save the PDPA from its death.”
Indeed, Gorbachev had largely given up on the idea of preserving the PDPA in 
power, and was starting to accept that the only government that could survive in the 
longer term was one which consisted in large part o f opposition figures, albeit with 
Najib at its head. Yet it was becoming clear that the process of forming a new coalition 
government was going to take much longer than expected, in part because of the
96 Kornienko, Kholodnaia Voina, 254.
97 Letter to Minister o f Defense Dmitrii Yazov, August 13, 1987, NSA: NSA Afghanistan: Lessons from 
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PDPA’s reluctance. Reports coming in from Afghanistan confirmed that National 
Reconciliation was failing.98
Gorbachev brought up these issues when he met with Najib in July. He 
underlined that the PDPA was still failing to reach out beyond Kabul: “We have been 
receiving information that decisions being taken in Kabul are arriving [to the provinces] 
much weakened.” He urged Najibullah to become more pro-active in including other 
parties in the government: “It seems that in the second stage o f National Reconciliation 
the question of creating a coalition government will come up, a block of left-democratic 
forces. You cannot refuse to cooperate with those who have a different point o f view. 
You need to create real pluralism in society and in government offices. The right tactic 
would probably be to emphasise that which unites these forces, and this will be the 
policy of national reconciliation, ceasing of military activity.”99
Gorbachev emerged dissapointed from his July 1987 talks with Najib. For 
several months the Politburo had been discussing why National Reconciliation had 
stalled. The talks with Najib, Gorbachev told the Politburo on July 23, “showed that 
Karmalism has put down deep roots. Everyone has started moving, but they are thinking 
first of all o f themselves, even Karmal is raising his head. There could be a crisis in 
connection with this.”100 The Afghan problem occupied his mind during the summer 
holiday, and from time to time he sent his thoughts to Chenayev: “We were pulled into 
Afghanistan, and now we don’t know to get out.. .it is awful, when you have to defend 
Brezhnev’s policies.”101
Nevertheless, Moscow’s policy in Afghanistan had shifted tremendously. The 
leadership in Kabul had been changed, advisers had been recalled, a new crop of people 
had been assigned to help achieve reconciliation. Most importantly, Soviet leaders were
98 Plastun & Adrianov, Najibullah. Afghanistan v Tiskah Geopolitiki 75.
99 Record o f Conversation of MS Gorbachev with Com Najib, July 20, 1987, NSA READ/RADD Box 9.
100 Notes from Politburo meeting, July 23, 1987, GFA PB 1987, 429. To Gorbachev, Karmalism meant 
“elements o f Marxism combined with dependence on the USSR.”
101 Thoughts from Gorbachev’s summer vacation, Politburo notes, GFA PB 1987,471.
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being stripped of illusions about what they could accomplish in Afghanistan before 
bringing the troops home. And while efforts within Afghanistan were disappointing, 
there was still some reason for optimism that an honourable exit could be arranged. US- 
Soviet relations seemed to be improving. At the July 23, 1987 Politburo meeting 
Gorbachev suggested that a three-party meeting o f the USA, USSR, and Afghanistan 
was necessary.102 The effort to get the USA involved in an agreement would dominate 
Moscow’s Afghan policy from the fall o f 1987 until the signing of the Geneva Accords 
in April 1988.
Conclusion
Between 1985 and 1987, Moscow’s Afghan policy was defined by an effort to end the 
war without facing a defeat. As the previous chapter showed, Gorbachev was almost as 
concerned as his predecessors about the damage a hasty Soviet withdrawal might do to 
Soviet prestige, particularly among his Third World partners. Yet Gorbachev was also 
committed to ending the war, and for the most part had the support of his Politburo to 
do so. This meant looking for new approaches to developing a viable regime in Kabul 
that could outlast the presence o f Soviet troops.
With regard to its policy in Afghanistan, Soviet officials continued to operate on 
the premise that the Afghan government could be made acceptable to the population 
with a combination of economic and political measures. Hence Moscow invested much 
of its own money to help the Kabul government achieve legitimacy and looked for ways 
to attract funds from its Eastern European satellites as well. Equally crucial were the 
political efforts: the replacement of Karmal with Najibullah, the launching of National 
Reconciliation, the efforts to broker a truce with certain rebels and the PDPA 
government. Much more so than even during the Andropov era, these efforts showed a
102 Notes from Politburo meeting, July 23, 1987, GFA PB 1987, 429.
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willingness to practice Realpolitik. Moscow was content to see a government that was 
Islamic in form as long as it would remain friendly to the USSR. As with domestic 
reforms, however, decisions made by the Politburo were not implemented properly by 
officials on the ground. The imperial attitude of Soviet advisers changed only slowly, 
while PDPA officials resisted efforts to curb their position and their privileges.
This period saw, for the first time, a truly honest assessment of the situation in 
Afghanistan at the Politburo level. At the January 21, 1987 Politburo meeting, Ryzhkov 
responded to Shevardnadze’s report by saying that the Politburo leader was hearing 
such a devastating account of the war “for the first time.” Yet KGB Chairman 
Chebrikov was equally correct when he said that such information had been available 
before. Previous chapters have shown that very sceptical and critical assessments had 
come from the military as well as other quarters as early as 1980. What had changed 
was the Politburo’s willingness to look at this information objectively, as well as to 
invite it into their discussions. Moreover, the questions were being discussed with the 
full participation of the Politburo, unlike in the Brezhnev and Andropov years, when the 
“Afghan commission” presented policies that were approved without much discussion.
While everyone in Moscow now recognised the apparent hopelessness o f the 
situation in Afghanistan, they worried about the damage that a collapse there would 
have on Soviet interests. It became clear to Shevardnadze and others in the Politburo, 
that after seven years of war, the Afghan population was unlikely to think positively of 
the Soviet Union. This, in turn, meant that abandoning the PDPA completely was out of 
the question. Even as Soviet leaders abandoned hope in the spring of 1987 that a viable 
PDPA-led government could be constructed, they continued to look for ways to 
preserve a role for the party, or at least for Najibullah. Even as their faith in the party as 
a whole declined, their confidence in Najibullah grew.
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The diplomatic efforts, which had been revived so quickly after Gorbachev came 
to power, were stalled for two reasons. One was the difficulty of talking to the United 
States about Afghanistan. US officials were unimpressed by the “signals” being sent by 
Moscow and continued to treat them as political ploys. In fact, it was only in the fall of 
1987 that the US began to take Moscow’s desire to end the war seriously. Yet the 
Soviet-American relationship was only one part o f a much larger problem. Another was 
that as long as Moscow held out hope that it could engineer a solution within 
Afghanistan it would not separate its diplomatic initiatives from efforts within the 
country. Indeed, when the process seemed to be making significant progress in 1986, 
Moscow decided to link the issue of National Reconciliation to the withdrawal of 
troops. As long as Soviet leaders held out hope that National Reconciliation could work 
they refused to consider de-linking.
The summer of 1987 was a crucial turning point in the development of 
Gorbachev’s thinking about reform, in the history of perestroika, and in the history of 
the Soviet Union. It was at this point that he told some of his closest advisers that he
i mwas prepared to change “the whole [Soviet] system, from economy to mentality.”
Soon he would start speaking openly o f de-Stalinization, a topic that had not been 
broached by Soviet leaders since Khrushchev. Although Gorbachev still spoke of 
putting pressure on Western countries in conversations with Third World leaders, he 
was increasingly eager to achieve a breakthrough in relations with the United States, 
even if Reagan did not abandon the hated Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI).104 Not 
surprisingly, this was also a turning point in his thinking on Afghanistan and for 
Moscow’s Afghan policy. It was becoming clear that National Reconciliation was not 
going to greatly increase the stability of the DRA government, that Najib was not a 
saviour, and that the war could continue to drag on endlessly. Gorbachev was losing
103 Zubok, Failed Empire, 301.
104 Ibid
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confidence that the USSR could fundamentally change the situation and undo the errors 
of his predecessors with minimal political cost. As the next chapter will show, it was at 
this point that Gorbachev decided to turn to the United States directly. Although he still 
preferred to see an Afghanistan in which a transformed PDPA played a key role, he now 
seemed ready to face the ultimate defeat o f the regime after the withdrawal of troops.
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Chapter 4: Superpower Relations and the Geneva Accords1
The Geneva Accords, signed in April 1988, were the starting point of the Soviet 
withdrawal from Afghanistan. Since 1985, General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev had 
looked for ways to steer the Soviet Union out o f the conflict without undermining 
Soviet prestige or leaving himself politically vulnerable. Successive efforts to shore up 
the communist government had failed, however: the surge of troops in 1985, the 
changing o f the leadership in 1986, and the focus on National Reconciliation in 1987 
produced only the most modest results. The Kabul government was still weak and 
Soviet troops were still dying. Thus at the end o f 1987 the focus shifted from trying to 
change the situation on the ground in Afghanistan to diplomacy with the other powers 
involved in the conflict, primarily the United States but also Pakistan. Although many 
of the details of policy making remain murky, it is clear that Gorbachev was determined 
to get out. By April it was also clear that the accords would be little more than a fig leaf 
for the withdrawal. Since both sides would continue to supply their clients with 
weapons, the conflict would continue, with the balance quite possibly falling against the 
government, which would no longer have the support o f Soviet troops.
From the fall o f 1987 to the spring of 1988 Gorbachev and his colleagues sought 
to use the improving US-Soviet relationship to secure an agreement on Afghanistan of 
the sort that had previously eluded him and his predecessors. Not coincidentally, it was 
a crucial period in Gorbachev’s thinking about both domestic reform and foreign policy, 
and ultimately in the fate of the USSR. Since 1985, Gorbachev had followed a cautious 
approach to reform, often, as with the case o f the anti-alcohol campaign, borrowing 
from Andropov’s playbook. In foreign policy there were more genuine innovations, but 
as the failure o f the Reykjavik summit showed, huge chasms remained in relations with 
the Reagan administration, and neither Gorbachev nor other Soviet officials showed any
1 A version o f this chapter appears as “Politics, Diplomacy and the Soviet Withdrawal from Afghanistan: 
From National Reconciliation to the Geneva Accords,” Cold War History 8:3 (August 2008), 381-404.
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inclination to move away from Soviet commitments in the Third World. In the summer 
of 1987 Gorbachev told his advisers that he had come to see the need for more radical 
approaches to both domestic and foreign policy.2 Having previously excluded 
“solidarity” with progressive regimes and movements from the range of topics that 
could be discussed bilaterally with the U S.Jienow decided to engage Reagan full-o n  
tlreAfghanistan issue.
Determined to withdraw troops and improve relations with the West, Gorbachev 
was ultimately willing to sacrifice the long standing Soviet position on stopping the 
supply o f arms to the Afghan resistance. By the summer o f 1987 it was clear that Soviet 
efforts to establish a viable regime in Kabul, including the ones undertaken since 
Gorbachev came to power, had failed. Yet in the fall o f 1987 Gorbachev did not 
abandon hope o f achieving a settlement in Afghanistan. Rather, he hoped that 
improving relations with the US would lead to a settlement in Afghanistan and 
elsewhere in the Third World. Ultimately, Gorbachev’s misjudgement of American 
politics and decision making and his inability to renege on traditional Soviet 
commitments meant that a Soviet withdrawal did not lead to a resolution o f the conflict.
The US-Soviet Relationship and Afghanistan
By mid-1987, Soviet policy on Afghanistan had once again reached an impasse. Several 
successive strategies had failed to improve the stability o f the Kabul regime, making it 
increasingly likely that an “honourable” withdrawal would be impossible. Although in 
November 1986 Gorbachev believed that the US only wanted to keep the USSR in 
Afghanistan to bleed it, by the autumn of 1987 he was taking a new view of the U S-  
Soviet relationship. By autumn 1987 Shevardnadze and US Secretary of State George 
Shultz had exchanged several useful visits and a treaty on Intermediate Range Nuclear
2 On domestic political and economic reform in particular, Gorbachev told Chemiaev he was prepared to 
go “far, very far.” Zubok, Failed Empire, 301.
Minutes o f Politburo Meeting, November 13, 1986, Sowjetische Geheimdokumente ..., 440.
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Force (INF) was nearly ready. It was logical that Gorbachev would try to use his 
improving relationship with the US to achieve the settlement he found so elusive. The 
key point would be US willingness to stop supplying the opposition. Such a resolution 
would fully justify not only the Soviet withdrawal but his entire foreign policy 
framework even to the most cautious and conservative elements in his own country and 
the communist bloc.
Gorbachev realised that he would first need to make it clear that the USSR was 
serious about withdrawal. Over the next six months Gorbachev and Shevardnadze tried 
several times to use a tactic they had previously developed in negotiations with the 
United States: a declaration of an unexpected position as a start to negotiation. At the 
end of July 1987, Gorbachev told the Indonesian newspaper Merdeka: “In principle, 
Soviet troop withdrawal from Afghanistan has been decided upon... We favour a short 
time frame for the withdrawal. However, interference in the internal affairs of 
Afghanistan must be stopped and its non-resumption guaranteed.”4 Soviet diplomats 
were told they could use the statement as a basis for saying the political decision had 
been made to withdraw. The statement was meant to jump-start negotiations and prompt 
the US to agree to certain Soviet positions, making it clear that Soviet troops would 
withdraw in the hope that the Reagan administration would agree to earlier Soviet 
demands originally set as preconditions for withdrawal.
The first attempt to do this directly during a high-level meeting came during 
Shevardnadze’s visit to Washington in September 1987. On September 16, 
Shevardnadze told US Secretary o f State George Shultz that “we will leave 
Afghanistan. It may be in five months or a year, but it is not a question of it happening
4 Mikhail Gorbachev’s Replies to Questions Put By The Indonesian Newspaper “Merdeka, " July 21, 
1987
Novosti (Moscow: 1987). As late as November 1986 Soviet officials publicly said that a Soviet 
withdrawal would begin only two years after it was clear interference had stopped. Gankovsky, 
“Afghanistan,” 135.
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in the remote future.”5 Shevardnadze asked the Secretary of State for cooperation in 
ensuring a “neutral, non-aligned Afghanistan.” He also revealed that the Soviet 
leadership had taken a firm decision on withdrawal.6 In the context o f the Geneva 
negotiations on Afghanistan, Shevardnadze’s comment was a significant move, 
suggesting that the Soviet side would show its cards.7 Similar statements had been made 
before, but this one convinced Schultz.8 Improving Soviet-US relations played an 
important role. As Shultz put it in his memoirs, part of the reason he accepted 
Shevardnadze’s September 16 statement rather than earlier ones was that by then he 
“had enough confidence” to trust Shevardnadze’s word.9
It is not clear just how broad support for this policy was among Soviet 
politicians, but at least in its early stage it seems to have had support from Politburo 
members as well as senior Foreign Ministry officials. One measure o f this, perhaps, is 
that similar feelers were put out on the eve o f the Washington summit by KGB 
Chairman Vladimir Kriuchkov, a man who would later adopt some o f the most 
conservative positions on Afghanistan within the Soviet leadership. At a dinner meeting 
at the Maison Blanche bistro in Washington, he told his counterpart, CIA director 
Robert Gates, that the USSR wanted to get out, but was seeking a political solution. 
Kriuchkov fully played on Gorbachev’s themes of “mutual interests”, emphasizing that 
a possible fundamentalist state in Afghanistan would complicate US interests in the 
Gulf. As Gates puts it in his memoir, Kriuchkov told him: “You seem fully occupied in 
trying to deal with just one fundamentalist state.”10 Other senior figures, both at the 
party and at the deputy ministerial level, also signalled that the Soviet Union was 
getting reading to withdraw. Early in November 1987, for example, Soviet Foreign
5 Coll, Ghost Wars, 168.
6 Brown, Gorbachev Factor, 235.
7 George Shultz, Turmoil and Triumph (New York, 1993), 987.
8 Ibid.
9 Ibid, 1007.
10 Gates, From the Shadows, 425.
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Ministry spokesman Gennadi Gerasimov remarked that it would be possible for Soviet 
troops to leave within seven to twelve months. Towards the end of November, both 
Politburo member Nikolay Ryzhkov, speaking in New Delhi, and Deputy Foreign 
Minister Igor Rogachev, speaking in Moscow, suggested that Moscow was ready to 
make an offer on the time-frame.11
Gorbachev hoped that the improving US-Soviet relationship (or the Gorbachev-
Reagan relationship) would make it possible to reach an acceptable agreement. He
expressed this idea in a meeting with Najibullah in Moscow on November 3. “Maybe at
the sunset of their rule the Reagan administration will want to show that it contributed -
along with the USSR -  to the settlement o f the situation in a hot spot such as
Afghanistan,” Gorbachev told Najibullah. At the moment, the US attitude remained
unacceptable, because the Reagan administration “would want a settlement in which the
PDPA would be pushed to the back ...” but that could change. After all, the PDPA
10government represented the reality on the ground. Gorbachev believed that he could 
get Reagan to accept this status quo if Soviet troops withdrew.
The test of Gorbachev’s new approach was the Washington summit in 
December 1987. Although the keystone o f the summit was the Intermediate-Range 
Nuclear Forces (INF) treaty, for Gorbachev its importance lay not only in arms control 
talks but in being able to truly set the US-Soviet relationship on a new footing. This 
included regional conflicts, and, in particular, Afghanistan. Determined to explore the 
possibility that he could get a concession out of Reagan, Gorbachev pressed the issue 
during at least two meetings with Reagan and Shultz and one with vice-president 
George H.W. Bush. The interpretation o f these meetings greatly affected Soviet actions 
in the weeks that followed. Shevardnadze and Gorbachev seemed to believe that they 
had secured an important understanding regarding arms supplies, while the US denied
11 Khan, Untying the Afghan Knot, 233.
,2Record o f conversation between M.S. Gorbachev and Najibullah, November 3, 1987, NSA 
READD/RADD Collection, Box 9.
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that any such concession had ever been made.13In fact, there was good reason for Soviet 
leaders to think that a concession had been made. At the same time there was reason for 
them to be sceptical.
In the first conversation, on December 9th, Reagan urged Gorbachev to move 
forward with an announcement regarding the start of the withdrawal. Although he 
promised that the US would do everything to ensure that Afghanistan would become a 
neutral state, he balked at Gorbachev’s request that the US stop supplying the 
mujahadeen. Gorbachev had again tried to take the initiative by promising a quick end 
to Soviet participation in operations: “I can tell you that the day the announcement is 
made about the withdrawal of Soviet troops, they will not participate in military 
operations, except for self defense.”14 Reagan stuck to a familiar motif justifying 
continuation of US supplies: “The president o f Afghanistan has an army, the opposition 
does not. Therefore we cannot ask one side to put down their arms while the other keeps 
them.”15
The next day, Reagan’s position seemed even less compromising. He suggested 
that the DRA government should disband the army. Gorbachev insisted that there could 
be no question of troop withdrawal if the US did not agree to stop supplying the 
opposition. “Only under the condition that it is tied with the question of stopping US aid 
to the opposition forces; that is, the day Soviet troops start withdrawing should be the 
day that American military aid is stopped.”16 If not, Gorbachev pointed out, the situation 
in the country would deteriorate, “making a Soviet withdrawal impossible.” Here he 
tried the tactic he had earlier mentioned to Najibullah during their November meeting. 
Perhaps he could entice Reagan with the promise o f a major diplomatic resolution. He
13 Shultz, Turmoil 1087; Coll, Ghost Wars, 177.
14 Excerpt from conversation between M.S. Gorbachev and President Reagan on Afghanistan, December
9, 1987, NSA READD/RADD Collection, Box 9.
15 Ibid.
16 Excerpt from conversation between M.S. Gorbachev and President Reagan on Afghanistan, December
10, 1987, NSA READD/RADD Collection, Box 9
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suggested that it was time the US and USSR made a move together: “And regarding the 
cessation of American aid to the Afghan opposition. Let’s agree on a timetable and 
announce it. And if you need more time to think than please do think. But we are 
inviting you to take a concrete joint step. This would allow us to check if the US 
administration is genuinely trying to find a solution to the situation in Afghanistan.” 
Shultz, perhaps indeed thrown off balance by this last statement, remarked that “At the 
Geneva talks a suggestion was made that the US could stop supplying Afghan freedom
1 7fighters deadly weapons 60 days after the start of the Soviet withdrawal.”
Both the Russian and US records show Gorbachev being firm on the point of the 
US stopping supplies to the opposition. His position remained consistent with the brief 
prepared by the Chief of the General Staff, Marshal Akhromeev. The brief pointed to a 
few basic preconditions: the end of arms supplies to the resistance and a guarantee of 
neutrality for any future Afghan government. Other issues, like the timetable for 
withdrawal, were more flexible. The troop withdrawal could easily be completed in less
152than twelve months, as long as other issues were settled. Reagan proved largely 
unreceptive to Gorbachev’s demands, insisting that if the US cut off arms supplies it 
would amount to an unacceptable “monopoly of force” for the Najibullah government.19 
Curiously, Shultz did seem to endorse the possibility o f cutting off arms, remarking that 
the US, like the USSR, supported the Geneva agreements, which stipulated that outside 
support to the opposition would cease 60 days after the start o f the Soviet withdrawal.20
Thus Shultz showed willingness to meet the Soviets on the issue o f arms 
supplies, and it seems that this had been considered by mid-level diplomats. Steve Coll, 
in his extensive study of the US involvement in Afghanistan, points out that US
17 Ibid.
18 Memorandum from S.F. Akhromeev, Afghanistan: The Position o f the USSR, December 3, 1987, GFA 
#944.
19 Memorandum o f Conversation in the Oval Office, December 9, 1987, NSA End o f the Cold War 
Collection, Box 3. Reagan, Reagan Diaries, 556.
20 US Memorandum of Conversation o f Working Luncheon, December 10, 1987, NSA End o f the Cold 
War Collection, Box 3. See also the Russian record: excerpt from conversation between M.S. Gorbachev 
and President Reagan on Afghanistan, December 10, 1987, NSA READD/RADD Collection, Box 9.
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negotiators had been preparing to accept an end to CIA involvement around this time,
0 1
while in late 1987 the American press treated the question o f arms supplies as settled. 
The confusion reflected the split between “bleeders” and “dealers” in the Reagan 
administration, as well as differences between State Department officials on the one 
hand and CIA officials and the vocal “Afghan lobby” in Congress on the other.22 It is 
possible that Shultz was trying to maneuver Reagan toward his department’s position, 
while Reagan was mindful of the political pressure he might face if  he “abandoned” the 
mujahadeen to face the DRA army alone. Although Reagan had said in a television \
'    . Linterview prior to the summit that the US would not stop sending arms, senior officials
after the summit reaffirmed that the US was in fact prepared to do so and that the mair
sticking point remained an acceptable tintetable, These confusing signals would have ;
serious conseguencesjor ho,w_Gorbachev-saw his_prospects for aJJuitaMe agreement.
  (
Gorbachev apparently left the meeting believing that he and the US
administration had reached a new understanding.24 There was certainly reason for him
to think that this was the case, although he should have remained suspicious. There had
been no official agreement, nothing made public in the communique. Gorbachev’s
belief that he was finally reaching a new understanding with the Reagan administration
that would lead to increased cooperation defined Soviet policy in the weeks following
the summit and affected the way the Geneva negotiations ultimately played out.
21 Coll, Ghost Wars, 177.
22 The “bleeders” in the administration and Congress preferred to see the Soviet Union remain in 
Afghanistan and take losses from US supplied mujahadeen.
23 Soon after the summit the Washington Post reported that Undersecretary of State Michael Armacost, 
who was involved in the high-level talks on Afghanistan, as well as several other senior officials 
confirmed that the US would end aid to the Afghan opposition once Soviet troops had withdrawn. “Aid to 
Rebels Would End With Soviet Pullout,” Washington Post, December 14, 1987.
24 This is the opinion o f long-time Soviet ambassador to the US, Anatolii Dobrynin, who at the time was 
serving on the Afghanistan commission o f the Politburo. See Halliday, “Soviet Foreign Policymaking,” 
687.
25 Only a general statement on cooperation in Third World conflicts was made. See “Joint US-Soviet 
Summit Statement,” USSR-US Summit Washington December 7-10, 1987, Documents and Materials 
(Moscow, 1987), 67.
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Initiatives and Concessions
Moscow placed great importance on a US guarantee of non-interference for several 
reasons. Such a guarantee would show that the US was easing its demands as a positive 
response to the Soviet initiative. It would also change the dynamics of the fighting in 
Afghanistan by removing the element of “outside interference” and thereby justifying a 
Soviet withdrawal. The guarantee would provide a cushion for Najibullah once the 
Soviet withdrawal began. Within a highly factionalised government, Najibullah would 
not be able to hold power for long if it seemed like he was being left alone against a US- 
backed opposition. Firm guarantees that US supplies would cease could strengthen 
Najibullah’s position, perhaps even allowing him to achieve some of the goals set out in 
the Policy of National Reconciliation. Finally, Soviet leaders always had to contend 
with the possibility that their Afghan “clients,” although their geo-strategic influence 
was minimal, could act as spoilers, refusing to sign the accords if they felt their interests 
were not addressed. This would undermine the possibility of withdrawal, create an 
unnecessary public breach between Moscow and an ally, and destroy the credibility of 
New Thinking in front o f the world.
Shevardnadze travelled to Kabul on January 4, 1988 to talk with Najibullah and 
senior Afghan leaders. The main topic of discussion, of course, was the progress of 
negotiations.26 Although the records of this conversation are not available, the timing as 
well as statements made by Shevardnadze before and after the trip suggest that he felt 
some pressure to reaffirm a commitment to the Najibullah regime. In particular, he 
stressed that any agreement endorsed by the USSR and US would mean an end to arms 
supplies to the opposition when Soviet troops withdrew. In an interview before his 
departure, Shevardnadze told the Bakhtar news agency that “The American side has 
agreed to act as a guarantor and, accordingly, to end its assistance to armed groupings
26 “Shevardnadze in Kabul for talks with Najibullah, sees good prospects for Soviet troops withdrawal 
within 12 months,” Pravda, January 7, 1988, Current Digest o f  the Soviet Press, XL, N o .l, 1988, 13.
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that are engaged in military operations in Afghanistan against the people’s regime.”
This point formed the basis o f the agreement that he and Najibullah had reached during 
their talks. If the US made a commitment to end outside interference, Soviet troops
27could begin their withdrawal and complete it in less than twelve months.
While Gorbachev increasingly came to terms with the idea that Najibullah might 
not retain power, Shevardnadze believed that the USSR had a responsibility not only to 
work for a neutral Afghanistan, but also to help Najibullah stay in charge. General 
Liakhovskii, who was present at many o f Shevardnadze’s meetings in Kabul, believes 
that the “personal” factor played a big role in the Foreign Minister’s relentless support 
of Najibullah.28 During the January 6 interview with Bakhtar news agency, he spoke of 
the need to leave Afghanistan with “a clear conscience,” which meant with assurances 
that supplies to the opposition would end. Shevardnadze’s sense of a “personal” 
commitment, combined with his belief that a “strong-man” would be needed in 
Afghanistan, certainly played a role. Tellingly, in one of the few pages on Afghanistan 
in his memoirs, he wrote that he was bothered by a sense that the USSR was 
“abandoning” its Afghan friends, although he also noted that he had other worries 
besides his personal commitment to Najibullah.
During the first few months of 1988 Shevardnadze still hoped that the Geneva 
accords could become a proper instrument of guarantees and enforcement. That way 
they could give Najibullah a chance of surviving and protect Soviet credibility with 
other Third World countries. On January 15,1988 he told his Politburo colleagues that 
National Reconciliation was having an effect and that the PDPA would be able to play a 
leading role in the government if it could avoid factionalism.30 By contrast, in May of 
the previous year he had reported that the effect o f National Reconciliation had been
27 “Interview with the Bakhtar News Agency,” Pravda, January 7, 1988, CDSP, XL, N o .l, 1988, 14.
28 Author’s interview with Aleksandr Liakhovskii, July 2006.
29 Shevardnadze, The Future Belongs to Freedom, 69.
30 Diary notes of Politburo meeting. Vorotnikov, A Bylo Eto Tak, 219.
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quite limited. This new line reflected Shevardnadze’s growing faith in Najibullah, as 
well as his belief that without a strong pro-Soviet leader Afghanistan would not remain 
a friendly country.
While the idea of ending supplies to the mujahadeen in exchange for a Soviet 
withdrawal may have been acceptable to US negotiators, it proved unpalatable to the 
Reagan administration, perhaps because it was so politically risky. Shevardnadze’s 
interview on January 6 supposedly surprised and angered US Secretary o f State George
Shultz, who immediately sent a telegram to Moscow clarifying that Reagan had never
1  . , # .
made any such promise and denied it publicly as well. The incident put Moscow in a
bind. It had promised Najibullah that the USSR could get the US to stop supplying the 
opposition. Shevardnadze had followed this up publicly with an interview carried 
around the world and had then been rebuffed by Shultz and Reagan in an equally public 
manner.
Shevardnadze also seems to have genuinely believed that the Geneva Accords 
could be more than just a fig leaf for the Soviet withdrawal. He insisted to subordinates 
that by signing the accords, Pakistan was binding itself to stop interference and would 
have to respect that agreement.32 In a meeting with Cordovez in January 1988, he 
pressed for a strong enforcement mechanism so that the USSR could be reassured that 
“Pakistan would respect all the provisions of the agreement.” Pakistan’s willingness to 
be bound by the accords was important not only for Afghanistan, but for 
Shevardnadze’s relative standing within the Soviet leadership.
Reagan’s public reversal on supplying the opposition threatened to undermine 
Gorbachev’s and Shevardnadze’s positions with the “conservative” elements in the
31 Shultz, Turmoil and Triumph, 1087.
32 “Afghanistan stoil nam 15 milliardov dollarov v god” [Afghanistan cost us 15 billion dollars a year] 
(Interview with Nikolai Egorychev), Kommersant Vlast', No.46, November 25, 2002.
33 “Notes o f Meeting with Shevardnadze,” December 15, 1987, Perez de Cuellar Papers, Box 9.
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military and government.34 While most segments o f Soviet bureaucracy were in favour 
of withdrawal, there were still differences over the manner in which both the withdrawal 
should take place and Moscow’s relationship with Kabul should evolve. The military, 
for example, favoured either a unilateral withdrawal or one conducted through the 
Geneva process, but only if it provided concrete guarantees o f parallel disengagement 
on the part o f Pakistan. General Varennikov wrote that his team petitioned Moscow 
numerous times to work for symmetry in withdrawal. He suggested to both 
Shevardnadze and Diego Cordovez, the UN mediator, that for every military facility 
Soviet troops left, Pakistan should dismantle one o f the mujahadeen facilities on its 
territory.35 According to Liakhovskii, the top Soviet military leadership in Afghanistan 
felt that the Geneva process was pointless unless it brought real guarantees of the kind 
Varennikov demanded.36 Aside from trying to lobby Shevardnadze, Gorbachev, and the 
Politburo, however, they could do little in terms o f affecting the Geneva process. 
Reagan’s flat refusal to provide such guarantees made Gorbachev’s recent enthusiasm 
for an agreement with the US seem foolish and could have become fodder for 
conservative critics if  withdrawal was followed by disaster in Kabul or if  the still 
nascent rapprochement in US-Soviet relations collapsed.
With Reagan and Shultz rejecting the possibility that they would cease 
supplying the mujahadeen in exchange for a Soviet withdrawal, Gorbachev and the 
Politburo were faced with a stark choice. They could either retrench, refusing any 
further concessions until the US agreed to stop weapons supplies, or push forward, 
hoping that the US would come around if conservative “bleeders,” who Moscow 
believed (correctly) to be responsible for America’s hard-line policy, could be
34 According to Nikolai Kozyrev, a Deputy Foreign Minister who was the chief negotiator at Geneva, 
Shevardnadze felt vulnerable within the Soviet leadership, which moved him to take a more conservative 
line on Afghanistan and also to ally himself more closely with Kriuchkov. Author’s interview with 
Nikolai Kozyrev, Moscow, November 15, 2008.
35 “Sud’ba i Sovest”’ (Interview with General Valentin Varennikov) (Moscow, 1993), 51.
36 Author’s interview with Aleksandr Liakhovskii, July 2006.
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convinced that the intent to withdraw troops was genuine. The first approach was the 
one favoured by the military, by Shevardnadze, and to some degree the Foreign 
Ministry negotiators in Geneva. The danger, however, was that such a retrenchment 
could stall the whole withdrawal process, leaving Soviet troops in Afghanistan because 
of diplomatic hurdles.
At this critical moment, with the talks stalled,Jhe Reagan administration proving 
completely uncooperative, and his colleagues and advisers at loggerheads about how to
proceed, Gorbachev opted for yet another bold, unilateral announcement.37 In a
statement aired on Soviet television he announced that the Soviet withdrawal would
begin on May 15. Commitment to a withdrawal start-date had been a long-standing
American demand, and Gorbachev was hoping that by commiting to a date he could 
nudge the Americans to revisit the issue o f arms supplies. Georgii Kornienko, the 
deputy foreign minister, claims that he introduced the idea o f the announcment in the
38belief that such a statement from Gorbachev would accelerate the Geneva process. 
Bolstered by comments made by US officials during his trip to Washington in January 
1988, Kornienko argued that announcing a withdrawal date would allow the US to 
apply greater pressure on Pakistan and would convince Najibullah to sign. 
Shevardnadze rejected this approach, agreeing only to a statement to the effect that “a 
withdrawal of troops could begin in May 1988 if  a settlement agreement could be 
signed in February -  March.” The Politburo accepted this phrasing and Shevardnadze
37 The talks had stalled in 1988 in part because of disagreements regarding the Afghani-Pakistan border, 
the “Durand line” that separated Pushtun clans into two political entities. Cordovez writes that, although 
the superpowers seemed to be closer than ever to an agreement at this time, Pakistan and Afghanistan 
were becoming more intransigent. This was not Moscow’s main concern, however. After all, a 
commitment from the US would really have been the key to getting Afghanistan to sign and would have 
isolated Pakistan as the sole obstructionist player. Harrison and Cordovez, Out o f  Afghanistan, 323. 
Kornienko believes that Pakistan’s new stubbornness had to do with Shevardnadze encouraging 
Afghanistan to use Indian attitudes toward Pakistan as justification for Afghan positions at negotiations. 
The effect, as he puts it, was to “wave the red flag before the bull.” Kornienko, “The Afghan Endeavor,” 
14. But Riaz M. Khan, the chief Pakistani negotiator at Geneva, believes that it had more to do with 
Pakistan president’s Zia ul Haq’s fear of isolation should a US-Soviet rapprochement on Afghanistan 
make him an unnecessary ally. See Khan, Untying the Afghan Knot, 236-237.
38 Kornienko, Kholodnaia Voina, 257.
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and Kriuchkov carried the message when they went to see Najibullah in Kabul to 
discuss the planned announcement. At the last minute, however, Gorbachev opted for
• • • OQ
stronger wording, personally writing it into the Politburo decision by hand.
Kornienko claims a key role in this last-minute decision, but it is quite consistent 
with Gorbachev’s preferences in similar situations. An announced start-date had been a 
frequent demand o f the Reagan administration, repeated during the Washington summit 
and frequently in the press. Gorbachev chose to make the announcement in order to take 
the initiative, to do what his counterparts in the US doubted he would do. The 
disagreement between him and Shevardnadze was that between a politician and a 
negotiator. Although Shevardnadze was often more the former than the latter, in this 
instance he saw that the announcement meant going into the next round o f negotiations 
holding fewer cards than ever before. This too was consistent with the role that 
Shevardnadze had been playing in the previous months, that of Najibullah’s top ally in 
Moscow and chief negotiator on the international scene.
The statement, read on Soviet television on February 8th and printed in both 
Pravda and Izvestiya, committed the USSR to start the withdrawal on May 15th as long 
as an agreement had been reached at Geneva by March 15. It also committed the USSR 
to “front-load” the withdrawal, that is, to include a larger proportion of troops in the 
first half o f the withdrawal. “Front-loading” had been a US and Pakistani demand, 
intended to make sure any partial withdrawal was irreversible. Finally, the statement 
made it clear that the withdrawal would be de-linked from the formation o f coalition 
government, an earlier Pakistani demand.40 Non-interference was only mentioned once, 
as “one of the aspects o f the settlement.” Najibullah released a parallel statement the 
same day. It is unfortunate that the records of Kriuchkov and Shevardnadze’s meetings
39 Ibid.
40 “Statement on Afghanistan by M.S. Gorbachev,” Pravda, February 9, 1988, p .l, CDSP Vol. XL, No.6,
pp. 1-2.
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with Najibullah that week are unavailable, as they would make for lively reading. It is 
highly unlikely that Najibullah was particularly enthusiastic.
With regard to the talks in Geneva, the February 8 announcement, made despite 
Shevardnadze’s opposition, had the desired effect. Pakistani President Zia al-Huq, 
previously non-committal regarding Pakistan’s role in the last stage of negotiations, 
now told Cordovez that Pakistan would “fully participate” in the upcoming talks.41 
Although there would be further hurdles prior to signing the Geneva agreement, 
Feburary 8 became a turning point. Cordovez describes it as the breakthrough he had 
been waiting for, allowing him to announce the talks would resume on March 2.42
Wh il ethejwi th drawal announcement facilitated the Geneva process, it 
undermined the Soviet position at the talks. From the point of view of Soviet 
negotiators, any flexibility on their part was met with a firmer hand from Islamabad and 
Washington.43 In his analysis of the accords, Soviet negotiator Nikolai Kozyrev pointed 
out that prior to December 1987, statements regarding the Geneva process made in 
Moscow reflected recommendations made by the Soviet team in Geneva. After 
December, the statements were often made without consulting or warning the Geneva 
team.44 Shevardnadze’s staff in Geneva had opposed previous announcements, such as 
Gorbachev’s December 1987 and Shevardnadze’s January 1988 statements that the 
USSR would be willing to withdraw its troops within twelve months in exchange for the 
creation o f a broad coalition government in Kabul and the cessation of aid to the 
mujahedeen. According to Kozyrev, these announcements “devalued the position of our 
delegation at talks, put it in an awkward spot and gave the opposite side extra 
motivation to pressure Moscow in the hope that the Soviet leadership would agree to
41 Harisson and Cordovez, Out o f  Afghanistan, 335.
42 Ibid, 334.
43 N.I. Kozyrev, “Zhenevskie Soglashenie 1988 goda i Afganskoe Uregulirovanie” Diplomatic Academy 
of the Ministry o f Foreign Affairs (Moscow, 2000), 21.
44 Kozyrev, “Zhenevskie Soglashenie,” 22.
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further concessions.”45 Even as they pushed the talks towards an agreement, 
Gorbachev’s unexpected announcements took away some o f the leverage that Soviet 
diplomats hoped to employ in negotiations.
The withdrawal announcement should be seen in the context o f Gorbachev’s 
political style as well as his changing conception of foreign policy in early 1988. While 
the comment on interference barely took up a line in the statement, some twelve 
sentences were devoted to the connection between a resolution to the Afghan conflict 
and other third-world hot spots. This included the Iran-Iraq war, southern Africa, 
Cambodia, and Central America. Using language he had previously used to describe the 
Afghan war to the CPSU, he called these hotspots “bleeding wounds capable o f causing 
spots of gangrene on the body of mankind.”46 But if Gorbachev was a true believer in 
his reforms and his vision of a new foreign policy focused on cooperation, as both his 
detractors and supporters say, then the linkage made sense. A politician’s intuition told 
him that he was not the only leader dealing with a thorny problem. Reagan could be 
persuaded to see the mutual advantage of a new approach, but he would have to start in 
Afghanistan.
The February 8 statement was not pure propaganda. Several weeks later, 
meeting with Politburo members to hear a report on the Afghan situation, Aleksandr 
Iakovlev, a close Gorbachev aide and a Politburo member in charge of ideology (as well 
as a member o f the Afghanistan commission) told his colleagues to take this line as 
policy. The formal statement had been about Afghanistan, but “our announcement is a 
real solution for one regional conflict and a possible formula for others. Let us approach 
with the same sense o f responsibility and international participation to other regional
45 Ibid.
46 “Statement on Afghanistan . . .”
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problems, be it Angola and the SAR, or the Near East, or Central America.”47 For 
Gorbachev, the new formula was more important than losses at the negotiating table.
Gorbachev’s announcement helped to clear one o f the last hurdles to completing 
the formal Geneva document. The Pakistani side had demanded the formation of a 
coalition government largely excluding the PDPA before the withdrawal of Soviet 
troops.48 Gorbachev’s rejection of this proposal met with no resistance from Shultz, who 
had not found it reasonable and only reluctantly agreed to carry Zia’s demand to 
Moscow.49 As one senior official told reporters just after Shultz’s Moscow trip, it would 
be wrong of the US to now ask the USSR to “stick around” until a political settlement 
had been reached.50
While the announcement helped to move the negotiations at the Geneva level, 
the US did not agree to stop supplying arms to the opposition. It had become clear to the 
US administration that the Soviet Union was desperate to leave, and there was no reason 
to take a political risk domestically by giving any concessions.51 Shevardnadze kept 
trying to convince the US to agree to halt arms supplies with the start of the Soviet 
withdrawal. When Shultz came to Moscow in February, Shevardnadze accused the US 
of “switching signals” on the question of arms supplies. After all, the USSR had done 
all it was asked to do, including the announcement of a start date and offering a short 
timetable for the withdrawal. Shevardnadze emphasised that Najibullah was working 
towards a coalition government that would include the opposition while marginalizing 
the most extreme elements. Shultz remained adamant that a US cut-off would come 
only if the USSR also stopped supplying Kabul. In Washington the following month, 
Shevardnadze again pressed this point, but Shultz refused to back down. After the
47 Record o f a Politburo meeting chaired by Iakovlev, February 22, 1988, NSA READD/RADD 
Collection, Box 9.
48 Cordovez and Harrison, Out o f  Afghanistan, 338.
49 Matlock, Reagan and Gorbachev, 287; Shultz, Turmoil and Triumph, 1089.
50 “Shultz Sure o f Soviets’ Afghanistan Pullout,” Washington Post, February 24, 1988.
51 Author’s interview with Ambassador Jack Matlock, January 1, 2008.
52 Matlock, Reagan and Gorbachev, 286.
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February meeting, Shultz said he “had no doubt that Soviet troops would be 
withdrawn.”53 Shultz knew that further concessions were unnecessary, that Moscow 
now wanted the accords more than the U.S; there was no need to take steps that would 
cause a conservative backlash back home
Gorbachev should perhaps have realised that the Reagan administration would 
avoid a politically risky step if it could. Conservative commentators and politicians in 
the United States had been edgy since the Washington summit, worrying that Reagan 
would give away too much.54 Even the mainstream press did not see any reason why
thaid to the mujahadeen should be stopped. The day after the February 8 announcement, 
the Washington Post argued that support for the mujahadeen was a duty o f the United 
States, a responsibility “to sustain a brave people fighting to repel a foreign 
aggression.”55 Gorbachev had easy access to this kind o f information via the KGB and 
foreign ministry and should have realised that there was nothing to gain for Reagan 
politically by stopping supplies to the Afghan opposition.
Despite having lost out on the key issue o f arms supplies, Gorbachev held out 
hope that a new, broader understanding with the US would lead to a peaceful resolution 
of the conflict some time after Soviet troops withdrew. Shultz did accept Gorbachev’s 
broader framework for conflict resolution. In a closing meeting on February 22, he 
pointed out that the most valuable parts of the visit were understandings about how 
conflicts in Angola, Cambodia, and Iran-Iraq could be settled. Gorbachev concurred: “I 
think that we have to set an example for the world in these questions. If we develop this 
sort of cooperation, one can hope that conflicts will be decided in a way that addresses 
the interests o f all sides.” The most curious thing about this conversation, however, was 
that the issue o f a US aid cut off was not even mentioned. Gorbachev restricted himself 
to urging Shultz to ensure that the next round of Geneva talks was the last and to
53 Cordovez and Harrison, Out o f  Afghanistan, 340.
54 There was very open opposition in the Senate, see Matlock, Reagan and Gorbachev, 285-6.
55 “The Afghanistan Announcement,” Washington Post, February 9, 1988.
highlighting that the USSR would not now accept a linkage of a coalition government 
with troop withdrawal. To this latter point, Shultz readily agreed.56
Towards the Geneva Accords
By mid-February 1988, Gorbachev had reconciled himself to the idea that a Soviet 
withdrawal would not bring about the cessation o f US aid to the mujahadeen. Although 
Gorbachev was prepared to accept a weak agreement as long as it paved the way for 
Soviet troops to withdraw, Shevardnadze kept trying to push for a new agreement.
It is quite possible, in fact, that Gorbachev had made the February 8 
announcement fully expecting to begin the withdrawal without a US agreement to cut 
off aid. On February 11th, he seemed to be preparing the Indian Minister o f Defense, 
Krishna Pant, for a Soviet acceptance o f a weak accord. When Pant pointed out that US 
weapons could fall into the hands of rogue terrorists, Gorbachev replied that the 
question of arms supplies was difficult, but if the USSR pursued it, the US could 
counter by pointing to Soviet weapons held by the Kabul regime, “and then the whole 
process could get stuck. And we don’t want to leave Najib naked.”57 At the February 22 
meeting with Shultz, Gorbachev did not bring up the question o f arms supplies at all, 
suggesting that he was prepared to accept an agreement that did not stop the US from 
supplying the opposition via Pakistan. He needed a withdrawal to prove he was serious 
about putting the Soviet Union on a new foreign policy course. Agreement or not, the 
USSR had to withdraw. As he explained to his Politburo colleagues on March 3, “The 
country, the world, is ready for us to do this. In politics it is not only what you do that 
matters, but also when and how.”58
56 Record o f conversation between M.S. Gorbachev and US Secretary George Shultz, February 22, 1988, 
NSA READD/RADD Collection, Box 9.
57 Record o f conversation with K. Pant, February 11, 1988, NSA READD/RADD Collection, Box 9.
58 Politburo meeting, March 3, 1988, GB PB 1988, 89.
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Shevardnadze could not accept such a stance. His close ties with Najibullah, 
developed over several years and numerous meetings, pushed him to seek an agreement 
that would help guarantee the regime’s survival after Gorbachev had given up on this. 
Shevardnadze made one final attempt to get the Reagan administration to stop supplying 
the mujahadeen during a trip to Washington in March. In a meeting with Shultz, he 
emphasised that Moscow had met all o f Washington’s earlier demands. The timetable 
had now been reduced to nine months and could be made even shorter, while the 
withdrawal would be “front loaded,” meaning that half the Soviet troops would leave in 
the first ninety days. Should not the US respond by meeting a demand of Moscow’s? 
Shultz rejected these arguments. The next day Shevardnadze tried again. Shultz 
consulted with the National Security Advisor, Lieutenant General Colin Powell, and 
Armacost, and came back to tell Shevardnadze, again, that the US would only cut off 
aid if  the USSR did as w ell.59 A few days later, however, they conferred over the 
telephone and agreed to set aside the question o f cutting off arms. Shultz confirmed this 
with a letter and the stage was set for the accords to be signed.60
Throughout this period and after the troop withdrawal had begun, Shevardnadze 
and Kriuchkov formed a sort of “Najib” lobby within the Soviet leadership. 
Shevardnadze’s trips to Afghanistan had convinced him that unless a strong leader was 
in charge, the country would become firmly anti-Soviet. It is unfortunate that no 
records are available o f Shevardnadze’s conversations with Najibullah, since these 
would reveal much about the dynamics of their relationship. Nikolai Egorychev, 
Moscow’s ambassador to Kabul, has said that Shevardnadze guarded the relationship
59 Oberdorfer, The Turn, 219.
60 Chemiaev Diary, April 1, 1988, GFA CD 1988. See also the discussion between Ambassador 
Belonogov and Perez de Cuellar on March 29, 1988. The Soviet position was that “symmetry” should be 
understood as the trade-off in the accords between the Soviet withdrawal and the cessation of arm 
supplies. Vorontsov had told the Pakistani ambassador that “The Soviet Union had no intention of  
entering into negotiations with the US on this issue.” As we will see, in the end the Politburo voted to 
sign the accords with the US as a signatory -  primarily to give the withdrawal more o f an international 
legal framework. “Notes o f a meeting of the Secretary General and the Permanent Representative of the 
USSR,” March 29, 1988, UNA, S-1024-2-3.
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rather jealously.61 According to Liakhovskii, Shevardnadze made extensive promises to 
Najibullah about Soviet support during their meetings. Even in April, when the 
accords were about to be signed, Shevardnadze argued for a revision of the 1978 
Soviet-Afghan Friendship Treaty to permit the return of Soviet troops under certain 
circumstances, but Gorbachev refused this approach.
Gorbachev, however, viewed the withdrawal from Afghanistan as part of his 
overall political reforms as well of the USSR’s standing with its allies. As Iakovlev 
pointed out, the USSR absolutely had to get out; most Soviet people knew this and 
supported the decision. However, Moscow had to keep the “national interest in mind.” It 
was a question of authority and legitimacy: “after all, we have to explain this problem to 
all our people, the mothers, to public opinion. We have to look at what the reaction will 
be like abroad. Some people will be unhappy with this step. We have to look really 
carefully at the reaction in the Third World.”64 Although achieving the broader goals of 
New Political Thinking required ending the war in Afghanistan, it also meant preserving 
a sense of the USSR’s power and authority, without which Moscow would very quickly 
lose control of its position in the world.
Gorbachev’s public and private statements suggest that he would have preferred 
an agreement that preserved a neutral Afghanistan with a broad coalition government 
that included the PDPA. His commitment to New Political Thinking notwithstanding, 
he remained concerned with the USSR’s great power status. He acknowledged that a 
withdrawal from Afghanistan that did not guarantee Najibullah’s survival in power 
would invite challenges from conservatives within the USSR as well as socialist 
governments in Eastern Europe and the Third World. Nevertheless, Gorbachev told his
61 “Afghanistan stoil nam 15 milliardov dollarov v god” [Afghanistan cost us 15 billion dollars a year] 
(Interview with Nikolai Egorychev) Kommersant F/asf VNo.46, November 25, 2002.
62 Author’s interview with Aleksandr Liakhovskii, Moscow, July 2006.
63 Ekedahl and Goodman, Wars o f Eduard Shevardnadze, 185.
64 Record o f a Politburo meeting chaired by Comrade A.N. Iakovlev, February 22, 1988, NSA 
READD/RADD Collection, Box 9.
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Politburo colleagues on March 3, 1988 that challenges from the Third World and from
conservatives should in no way affect the withdrawal decision:
There will be questions, even in our country. What did we fight 
for? What did we sacrifice so many for? In the “Third World” 
there will be questions. They’re already coming in. You can’t 
depend on the Soviet Union, they say. It leaves its friends to the 
mercy o f  the United States.
And here we must not budge.65
His commitment to withdrawal from Afghanistan was now absolute. He knew, however,
that he did not operate in a political vacuum, that his foreign and domestic policies
would invite criticism and opposition and that he had to proceed carefully at every step.
It was important, he pointed out, “to keep the authority o f power before our own people
and the outside world.”66
The Politburo gathered in the late afternoon on April 1st to decide whether or not
to sign the Geneva accords. Gorbachev knew the accords were weak, but their existence
gave hope that it would be possible to affect how the withdrawal was to be played out. It
is clear that he did not expect much from the accords themselves. Rather, he saw them
as a symbol of the way he wanted to conduct relations, perhaps even a stepping stone
that would help establish trust. As he put it, “this will be a confirmation of our entire
approach to solving international problems.”67 Every single member of the Politburo
voted in favour.68
Najibullah knew that the withdrawal was inevitable. As he told an interviewer in 
1989, he took Gorbachev seriously when the latter first came to power and began 
talking about Soviet disengagement.69 Yet he also knew it would be incredibly difficult 
to survive without the support of Soviet troops. Shevardnadze had clearly been 
promising him that the accords would not be signed unless the US also agreed to stop 
supplying arms. Over the previous month, this position had disintegrated, and now
65 Politburo meeting March 3, 1988 GFA PB 1988, 89.
66 Ibid.
67 Politburo meeting April 1, 1988 GFA Vestka v Politburo, 312.
68 Chemiaev Diary, April 1, 1988, GFA CD 1988.
69 B. Padishev, “Najibullah, president Afganistana,” International Affairs (Moscow) Jan. 1990, 20.
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Soviet troops were preparing to withdraw and leave the Afghan army, such as it was, 
fighting largely alone.70 He did what he could to ensure continued Soviet support.
Najibullah’s resistance to an agreement that would potentially weaken him was 
on full display when Shevardnadze flew to Kabul on April 3. According to Deputy 
Minister Yulii Vorontsov, who was involved in the Geneva process and later served as 
ambassador to Afghanistan, Najibullah at first refused to sign. It took Shevardnadze
71three days o f difficult persuasion to make the Afghan leader agree to the accords. It 
also took extensive promises o f Soviet support and even the possibility of leaving 10-
15,000 troops in the country.72 Shevardnadze stayed in Kabul until April 5, then 
returned to Moscow and announced that Najibullah had accepted the agreement. The 
next day he flew to Tashkent with Gorbachev, Kriuchkov, and Chemiaev to meet with 
Najibullah. By the time Gorbachev met Najibullah in Tashkent on April 7, all o f these 
questions had largely been solved, and Gorbachev assured Najibullah that the Soviet 
government endorsed completely the agreement reached between Shevardnadze and the 
Afghan leader over the previous days.
The accords were a threat to Najibullah not only in that they deprived him of  
Soviet troops without any cut-off of supplies to the mujahedeen, but also because this 
meant that his authority within the government could be further eroded. This was
70 Details regarding the condition o f the Afghan armed forces is beyond the scope o f this study, but a 
report made on March 9th by General Varennikov is quite telling and worth citing. Varennikov noted that 
desertion was on the rise and very little had actually been accomplished in terms o f improving the Afghan 
army during the Soviet presence in Afghanistan. “Meeting o f political workers and advisers in the 
Officer’s House o f the 40th Army in Kabul,” March 9, 1988, in Plastun and Adrianov, Najibullah v Tiskah 
Geopolitiki, 208-212.
71 Oberdorfer, The Turn, 281.
72 Najibullah, knowing Gorbachev was eager to sign, asked about the possibility o f leaving 10-15,000 
troops both for training purposes and to help guard economic targets. Gorbachev left the question open 
but pointed out that it might be possible to do so within the framework o f the Geneva agreement if these 
were sent as “advisors” who would train Afghans working with Soviet armaments: “after all, it is natural 
that when military technology is provided, there is a demand for help in mastering it. This is normal, 
everyone acts this way.” While it could be argued that Gorbachev said this only to humor Najibullah and 
get his approval o f the accords, Gorbachev’s decision making in the fall o f 1988, discussed in chapter 5, 
suggests that he really did believe in supporting Najibullah. Record o f Conversation o f MS Gorbachev 
with the President o f Afghanistan and General Secretary o f the CC PDPA Najibullah April 7, 1988 
National Security Archive, READD/RADD Collection, Box 9.
73 “Record of conversation between M.S. Gorbachev and the president o f Afghanistan, Najibullah” April 
7, 1988 NSA READD/RADD Collection, Box 9.
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highlighted when DRA Foreign Minister Abdul Wakil refused to sign the accords in 
Geneva, saying that to do so would be to betray his people.74 While Shevardnadze and
*7C
Gorbachev met with Najibullah, Nikolai Kozyrev worked on Wakil in Geneva. In his 
hotel room, Wakil put on a great show of emotion, ripping napkins and screaming that 
the Afghan people would never forgive him. Although Najibullah had agreed to the 
accords, Wakil still refused to sign, and only relented after Soviet deputy foreign 
minister Vorontsov, who flew to Geneva at Kozyrev’s request and spent six hours alone 
with Wakil, made it clear that if  the Foreign Minister did not sign, another official 
would be sent from Kabul.76 The intense effort put in by Shevardnadze and his aides 
could only increase the Foreign Minister’s sense o f commitment to the Najibullah 
regime. More importantly, it highlighted how fragile Najibullah’s position could be if  it 
was not absolutely clear that he had complete Soviet support.
Gorbachev needed the meeting in Tashkent just as much as Najibullah. As he 
explained to Alessandro Natta, the General Secretary o f the Italian Communist Party, 
the imminent withdrawal from Afghanistan was already causing rumblings among 
Soviet allies, particularly in the Third World. The essence of this criticism, according to
• 77Gorbachev, was “you’re ‘abandoning’ Afghanistan, and you will ‘abandon’ us.”
While Gorbachev needed to demonstrate that the USSR really wanted to do business in 
a new way, he also needed to show that it was not about to leave its friends in the lurch. 
Proving that the Soviet Union could do both meant expressing confidence in Najibullah 
as a leader who could survive without the aid o f Soviet troops. This was a key purpose
74 Wakil insisted that the main obstacle was the issue o f borders, i.e. the Durand line, which all parties 
pledged to respect. In fact, it was probably an attempt to scuttle the accords, which Wakil feared would 
mean the end o f his government. Author’s interview with Nikolai Kozyrev, Moscow, November 14,
2008.
75 Cordovez, Out o f  Afghanistan, 359.
76 Ibid; Author’s interviews with Yulii Vorontsov, September 11, 2007 and Nikolai Kozyrev, November 
14, 2008.. See also “Zalozhniki Istorii” (Interview with Nikolai Kozyrev) Moskovskiy Komsomolets 
March 5, 2004, No.49, pg.9.
77 Record o f conversation between M.S. Gorbachev and General Secretary o f the Italian Communist Party 
A. Natta, March 29, 1988, NSA READD/RADD Collection, Box 9.
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of the April 7 meeting in Tashkent, a “heads o f state meeting” that was supposed to 
represent the beginning o f a new relationship between two sovereign states.
Gorbachev used the meeting to provide political cover for his approach.
Between April 1, when the decision to sign the accords was discussed, and April 14, 
when the signing ceremony took place, Gorbachev personally briefed communist bloc 
leaders and party bosses, telling them that Najibullah was a capable leader who was 
gaining in authority and that the USSR would continue to support him politically. This, 
and the usefulness o f the Geneva accords, were central themes of his conversations with 
Cuban leader Fidel Castro on April 5 and with Czechoslovak President Husak on April 
8.78 At meetings with regional party secretaries called to Moscow in April after the Nina 
Andreyeva affair, which had alerted Gorbachev to the strength of conservative feeling 
in the country and within the leadership, he again stressed the importance of 
withdrawal. He admitted that there could be an unfavourable turn o f events, but insisted
70
the Geneva accords would help settle the political crisis.
Although Shevardnadze formed a united front with Gorbachev just prior to the 
signing of the accords, he was clearly unhappy with the result. On April 1, 1988, 
Shevardnadze told the Politburo that with the Geneva accords there was a “legal basis” 
for the withdrawal, which meant that the US could no longer use Pakistani bases to re­
supply the mujahadeen, and that there would be 150 monitors to make sure the accords 
were carried out.80 In fact, Shevardnadze’s support for the accords was half-hearted at 
best. He had fought hard to secure an agreement to end arms supplies. In his memoirs, 
Shevardnadze confesses that he left Geneva with mixed feelings: “I knew that we would 
not lessen our political efforts for a peaceful settlement in Afghanistan, but still I could
78 Record of telephone conversation between M.S. Gorbachev and F. Castro, April 5, 1988 GFA 
Document # 20686; Record o f conversation between MS Gorbachev and President o f the CSSR G. Husak 
(Czechoslovakia), April 12, 1988, GFA Document # 20684. Nina Andreyeva was a Leningrad chemistry 
teacher who published an article entitled “I will not forsake my principles” in Sovetskaia Rossiia. The 
article was applauded by more conservative party members. Brown, Gorbachev Factor, 172-175.
79 Gorbachev’s meeting with the third group of Obkom secretaries, April 18, 1988 GFA PB 1988, 191.
80 Politburo Meeting April 18, 1988 (Medvedev’s Notes) GFA PB 1988 211.
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not rid myself o f a sense of personal guilt toward my friends.” The accords were a 
much weaker document than what many in the Soviet government and the PDPA had 
sought. Although they did contain non-interference clauses, the question of arms 
supplies was left open. The accords contained no guarantee of a role for the PDPA in a 
future government and had only a weak enforcement mechanism. The latter point in 
particular greatly irked both the diplomats and the Soviet military.82
For Gorbachev, the Geneva accords served a dual purpose: they could be used as 
a shield against conservatives as the withdrawal got underway and as proof of the 
USSR’s commitment to political solutions for Western audiences. Despite the weakness 
of the proposed document, Gorbachev argued that it was the best way to get out, in part 
because it would allow Moscow to maintain a degree o f leverage in future discussions. 
The biggest caveat was the political victory. Arguing for signing the accords rather than 
a unilateral withdrawal, he put the issue in the wider context o f his domestic and 
international challenges: “it is hard to overestimate the political value of settling the 
Afghan problem. This will be a confirmation o f our new approach to solving 
international problems. Our enemies and opponents will have their strongest arguments 
knocked out of their hands.”83 The limited discussion o f Afghanistan in his memoir 
stresses this aspect: “The significance of this unprecedented settlement went far beyond 
its regional implications. It was the first time that the Soviet Union and the United 
States, together with the conflicting parties, had signed an agreement which paved the 
way for a political solution of the conflict.”84 Gorbachev was less concerned with the 
fate of Afghanistan than with the success of his broader foreign policy.
For all the rhetoric about changing the way conflicts were solved and the way 
the USSR behaved in its foreign relations, Gorbachev had to go to great lengths to show
81 Shevardnadze, Future Belongs to Freedom, 69.
82 Liakhovskii interview; “Sud’ba i Sovest,” 51.
83 Politburo meeting April 1, 1988 GFA Vestka v Politburo, 312.
84 Gorbachev, Memoirs, 458.
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that in many ways things were still the same. One phrase in particular from the April 7 
Tashkent meeting captures this. Seeking to reassure Najibullah that the USSR intended 
to keep supporting the regime with arms, Gorbachev framed the commitment in 
thoroughly uncompromising terms: “Even in the most difficult, harsh circumstances, 
even under conditions o f strict control, in any situation we will provide you with 
arms.”85 This was a far cry from the talk o f mutual settlement of conflicts that had come 
from Gorbachev so often on previous occasions. As often throughout his tenure, 
Gorbachev manoeuvred between two positions: one that was imaginative and reformist, 
the other much closer to traditional Soviet policy and priorities. While this rhetoric was 
presented to different audiences, Gorbachev’s willingness to make contradicting 
promises and statements would come to haunt him during the withdrawal period, when 
some of his advisers expected him to stick to the letter o f the accords, while other 
insisted that he honour his promises to Najibullah.
Conclusion
Between the August of 1987 and April 1988 Moscow took a series of steps to begin its 
disengagement from Afghanistan. These initiatives followed the failure of  earlier
policies to create the conditions necessary for an honourable withdrawal. Moscow’s
? —    " — — —
hopes in late 1987 and early 1988 focused on enticing the US to sign an agreement that 
would make the Soviet withdrawal justifiable in the eyes of its allies. The withdrawal 
ultimately began without the key US agreement on cutting off supplies to the 
mujahadeen. Moscow could have withdrawn unilaterally or delayed the withdrawal 
until a later date in the hopes of gaining concessions at the bargaining table. The 
military supported the first option, while Najibullah and his most fervent supporters in 
Moscow, Shevardnadze and Kriuchkov, did not want to sign any accords that left the
85 “Record of conversation between M.S. Gorbachev and the president o f Afghanistan, Najibullah,” April 
7, 1988, NSA READD/RADD Collection, Box 9.
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Kabul government facing an enemy still supported from the outside without the Soviet 
army to carry on the fight. It was Gorbachev’s decisions and actions at key points that 
decided the actual turn o f events.
It has been pointed out that around mid-1987 Gorbachev, increasingly frustrated 
with the slow pace of reforms, began to see all of his country’s problems as interlinked 
and solvable either all at once or not at all. This observation helps explain 
Gorbachev’s Afghanistan policy in the period discussed in this chapter. In previous 
periods, Gorbachev had approved different policies that would improve the situation 
within Afghanistan. Now he took a more direct, personal role to try to bring the Soviet 
intervention to an end. There were two reasons why Gorbachev was willing to abandon 
seemingly strong negotiating positions. Firstly, he hoped that this would help achieve a 
broader improvement in relations with the US. Secondly, and most importantly, he did 
not want to drag out the Soviet involvement in Afghanistan any longer, because by the 
end of 1987 he had lost faith in most Soviet military and political efforts within that 
country. Gorbachev’s initiative proved crucial in ensuring a withdrawal date was 
announced in February 1988 and that the accords were signed in March. He overrode 
objections from the military as well as people closer to him, like Shevardnadze, to bring 
this about. Gorbachev chose this course because he believed that he could sacrifice a 
favourable settlement on Afghanistan for a broader improvement in relations with the 
West.
Many o f the people around Gorbachev were not so sanguine about the chances 
of a US -  Soviet rapprochement leading to a favourable resolution in Afghanistan. Quite 
correctly, they saw that the Reagan administration was not inclined to give up aid to the 
mujahadeen; not only did Reagan himself believe in the moral value of that aid, but 
there was a vocal congressional lobby that was sceptical o f even his very limited
86 Zubok, “Gorbachev,” 61-100.
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engagement with the USSR on this and other regional issues. More importantly, some 
of the most senior officials around Gorbachev were very closely involved with the 
Kabul leadership and saw themselves as responsible for representing the PDPA’s 
interests. This included the KGB chairman Vladimir Kriuchkov and Foreign Minister 
Eduard Shevardnadze. Shevardnadze may indeed have felt a great deal of “personal” 
responsibility, but with Kriuchkov it was also an issue o f maintaining Soviet (and KGB) 
commitments to client governments. Perhaps they saw the abandonment of Kabul as a 
precedent for the Soviet government to abandon all o f its commitments -  a domino 
effect started from the centre. Najibullah exploited this situation fully, securing 
promises from Shevardnadze and Kriuchkov in return for his cooperation in 
Gorbachev’s diplomatic game. This explains the frequent references to protecting 
“friends,” a concern which Gorbachev acknowledged but was willing to set aside.
For all o f his emphasis on New Political Thinking, which was genuine, 
Gorbachev could not ignore such concerns. He had to think about his political strength 
at home and also about the USSR’s relationship with its allies. His promise of support 
and arms supplies to Najibullah “no matter what” was only one example of his 
willingness to conduct relations with Third World client states much the way his 
predecessors had. On April 1, the day that the Geneva accords were discussed, he 
approved a major airlift o f arms to Colonel Haile Miriam Mengistu’s regime in Ethiopia 
-  ignoring the objection o f Chemiaev as well as reports from Marshall Akhromeev, the
on
chief of staff, which showed that the situation was hopeless. Similarly, for all the talk 
about applying New Political Thinking to other international problems, Gorbachev 
made no serious effort to tie in Soviet aid to the Sandinistas or to the MPLA in Angola.
87 On April 12, two days before the signing ceremony in Geneva, Reagan complained in his diary: 
“Another meeting with leaders of hard Conservative leaders [sic] Paul Weyrich, Gen. Graham etc ... As 
usual they had us on the wrong side in Afghanistan settlement, Mozambique, Chile & Angola. It’s 
amazing how certain they can be when they know so d— n little o f what w e’re really doing.” Reagan, 
Reagan Diaries, 595.
88 Chemiaev Diary, April 1, 1988, GFA CD 1988. Chemiaev notes that he had attached a memorandum to 
the plan for supplies urging Gorbachev to focus on making Mengistu change his approach to the Eritrean 
separatists, but Gorbachev simply pulled it off and signed the supply plan.
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The “conservative” (in this case) critics who were unhappy with the accords did 
not offer viable alternatives, however, and this explains why support in the Politburo for 
signing the accords was nearly unanimous in March 1988. Delaying the withdrawal 
would have brought more Soviet deaths at a time when Gorbachev had already called 
the war a “bleeding wound.” It might also have undercut the enormous leap he was 
about to take in US-Soviet relations. A unilateral withdrawal would have provided the 
USSR with greater freedom of action in the future, but it would have done the same for 
both the Pakistanis and the Americans. The Geneva Accords at least created a precedent 
for international agreement, and, by convincing all parties that the USSR was serious 
about pulling out, helped achieve a relatively bloodless withdrawal.
In developing New Political Thinking, Gorbachev had to reconcile two often 
contradictory positions, maintaining Soviet prestige while increasing cooperation with 
the West. This was most difficult in relation to Afghanistan, where the minimum 
necessary to enable an “honourable” Soviet withdrawal was far from what was sought 
by the United States and its allies. The key issue, as Gorbachev saw it, was to build up 
trust, rather than continue to undermine it by stalling at negotiations, which in any case 
would lead to a prolonged stay in Afghanistan. It was no longer a question of 
“winning” in Afghanistan, but rather of converting the withdrawal into a foreign policy 
triumph in other areas. As he put it to the Politburo after the accords were signed,
O Q
“having lost in Afghanistan we have to win in the world.”
In April 1988, Gorbachev believed that the concessions made to the United 
States over the past several months were worth the price, since they would lead to a new 
relationship between the two countries and the solution of problems in Third World “hot 
spots.” The behaviour o f Shevardnadze, Kriuchkov, and even Gorbachev, showed that
89 Politburo meeting, April 18, 1988 GFA PB 1988, 215.
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there was a limit to how far Moscow would go in backing away from support to its 
client in Kabul.
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Chapter 5: Politics and Diplomacy During the Withdrawal
In a memorandum written for Gorbachev in 1986, Aleksandr Iakovlev, the “architect of 
Perestroika,” argued that Soviet foreign policy making was hampered by the 
competition and in-fighting that took place between various bodies, including the KGB 
and the military. The only way to overcome this, Iakovlev said, was to create a body to 
oversee the co-ordination of foreign policy making in the model o f the National 
Security Council.1 Nowhere was Iakovlev’s critique more applicable than in the case of 
Afghanistan, where the military, the KGB, the party, and the foreign ministry conducted 
different, often contradictory policies. All of them operated with the same ostensible 
goal in mind: to create a stable government in Afghanistan that could stand on its own 
two feet even after Soviet troops withdrew. In practice, each had its own view o f how 
this was to be accomplished.
The signing of the Geneva Accords and the start o f the troop withdrawal only 
exacerbated these divisions, which reflected not only disagreement on Soviet priorities 
within Afghanistan but also very different assessments of the situation. To take one 
example, senior Soviet military officers in Afghanistan, organizing the transfer of over
100,000 troops and assorted materiel through largely hostile territory along treacherous 
and poorly defended roads, looked for arrangements that would ensure the safety of 
their soldiers. For this reason they tried to convince both Moscow and the PDPA 
leadership in Kabul to make peace with the Tajik commander Ahmad Shah Massoud. 
The KGB and Shevardnadze believed that the best way to ensure such an outcome was 
by showing that Najibullah had the complete support of the Soviet Union even if  its 
troops were withdrawing. This meant not only meeting all his requests for materiel, but 
also being willing to go to battle on his behalf, thus showing his detractors within the 
PDPA leadership that Najibullah was still top man and demoralizing the opposition.
1 On Certain Measures to Reform Foreign Policy, 1986, GARF, F. 10063, op.2, d. 69
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When Najibullah refused and insisted that the Soviet military help attack Massoud, he 
had the backing o f the KGB as well as Foreign Minister Shevardnadze.
Gorbachev’s own position changed several times during this period. In July 
1987 he insisted that further Soviet participation in military action was out of the 
question and that there was no possibility o f the troops withdrawal being delayed. Later 
in the year he changed his mind on both counts; by February 1989 he would change it 
back again. The Politburo seemed to lurch back and forth between contradictory 
positions. The fate of Afghanistan was far from inconsequential for Gorbachev and 
other Soviet leaders, and they looked for ways to withdraw without leaving behind 
chaos. The situation that played out between April 1988 and March 1989 showed that 
there was still no consensus on what needed to be done.
There were two conflicting forces pulling on Afghan policy between the signing 
of the Geneva Accords and the end of the Soviet withdrawal in February 1989. The first 
was the desire to capitalise on the improvement in relations with the US, which seemed 
on the verge of radical transformation in the Spring of 1988. The second was the desire 
and political necessity o f demonstrating that Moscow could carry out this radical 
transformation in its relations with the capitalist world without “abandoning its friends” 
in the Third World. Gorbachev himself maneuvered between various positions and 
streams of advice. His preferences were dictated first and foremost by his larger foreign 
policy priorities and challenges, less so the developments in Afghanistan.
Making the Best of the Geneva Accords: The Moscow Conference and After
Moscow signed the Geneva Accords, accepting “negative symmetry,” to end direct 
Soviet involvement in a long and bloody war. Gorbachev and other Soviet leaders also 
hoped that withdrawing troops would improve Soviet relations with the US. The new 
relationship might then pay dividends in the form of greater cooperation on on the part
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of the United States in enabling reconciliation in Afghanistan. Throughout the 
withdrawal period (May 1988 to February 1989), Moscow sought to make the most of 
the Geneva accords by continuing talks with the United States, trying to press for 
enforcement of the accords through the United Nations and continuing negotiations with 
opposition leaders and with Pakistan. At the same time, however, Soviet leaders 
subordinated largely subordinated the Afghan problem to the key goal o f building on 
the Washington summit and improving US-Soviet relations.
As the last chapter showed, the Geneva Accords were a much weaker agreement 
than what Soviet diplomats had worked towards over many years. It did not obligate 
the United States to stop supplying the opposition via Pakistan, although technically it 
did bind Pakistan to stop the flow of arms. The accords had a weak enforcement 
mechanism: a small UN observation force that could take note of violations and pass 
them on to UN headquarters. Nikolai Kozyrev, the Soviet diplomat who negotiated the 
accords, wrote that “the legal documents of the Geneva accords, even if they were not 
faultless, could, if strictly adhered to, lead to a settlement of the most important foreign 
policy aspects o f the Afghan problem: the withdrawal o f foreign troops from the 
country, barring any outside interference into the affairs of Afghanistan, and return to 
the country the main body of refugees.”2 Yet even he admits that in practice, the Geneva 
accords as signed in April 1988 were a face saving exercise that allowed the USSR to 
“withdraw its troops in a dignified manner” and continue to support the Kabul regime, 
as well as soften the negative reaction to the withdrawal from countries such as Cuba 
and India.
In conversations with Politburo and party colleagues as well as foreign leaders, 
Gorbachev spoke of the Geneva accords as the first great success o f new thinking. This 
had several important implications. If he used force now, it could cost him some of the
2 Kozyrev, Zhenevskie Soglashenie, 35.
3 Ibid, 46.
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political capital accumulated as a result. If, however, Najibullah fell too quickly, it 
could be ammunition for the conservatives and could harm the Soviet Union’s relations 
with its allies. At a Politburo meeting on April 18, he made it clear that new political 
thinking was more important than worrying about what allies might think: “we have an 
agreement, there could be turns in the development of the situation. But we will not 
allow ourselves to violate the agreement, especially before the face of the whole 
world.”4 Significantly, he also assigned Aleksandr Iakovlev, the most liberal of the 
reformers in the Politburo, to the Afghanistan commission. The Afghanistan 
commission, Gorbachev said, had to take advantage o f the Geneva accords and continue 
“untying the knot of collision of interests on the world, regional, and Afghan scales.”5 
Assigning Iakovlev to the Afghan commission reflected a commitment to new political 
thinking.
In the months after the withdrawal began it became clear that, in violation of the 
Geneva accords, Pakistan was continuing to aid the mujahadeen. Soviet and Afghan 
diplomats filed numerous complaints with the UN office in Kabul. Among the 
complaints were reports that Pakistan continued to operate training centers, supply 
hardware for the opposition, and even actively participate in transporting fighters over 
the border from Pakistan.6 Gorbachev had three choices: he could halt the withdrawal, 
undertake major operations to knock out mujahadeen positions, or he could limit his 
protests to the diplomatic arena. More than the withdrawal was at stake. As Gorbachev 
told his colleagues at a Politburo session on April 18th “We have to get the most out of 
the Geneva accords. It’s not just about Afghanistan. We are taking major steps towards 
realizing new thinking, a recognition of a balance of interests, and the search for paths 
of cooperation.”7 Afghanistan had been one of the major issues impeding improvement
4 Politburo Meeting, April 18, 1988 GFA PB, 211.
5 Ibid.
6 Liakhovskii Tragedia i doblest’, 588.
7 Politburo Meeting April 18,1988 (Medvedev’s Notes) GFA PB 1988 213.
198
in Soviet-American relations since 1979; now the Geneva accords offered an 
opportunity not only to remove that obstacle to a new detente but to provide a model for 
how the superpowers would settle similar difficult issues in the future.
The behavior o f Soviet diplomats in the weeks around the Moscow Summit 
showed the US that Moscow was looking first and foremost for an improvement in 
bilateral relations. When the US Charge d’Affaires in Kabul, Jon D. Glassman, met the 
Soviet Ambassador, Nikolai Yegorychev, the latter avoided any discussion of violations 
of the Geneva Accords by either the Pakistan or the US. When the US charge brought 
up Afghan allegations that the accords were being violated, Yegorychev replied that the 
“Soviet Union works with the Afghan government but is not responsible for its actions. 
Nor...is the United States responsible for the acts of the mujahadeen” In his report back 
to the State Department, Glassman noted that “Yegorychev appeared to be dissociating
Q
the Soviet Union from RA allegations of Pakistani Geneva violations.”
Why was Gorbachev suddenly willing to leave Afghanistan off the table in his 
relations with the US? In the spring o f 1988, US-Soviet relations were on the verge of 
an unprecedented breakthrough. The Moscow summit promised to be the culmination of 
Gorbachev’s “peace offensive.” Gorbachev’s standing and popularity rose in the US, 
Europe, and even at home.9 The presence o f Soviet troops in Afghanistan had been a 
major obstacle to improving the US-Soviet relationship, and signaling the seriousness of 
Soviet intentions to withdraw in September 1987 had helped the ultimate success of the 
Washington Summit that December.10 Concerns about sustaining this momentum 
eclipsed, for the time being, concerns about what might happen in Afghanistan 
following a Soviet withdrawal. Further, despite the disappointing US attitude on arms 
supplied in the winter of 1988, Gorbachev still held out hope that eventually the Reagan 
administration might prove more cooperative, particularly if  there were gains in other
8 US Embassy, Kabul to State Department, May 21, 1988 NSA End o f the Cold War Collection, Box 3.
9 Brown, Gorbachev Factor, 236-238.
10 Shultz, Turmoil and Triumph, 987.
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areas of the relationship. Finally, Moscow would try to rely more heavily on the UN in 
helping to regulate the conflict and limit Pakistani interference.
Moscow’s reluctance to let Afghanistan mar the improvement in US-Soviet 
relations was evident at the Moscow summit itself in May. Afghanistan was discussed 
at the experts and foreign ministers level, along with a host of other regional issues, 
including the Horn of Africa and Central America. The Soviet Union and the United 
States were still far apart when it came to resolving regional problems. Shevardnadze 
reported at the plenary session that, on each of the topics discussed, “deep and serious 
issues remain. In a few areas, the method and procedures for a settlement seemed in 
sight, but further work was required.” Yet on Afghanistan Shevardnadze restricted 
himself to commenting on Pakistani violations of the accords and the importance of 
upholding the accords in general.11
In the plenary session Gorbachev tried to push both his broader ideas on regional
conflicts as well as on Afghanistan. The American side should take him seriously, he
said, when he spoke o f finding a new way in which regional conflicts were solved. The
US side could be assured that “The hand o f Moscow would be a constructive hand.”
Afghanistan, he told his counterparts, was a “thing of the past,” and should be seen as
the first example of Third World conflict resolution by the United States and the Soviet
Union. But he also urged the United States to help settle the conflict. He did not want to
see a fundamentalist Muslim government there, but he would support the transition to a
coalition government. Unlike earlier discussions on Afghanistan, here Gorbachev did
not accuse the United States of playing an obstructionist role; all o f his complaints in
1this regard were reserved for Pakistan.
" Moscow Summit, Second Plenary Meeting, June 1, 1988 NSA End o f the Cold War Collection, Box 3, 
Pg- 4.
Reagan’s comment during the summit that he no longer saw the USSR as an “evil empire,” seemed to 
show that Gorbachev’s strategy was working.
12 Ibid, pg. 12.
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While unwilling to press the issue too forcefully on a bilateral level with the 
Americans, particularly around the time of the May summit, Moscow did try to bring up 
violations with UN officials. Soviet and Afghan diplomats sent numerous reports of 
violations to UNGOMAP, citing the existence of bases on Pakistani territory as well as 
the continued movement o f arms across the border.13 They also made appeals in public 
and in a confidential manner to the UN officials.14 In the fall the Ministry o f Foreign 
Affairs even published a “white-book” called Fulfillment o f  the Geneva Accords is in 
the Interests o f  all Humanity. Towards the end o f the summer, when the military 
situation within Afghanistan was becoming particularly difficult, the tone o f Soviet 
protests became harsher. An editorial in the September 1988 issue of the Soviet journal 
International Affairs complained about the “gross violation” o f the Geneva Accords by 
Pakistan: “The Pakistani President pretends that there is nothing worthy of attention in 
the Geneva accords but the withdrawal of the Soviet armed forces from Afghanistan. 
Foreign interference in Afghan affairs did not stop after May 15 but intensified.” The 
editorial even went on to criticise the US directly: “Nor can we understand the attitude
13 The United Nations Good Offices Mission in Afghanistan and Pakistan, a team o f fifty military 
observers sent to monitor the Soviet withdrawal. See Perez de Cuellar, Pilgrimage for Peace, 198-199.
14 See, for example, the MID letter passed to the UN Secretary General’s Office, dated June 2, 1988, or 
record o f conversation between DRA Foreign Minister Abdul Wakil and Perez de Cuellar, June 2, 1988, 
both in SML, Perez de Cuellar Papers, Box 10. The UN’s inability (or unwillingness) to do anything 
about Pakistani “interference” is evident in Cordovez’s report on his visit to the area and investigation of 
Soviet-Afghan allegations. Apparently, he was satisfied with Pakistan’s response that Islamabad intended 
to follow the Geneva Accords to the letter and that whatever violations took place were the result of
3,000,000 Afghan refugees whose “legitimate political activities” Pakistan could not restrict. 
“Implementation of the Agreements on the Settlement o f the Situation Relating to Afghanistan: Progress 
Report by the Representative o f the Secretary-General,” July 26, 1988, Perez de Cuellar Papers, Box 10, 
Folder 102; See also Cordovez to S. Shah Nawaz, Pakistan’s Permanent Representative to the UN, 10 
June 1988. Perez de Cuellar Papers, Box 10, Folder 110. In a later letter to Abdul Wakil and Yaqub 
Khan, dated October 20, 1988,Cordovez insisted that the UN could not issue judgments on complaints 
and that the “letter and spirit” of the Geneva Accords required the parties to sort the problem out amongst 
themselves. Cordovez also begged both sides to be more selective in their complaints. Such meetings as 
Cordovez mentioned were envisaged in the accords; Pakistan initially rejected them, then agreed to 
conduct them at a Charge level. They never took place. Later reports o f UNGOMAP investigations from 
1988 generally either noted that Afghan/Soviet complaints regarding Pakistani activities (as well as 
Pakistani complaints about alleged Soviet/Afghani bombing on or near Pakistani territoiy) could not be 
investigated or did not constitute “clear violations o f the Geneva Accords.” UN officials admitted the 
difficulty o f fully investigating most o f these complaints, due to “insufficient information and details, 
frequent impossibility o f locating the positions mentioned... as well as difficulties o f terrain and security 
conditions.” Note for the Secretary General, 7 October 1988, Perez de Cuellar Papers, Box 10, Folder
110. One might add that the small number o f UNGOMAP staff would also have made investigating a 
large number o f complaints extremely difficult. See also Afghanistan: Recent Developments (Note for the 
SG) December 2, 1988 SML, Perez de Cuellar Papers, Box 10, Folder 110.
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Since February, US officials were convinced that the Soviet Union would pull back its 
troops. This had allowed Shultz to maintain a tough line on symmetry when negotiating 
with Shevardnadze in March and to brush off any hints that that Moscow might halt the 
withdrawal.17 The acting US Secretary of State, Michael Armacost, summarised the US 
position in a conversation with Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi in June: “There was 
no evidence of Soviet suspension of withdrawal. It was hard to see how they could now 
do so. Forces impelling continuing withdrawal were greater now than they were when
1 ftthe withdrawals had begun.”
By September, with the situation in Afghanistan growing more desperate for 
Najibullah, Moscow began to look for ways to regain some leverage vis-a-vis Pakistan 
and the US At a Politburo meeting on Afghanistan, Gorbachev agreed that Moscow 
would have to start taking a harsher line. Rather than saying publicly that the Soviet 
Union was committed to withdrawal, officials should emphasise that the complete 
return of Soviet troops was linked to the developing situation in Afghanistan. In other 
words, if the United States and Pakistan continued to be uncooperative, Moscow might 
reconsider its commitments under the Geneva Accords.19
Moscow needed to set a precedent in order to show that it took the accords 
seriously and that it expected the other contracting parties to do so as well. Soviet
9ftdiplomats cited the accords at every opportune moment. They tried to use the UN as a 
forum to highlight US and Pakistani non-compliance and to display on the seriousness 
of Soviet threats to keep its troops in Afghanistan. Soon after the September 18 
Politburo meeting, Shevardnadze asked the Security Council to convene a meeting to 
discuss violations of the Geneva accords and threatened to delay the troop withdrawal.
17 Author’s interview with Ambassador Jack Matlock, January 1, 2008.
18 Armacost to US Embassy, New Delhi, June 9, 1988 NSA End o f the Cold War, Box 3.
19 Politburo Meeting, September 18, 1988, GFA PB 1988.
20 Author’s interview with Ambassador Yulii Vorontsov, Moscow, September 11, 2007.
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21 At the meeting, the Soviet representative charged UNGOMAP with “not doing its job 
properly,” an accusation the US rejected.22 Throughout the autumn of 1988, Soviet 
diplomats would continue to insist that if the situation in Afghanistan were not settled 
by February 15, Soviet troops would stay beyond the deadline. The bluff failed to work. 
US diplomats saw such claims primarily as a tactic and had little doubt that Soviet 
troops would withdraw by the deadline.23
Even as the possibility o f threatening a continued Soviet presence faded, new 
opportunities presented themselves to solve the problem through diplomacy. Since the 
launch o f National Reconciliation, Soviet diplomats, advisers, KGB officials, and the 
military had been engaged in an effort to negotiate with rebel leaders to bring them into 
a coalition government. With the start of the withdrawal these efforts intensified. One 
Soviet foreign ministry official even earned the nickname “mujahed” from his 
colleagues because he spent so much time negotiating with rebel commanders.24 In the 
summer and fall o f 1988 these efforts even began to show some success.
Soviet diplomats and others working to open channels to the mujahadeen 
between March 1988 and February 1989 were operating with two goals in mind. They 
needed to ensure the safety of Soviet troops during the withdrawal. For this reason they 
were willing to accept cease-fires that did not necessarily extend to the Afghan army.
At the same time they were also trying to continue the long-term work o f forming a 
stable government in Afghanistan.
By continuing talks with Pakistan as well as individual commanders, Moscow 
was able to take advantage of Islamabad’s earlier desire to create a coalition
21 Rogers, The Soviet Withdrawal from Afghanistan, 45.
22 Afghanistan: Recent Developments (Note for the Secretary General) October 28,1988 SML, Perez de 
Cuellar Papers, Box 10, Folder 110.
23 Record o f meeting between Mr. Benon Sevan and Mr. Michael Armacost, November 14, 1988 SML, 
Perez de Cuellar Papers, Box 10, Folder 103.
24 Author’s interview with Pavel Palazchenko, Moscow, RF March 20, 2008; Author’s interview with 
Leonid Shebarshin, Moscow, RF March 19, 2008.
25 Notes on a meeting between US Under-Secretary o f State Michael Armacost and Benon Sevan 
November 14, 1988 SML Perez de Cuellar Papers, Box 10, Folder 103.
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government in Kabul. Pakistan had originally refused to discuss the issue, then 
demanded it be resuscitated when the Geneva Accords were about to be signed. 
Moscow, which had been trying to push a coalition government since the end of 1986, 
did not want to delay the start of the withdrawal any longer by agreeing to wait for one 
to be formed.26 Now that the withdrawal had started, however, Pakistan’s interest in a 
coalition government offered Soviet diplomats a new opportunity.
For Moscow, this development seemed to herald a new opportunity to work for 
the formation of a coalition government that included the Soviet Union’s own allies and 
moderate opposition elements and was at the same time strong enough to stabilise the 
country. Parallel to talks with rebel leaders, Soviet officials continued talks with 
Pakistan about the possibility o f a coalition government. In the summer o f 1988, Zia 
told Vorontsov, Moscow’s ambassador to Kabul, that he would support a solution in 
which a third of the government would be PDPA, a third would be the “moderate” 
opposition, including royalists, and a third would be from the “Peshawar seven.” 
Vorontsov passed the message on to Moscow and received a positive response.27 
Although such an arrangement might face opposition from Najibullah or others in the 
PDPA, the opportunity to form a government that contained Moscow’s allies but was 
also recognised by Pakistan was too good to pass up.
Zia’s death in a plane crash that summer put an end to that particular opening. 
Other opportunities appeared, however. In December Secretary General helped to 
arrange a meeting for Vorontsov and mujahadeen leaders, including Rabbani, in Saudi 
Arabia. Although the meeting itself was a sign o f how far the Soviet Union was willing 
to try to find a settlement in Afghanistan, it did not produce any concrete results.28 The 
bigger problem for the Soviets in trying to negotiate a coalition government was the
26 See chapter 4.
27 Author’s interview with Ambassador Yulii Vorontsov, Moscow, September 11,2007.
28 Author’s interview with Ambassador Yulii Vorontsov, September 11, 2007. See also notes on 
Gorbachev and Perez de Cuellar Meeting, December 7, 1988, and Talking Points prepared for Perez de 
Cuellar: SML Perez de Cuellar Papers, Box 10, Folder 103.
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continued difficulty of pushing Najibullah and the PDPA toward and agreement. 
(Another problem was the continued in-fighting among the “Peshawar-7” and their ISI
• •  29interlocutors, which, in the Soviet view, had only gotten worse since Zia’s death.) As 
we will see below, disagreements among different Soviet offices and services, 
particularly among the KGB and the military, made the effort to press for a coalition 
government even more difficult.
Moscow’s effort to use diplomacy to strengthen the Geneva Accords between 
April 1988 and February 1989 brought few concrete results. Soviet diplomats could 
threaten to suspend the withdrawal, but hardly anyone seems to have taken such threats 
seriously. It had become very clear to US policymakers in February 1988 that the 
Soviets wanted out and were unlikely to go through with threats to put off the 
withdrawal. Gorbachev’s desire to build on the improving relationship with the US 
made such a possibility even less likely. But his earlier concerns about how the 
withdrawal was perceived in the Third World and the possible reactions of 
conservatives at home had not disappeared; he was keen to prove that he could protect 
Soviet prestige even while engaging with, and making concessions to, its main enemy. 
When the Geneva Accords were signed, Gorbachev said that they could be a model for 
the new way of solving conflicts. Thus Moscow still looked for ways to protect its 
interests within Afghanistan and avoid a collapse of the PDPA government. The failure 
to do this through diplomacy and the UN led Gorbachev, in the fall of 1988, to entertain 
and accept proposals for desperate last minute offensive measures.
The KGB and Najibullah, the military and Massoud
For some time a conflict had been brewing among senior Soviet officials working on 
Afghanistan. As chapter 3 showed, the Soviet military and the KGB had taken sides in
29 Record o f Conversation between Vladimir Petrovsky, Deputy Foreign Minister o f the USSR, and Perez 
de Cuellar on October 21, 1988. SML, Perez de Cuellar Papers, Box 10, Folder 102.
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the Khalq/Parcham split almost from the beginning of the intervention. The critical 
situation in the summer and fall o f 1988 brought these divisions out. Rival DRA leaders 
tried to take advantage of the differences among Soviet officials to gain advantage. The 
disagreements of Soviet officials within Afghanistan echoed uncertainty at the Politburo 
level, whose members were divided about the best course to pursue in Afghanistan. 
Shevardnadze and Kriuchkov continued to believe that Moscow had to put all its weight 
behind Najibullah, while others were willing to see a Najibullah-less PDPA enter into a 
coalition with opposition movements.30
One of the biggest areas of disagreement was the extent o f support for 
Najibullah. An area where the split emerged initially was regarding the formation of a 
“presidential guard.” The formation of the guard, which was supposed to be loyal to 
Najibullah alone and provide for the defense o f the government in Kabul, reflected how 
little confidence the Afghan president had in his own military. Soviet military officers 
did not support the idea. In an August 4th meeting with Shevardnadze during the 
Foreign Minister’s visit to Kabul, Varennikov argued that the guard was doing more 
harm than good, upsetting Afghan army officers who complained that guard officers 
were earning 5-10 times more than they did.31 With Shevardnadze’s support, however, 
Najibullah was able to continue developing the guard.
Najibullah’s support among other PDPA leaders had never been absolute. On the 
one hand, he was not trusted by Khalqis any more than Karmal had been. His previous 
tenure as the chairman of the dreaded secret police, or Khad, also did not win him many 
friends. Key to Najibullah’s ability to stay in power had been absolute support from 
Moscow. With Soviet troops withdrawing, this aura o f absolute support had begun to
30 This confusion is reflected in a conversation between Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Petrovsky and 
Perez de Cuellar on October 21, 1988. Although Moscow seemed to be throwing all its weight behind 
Najibullah (see below) Petrovsky “indicated” that [Najibullah] would leave the scene.” SML, Perez de 
Cuellar Papers, Box 10, Folder 102.
31 Mikhail Sotskov Dolg i Sovest: Zakrytie Stranitsy Afganskoi Voiny (St. Petersburg: Professional, 2007), 
I: 101-108. This argument was also presented to Shevardnadze by Muhammad Gulabzoi, the Minister o f  
Internal Affairs. Handwritten notes taken at Shevardnadze’s meeting with Gulabzoi and Tanai, September 
1988, provided to the author by Dr. Antonio Giustozzi, LSE.
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fade. Najibullah’s rivals within the PDPA came out o f the woodwork and tried to win 
the support of Moscow.
The most serious challenge to Najibullah’s power to emerge in the fall o f 1988 
was that o f Shahnawaz Tanai and Seid Muhammad Gulabzoi. The two had similar 
backgrounds. Tanai had joined Khalq in the early 1970s, taken part in the 1978 uprising 
and subsequently risen through the ranks of the military and the party. Between 1985 
and 1988 he was chief of the general staff. In the meantime he had also been elected a 
member of the central committee and in 1987 became a candidate member for the 
Politburo. That summer, apparently as a result of Soviet insistence, he was made 
Minister of Defense.32 Gulabzoi had taken part in the 1973 uprising against Daoud and 
played a key role in the Saur uprising. He had a falling out with Amin, returned under 
Karmal, and then risen to the post of Minister of Internal Affairs.33
On September 2nd, Tanai approached Sotskov, the recently appointed Soviet
military adviser in Kabul, and tried to get his support to have Najibullah replaced. Tanai
told him “you, comrade Sotskov, have to understand something else: everything that
Najibullah is doing is to save his own regime, that of the Parchamists. And he will do
this going forward, whatever it costs him. The main thing is that he hopes to hold power
in his hands.” 34 Tanai told Sotskov that, at a PDPA Politburo meeting the previous day,
he had made arguments in line with the thinking of the Soviets, and the military
command in particular: a coalition government needed to be formed with
representatives of all opposition group, the defense of Kabul and its communications
needed to be improved. Now he made a series o f points to Sotskov in support o f his bid
to oust Najibullah:
1) The army is the only real force in Afghanistan, I have 50 
thousand troops and Gulabzoi has 30 thousand.
32 Slinkin, Afganistan vremen Taraki i Amina, 295-296.
33 Ibid, 211-212.
34 Mikhail Sotskov, Dolg i sovest: zakrytie stranitsy AfganskoivVoiny (St. Petersburg: Professional, 2007), 
I: 113.
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2) Ahmad Shah will not becom e president, since he only has 
support in the north-west. The people know m e and support me.
Ahmad Shah knows that I have all the p ow er...I  have channels to 
him and can m eet him personally but... first, the Soviet Union has 
to support m e and sanction a m eeting.
3) Ahmad Shah must know that you are supporting me. The war 
could be stopped by dividing spheres o f  influence.
4) I w ill be backed not just by Khalqists but by honest Parchamists 
as w ell
5) Real power is needed in Kabul. The [presidential] guard is 
inadequate.35
Tanai asked for this information to be relayed in Moscow, but that it not be shared with 
any other Soviet representatives in Kabul except Varennikov. Sotskov relayed this 
information in a cipher on the evening of Sept 2nd. 36
Tanai did not give up, and tried to open channels to other Soviet military
thadvisers. On September 6 Leonid Levchenko, advisor to the General Staff, brought 
Tanai and Gulabazoi to see Sotskov. This time Gulabzoi made the case for their 
position, saying that Najib could not hold the reigns of power and needed to resign. He 
suggested Mohammad Hassan Sharq as a temporary leader, and spoke o f opening direct 
contacts with Hekmatyar and Rabbani. When Sotskov reported this to Marshal 
Akhromeev, the latter told him to sit on the information until Gulabzoi and Tanai came
'xnto Moscow at end of September.
Gulabzoi and Tanai’s bid failed. It never received any support in Moscow, in 
part because it never had more than the tacit support of Soviet military advisors in 
Afghanistan and probably had none from the Minister o f Defense, Yazov. Kriuchkov 
and Shevardnadze, on the other hand, were strongly opposed to challenges to 
Najibullah’s authority. For months KGB representatives had been aware that a conflict 
was brewing between Gulabzoi and Najibullah and had tried to convince the former to 
make peace. Kriuchkov even met with Gulabzoi directly, and Shevardnadze met with 
both Gulabzoi and Tanai. Shevardnadze urged Gulabzoi to focus on maintaining unity
35 Ibid, 113-115.
36 Ibid, 116.
37 Ibid, 118-119.
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within the leadership, insisting that “if a split happens it will be the end of the Khalqists 
and the Parchamists.” What he said next was particularly revealing about Moscow’s 
concerns: “if you suffer a defeat [porazhenie], this would be a serious political defeat 
[porazhenie] for the USSR.” Gulabzoi insisted that he was a faithful friend of the 
USSR, but he did not trust Najibullah.38 While Tanai was more open to calls for unity, 
Gulabzoi proved intransigent. Evidently, the rift between him and Najibullah had grown 
too wide. On October 6, a week after his meetings in Moscow, Gulabzoi was relieved as 
head o f the Kabul garrison. A month later he was sent to Moscow as ambassador, where
• 'XQhe could no longer pose an immediate threat to Najibullah.
Sotskov and Varennikov were willing to listen to Gulabzoi and Tanai not just 
because they represented the Khalqi faction and the Afghan military, but because what 
the two Afghans said corresponded to their own reading of the situation. The Soviet 
military had been arguing that it was necessary to open talks with Massoud, even that it 
would be possible to entice him into some sort of coalition government. With 
Najibullah rejecting talks with Massoud and pressing instead for further military 
operations against him, Tanai and Gulabzoi naturally appeared the more appropriate 
partners. The incident had enraged Kriuchkov, who resented the military’s undertaking 
of political and diplomatic activity. On September 26 Kriuchkov called in Sotskov and 
berated him: “You are expected to help the army fight successfully, not engage in 
politics. Najibullah is supported by our leadership and by Mikhail Sergeevich. We and 
all o f the representatives in Kabul need to support Najibullah.”40
Meanwhile, the Policy of National Reconciliation meanwhile continued, at least 
nominally. Yet this policy too was undermined by the disagreements within the party 
and among Soviet intelligence officers regarding which commanders to focus their
38 Handwritten notes taken at Shevardnadze’s meeting with Gulabzoi and Tanai, September 1988, 
provided to the author by Dr. Antonio Giustozzi, LSE.
Author’s interview with Leonid Shebarshin, Moscow, RF March 19, 2008.
40 Sotskov, Dolg i Sovest, 120.
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efforts on. The biggest point of disagreement was over Ahmad Shah Massoud. An 
accommodation with him was particularly important for Soviet troops during the 
withdrawal, since Massoud controlled territories in Northern Afghanistan through which 
they would have to pass. The “Kabul-Khairaton” highway, which might fall under his 
control after the withdrawal of Soviet troops, was particularly important since it was the 
only artery for delivering Soviet supplies by land to Kabul. He had agreed in principle 
to hold his fire while Soviet forces withdrew.41 Further, Soviet officers and advisers 
believed that Massoud could play a constructive role in reconciliation and in a coalition 
government. They were very unhappy with Najibullah’s efforts, beginning in the 
summer o f 1988, to draw the 40th army into battle against Massoud.
Relations with Massoud became a major point of disagreement between 
Najibullah and the Soviet command. Varennikov found Najibullah’s hatred of Massoud 
“pathological.”42 Not long before the Geneva accords were signed Varennikov met with 
Najibullah to discuss measures to be taken in preparation for the withdrawal of Soviet 
troops. According to Varennikov, Massoud remained the only sticking point. Najibullah 
insisted that Soviet troops “liquidate” him, because a political compromise was 
impossible. Varennikov suggested that Najibullah order his own special forces to 
conduct the attack. The latter replied that they could not handle such an operation.43 The 
incident illustrates not only Najibullah’s antipathy to Massoud but also Varennikov’s 
considerations at this point. If he attacked Massoud now, prior to the withdrawal, he 
would be putting his troops at risk in the months ahead, since Massoud might not show 
restraint after being pummeled by Soviet planes and artillery.
The deteriorating military situation during the first phase of the troop withdrawal 
and immediately after its completion heightened the urgency o f Najibullah as well as his 
KGB advisors. They needed to show that Najibullah was in control to neutralise
41 Liakhovskii, Tragedia i doblest’, 651.
42 Varennikov, Nepotovrimoe, 376.
43 Ibid, 369-370.
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opposition to him within the DRA. This meant being able to show that he could call on
Soviet support to attack Massoud. The military saw things differently. In August
Varennikov sent a report to the Defense Minister, Yazov, explaining the military’s
position and offering short and long term reasons for avoiding military confrontation
with Massoud, and focusing instead on political efforts. Varennikov argued that since
Soviet troops would be withdrawing through areas controlled by Massoud, it was in
their interest to remain on the best possible terms with him in the near future. To do
otherwise would put Soviet troops in unnecessary jeopardy.
In our view , accepting the president’s proposal to pull the 40th 
army into battle with A. Shah [Massoud] could put our troops 
into a very difficult position during the second phase o f  their 
withdrawal from Afghanistan. Undoubtedly, there w ill be 
additional major losses, and the organization o f  their 
withdrawal in general could be disrupted. A t the sam e tim e 
achieving the main goal -  the destruction o f  A. Shah -  is 
im possible, since it is necessary to know where he is located, 
and this is im possible because Afghan intelligence has not been 
able to do this over the last 8 years.44
Varennikov urged his superiors to focus on reaching an accommodation with Massoud, 
which was in the Soviet interest because Massoud had let it be known that he had no 
particular animus against the USSR and would be willing to maintain contacts. The 
DRA government, he argued, should be willing to accept “any compromise,” including 
granting autonomy to the northern provinces. Varennikov continued to argue that a 
military operation against Massoud was unadvisable. Aside from being impossible 
militarily it would put Soviet troops “in a very difficult position during the second phase 
of troop withdrawal.”45 An operation against Massoud would not only contradict 
Varennikov’s policy but also complicate preparations for withdrawal and put Soviet 
troops in great danger.
Varennikov was not the only one who held this view. There was a consensus 
among the top Soviet brass in Afghanistan, if  not the Minister o f Defense in Moscow.
44 Liakhovskii and Nekrasov Grazhdanin, Politik, Voin, 169.
45 V.I. Varennikov, Memorandum to the USSR Minister o f Defense Comrade D.T. Yazov August 1988 in 
Liakhovskii, Tragedia i doblest’, 656.
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Notes similar to Varennikov’s were sent both by Generals Boris Gromov, the 
commander of the 40th army who gained fame for commanding its withdrawal, and 
Mikhail Sotskov. In another memorandum they complained that Najibullah seemed to 
have no long term plan, aside from finding ways to keep Soviet troops involved in the 
fighting. They asked the leaders in Moscow to make it clear to Najibullah that this was 
not an option.46
Soviet commanders had been using their channel to Massoud to create some 
stability in the north and find some arrangement between government-friendly forces 
and the Lion of Panjsher’s fighters. In their view this would not only further the process 
of reconciliation, it would help create a counterweight to the more extremist Hekmatyar. 
Varennikov drafted a series of proposals, with Tanai’s support, to create three militia 
divisions, to be supplied from the USSR, which would collaborate with Massoud but 
stay loyal to Kabul. Najibullah rejected these plans, and instead pushed for the 
formation of a special divison to take on Ahmad Shah Massoud.47
The tenacity o f Varennikov and other senior officers in trying to come to some 
accommodation with Massoud in this period, over the objection o f Najibullah, the KGB, 
and their superiors in Moscow is testament to the importance they attached to their 
initiative. Throughout the fall o f 1988, Varennikov tried to arrange meetings with 
Massoud. In one message, he offered seven points for discussion, including the creation 
of a Tajik autonomous region within Afghanistan, the creation o f regular units built 
around on Massoud’s forces, as well as economic aid not only from the Kabul 
government but also from the USSR. On three occasions when meetings were set up, 
however, RA forces carried out attacks in the southern Salang area, forcing Najibullah 
to call off the talks. Efforts to open a dialog with Massoud continued, but were
46 Sotskov, Dolg i Sovest, 111-113.
47 Ibid, 548-550.
48 Letter to Massoud in Liakhovskii and Nekrasov, Grazhdanin, Politik, Voin 193-194.
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undermined by the insistence of Najibullah that the focus should be on military activity 
against Massoud.49
As in earlier periods of the war, the commanders on the ground found it difficult 
to have an advocate for their views in Moscow. It was becoming clear that their point of 
view was losing out to the Kriuchkov/Shevardnadze line. On the morning o f September 
5th, Sotskov received a phone call from Yazov, who made it clear that the line being 
taken by Sotskov and Varennikov would not hold: “Our strategy is to keep Afghanistan 
friendly. If we keep 50% we have solved our problem, if  we run away -  they’ll come up 
to the borders of the USSR. Yesterday Mikhail Sergeevich called me in, he demanded a 
blow be delivered to Ahmad Shah, against whom you need to be active. MS 
[Gorbachev] is very worried about Ahmad Shah and that he’s gaining strength but not 
being hit. The confrontation between us, the Ministry o f Defense, the KGB and the 
embassy he does not support. We have to act together and do everything so that 
something can remain. You have so many forces there and yet you’re being hit. You 
have to think about defending Kabul.. .You have to work with the Minister of Defense, 
and you keep talking about Najib.”50
The Politburo records available at the Gorbachev Foundation Archives, while 
incomplete, help give a picture of how these intra-service disagreements plaid out at the 
most senior policy-making level. Yazov did not ignore the arguments made by 
commanders in Afghanistan. At the September 18 Politburo meeting he spoke for an 
agreement with Ahmad Shah, explaining that “he is difficult to beat because he has the 
support o f the population.”51 Kriuchkov did not respond directly to this statement, but 
complained o f the “separatist actions of the GRU,” an open criticism of the military’s 
efforts to reach out to Massoud. Gorbachev also chided Yazov for allowing “individuals 
in the working-group” to pursue policies different from those approved by the Politburo,
49 Ibid, 195-202.
50 Sotskov, Dolg i Sovest, 129-130.
51 Politburo Meeting, September 18, 1988, GFA PB 1988.
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but agreed that contacts with Ahmad Shah could be attempted. If they did not bring
♦Vi • o
results, however, the 40 army would have to attack him.
The KGB-military rivalry was nothing new. Najibullah’s intrigues only stoked 
the flames of this conflict and brought it to the fore. Kriuchkov complained that military 
intelligence conducted its own policy without any supervision. Kriuchkov greatly 
resented the military’s conducting secret talks with the opposition because he viewed 
this as encroachment on KGB territory. During his trips to Kabul, he would question 
officers working under Varennikov hoping to prove that the military sought a separate 
peace.54
Such inter-service accusations need to be taken with a grain of salt. There was a 
long-standing rivalry between the KGB and the GRU and distrust between the KGB and 
the military as a whole; military officers came to see the Afghan war in particular as the 
result o f foolish KGB adventurism. Nevertheless there is some truth to the fact that both 
Shevardnadze and Kriuchkov sought to sideline their opponents on the Afghanistan 
commission. Two casualties of their effort to monopolise control o f Afghan policy at 
this time were Georgii Kornienko and Marshal Akhromeev. Kornienko had been at odds 
with Shevardnadze on Afghan policy earlier in the year, when Kornienko had gone over 
Shevardnadze’s head and convinced Gorbachev to include a deadline for the withdrawal 
of troops in his statement on February 8. His removal came in the fall o f 1988, when he 
fought against Shevardnadze’s and Kriuchkov’s efforts to provide almost unconditional 
support to Najibullah.
According to Kornienko, both he and Akhromeev were ultimately removed from 
the commission for arguing that Najibullah should cede power. Kornienko and 
Akhromeev pressed this point at a “working group of four” meeting in early September
52 Ibid. At this meeting, Shevardnadze also supported talks with Ahmad Shah. Later, as we will see, he 
became a forceful proponent of an attack on the Tajik leader.
53 Sotskov, Dolg i Sovest, 129-130.
54 Liakhovskii, Tragedia i doblest’ 669.
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1988, which included Kriuchkov and Vorontsov. Shevardnadze apparently complained 
to Gorbachev that “Akhromeev and Kornienko were not following the Politburo line.”55 
Soon after, Kornienko was sidelined from all Afghan affairs and Akhromeev received a 
strong reprimand from Gorbachev. Both men left their respective posts in November. 
Kornienko was asked to resign, Akhromeev left of his own volition.56 The removal of 
Kornienko and Akhromeev from Afghan affairs silenced the chief voices for a
c n
settlement not focused on Najibullah.
With Kornienko and Akhromeev removed, this period represented the peak 
influence of Shevardnadze and Kriuchkov on Afghan affairs. Gorbachev followed their 
line not only on policy towards Najibullah but also with regard to the military’s efforts 
with Ahmad Shah. He expressed his dissatisfaction with the military to the Politburo: 
“We must carry out the line of the Politburo and not adapt it to individuals in the 
General Staff or the working group.” At a meeting with Rajiv Gandhi in Delhi on 
November 19th, Gorbachev told the Indian leader, “our people once tried to undertake 
something by going around Najibullah. This became the subject of a serious 
investigation, and we have taken measures to eliminate similar [initiatives.]” This 
signaled a renewed commitment to Najibullah, one closer to the kind Shevardnadze and 
Kriuchkov urged. Gorbachev seemed committed to treating Najibullah as a partner: 
“Najibullah is a figure of high caliber. He is prepared to go far. But we will do 
everything not behind his back but with him.”58
Naturally, in these policy battles, Gorbachev’s voice was decisive. Why did he 
side with the more hawkish line o f Shevardnadze and Kriuchkov rather than the one
55 Kornienko, Kholodnaia Voina, 260.
56 Ibid, 261.
57 This version o f events was also confirmed by Andrei Umov, who dealt with Afghan policy in the 
International Department between 1986 and 1989. Author’s interview with Andrei Umov, March 25, 
2008. However, there was another element to this story as well: the rivalry between Shevardnadze and 
Kornienko. Shevardnadze believed that the Gorbachev was using Kornienko to “balance” his influence in 
foreign policy. By 1988, Shevardnadze saw Kornienko as a potential opponent who would have to be 
removed. Author’s interview with Shevardnadze, Tbilisi, Georgiiia, May 9, 2008.
58 Third Conversation o f M.S. Gorbachev and R.Gandhi (India) Delhi, November 19, 1988. National 
Security Archive READD/RADD Collection, Box 9.
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advocated by Kornienko and Akhromeev? In all likelihood, Gorbachev was acting on 
his considerations regarding broader Soviet commitments and his own standing within 
the USSR, rather than any firm belief that one or the other approach was best for 
Afghanistan. Kriuchkov and Shevardnadze’s arguments appealed to Gorbachev’s sense 
that the Soviet Union had to show its ability to remain faithful to old friends. If the 
Soviet Union now “abandoned” Najibullah after backing him so enthusiastically for 
three years, it could put a strain on Gorbachev’s relations with other leaders in the 
socialist camp.59 The critical situation in the late summer and fall o f 1988 only 
heightened these concerns.
The second reason has to do with politics at the top of the Soviet hierarchy in the 
context of Gorbachev’s concessions to the US By 1988 Gorbachev and Shevardnadze 
had their first confrontations with the military over arms control. Their decision to 
pursue a treaty on Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces independently o f an agreement on 
START and Anti-Ballistic Missiles, a longstanding Soviet position, as well as to include 
the Soviet SS-23 rockets in that agreement were taken over the protests o f the military 
and Akhromeev. At the time, opponents in the military were kept in line by being 
warned that they were trying to oppose decisions taken by party leadership. 60 
Gorbachev was clearly beginning to feel threatened by the military, and seemed to 
welcome the opportunity to reassert his primacy in foreign policy decision-making. The 
confrontation may also have pushed him closer to Shevardnadze and Kriuchkov. Since
59 Indeed, there is evidence that leaders o f foreign communist parties were making their concerns about 
the Soviet withdrawal known to Moscow. A paper on Vietnamese Foreign Policy from IMEMO, a bastion 
o f new-thinking, noted that while the Vietnamese leadership saw the invasion o f Afghanistan as a 
mistake, they were very unhappy with the way the Soviet Union had gone about the withdrawal. The 
paper, submitted to the Central Committee on August 30, 1988, noted that the Vietnamese were still 
dealing with a difficult situation in Cambodia and viewed the Soviet withdrawal in that light: “The 
Vietnamese are making it known that having taken the path of settling the Afghan problem, the Soviet 
Union has made excessive concessions to the opposing side. Soviet troops are being withdrawn hastily, 
despite the unfavourable development o f events within Afghanistan, the unceasing aid o f the USA and 
Pakistan.” “Regarding the Foreign Policy of Vietnam” IMEMO Policy Paper, submitted to the CC CPSU 
August 30, 1988. IMEMO Archive.
60 Svetlana Savranskaya, “ Voenno-Politicheskie Aspekty Okonchania Kholodnoi Voiny" in Vladislav 
Zubok, ed. Konets Kholodnoi Voiny: Novye Fakty i Aspekty (Saratov, 2004), 62-64; Kornienko and 
Akhormeev, Glazami Marshala i Diplomata, 131-133.
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the latter represented the security forces, his support was key for any initiative that 
could make Gorbachev vulnerable to charges of ignoring national interests.61
Prolonging the agony
After the first phase of withdrawal was completed on August 15th, Najibullah increased 
his efforts either to have Soviet troops launch a “decisive blow” or halt their withdrawal 
and put pressure on the opposition. Unwilling to undertake such operations while it was 
concentrating on withdrawal, the Soviet military resisted Najibullah’s requests and 
urged him instead to focus on negotiations with leaders like Ahmad Shah Massoud.. As 
his relationship with Soviet military commanders deteriorated, Najibullah increasingly 
sought the help of Shevardnadze and KGB chairman Kriuchkov which led to a 
significant halt in the withdrawal, and eventually, the operation against Massoud that 
Najibullah had been requesting for many months. Gorbachev, initially persuaded by 
Shevardnadze and Kriuchkov, ultimately abandoned his support for their tactics and 
reasserted the policy he had followed for the previous two years: focus on withdrawal as 
a priority and use diplomatic channels to work for a neutral Afghanistan.
Although willing to provide Najibullah with massive economic aid and military 
hardware, Gorbachev for the most part resisted requests for major military operations 
involving Soviet troops. In the summer of 1988, during the first months of the 
withdrawal process, Najibullah asked about the possibility o f conducting a joint 
campaign with India against Pakistan, with the USSR also providing troops. The 
military situation had been deteriorating since the start of the Soviet withdrawal in May, 
with rebels taking over some positions previously held by Soviet troops and Afghan 
government troops being forced back from the Pakistani border. But Gorbachev 
refused, for now, to consider allowing Soviet troops to resume taking part in offensive
61 Thus in his conversation with Gandhi, cited above, Gorbachev was demonstrating that his control over 
the military had been restored.
62 Tom Rogers Soviet Withdrawal from Afghanistan: analysis and chronology (Westport: 1992), 144.
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operations. He did not want to undermine the political and diplomatic gains he had 
made by signing the Geneva accords. Thus Gorbachev rejected Najibullah’s request for 
several major operations in which Soviet troops would participate, albeit in a secondary 
or tertiary role. The only way such an operation would be possible, Gorbachev told 
Najibullah, was if  “an attack on our [Soviet] troops is committed.”
Understanding the split between Soviet commanders and Najibullah is crucial to 
understanding the halts in withdrawal in 1988 and the military operations undertaken in 
early 1989.64 Najibullah did not trust Massoud and resisted negotiating with him. 
Instead, he sought to bypass his Soviet military interlocutors and, through 
Shevardnadze, convince Moscow to order major strikes on Massoud’s positions. One 
such strike was ordered in January 1988. According to Liakhovskii, Varennikov and his 
staff made every effort to show that such an operation was militarily unadvisable, 
compiling aerial photographs of the snow covered mountains they had been ordered to 
attack. A team, which included Liakhovskii, flew to Moscow on February 14 to present 
the case against the operation. The operation was set aside, but the episode added to 
tensions between Najibullah and Soviet military advisors.65
Najibullah used every possible channel to force the 40th army to attack 
Massoud. In September he wrote a letter to Gorbachev in which he claimed that 
Massoud was gaining strength and receiving arms directly from the Americans. 
Unfortunately, the text o f the letter is unavailable, but the Politburo discussion of the 
letter gives us a general idea o f its content. The idea o f a major operation was rejected 
for the time being, but Gorbachev took a more hawkish line. The main focus still had to 
be on “political settlement and normalization.” For the first time, however, Gorbachev
63 Record o f Conversation o f MS Gorbachev with the President o f Afghanistan and Najibullah June 13, 
1988 National Security Archive READD/RADD Collection, Box 9. Najibullah also suggested that the 
Soviet Union, Afghanistan, and India launch a war against Pakistan, though it does not seem this ideas 
was ever taken seriously. See Chemiaev Diary, June 19, 1988, GFA CD 1988.
64 For a fuller account o f the military’s relations with Massoud, see Liakhovskii, Tragedia i doblest” , 
630-688 and Liakhovskii and Nekrasov Ahmad Shah Massoud: Chelovek, Politik, Voin (Moscow: 2007).
65 Liakhovskii, Tragedia i doblest 651-652.
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signaled that he might consider delaying: “we have to stop saying that we will withdraw 
no matter what. We must tie the schedule of withdrawal with the current situation.” This 
was to be the new line in talks with Reagan and other politicians as well as in the press 
and UN. Similarly, if  Ahmad Shah did not want to talk, then the military should 
consider operations.66
In the fall o f 1988 the situation became increasingly desperate for Kabul. As the 
opposition increased its attacks on Kabul airport and the Khairaton-Kabul highway, 
Najibullah looked for new military commitments from Moscow. In October an entire 
“Scud” missile division was sent to the outskirts o f Kabul to hit resistance positions 
near the capital.67 There were calls from Najibullah, via Kriuchkov and Shevardnadze, 
to halt the withdrawal. The military was opposed, according to Gromov, for three 
reasons: 1) it meant that the USSR would be violating international accords, 2) the 
Soviet military would have had to conduct major operations in the North, endangering 
the highway, 3)it would have made the refugee problem much more difficult. Of the 
three reasons it is fair to assume that the second was the most pressing: the security of 
the highway had been a priority of the military since the start o f the withdrawal. Yet 
again, the voices o f Gromov and Varennikov did not carry the day. On November 5, 
Moscow suspended the withdrawal.
Some in Gorbachev’s “inner circle” opposed the new line. Chemiaev had 
believed his boss simply meant to use talk of halting the withdrawal to put pressure on 
Pakistan and the US. He expressed great surprise when, a month later, a request came in 
for a major operation against Massoud. After all, Chemiaev insisted, Gorbachev had 
told Shevardnadze “we will not change our decision regarding the withdrawal, the 
Afghans have to fight for themselves.. .under no circumstances could we in fact return 
to participating in this war.” Chemyaev feared just such a return would be considered.
66 Politburo Meeting September 18, 1988 GF PB 1988.
67 Liakhovskii, Tragedia i doblest', 616; See also Rogers, The Soviet Withdrawal from Afghanistan, 45.
68 Gromov, Ogranichenniy Kontingent, 324-325.
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He warned his boss that such operations were not likely to save Najibullah and that, 
even if they did, the price would be too high.69 In his memoir, Kriuchkov points out 
with some anger that Aleksandr Iakovlev, a closer friend of Gorbachev’s and now a 
member of the Afghanistan commission, also argued for timely withdrawal and against 
new operations.70 For the moment, however, the voices o f Iakovlev and others who 
argued against the operation faded into the background.
It is unlikely that Gorbachev ever considered anything as drastic as stopping the 
withdrawal completely. As he pointed out to Rajiv Gandhi, only the “tactical steps,” not 
the “general line” on Afghanistan had changed.71 This new “tactical” line included not 
only a halt in withdrawal and new supplies of weaponry, but, ultimately, the major 
operation against Ahmad Shah Massoud that Najibullah had requested through 
Shevardnadze and Kriuchkov for the past year.
Najibullah could still exert influence in Moscow, primarily through his 
interlocutors from the Kremlin, Shevardnadze and Kriuchkov. The Foreign Minister and 
the KGB Chief made their last pre-withdrawal trip to Kabul on January 12, 1989. The 
trip was not unlike Shevardnadze’s visit on April 3, 1988, when Shevardnadze prepared 
Najibullah for signing the Geneva accords. Gorbachev had already confirmed with his
77colleagues that withdrawal would resume at a meeting on December 28,1988. Now  
Shevardnadze had to prepare Najibullah for this decision. Najibullah, however, was still 
obsessed with Massoud. According to notes from their meeting, Shevardnadze promised 
Najibullah that he would work for an operation against Massoud. This would be a major 
strike, not a small operation: “it is clear that no local or limited measures will be
69 A.S. Chemyaev, Memomadum (for special 1606 from Kabul) October 26,1988 GFA #1553.
70 Kriuchkov, Lichnoe Delo, 257.
71 Third Conversation o f M.S. Gorbachev and R.Gandhi (India) Delhi, November 19, 1988. National 
Security Archive READD/RADD Collection, Box 9; For a summary o f Soviet “hints” that the withdrawal 
might be suspended indefinitely, dropped throughout November 1988, see “Afghanistan: Recent 
Developments” (Note for the SG) December 2, 1988 SML, Perez de Cuellar Papers, Box 10, Folder 110.
72 Politburo Meeting December 28, 1988 GFA PB 1988, 527.
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sufficient to solve the problem of Ahmad Shah [Massoud].”73 Shevardnadze carried this 
request back to Moscow, where he managed to get approval for what would become 
“Operation Typhoon.”74
Military officers who had long opposed such an operation fought a losing battle 
to convince Moscow to avoid it in the winter of 1988-89. Throughout December, 
Varennikov and other members of the operating group drafted and sent memos where 
they explained that such an attack now would mostly harm civilians, damage 
communications with Kabul, make the withdrawal more difficult for Soviet troops, and 
harm the chances of any future reconciliation.75 Officers o f the 40th army were unhappy 
with the order. Some spoke openly o f refusing to fight, or even returning medals they 
had earned in the war, although none appear to have followed through with this threat.
A distraught Varennikov approached Vorontsov, the ambassador, asking what he should 
do. On the one hand, an order had come down and would have to be followed. On the 
other hand, it had upset the officers who felt it was wrong both strategically and 
morally. Vorontsov advised Varennikov to carry out the order, but limit the strikes to 
areas where there were no inhabitants. In the end, the military managed to limit the 
operation to artillery attacks from the highway itself. This minimised Red Army and
• • 76possibly civilian losses but still resulted in extensive damage to villages in the area.
The military had remained unhappy about the operation throughout, and were 
strongly opposed to the idea of leaving a small force behind. General Sotskov has
73 Memorandum of Conversation between Najibullah and Shevardnadze, Kabul, January 13, 1989. 
Liakhovskii, 670.
74 Unfortunately, there is no record available of how this decision was taken. However, Vorotnikov’s 
diary does contain part o f a January 13 Politburo meeting where Shevardnadze talks about an imminent 
economic blockade o f Kabul. According to Vorotnikov’s notes, Gorbachev said: “We must not leave the 
DRA to its fate. Work, think about propaganda. But first we leave, and then we act through the UN, 
Security Council, and others.” (See Vorotnikov, 280) It’s difficult to evaluate Gorbachev’s attitude from 
this fragment. On the one hand he seems to be in favour o f getting out and only using diplomacy to 
protect the DRA, on the other hand he clearly emphasises that the USSR has to take responsibility for the 
DRA. However, since the operation was approved, we must assume that Shevardnadze and Kriuchkov 
convinced Gorbachev o f its necessity.
75 Bogdanov, Afganskai Voina, 296-298.
76 Author’s interview with General Aleksandr Liakhovskii, Moscow, July 2006. Author’s interview with 
Yulii Vorontsov, Moscow, September 11, 2007.
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written of “Typhoon” that “almost ten years of the war were reflected as if in a mirror in 
three days and three nights: political cynicism and military cruelty, the absolute 
defenselessness o f some and the pathological need to kill and destroy of others. Three
• 77awful days absorbed in themselves ten years of bloodletting.”
Gorbachev’s closest advisors disapproved of his tilt towards the Kriuchkov- 
Shevardnadze line and tried to convince their boss that he was making a mistake. 
Chemiaev sent him a memorandum at the end of October arguing against a number of 
developments in Moscow’s policy, including the halt of the withdrawal and the
7 0
planning an operation against Massoud that was being requested by Kabul. Similarly, 
Georgy Shakhnazarov warned Gorbachev in December that Najibullah’s approaches to 
Hekmatyar (whom the DRA leader preferred to Massoud) were dangerous because 
Hekmatyar was an extremist and not likely to compromise. He disagreed with claims 
that Massoud and Rabbani would be more likely to cause problems in Soviet Central 
Asia than Hekmatyar.79 And in January Vladimir Zagladin, another aide, warned 
Gorbachev not to order military action against Massoud, since it would hurt any chances
O A
of forming a Soviet-friendly coalition government.
In all likelihood, those who saw Najibullah’s salvation in a deal with Massoud 
and those who believed in backing a “Pashtun” government led by Najibullah were 
exaggerating their case. Massoud was a brilliant commander, an able administrator, and 
relatively moderate, but he had used previous truces to rebuild his forces and go back to 
war. Supporters of the “Pashtun” option, on the other hand, were too quick to dismiss 
the possibility of an influential Tajik figure taking part in a government. Yet what 
swayed policy at the Politburo level in the fall of 1988 had little to do with these debates 
about how best to form a government in Kabul. Instead, it was Gorbachev’s
77 Sotskov, Dolg i <Sovest, 531.
78 Memorandum to Gorbachev, October 26, 1988 GFA #1553.
79 G. Shakhnazarov, Memorandum to MS Gorbachev Regarding Najibullah and Hekmatyar December 16, 
1988, GFA #18188
80 Zagladin Memorandum on Afghanistan, January 1989, GFA #7178.
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considerations about his standing with other Soviet elites and concern about how the 
withdrawal would be perceived that led him to side side with Shevardnadze and 
Kriuchkov, who believed that the Soviet Union’s priority was to show support to 
Najibullah.
Why was Gorbachev, who was generally averse to using force, willing to 
undertake the Operation “Typhoon” over the protests of many o f his advisers and the 
military? First and foremost, o f course, was the desire to leave some sort o f stable 
government within Afghanistan that would not collapse after February 15. He had 
hoped to do so through diplomacy, but by January 1989 it was clear that the Geneva 
Accords had done little or nothing to advance an internal Afghan settlement. Operation 
“Typhoon” may have appeared as a way to give Najibullah additional political breathing 
space, even though in practice its military value was limited. Gorbachev still believed in 
the importance of maintaining Soviet prestige in the Third World, which in turn made 
him more open to arguments by Kriuchkov and Shevardnadze that Moscow first and 
foremost had to show support to its friend.
Even more important, at this stage, was that Gorbachev (and Shevardnadze) was 
increasingly worried about protecting his “right flank” internally. Kriuchkov was a 
crucial supporter, without whom fending off attacks from conservatives would be very 
difficult. If the Kabul government collapsed soon after the withdrawal -  a serious 
possibility in late 1988 and early 1989 -  Gorbachev would need Kriuchkov’s support 
against any attacks on his handling of the problem. It thus made good political sense to 
follow the KGB chairman’s advice. Moreover, by this point he had allowed Kriuchkov 
and Shevardnadze to dominate Afghan policy. Their ability to direct information and 
block opposing arguments was crucial to Gorbachev’s understanding of the problem, 
particularly as demands for his attention grew in the face of mounting economic 
problems and political difficulties.
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Back Over the Friendship Bridge
After the “pause” in November-December, Soviet troops continued their withdrawal in 
January 1989, and were on target to complete it by February 15, the deadline mandated 
by the Geneva accords. Yet the situation had not markedly improved for Najibullah in 
this time. He still faced the same hostile opposition, now emboldened, and a 
government and military whose loyalty to their president was shaky at best. Moscow 
now had to decide how to shape its relationship with Kabul: would further military 
involvement be possible? How many military advisors could stay behind? These 
questions were still not settled in the first months o f 1989. The crisis of the Najibullah 
regime in this period forced Moscow to solve them by improvising in response to the 
situation as it developed.
Just how much Kriuchkov and Shevardnadze believed in the importance of 
protecting Najibullah’s regime became evident when, in the final weeks of the 
withdrawal, they pushed to have 10-15000 Soviet troops stay behind, guarding the roads 
and thus providing a life-line for the regime. It was an idea that first originated 
sometime between February and April 1988. Moscow’s decision to sign the Geneva 
accords without a US agreement to stop supplying arms to the opposition had put it in 
an awkward situation before Najibullah and his allies. Since this had been a key 
precondition for Soviet and Afghan negotiators in earlier years it might look like a 
betrayal, weakening Najibullah in the eyes o f both the PDPA and the opposition. It also 
meant that the armed forces o f the DRA would be facing an opposition that still 
received substantial support from Pakistan and the US as well as Saudi Arabia and Iran.
In the remaining weeks before the February 15th deadline, Soviet officials 
wrestled with the still unsettled question o f how to define the Soviet-Afghan 
relationship after the withdrawal. As in earlier periods, Gorbachev looked for ways to
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avoid a chaotic collapse in Afghanistan. In 1988 and the first months of 1989 in 
particular he entertained the possibility that some Soviet troops would remain, a 
position advocated by Kriuchkov and Shevardnadze. On January 24th the Afghan 
commission submitted a lengthy memorandum that suggested a number o f options. It 
highlighted the numerous difficulties that Najibullah faced, Pakistan’s violation of the 
Geneva accords, and the importance of maintaining a road link between the Soviet 
Union and Kabul. The memorandum offered a number o f ways that Soviet troops could 
be kept in Afghanistan to guard those roads, and suggested forming volunteer divisions 
to carry out the task, offering soldiers a salary of 800-1000 rubles a month, unheard of 
at the time even for officers.81
The idea to leave some Soviet troops after the withdrawal had received its latest 
incarnation around the same time as “Typhoon,” during Shevardnadze and Kriuchkov’s 
last pre-withdrawal visit to Kabul. After meetings with a number o f Afghan officers, 
officials, and Najibullah, Shevardnadze agreed that leaving behind 10-15000 troops was 
necessary to prevent collapse in Kabul. At a meeting with officers and staff in the Soviet 
embassy, Shevardnadze laid out his proposals.82 Varennikov and other senior officers 
were against leaving an exposed division to continue guarding the highway for 
Najibullah. It was also a question of logistics. They argued with Shevardnadze and his 
subordinates that it was not possible to leave ten to fifteen thousand troops because 
those troops would need support. Once again, the military command in Afghanistan 
was pitted against officials from Moscow.
Gorbachev’s more reform-minded advisers were horrified. On January 20 
Iakovlev called Chemiaev, informing him that Shevardnadze was circulating a plan to 
send three to five thousand Soviet troops to launch a breakthrough attack on the road to
81 “On measures in connection with the upcoming withdrawal o f Soviet troops from Afghanistan,”
January 23, 1989, Sowjetische Geheimdokumente, 462-482.
82 Bogdanov, Afganskaia Voina, 294-295.
83 Author’s interview with General Aleksandr Liakhovskii, Moscow, July 2006.
226
Kandahar and act as a convoy for goods. In a conference call a short while after, 
Chemiaev and Iakovlev pleaded with Gorbachev not to act on the proposal. Gorbachev 
included Shevardnadze in the conversation, who argued that the USSR had a 
responsibility to help Najibullah: “you weren’t there, you don’t know how much we’ve 
done over ten years.” Gorbachev listened to the discussion, then hung up to call
Q A
Kabul. The debate erupted again at a Politburo meeting on January 24, when 
operation “Typhoon” was already underway. Shevardnadze insisted that the USSR 
remained responsible for protecting the Najibullah government: “the fate o f the regime 
is not inconsequential for us. Our Afghan friends ask us not to leave them without 
support.” He went on to highlight the awful state the country was in: “there’s already a 
blockade of Kabul. We are leaving the country in a pitiable state. The cities and villages 
are ravaged. The economy is paralyzed. Hundreds of thousands of people have died.” 
The withdrawal, Shevardnadze said, “will be seen as a major political and military 
defeat.”85 No duoubt the “emotional” or “personal” factor was at play here -  
Shevardnadze was genuinely worried that Najibullah and his colleagues, political and 
perhaps even personal friends, might perish in a bloody confrontation as mujahadeen 
took the city. But he also knew that Gorbachev shared his concerns about allowing the 
withdrawal to be seen as a defeat, and he dramatised this possibility for the Politburo.
Shevardnadze found hismelf isolated among his colleagues. No one else seems 
to have spoken up in favour of keeping troops in Afghanistan. Gorbachev rejected 
Shevardnadze’s arguments, calling his presentation “empty, hawkish babble.” As for the 
fate of Najibullah, Gorbachev said, “we are not going to save the regime. We’ve already 
transformed it.” Chebrikov, Ryzhkov and Iakovlev all agreed.86 The military 
involvement had to end: “[we] need to hold our principled line so there is no presence of 
our element in their fight,” Gorbachev went on. But he agreed with Shevardnadze that
84 Chemiaev, Afganskii Vopros (Mezhdunarodnye Otnosheniia: 2000), 47.
85 Politburo Meeting January 24, 1989 GFA PB 1989, 48.
86 Chebrikov was still a Central Committee member, but no longer KGB chief.
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the Soviet Union still had an interest in Afghanistan and that Moscow could not “run
away” from the problem. “There are some people, there are comrades who say: so
what? We didn’t start it!” Gorbachev rejected these arguments as well: “capitulation,
running -  is unserious, wrong.. .we cannot appear before the world in just our
underwear.”87 As the protocol of the meeting reveals, the Politburo recognised the
importance o f protecting the Khairaton-Kabul road, but limited Soviet aid to supplying
the Afghan divisions that would be doing the work.88 Leaving these troops was not just
a logistical challenge that the military clearly opposed; it would also mean exposing the
USSR to criticism that it had no intention of withdrawing all o f the troops anyway.
The withdrawal was completed on February 15th, in full accordance with the
Geneva timetable, and with representatives of the Soviet and foreign press corps
present. Although the pause in November-December meant that more Soviet troops had
to return through harsh winter conditions, the withdrawal was effected in good order
and with minimal Soviet losses, a testament to the planning and logistical preparation of
• 80the Soviet military and the diplomatic efforts of a wide range o f officials. The footage 
of General Gromov dismounting from a tank half-way across the “Friendship bridge” to 
Termez and walking the rest of the way to his homeland was seen the world over. Yet 
his statement that there were no Soviet troops left behind was not quite true -  a number 
of adviser^ had stayed in Afghanistan, some of whom would later take part in key 
battles. Nor was the question of how far support for Najibullah could go in the future 
settled by the time of the withdrawal. Although the idea o f keeping a whole division 
within Afghanistan had been discarded, Moscow had taken measures to allow for the 
possible use o f Soviet air support and even ground troops in the future. The document 
formalizing the last phase of the withdrawal stated, “for the purposes o f solving sudden
87 Politburo Meeting January 24, 1989 GFA PB 1989,48.
88 Politburo protocol, January 24, 1989 in Sowjetische Geheimdokumente, 458-460.
89 US military analyst Lester Grau has judged it an “excellent model for disengagement form direct 
military involvement in support of an allied government in a counter-insurgency campaign.” Lester Grau 
“Breaking Contact Without Leaving Chaos,” 260-261.
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problems in the case of worsening condition on the Soviet-Afghan border or in 
Afghanistan, [we are] providing to temporarily maintain on the territory of the USSR in 
battle readiness three motorised rifle and one airborne division, six aviation divisions, 
and two helicopter regiments.”90
The start o f the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan in May 1988 brought the 
Najibullah regime to a crisis point. The signing of the Geneva Accords emboldened the 
opposition and frightened PDPA members. Despite years o f training and support, the 
army of the Democratic Party of Afghanistan had not proven that it could fight 
independently. Najibullah’s requests for aid in these difficult months were meant to take 
some o f the wind out of the sails of the opposition and at the same time build him up in 
the eyes of the party and non-party figures within the government. As chapter 3 showed, 
Soviet confidence in Najibullah helped him come to power and consolidate it in 1986 
and 1987, but not to the point where Najibullah could truly claim to have a solid 
independent power base even within his party.
Soviet policy in response to this crisis was dictated by two conflicting priorities. 
On the one hand, the US-Soviet relationship was improving rapidly in 1987 and 1988. 
As the previous chapter showed, Moscow saw the Geneva Accords both as result of this 
improvement as well as a catalyst for further detente. This priority was well reflected in 
Moscow’s attitude around the time of the Moscow summit in May 1988 and the months 
afterward. Soviet leaders and politicians at all levels kept violations o f the Geneva 
Accords out o f discussions with their US counterparts; when the issue was brought up, 
they were careful to blame Pakistan and not the United States.
The growing crisis, however, forced Moscow to reassess its priorities. Starting 
in the late summer key Soviet policymakers began urging the Politburo to approve 
additional military strikes within Afghanistan. The two most senior supporters of this
90 Regarding the completion of withdrawal o f Soviet troops from the Republic of Afghanistan, CC CPSU 
memorandum, 16 Feb 1989, Volkogonov Papers, Reel 17/Box 26.
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policy, KGB Chairman Kriuchkov and Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze, pressed 
the idea on Gorbachev. They faced formidable opposition from other policy-makers, not 
just “liberals” like Iakovlev and Chemiaev but even more cautious reformers like 
Kornienko. Although Gorbachev resisted similar pleas from Najibullah earlier in the 
summer, he now increasingly sided with the Kriuchkov-Shevardnadze line.
There are several reasons for this. First, it was becoming clear that Geneva had 
failed to pay any dividends as far as the situation within Afghanistan was concerned. 
When he had signed the accords, Gorbachev still hoped that the withdrawal itself would 
prompt the United States to stop supporting the mujahadeen and make a settlement 
which included the PDPA more favourable. In practice, the blatant violation of the 
accords by Pakistan was an embarrassment, as it highlighted that the accords were really 
little more than a fig-leaf.
Second, concerns about the effect of a withdrawal on other Soviet third-world 
allies had not gone away. Indeed, at a time of profound changes in Moscow’s 
international relations, Gorbachev had to maneuver very carefully to avoid upsetting the 
entire system of relations in the Soviet sphere. In their complaints to Soviet visitors in 
August 1988, North Vietnamese leaders expressed concern over not only the withdrawal 
form Afghanistan, but also the Soviet opening to China. Similarly, the cautious Soviet 
opening to South Korea worried the North.91 We know that other countries, such as 
India and Cuba, had made their concerns about a hasty Soviet retreat known earlier. 
While the limited archival access makes it difficult to assess precisely how widespread 
this sentiment was among Soviet allies, it is clear that this concern only became greater 
during the withdrawal period.
The withdrawal also coincided with a pivotal phase of perestroika and a difficult 
period for Gorbachev politically. On the one hand, he had been successful in packing
91IMEMO Policy Paper, submitted to the CC CPSU August 30, 1988. IMEMO Archive.
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the Politburo with his own allies and removing most hard-liners he had seen as a threat. 
His foreign policy, particularly vis-a-vis the west, seemed to be showing significant 
results (see chapter IV). On the other hand, a worsening economic situation was causing 
discontent in the Soviet population at the same time as nationalist movements were 
increasingly making their presence felt. The extent of growing opposition to perestroika 
within the party was brought home to Gorbachev in April 1988, with the publication of 
a letter by a Leningrad school-teacher entitled “I cannot part with my principles.” The 
Gorbachev described by Zubok, who sought “good relationships with Western 
statesmen” and had an aversion to the use of force, was also highly aware o f the 
fragility of his position and his reforms.93 His shifts from dovish to hawkish positions 
and back again, described in this chapter, presaged and echoed similar “zig-zags” in 
other areas o f foreign and domestic policy, particularly in 1990-1991.94
Third, the events described in this chapter highlight the problems o f Soviet 
foreign-policy making in general and in Afghanistan in particular. Splits between Soviet 
officials on the ground, particularly the military and the KGB, translated into policy 
battles fought out in Moscow. All sides involved felt that they were acting in the best 
interest o f the Soviet Union, but their policies were often incompatible. The military’s 
relationship with Massoud was incompatible with the KGB’s goal of supporting 
Najibullah, since the latter believed that Najibullah should be allowed to define who he 
makes alliances with. What is striking, moreover, is that these debates were not aired 
out fully in Politburo meetings but decided, as in many instances during the war, 
kuluarno -  i.e., in some sort of informal framework. Thus phone calls or private 
conferences between Shevardnadze, Kriuchkov, and Gorbachev often pre-determined 
the results o f Politburo decisions. At the same time, the sidelining of officials like 
Kornienko proved an effective way for Kriuchkov and Shevardnadze to increase their
92 Sovetskaia Rossia, 13 March 1988.
93 Zubok, A Failed Empire, 314-317.
94 Kotkin, Armageddon Averted, 87-92.
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dominance in the foreign policy-making process. Thus after a brief period of a more 
“democratic” approach to policymaking on Afghanistan-which saw long, heated debates 
involving the full Politburo-a pattern resembling the early 1980s, when Andropov- 
Ustinov-Gromyko reemerged essentially set Afghan policy between themselves, re- 
emerged.
As we will see in the final chapter, some of these factors were still defining 
Soviet policy-making on Afghanistan in the Soviet Union’s last years. Although the 
importance of Third World client states began to fade in the face o f the acute internal 
situation from late 1989, Soviet leaders continued to look for ways to maintain influence 
in those areas. More conservative leaders, like Kriuchkov, were particularly anxious to 
arrest the decline of Soviet influence in the world. Gorbachev, often cautious about 
offending that end o f the political spectrum, was doubly so in the tumultuous years of 
1990 and 1991.
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“I didn’t want to be president, 
you talked me into it, insisted 
upon it, and promised support. 
N ow  you are throwing m e and 
the Republic o f  Afghanistan to 
its fate. H ow  is one to 
understand this?”1 -Najibullah  
to Shevardnadze, personal 
letter, 1991.
Chapter 6: Politics, Aid and Diplomacy after the Withdrawal
The withdrawal o f Soviet troops from Afghanistan, completed on February 12, 1989, left 
many questions about Moscow’s future policy in that country unresolved. In the years 
after Soviet troops departed, Najibullah would make requests for Soviet military 
intervention during several crises. Although all of these requests were ultimately denied, 
there were certainly those in Moscow who believed such interventions should not be 
ruled out. Long after the Soviet government had lost the ability to support him materially 
it continued to insist that Najibullah be included in any transition government.
In many ways Moscow’s policy towards Afghanistan followed the same basic 
principles after the withdrawal as before. The main goal of Soviet policy was still to 
prevent a collapse of the Kabul government and to show that it had achieved a controlled 
transition there. Despite the growing financial and economic crisis within the Soviet 
Union, military and material aid continued to arrive in Kabul on Soviet transport planes. 
Soviet advisors stayed behind with the Afghan army. And Soviet diplomats continued 
their efforts to negotiate for recognition of the regime and the cessation of US arms 
supplies to the opposition.
Following the Soviet withdrawal, internal developments in Afghanistan 
continued to be important to Soviet leaders. First, Gorbachev’s reforms and outreach to 
the west were no longer going unchallenged. Although nobody in the leadership opposed
1 M.A.Gareev Afganskaia Strada (S Sovetskimi voiskami i bez nikh) (Moscow: Insan, 1999), 316.
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the withdrawal of troops from Afghanistan, many, like KGB chief Vladimir Kriuchkov, 
were skeptical of the new multilateral approach to foreign relations and thought that 
Gorbachev was going too far. Bringing the war in Afghanistan to a peaceful conclusion 
that allowed Moscow’s client to play a key role would help neutralise their criticism, 
particularly if it was done with the cooperation of the UN, the US, and Pakistan. Second, 
Afghanistan continued to be important after 1989 for some of the same reasons it had 
been important in 1979 -  it shared a 2000 kilometer border with the Soviet Union. Even 
if fears o f Afghanistan becoming a US base had diminished somewhat, rising 
nationalism and anti-Soviet sentiment in the republics bordering Afghanistan gave Soviet 
leaders new reasons to work toward stability there. Finally, Afghanistan continued to be 
important because the war was now too much in the public consciousness to be ignored. 
Not just Gorbachev but even reformers like Iakovlev worried about the political fallout 
should the war be declared meaningless -  which it may have been if  Moscow no longer 
played a role in events there.
Nevertheless, soon after the withdrawal Soviet policy on Afghanistan was adrift. 
This is not surprising, considering the escalating crises that Moscow faced from 1989 
onwards in both the domestic and foreign spheres. The collapse o f Eastem-European 
communism in 1989, the secessionists movements that grew in strength from 1990, and 
the challenge o f trying to fundamentally transform the Soviet state now loomed as larger, 
more threatening and immediate problems than the war in Afghanistan. Although 
preventing a collapse in Kabul was still important to Moscow, the imperative of guarding 
the Soviet Union’s reputation as defender o f global national-liberation movements 
decreased as the country’s superpower status evaporated at the end o f 1989.
Gorbachev’s greatest success with regard to the withdrawal was on the 
propaganda front. The withdrawal was welcomed by the Soviet public, which largely 
credited Gorbachev with ending the war. Moreover, a carefully controlled propaganda
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campaign allowed him to criticise the war without facing questions about why it had 
dragged on long after he came to power. Moscow continued to support Najibullah even 
as it sought a diplomatic solution to the conflict. This was partly because until August 
1991 there were still people in the Soviet government who supported propping up the 
Najibullah government with supplies. Even after the failed August 1991 coup, however, 
the dying Soviet state continued to back Najibullah politically.
Setting a precedent for non-intervention: the battle for Jalalabad and after
If Moscow had a clear Afghan policy in February 1989, we have no evidence of it. 
Indeed, it seems that Soviet leaders were unsure to what extent they needed to continue 
supporting Najibullah. Shevardnadze and Kriuchkov continued to argue for active 
support for the Kabul regime, even to the point of using Soviet air support during in 
critical battles. Gorbachev himself seemed less interested in propping up Najibullah, and 
was too preoccupied with other problems to give Afghan policy much direction. As a 
result, Afghan policy continued on inertia, with the KGB playing the most active role.
To some extent Soviet policymakers may have expected events to resolve the 
issue. The CIA had been predicting that the Najibullah regime would not outlast the 
Soviet presence in Afghanistan, and their lack of confidence was shared by their 
Pakistani counterparts. Similarly, some in Moscow, such as Minister of Defense Dmitrii 
Yazov, did not think the regime would last more than a few months. As in 1980, the 
spring thaw, the traditional start of the fighting season, would reveal the military balance 
between the opposition and the government.
2 The study o f this period poses particular methodological problems. As Gorbachev manoeuvred between 
different factions, decision making became increasingly chaotic. At the same time, his effort from 1990 
onwards to distance himself from the party and create a new governing apparatus meant in practice that 
decisions were increasingly taken informally or at the ministerial level. I have attempted to reconstruct 
some o f the decision making for this period through a reading of newspaper reports, memoirs, and the few 
archival documents available.
3 Gareev, Moia Poeslednia Voina, 127.
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The first test of Soviet resolve to refrain from further direct military involvement 
came within two months of the withdrawal. US and Pakistani officials were confident 
that Najibullah would fall quickly once Soviet troops withdrew. On March 6,1989, 
Benazir Bhutto, the recently appointed Prime Minister o f Pakistan met with the “Afghan 
Cell,” a group of senior ISI and military officers, to discuss what steps to take next. Her 
advisers, in particular ISI chief Hamid Gul, urged a frontal attack on Jalalabad. Although 
it was heavily defended by government forces, Gul was confident it would fall within 
twenty four hours. US ambassador Robert Oakley, who was present at the meeting, 
believed Gul was right. The plan was approved and soon the CIA began directing Toyota 
pick-up trucks and weapons to positions outside Jalalabad.4
Several days later the attack began. It was the first major attack since the 
withdrawal, with hundreds of young Afghan men and boys recruited from refugee camps 
taking part. In Kabul, Najibullah grew nervous. Several urgent telegrams were sent to 
Moscow. Jalalabad, Najibullah said, was about to fall, and then the road would be open 
to Kabul. He requested support in the form of air cover and bombardment delivered by 
pilots flying in from Soviet bases.5
Gorbachev called together a meeting of Politburo members and Central 
Committee secretaries at the Novo-Ogarevo dacha to discuss possible responses. Once 
again, his colleagues took familiar positions. The main supporters of a Soviet 
intervention were Shevardnadze and Kriuchkov. And it was Shevardnadze, as before, 
framing the question in terms of loyalty, saying that if  the Soviets let Najibullah fall it 
would be betrayal and that the Soviet Union’s friends in the Third World would see it as 
such. Yazov, the defense minister, was more cautious, saying that the air bombardment 
would do little, and Soviet involvement would be impossible to hide. Apparently it was 
Iakovlev who spoke most forcefully against intervention, though he had the support of
4 Coll, Ghost Wars, 192-193; Liakhovskii and Nekrasov, Grazhdanin, Politik, Voin, 217-219; Yousaf and 
Adkin, Bear Trap, 226-228.
5 Ibid, 194. Chemiaev, Afganskii Vopros (Mezhdunarodnye Otnosheniia: 2000), 49-50
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others at the meeting. In the end Gorbachev said that he was “categorically” against any 
Soviet bombardment of Jalalabad.6 Although the Politburo approved additional supplies 
and the organization o f a special supply train, Soviet bombers did not come to 
Najibullah’s rescue.7 The behaviour of Shevardnadze and Kriuchkov demonstrated that 
the “Najib lobby” would keep working to ensure Moscow’s support long after Soviet 
troops had gone home. If they could not involve Soviet troops, they would at least make 
sure he had all the means to keep fighting on his own.
According to Chemiaev’s diary entry, Gorbachev had declared himself 
categorically against using Soviet pilots to defend Jalalabad because he didn’t want to go 
back on a promise the Soviet Union had made before the world. This is disingenuous. 
Gorbachev had proven on numerous occasions in the previous nine months that he 
believed the Soviet Union had to continue supporting the Najibullah regime or risk 
undermining its own authority. He had authorised Operation “Typhoon” even though 
there was strong opposition to it on the grounds that it made the USSR looks 
disingenuous; he had entertained the idea of leaving troops behind after the withdrawal, 
in contravention of the accords. Yet on this occasion he sided against Kriuchkov and 
Shevardnadze, thus keeping Soviet troops out of direct involvement.
We cannot be sure why exactly Gorbachev acted the way he did in March 1989. 
It is important to remember, however, that his decision not to send in Soviet pilots was 
largely consistent with his attitude prior to the later summer and early fall o f 1988 -  the 
Soviet Union would continue to support the DRA regime with material aid and 
diplomacy, but not with any military involvement. Gorbachev must have realised that his 
reaction to Jalalabad would set a precedent -  if Moscow sent in pilots, it would be 
expected to do so on every occasion where the Najibullah government felt it was in
6 Chemiaev, Afganskii Vopros (Mezhdunarodnye Otnosheniia: 2000), 49-50; Politburo notes, March 10, 
1989 GFA PB 1989, 202. Chemiaev was not at the meeting, and the information in this diary entry comes 
second-hand from Iakovlev. This version agrees in general with the notes in the Gorbachev Foundation 
Archive, which were taken by Medvedev.
7 Liakhovskii, Tragedia i doblest”, 682.
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immediate danger. The war would then drag on indefinitely and he would no longer be 
able to take credit for withdrawing troops. Further, his decision offered a compromise 
between those arguing for direct Soviet involvement and those arguing for no 
involvement whatsoever. Whereas Moscow had ceased supplying the Afghan military 
from the time of the withdrawal, it now committed itself a new to providing military 
materiel. This too set a precedent -  Najibullah’s military continued to receive Soviet 
arms until the end of 1991.
There is also some evidence that Gorbachev was increasingly unconcerned with 
supporting Najibullah or the PDPA and including them in a future government. 
Emboldened perhaps by the positive public response to the withdrawal, he was less 
worried about the potential political damage from not supporting Najibullah. At a 
Politburo meeting on March 23, 1989, he said that the actual composition o f the 
government in Kabul no longer carried great importance for the Soviet Union: “For us 
the main thing is that a hostile government doesn’t appear [in Kabul]. The rest.. .let it be 
any governing combination -  not our problem.”8 In practice, however, he never quite 
made this sentiment official policy.
Najibullah survived the Jalalabad attack. The mujahadeen recruits proved 
unequal to the task the CIA and ISI had confidently predicted would be accomplished. 
The RA troops in Jalalabad, after being forced to give up several border posts in the first 
hours of the battle, held their ground over many weeks. Not only did the Afghan military 
hold out better than expected, but the Soviet military materiel, some of it turned over 
during the withdrawal, overpowered the attackers. The Afghan air force, flying Soviet 
bombers, successfully carried out the bombings Najibullah had asked Moscow to
8 Chemiaev’s notes o f March 23, 1989 Politburo meeting in Chemiaev, Afganskii Vopros, 50.
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conduct. And Soviet advisers helped operate the Scud missiles that had been turned over 
to the Najibullah regime during the withdrawal.9
The Jalalabad attack changed the shape of the conflict. In March Najibullah had 
appealed to Moscow in panic, but it was a confident and emboldened leader who spoke 
at the 11th anniversary of the Saur revolution. The defense o f Jalalabad, he told party 
members “can be considered a strong blow to those who were speaking of the collapse o f 
our revolution.”10 The foreign press reported that the mujahadeen were showing 
themselves a divided fighting force, incapable of taking full advantage of the heavy arms 
provided by the United States. There were reports of growing resentment of Islamabad’s 
involvement and support for the most radical groups.11 Najibullah’s ability to continue 
governing without the presence o f Soviet troops began to impress many Soviet advisors 
still involved in Afghanistan. The Jalalabad victory emboldened not only Najibullah, but 
also many o f his supporters in the KGB and among Foreign Ministry advisers in Kabul. 
General Mahmut Gareev, a military theoretician sent to serve as the senior Soviet 
military advisor in Afghanistan, wrote that by the end o f 1989, there was increasing talk
• j 2of moving the Afghan army from defensive to offensive operations.
Gareev did not share the optimism of these advisers. Najibullah and the regime 
were still very vulnerable. The budget deficit grew as the state’s economic links frayed 
and and it relied increasingly on cash payments, including to militias, for maintaining 
support.13 More desperate than ever for Soviet support, Najibullah asked for more arms 
and for Moscow to take a stronger line on Pakistan, to at least consider demonstrative 
flights over that country’s territory. He threatened to take the initiative himself, writing 
to Moscow “on our side we are considering the question o f rocket attacks on targets on
9 Coll, Ghost Wars, 193-194; Yousaf and Adkin, The Bear Trap, 230-232; “After Jalalabad’s Defense, 
Kabul Grows Confident,” New York Times, April 30, 1989.
10 “After Jalalabad’s Defense, ” New York Times, April 30, 1989.
" See, for example, “The encircling gloom,” The Guardian April 10, 1989.
12 Gareev, Moia Poslednia Voina, 127.
13 Militias had been used since 1980, but playes and increasingly important role in the latter half o f the 
1980s, and particularly after the withdrawal. The militias’ loyalty to the Kabul government hinged largey 
on the payments and esources provided to them. See Giuozzi, War, Politics, and Society, 198-231.
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Pakistani territory.”14 Although no record is available of Moscow’s response, the request 
must have made most Soviet officials bristle. They could not but be horrified by the 
thought of the war expanding at a time when the USSR could barely afford its already 
shrinking commitments to Kabul and when Soviet leaders were looking to their former 
Cold War enemies for economic support.
The withdrawal of Soviet troops removed Afghanistan from Gorbachev’s day to 
day agenda. In this context, the policies and views o f individual officials gained 
increasing importance. There was disagreement not only over the USSR’s future role in 
Afghanistan, but also the prospects of the Najibullah regime. These were evident when 
General Gareev, went for pre-departure briefings with senior officials in Moscow. 
According to Gareev, Dmitrii Yazov told him “go there [to Kabul] for two-three months, 
and then we’ll see,” meaning that he did not expect the Najib government to last much 
longer.15 Kriuchkov, on the other hand, urged him to work hard to continue supporting 
Najibullah.16 Nor had the KGB-military rivalries, discussed in the previous chapter, been 
resolved. In his meeting with Gareev, Kriuchkov harped on the importance of developing 
a good working relationship with Najibullah as well as the KGB representative in Kabul. 
When Gareev tried to suggest that Moscow needed to push Najibullah towards 
improving his relationship with his own army, Kriuchkov showed his displeasure and 
criticised, the “improper position” taken by “certain military advisors working in 
Kabul.”17 The in-fighting between the military and the KGB did not end with the 
withdrawal.
Whatever strengths Najibullah had shown after the Soviet withdrawal, he still 
faced bitter divisions within his own government. For one, the troubled relationship with 
Defense Minister Shanawaz Tanai, discussed in the previous chapter, had not improved.
14 Gareev, Moia Poslednia Voina, 120.
15 Gareev, Moia Poeslednia Voina, 127.
16 Gareev, Moia Poeslednia Voina, 92.
17 Gareev, Moia Poslednia Voina, 92. Gareev shares the frustration o f other Soviet military officers who 
felt that their voice was often silenced by Kriuchkov. See Gareev Afganskaia Strada, 276-277.
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By February 1990 Tanai emerged as the leader o f a plot to oust Najibullah. As in 1988, 
Tanai tried to win Soviet support for his plans. This support was not forthcoming. Like 
General Sotskov, Gareev found himself being approached as a messenger to Moscow as 
well as a mediator in the intra-PDPA rivalry. Tanai tried to convince him that the Soviet 
Union was making a mistake in putting so much support behind Najibullah and the 
Parcham wing. Gareev could do little besides try to mediate some sort of truce between 
the two sworn enemies. By January 1990 the conflict within the government had grown 
so acute that, Gareev found, most of the leadership had given up governing and had 
devoted themselves full time to infighting.18
Najibullah’s behavior did not help matters. He relied on his support in the state 
security apparatus to try to weed out plotters, ordering the arrest of 137 army officers he 
believed might be loyal to Tanai. When Gareev pointed out that the arrests might 
provoke Tanai, Najibullah rejected the suggestion. Gareev told the president that he was 
relying too much on the Ministry of State Security, urged him to be more inclusive with 
Khalqists, and pointed out that in some ways Tanai had a legitimate gripe. Gareev even 
suggested offering Tanai another promotion and then sending him to Moscow for 
training, but Najibullah did not believe Tanai would go. By early March, the atmosphere 
had become so tense that meetings of the Commander in C hiefs Staff had been 
abandoned, Tanai refusing to enter the President’s residence for fear o f arrest. Nor did he 
agree to Gareev’s request to meet with Najibullah, saying it was useless and that he 
would make no more compromises.19
Moscow largely remained aloof from this conflict. When Tanai told Gareev that 
he and his supporters “were ready to deliver a blow,” Gareev passed on the information 
to Yazov. The latter said he believed he could get them to meet were he there, but never
18 Gareev, Moia Poslednia Voina, 132.
19 Gareev, Moia Poslednia Voina, 132-133.
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made the trip.20 Although reports on the situation within the PDPA would probably have 
been available at Politburo meetings in Moscow, we have no records to indicate what 
discussion they sparked or which options were discussed. The position of Kriuchkov or 
the KGB advisers during this episode is, unfortunately, also unknown.21
In the event, Tanai launched his bid for power on March 7,1990, ordering jets to 
bomb Najibullah’s palace. Meanwhile, forces loyal to Tanai tried to open a path for 
Hekmatyar’s fighters. The bombs did not kill Najibullah, and the coup failed within 
several hours. Units loyal to to Kabul routed the defecting units, and Hekmatyar’s force 
never entered the capital.22As it emerged later, Tanai’s plot involved more than the 
removal o f Najibullah. As in 1988, he believed that he could reach out to the opposition 
and form a new government. This time, however, rather than appealing to Massoud, he 
had made contacts with Gulbaddin Hekmatyar. As the journalist Steve Coll has shown, 
this was part o f a planned double coup, funded in part with Osama bin-Laden’s help, to 
remove both Benazir Bhutto in Islamabad and Najibullah in Kabul.
Available evidence suggests that the possibility of using Soviet planes to help 
quash the rebellion was at least briefly considered in Moscow. Several Politburo 
members spoke in favour o f such an operation, citing familiar arguments. Lev Zaikov, a 
CC CPSU secretary responsible for the military-industrial complex and a Politburo 
member, said “If Najib falls, people will say -  what did we fight for?” Yet even 
Shevardnadze was now opposed to using Soviet planes. Najibullah’s request was 
denied.24
The Tanai rebellion marked the last time that Soviet leaders seriously discussed 
the possibility o f using the Soviet military to support the Najibullah regime. Indeed, by
20 Gareev, Moia Poslednia Voina, 134.
21 Although not surprisingly, there was some suspicion among Soviet diplomats and officers in Kabul that 
the whole plot was hatched by the KGB. Gareev, Moia Poslednia Voina, 135. Considering Kriuchkov’s 
support for Najibullah both before and after the coup, it is most unlikely that the KGB would have been 
supporting Tanai’s bid for power.
22 Coll, Ghost Wars, 212; Rubin, Fragmentation o f  Afghanistan, 253.
23 Coll, Ghost Wars, 212; Gareev, Moia Poslednia Voina, 134-135.
24 Politburo meeting, March 7, 1990, GFA PB 1990, 169.
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the fall o f 1990 Najibullah’s supporters in the KGB were becoming concerned that aid 
would eventually be cut off entirely by the Council of Ministers, where both ability and 
willingness to continue any sort of foreign aid was eroding. Shebarshin tried to make 
Najibullah aware of this trend through the KGB’s representative in Kabul. Meanwhile, 
he and Kriuchkov agreed that they would try to push through as much aid as possible 
before the tide turned completely against supporting Najibullah.25
Officials in the KGB and the military now began to worry about the effects of 
events in Afghanistan on the USSR’s Central Asian republics. As chapter 2 showed, this 
was not a great concern in the early years of the war. Yet in 1989 and 1990 separatist and 
Islamist groups were beginning to make their presence felt, particularly in Tajikistan. 
Gareev, Kriuchkov, Shebarshin, and others worried about the potential of a spillover 
effect if extremists did come to power in Kabul. This concern became another 
argument for those who wanted the USSR to continue supporting Najibullah politically 
and economically. In a Politburo memorandum following a trip to Afghanistan in August 
1989, Kriuchkov and Shevardnadze pointed out that their conversations with party 
leaders in Uzbekistan confirmed that “Islamist fundamentalist” groups there and in other 
Central Asian republics were waiting to take advantage of a mujahadeen victory in 
Afghanistan.27 Nevertheless, it does not seem that any particular response was discussed 
at the Politburo level.
The Tanai coup highlighted the fact that Afghan policy was adrift in Moscow. A 
few weeks later Chemiaev wrote a memo to his boss suggesting that he request some 
policy reviews, involving various experts, towards a “fundamental redevelopment” of 
Soviet policy towards Afghanistan. Such policy reviews did take place through the 
summer of 1991. Yet none o f them led to a fundamentally new policy. In the context of
25 Shebarshin, Iz Zhizni Nachalnika Razvedki, 24-25.
26 Author’s interview with Leonid Shebarshin, March 19, 2008; Gareev, Moia Poslednia Voina, 107-108.
27 “Regarding talks in Kabul and our potential further steps...” August 11, 1989 in Sowjetische 
Geheimdokumente, 692.
28 Chemiaev memorandum to Gorbachev, GFA Fund 2, Opis 1, Document 8242.
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state collapse within the USSR itself in 1990 and 1991, this is hardly surprising. Further, 
in March 1990 the Politburo commission on Afghanistan was dissolved. This eliminated 
the one senior body with coordinating capacity, and at the same time served to increase 
Kriuchkov’s dominance of Afghan policy.
Najibullah’s ability to hold on to power after Soviet troops left was a testament to 
his own political skills, to the work of Soviet advisors who had trained the Afghan 
military and militias, and to the weakness o f the mujahadeen. His survival proved to be a 
political boon to Gorbachev, who did not have to face the political fallout of a bloody 
collapse in Afghanistan. It also posed a challenge -  as long as he stayed in power 
Moscow had some obligation to keep its promises and offer him support by way o f aid, 
advice, and representation on the world stage. Key officials who had been instrumental 
in steering Afghan policy in earlier periods, including Shevardnadze and Kriuchkov, 
continued to exert enormous influence and press for a more active involvement. 
Although they failed to secure continued military involvement, they succeeded in 
ensuring that supplies would continue to flow to Kabul. While Gorbachev accepted their 
insistence that military and economic aid would continue, he rejected the possibility of 
allowing any Soviet troops to return. Sending the Soviet air force into Afghanistan could 
have compromised the political gains o f the withdrawal and Gorbachev’s new reputation 
as a global peace-maker, increasingly the only source o f his waning popularity.
Continuing diplomatic efforts: the UN, Pakistan, and the US
Although the Geneva talks had culminated with the signing of the accords in April 1988, 
Moscow continued to look for ways to steer the situation in Afghanistan toward some 
sort of acceptable resolution. While the increasing dialogue with the United States, 
Pakistan, and Iran seemed to provide new opportunities for a diplomatic solution, Soviet
29 Author’s interview with Nikolai Kozyrev, November 14, 2008.
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leaders and diplomats now had to operate in an arena where they had much less leverage 
and where Soviet power in general was in rapid decline. This decline made multi­
lateralism all the more crucial, for it offered the only real possibility of protecting Soviet 
interests in Afghanistan in a way that was consistent with New Political Thinking. It was 
also part of Gorbachev’s drive to show his conservative critics that he had not abandoned 
Soviet interests by moving away from confrontation with the USSR’s recent enemies.
From the signing of the Geneva Accords onwards, Gorbachev repeatedly 
expressed his belief that Moscow could resolve the Afghan conflict through multi-lateral 
diplomacy and the United Nations. Pakistani leaders also expressed interest in a greater 
UN role. Having failed to get a coalition government set up before the Geneva Accords 
were signed, Pakistan had to be content with a mechanism that allowed the UN to stay 
involved. Yet the UN Secretary General was reluctant to involve his organization in the 
conflict any further.
At a meeting with Perez de Cuellar on the day o f the signing ceremony, the 
recently appointed Foreign Minister of Pakistan tried to push the UN Secretary General 
to commit his organization to a continued role in Afghanistan. The accords themselves, 
he said, “would not lead automatically to peace in Afghanistan. That could only be 
achieved with the formation of a transitional government. All the Geneva parties were in 
agreement that Mr. Cordovez should continue his efforts towards reaching an 
understanding to that end with all the parties concerned.” Perez de Cuellar was unwlling 
to commit the UN again because the Geneva process itself, which had taken the better 
part of the decade, had brought his office under fire from a number of quarters. He 
insisted that it would be difficult for the United Nations to get involved, since the 
organization was “enjoined from interfering in the internal affairs of member 
countries.”30
30 Meeting between UN Secretary General and H.E. Mr. Zain Noorani, Foreign Minister o f Pakistan,
April 14, 1988. SML, Cuellar Papers, Box 10, Folder 102. Cuellar’s resistance to a UN role was broken
245
Moscow offered its own proposals before and after the withdrawal. In New York 
for the UN General Assembly in December 1988, Gorbachev met with Perez de Cuellar. 
Moscow was ready to accept a neutral government, Gorbachev told the Secretary 
General, but to ask Najibullah to step down ahead of time was unfair. Later, speaking 
before the assembly, Gorbachev proposed a cease-fire that would begin on January 1, 
1989, a halt of arms supplies to both the government and the opposition, and the 
“deployment of UN peacekeeping forces in Kabul and other ‘strategic centers.’ His 
proposals were rejected by virtually every country.31 Another Soviet proposal in March 
that called for a group o f experts representing the US, USSR, Pakistan, Iran, the 
Najibullah government and the mujahadeen also went nowhere.
If during most of the war Soviet leaders often sought to keep the UN at arms 
length, between 1989 and 1991 they increasingly looked to it to help reach a resolution in 
Afghanistan. As leaders in Moscow felt their own ability to influence events in 
Afghanistan slipping, their calls for UN involvement became more strident. In February
1989, Gorbachev tried to appeal directly to US President George Bush to accept the idea
• '1')
of an international conference proposed at the UN two months earlier. Bush refused. 
During the Jalalabad battle in March a Soviet representative delivered an angry message 
to Perez de Cuellar, accusing him of not taking an active role in Afghan affairs and 
allowing the situation to slip out of control.34 Soviet officials continued to push for the 
idea o f an international conference, under the auspices of the UN Secretary General, to
by a UN resolution, and he ended up playing a direct role, while Cordovez left the UN to serve as Foreign 
Minister for his own country, Ecuador. See Cuellar to Cordovez, November 11, 1988 UN Secretary 
General’s Files S-1031-60-25 and Cuellar, Pilgrimage for Peace, 196-197.
31 Perez de Cuellar, Pilgrimage for Peace, 202.
32 Ibid. See also a copy o f the proposal handed to Perez de Cuellar, March 15, 1989, and the Note for File 
on US and Pakistani responses to these proposals, (undated but after March 16 1989), in SML, Perez de 
Cuellar Papers, Box 10, Folder 104.
33 Carolyn McGiffert Ekedahl and Melvin A Goodman, The Wars o f  Eduard Shevardnadze (University 
Park, 1997), 193.
34 Note of the Secretary-General’s Meeting with the First Deputy Representative o f the USSR, March 22, 
1989, 1989 SML, Perez de Cuellar Papers, Box 10, Folder 109.
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increase the size of UNGOMAP, and for the Secretary General and his representatives to
c
play an activist role for the next several years.
The turn to the UN reflected Gorbachev’s own faith in that body, and his 
growing belief in the importance of broad international agreements. It also reflected 
Moscow’s growing realization of its own impotence to dictate the course of events. 
Moscow counted on the UN to help build international support for the Soviet position in 
negotiations; this in turn might force the US and Pakistan to modify their demands, 
particularly on Najibullah. It also counted on the UN to enforce those parts o f the Geneva 
Accords that protected the Kabul government, something the previous chapter showed 
the UN was unable and unwilling to do. Finally, Gorbachev clearly hoped that the UN 
would help provide legitimacy for the withdrawal and his handling o f Afghan policy. As 
he reiterated on numerous occasions, success in Afghanistan would prove that New  
Thinking could combine improvement in relations with the west and the protection of 
national interests.
Of course the UN was not the only venue for Moscow to work for a solution to 
the Afghan problem. Afghanistan continued to be on the agenda of bilateral US-Soviet 
meetings. Efforts over the following months to convince Washington to stop or at least 
reduce its support to the mujahadeen, however, were generally fruitless. In May, 
Shevardnadze made yet another in a series of private appeals to US leaders during a 
private dinner at the former’s apartment. Shevardnadze even went beyond earlier Soviet 
positions, de-coupling the cessation of Soviet arms supplies to the Sandinistas in 
Nicaragua and US aid to the mujahadeen. For the first time he even suggested that the 
Soviet Union would not insist on keeping Najibullah in a coalition government after the 
settlement.36
35 See, for example, Shevardnadze’s note to Perez de Cuellar, February 17, 1989 and Vorontsov to 
Cuellar, November 6, 1990 SML, Perez de Cuellar Papers, Box 10, Folder 109.
36 McGiffert-Ekedahl and Goodman, The Wars o f  Eduard Shevardnadze, 193; Michael R. Beschloss and 
Strobe Talbott At the Highest Levels: The Inside Story o f  the End o f  the Cold War (New York, 1993), 62;
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Over time, however, the attitude in Washington became more promising. On the 
one hand, Pakistani officials and their allies in congress still opposed the idea o f a 
transitional government that included Najibullah.37 On the other hand, there was a 
growing consensus that the US had reached its main objective (the Soviet withdrawal) 
and the realization was emerging that continued support for the mujahadeen might not be 
in US interests. Whereas in late 1988 and early 1989 CIA analysts were confident of a 
quick military victory, the RA army’s successful defense o f Jalalabad in the spring of 
1989 seemed to change the calculus.38 Further, now that Soviet troops had left, US 
officials and leaders began doubting whether a military takeover of Kabul would even be 
in US interests. In August UN officials had learned that both the United States and
>JQ
Pakistan were “reevaluating the desirability of a military solution in Afghanistan.” And 
in October, the US Senate Foreign Relations Committee rebuked the Bush administration 
for holding out for a military victory. As a State Department analyst put it, two changes 
had taken place since February 1989: “One, the congressional bipartisan consensus on 
Afghanistan is breaking up. And two, the perception that we are supporting a good cause
James A. Baker, The Politics o f  Diplomacy (New York, 1995), 74. Shevardnadze’s hint that the Soviet 
Union might drop its insistence on keeping Najibullah in a coalition government was “off the record,” and 
was not mentioned in a memorandum prepared by Soviet officials for the UN Secretary General, nor does 
Baker mention it in his memoirs. “USSR-USA Talks on Afghanistan,” May 17, 1989 SML, Perez de 
Cuellar Papers, Box 10, Folder 104.
37 In September Shevamdadze traveled to Baker’s ranch at Jackson Hole, Wyoming, for two days o f talks 
on arms controls and other bilateral issues. Although Baker and Shevardnadze spoke about the Afghan 
problem, they could only agree on the need for a “political settlement on the basis o f national 
reconciliation, and for a transitional government paving the way for the creation o f a non-aligned 
Afghanistan.” “Afghanistan: US goes cool on guerillas” The Guardian, October 6, 1989.
38 Indeed, mid level and senior officials had begun re-evaluating their policies towards support for the 
mujahadeen. In the fall o f 1989, Peter Tomsen, appointed ambassador to the Afghan resistance, led an 
inter-agency working group to re-evaluate US policy. They decided on a new approach: pressure on 
Najibullah would continue, but the US would work to form a moderate government to take his place.
Coll, Ghost Wars, 180-184, 205-207.
39 Perez de Cuellar, Pilgrimage for Peace, 203; Khan, Untying the Afghan Knot, 306-307. This was also 
evident when Pakistani Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto, in a meeting with Perez de Cuellar in June, noted 
that “the situation around Jalalabad had made everybody think in a different perspective...Pakistan was 
pursuing a search for a political settlement to the problem of Afghanistan.” Notes on the meeting between 
the Secretary-General and the Prime Minister o f Pakistan, June 9, 1989, SML, Perez de Cuellar, Box 10, 
Folder 105.
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is not there any more. We are no longer fighting the evil empire. They’ve gone. Now it’s 
just Afghans fighting Afghans.”40
Perez de Cuellar and the two officials now coordinating UN efforts on 
Afghanistan, Benon Sevan and Giandomenico Picco, saw an opening. In the fall of 1989 
they attempted to launch a new UN sponsored initiative to establish an intra-Afghan 
dialogue that would bring the opposition groups as well as the Kabul government to the 
negotiating table. Yet neither the US, Pakistan, or Moscow accepted the initiative, which 
represented the main thrust of UN efforts in 1989. For the former, any recognition o f the 
Najibullah government’s legitimacy continued to be anathema. Moscow continued to 
insist on an international conference, possibly fearing that the UN proposal might unite 
the chronically divided mujahadeen, depriving the Kabul government o f a political 
advantage.41
Indeed, Moscow found it hard to let go of support for Najibullah. Although they 
may have expressed great frustration in private, Soviet leaders could hardly dump him, 
particularly at a point when he seemed to be gaining support within the country and 
increasingly capable of standing on his own two legs. In a private letter to Bush and 
again at the Malta summit in December 1989, Gorbachev insisted that that Najibullah 
could not be forced out prior to a settlement.42 The two sides exchanged a number of 
accusations about the others’ contribution to the problem and failure to help find a 
solution. Shevardnadze even “sounded o ff’ at Baker, upset that the “friendly”
40 “Afghanistan: US goes cool on guerillas” The Guardian, October 6, 1989. See also George Bush and 
Brent Scowcroft A World Transformed (New York: Vintage Books), 134-5.
41 Perez de Cuellar, Pilgrimage for Peace, 203-204.
42 “Soviets reassert policy on keeping Najibullah,” The Washington Times, November 2, 1989, A7. 
“Soviet Support for Najibullah Blocked Political Headway at Malta Summit,” Associated Press, 
December 6, 1989. In a letter to Perez de Cuellar, Gorbachev noted that at Malta he and Bush had been 
able to focus their conversation on the need for a diplomatic solution. Yet he expressed his frustration that 
Bush refused to consider compromising on Najibullah: “It is important to see the realities o f today’s 
Afghanistan. It is necessary to take into account the fact that following the withdrawal o f Soviet troops 
the government o f the Republic o f Afghanistan has felt more confident. We think that the opposition is 
starting to become convinced o f this as well.” Gorbachev to Cuellar, December 3, 1989, GFA.
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relationship established between the two men during their meeting in Wyoming was not 
bringing concrete results.43
Moscow’s support for Najibullah seemed to be as much a matter o f decorum as 
defense o f interests, at least as far as Gorbachev and even Shevardnadze were concerned. 
In December the New York Times reported that although Shevardnadze and Gorbachev 
had both reiterated support for Najibullah during the Malta summit, they seemed to be 
dropping hints “with a wink and a nod” that he was dispensable.44 Then, at a meeting 
with Baker in February 1990, a frustrated Shevardnadze reportedly blurted out 
“Sometimes I wish all these people would just kill each other and end the whole thing.” 
He went on to say it would be better if Najibullah could stay at his post, but although “it 
would be very difficult for us to force him to go, it might be acceptable if  he decided to 
leave on his own.”45
For their part, US officials were moving closer to the Soviet position on 
Najibullah. Although the mujahadeen showed no sign o f dropping their insistence that 
Najibullah resign before negotiations could take place, the policy review and the 
changing atmosphere in congress were moving the Bush administration towards 
dropping their insistence on such a scenario.46 At the meeting with Shevardnadze cited 
above, Baker mentioned for the first time that the United States might stop insisting that 
Najibullah leave the scene before negotiations begin.47 Following the meeting, Soviet 
Foreign Ministry spokesman Gennady Gerasimov said that although the formal US 
proposal for a settlement still “did not take into account the situation in Kabul and the 
solidity of the Najibullah government,” the two sides had moved closer to a settlement
43 Chemiaev Diary entry, December 10, 1989, GFA CD 1989.
44 “US Divided on Soviet Stand” The New York Times, December 16, 1989,1.
45 Beschloss and Talbot, At the Highest Levels, 180. See also “Moscow spells out Afghan plan,” The 
Independent, February 21, 1990, p.9. Moscow’s position, as laid out to the UN Secretary General, was 
that the US insistence on removing Najibullah during the transition period was unacceptable. However, 
Moscow was reading to accept the results o f elections, as were Afghan leaders. Untitled memorandum on 
Baker/Shevardnadze talks, February 14, 1990, SML, Perez de Cuellar Papers, Box 10, Folder 106.
46 “Najibullah ‘can remain’” The Guardian February 6, 1990.
47 Beschloss and Talbot, At the Highest Levels, 180
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based on intra-Afghan dialogue.48 For his part, Najibullah announced publicly his desire 
for UN-monitored elections and his willingness to step down if defeated, and even 
suggested that he might step down before the vote was held during the negotiation
49process.
A week after his meeting with Baker in February, Shevardnadze published a new 
set o f proposals in the government newspaper Izvestia. His article repeated the call for an 
international conference and also called for a cease-fire, an end to both US and Soviet 
arms shipments (“negative symmetry”), and elections monitored by the UN and the 
Islamic Conference Organization. Perhaps the biggest innovation was the idea that both 
government and opposition forces could hold on to the territory they controlled during 
the transition period.50
Following Shevardnadze’s Izvestia article, Moscow and Washington seemed to 
move quicker towards an agreement. At a meeting in Helsinki in March US and Soviet 
experts elaborated on the proposals that came out o f the Baker-Shevardnadze meeting in 
February and the Izvestia article. The failure of the Tanai coup confirmed that Najibullah 
still had enough support within the military and party to hold on to power, even if it also 
highlighted the challenges he faced from rivals at the top. In May US officials said that 
they would agree to Najibullah participating in elections if  he first stepped down. In 
testimony before the US congress in June, Baker confirmed that “a very, very narrow 
difference” separated the views of Moscow and Washington.51 US President George 
Bush, meeting with Perez de Cuellar in June, noted “I was dead wrong about Najibullah
48 “Soviet Spokesman on Baker-Shevardnadze Talks in Moscow” TASS February 8, 1990.
49 “Afghan leader urges UN-monitored elections” Washington Post, January 25, 1990, p.A30.
50 “Soviets Offer Proposal for Afghan Settlement,” Washington Post, February 15, 1990, p.A45; 
Beschloss and Talbot, At the Highest Levels, 243.
51 “Superpowers plan Afghan arms freeze” The Independent, April 5, 1990, p. 14; “US and Soviets on 
New Tack in Effort to End Afghan War,” The New York Times, May 3, 1990, A l; “Baker Notes Gains on 
Afghan Accord,” The Washington Post, June 14, 1990, p. A34. Note on Afghanistan to the Secretary 
General, (undated, but after May 23, 1990), SML Perez de Cuellar Papers, Box 10, Folder 106.
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- 1 thought he would fall when the Soviet troops withdrew.”52 He went on to say that he 
could understand the Soviet insistence on keeping Najibullah through the election period, 
and their insistence on following the “Nicaraguan model.”
Soviet leaders could take some comfort in the change in attitude and policy of 
other nations that had supported the mujahadeen. Relations with Iran had improved, 
evidenced by Shevardnadze’s high profile visit to the country in February 1989, during 
which Ayatollah Khomeini hailed the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan.54 In August 
Kriuchkov and Shevardnadze noted that Iran was moving towards a more “constructive” 
position as a result of Soviet diplomatic efforts.55 In October, Iran cut off military aid to 
Shiite insurgents, even encouraging them to work with the Kabul government.56 From 
that point Soviet officials began to see Iran as generally playing a constructive role in 
Afghanistan.57 Similarly, China, which had once been part of the coalition supporting the
r o
mujahadeen, was no longer playing a hostile role.
On the key question of US support for the mujahadeen, however, an agreement 
remained always just out o f reach. Talks continued at the “expert” level, and Afghanistan 
was on the agenda at the July Baker-Shevardnadze meeting in Irkutsk and again when 
the two met in Houston that December. An international consensus, based on a draft 
prepared by UN officials, was within reach. Moscow now largely accepted the idea of a 
transition mechanism, “the powers of which could include important government
52 Note o f the Secretary-General’s luncheon with George Bush, June 4,1990. SML Perez de Cuellar 
Papers, Box 10, Folder 106.
53 Ibid. In Nicaragua, the Sandinista’s remained in power while elections took place, then stepped down 
peacefully after the results were certified. Bush’s growing doubts about the situation in Afghanistan were 
evident again later in the discussion, when he asked Cuellar “Is Hekmatyar a bad guy?” to which Perez de 
Cuellar responded “I don’t like him at all, he is a fundamentalist.”
54 “Shevamadze, Khomeini, meet in Tehran” Washington Post, February 27, 1989.
55 “Regarding talk in Kabul and our potential further steps...” August 11, 1989 in Sowjetische 
Geheimdokumente, 686.
56 “Iran halts arms flow to Afghan Shiites,” The Toronto Star, October 1, 1989, H8.
57 See the IMEMO paper prepared for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “International aspects o f a
settlement in Afghanistan,” July 23, 1990, IMEMO Archive and “Iran’s attitude to the settlement o f the 
Afghan problem,” GARF F. 10026, op. 4, d. 2868.
58 Ibid.
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functions.”59 Yet for all this progress, no agreement was reached in 1990. There were 
three reasons for this. First, the Moscow leadership still found it hard to let go of 
Najibullah. The softening of the US position in the first half of 1990 and Najibullah’s 
continuing hold on power encouraged Moscow to believe that sooner or later the US (and 
Pakistan) would accept his involvement in a transitional government. In a meeting with 
Najibullah in August 1990, Gorbachev reaffirmed his belief that the US would ultimately 
recognise that they did not have someone better to offer as a national leader.60 Second, 
Moscow pointed out, with some justification, that even if  the Soviet Union and the 
United States both cut off arms supplies, the opposition would still be able to count on 
support from Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and other minor donors. Therefore, Soviet officials 
insisted on a more comprehensive settlement, even offering “negative symmetry plus,” 
i.e. the withdrawal o f weapons like the Scud missiles from Afghanistan if  a complete cut­
off of supplies to the mujahadeen could be guaranteed.61
Finally, internal political dynamics continued to play an important role as they 
had in earlier periods. Although the internal debate in Moscow is difficult to trace for this 
period, there is reason to believe that Kriuchkov, and possibly Shevardnadze, continued 
to insist that Najibullah should not be forced to step down prior to the formation of a 
transitional government. As we will see later in the chapter, it was only when both were 
finally out of government in the fall of 1991 that an agreement on mutual cut-off of arms 
supplies and “negative symmetry” was finally reached. Boris Pankin, the Minister o f 
Foreign Affairs who took over after the failed coup in August 1991, learned that the
59 Note for the Secretary General following talks regarding Afghanistan held with senior Soviet officials, 
10 July 1990. The consensus non-paper, sent to the Foreign Ministers of Iran, Pakistan, the US and 
USSR, outlined a number points which were necessary for securing a settlement, including the cessation 
o f arms supplies by all sides and a “credible and impartial transition mechanism,” with specifics on the 
latter point deliberately left out. “Elements for an International Consensus,” 11 July 1990. SML, Perez de 
Cuellar Papers, Box 10, Folder 107.
60 “Record o f conversation between Gorbachev and Najibullah” August 23, 1990 NSA, READ/RADD, 
Box 9.
61 Beschloss and Talbot, At the Highest Levels, 243; Ekedahl and Goodman, The Wars o f  Eduard 
Shevardnadze, 193; “Superpowers plan Afghan arms freeze” The Independent, April 5, 1990, p. 14.
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agreement had been prepared a year earlier, at the Baker-Shevardnadze talks in Houston,
•  •  62 but Kriuchkov’s continued opposition had blocked the signing of the accords.
Handling the home front
Even before the withdrawal began, Gorbachev and other Soviet leaders had to decide 
how to explain the war to the public. The Soviet media had barely discussed Soviet 
military activities in Afghanistan prior to 1985, and in the years that followed few details 
regarding either the origins of the war or its conduct emerged. As Andrei Grachev, an 
International Department official and later Gorbachev aide, notes in his book 
Gorbachev’s Gamble, there was serious concern among the leadership about the reaction 
to the withdrawal from the Soviet public. While the public would probably accept the 
withdrawal, “official propaganda had been quite effective in concealing the truth about 
the real human price that had been paid.”63
The withdrawal coincided with a real flowering of the Soviet media as a result of 
glasnost, where the party no longer had absolute over the press and investigative 
journalism was emerging, allowing a wide range o f investigative reporting on everything 
from the origins o f the war to its conduct and aftermath. It was in the public sphere that 
Gorbachev scored the largest success of his Afghan policy. From 1988 through the 
collapse o f the USSR, he managed to get all the credit for ending the presence o f Soviet 
soldiers there without having to explain why it took him four years to do so. Gorbachev 
benefited from the genuine relief people felt that “the boys” had returned and no more 
would be sent to die, but his success also reflected a PR campaign that aimed to keep the 
focus on the origins of the war under Brezhnev.
Soviet leaders were already discussing how to explain the war and the 
withdrawal in the months prior to the signing of the Geneva Accords. At a meeting with
62 Boris Pankin, The Last Hundred Days o f the Soviet Union, (New York: I.B. Tauris, 1996), 117-118; 
Author’s interview with Nikolai Kozyrev, November 14, 2008.
63 Grachev, Gorbachev's Gamble, 103.
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several Politburo members working on propaganda and ideology, Aleksandr Iakovlev
told his colleagues that press discussion of the war had to increase, but to avoid any
discussion o f the war being a mistake: “God help us if we create the impression that our
boys put their heads down for naught, that they needlessly became invalids for their
whole lives, that they fought needlessly -  that is absolutely out o f the question.”64 Soon
after the accords were signed, the issue came up at a Politburo meeting. Gorbachev
agreed with Iakovlev that propaganda should emphasise the “international duty”
performed by Soviet soldiers, but at the same time it could not go too far: “after all, if
everything was correct, why are we withdrawing?” 65
Gorbachev proposed drafting a letter for the party and the country that would for the
first time address the human and material costs of the war, as well as the reasons for the
withdrawal. The letter had to strike a balance, “so that our withdrawal does not look like
running away. [The letter] must emphasise that there is no military solution.” The letter,
circulated within the CPSU in May 1988, for the first time summarised many of the
mistakes that had been made in the Afghan war. It spoke of the economics costs, the
naivety o f Soviet party advisors, as well as the mistake made with the appointment of
Babrak Karmal. Losses of men and materiel, long hidden from the party as well as the
public, now received wide circulation:
Combat action is combat action. Our losses in dead and 
wounded— and the CC CPSU believes it has no right to hide 
this— were growing, and becoming more and more heavy.
Altogether, by the beginning o f  May 1988, we lost 13,310 
people [dead] in Afghanistan; 35,478 Soviet officers and 
soldiers were wounded, many o f  whom became disabled; 301 
people are missing in action. There is a reason that people say 
that each person is a unique world, and when a person dies, that 
world disappears forever. The loss o f every person is very hard 
and irreparable, it is hard and sacred if  one died carrying out 
one’s duty.
64 Meeting chaired by Iakovlev, February 22, 1988, NSA READ/RADD, Box 9, p. 17.
65 Politburo Meeting, April 18, 1988, GFA PB 1988,211-215. At this meeting Gorbachev also nominated 
Iakovlev to the Afghan Commission, presumably to handle questions o f propaganda, and possible also to 
have a close ally in that body.
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The Afghan losses, naturally, were much heavier [than 
ours], including the losses among the civilian population.66
Although the letter avoided any actual mention o f soldiers having died without good 
reason, it is hard to see how anyone reading this letter would avoid coming to precisely 
that conclusion. Indeed, time would show that Gorbachev and others were perfectly 
content to admit the war was a mistake, as long as it meant shifting the blame back to the 
Brezhnev era.
A month later, at the 19th Party Conference, Gorbachev echoed the sentiments of 
the letter to the assembled delegates. He pointed out that the Soviet leadership had to 
bear the “moral responsibility” for what happened in Afghanistan, but quickly moved to 
distance himself from the mistakes of the Brezhnev era: “I have to tell you that many 
Politburo members did not know about the decision [to send troops into Afghanistan]. I, 
for example, a candidate member of the Politburo, learned about the introduction of
( \ 7troops from the newspapers.” By January 1989, the Politburo was discussing openly 
calling the decision to invade a mistake.
In the new atmosphere of glasnost the Soviet leadership could not hope to shape 
public perceptions of its policies through a monopoly on information. Although most of 
the leadership genuinely viewed the intervention as a mistake, they still worried about 
allowing criticism to get out of hand, thus undermining support for the military and other 
Soviet institutions.
As Gorbachev aide Vladimir Zagladin argued in a memo to his boss, thus far, the 
Soviet press had continued to follow the old official line justifying the Soviet 
intervention in Afghanistan.69 This line contained a number of contradictions. Among 
other things, Moscow had insisted that the intervention was necessary “to repel the
66 CC CPSU Letter on Afghanistan, May 10, 1988, NSA Documents on Afghanistan, Document 21, 
http:.//www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv Translated by Svetlana Savranskaya.
67 Notes from the XIX Party Conference, June 29, 1988 GFA.
68 Politburo meeting, January 24, 1989 GFA PB 1989, 60.
69 “Sobliudat Soglashenie,” Pravda February 18, 1989.
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foreign danger for Afghanistan.” But at the end of December 1979 foreign support for 
the opposition was still minimal. “It assumed a serious scale only after our entry into
70  •
Afghanistan and to a significant degree as a result o f the operation.” Zagladin 
concluded that while it was still too early to give a full explanation o f what happened, it 
was not advisable to return to explanations that directly contradicted reality.71 Zagladin 
accurately highlighted the contradictions created by Soviet propaganda that could 
potentially make trouble for the leadership on what was generally a popular move. In 
February 1989, in particular, it was far from clear if  the Najibullah regime would last 
more than a few months. If Kabul fell soon after the withdrawal o f Soviet troops and the 
decision to intervene had not been officially criticised, questions would almost certainly 
be raised about the advisability o f withdrawing them, or perhaps about the conduct of the 
war under Gorbachev.
Zagladin’s memorandum echoed concerns o f some Politburo members, including 
Shevardnadze. Even as he was advocating a more hawkish line in support of Najibullah 
at the end o f January 1989, the foreign minister pointed out that “Within the party and in 
the country at large there are different reactions to our withdrawal. At some point we will 
have to announce that the introduction of troops was a gross blunder.. .many thought it 
was adventurism even then. But their opinion was not considered. Later the lies about
77successes started.” If years of Soviet propaganda were not reversed, Shevardnadze 
feared, the present leadership could be saddled with the blame for the outcome o f the 
war.
In October, the new Congress of People’s Deputies launched an investigation 
into the causes and consequences of the Soviet invasion. The investigative commission, 
headed by Georgii Arbatov, was given a mandate to interview military figures and 
officials involved in the initial invasion. Crucially, however, it did not focus on other
70 Zagladin Memorandum on Afghanistan, February 29, 1989 GFA Fond 3, Opis 1, Document 7192.
71 Ibid.
72 Politburo meeting, January 24, 1989 GFA PB 1989, 60 and in Chemiaev, Afganskii Vopros, 48.
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aspects o f the war.73 Similarly, when Shevardnadze made a much publicised admission 
to the USSR Congress of People’s Deputies in October 1989 that the Soviet invasion had 
“violated general human values,” he moved to distance himself and his boss from 
responsibility for the war: “M.S. Gorbachev and I were candidate members of the 
Politburo. I found out about what had happened from radio and newspaper reports. A 
decision that had very serious consequences for our country was made behind the back of 
the party and the people. We were confronted with a fait accompli.”74 Several key 
military officers contributed, perhaps unwittingly, to Gorbachev’s efforts to put some 
distance between himself and the emerging criticism of the war, by giving interviews 
where they laid the blame on Brezhnev and his cohort.75
Even before the Supreme Soviet officially condemned the decision to invade on 
October 25, 1989, a number of enterprising journalists, sometimes writing in newly 
established newspapers, began providing the public with previously unknown 
information about various aspects of the war, including the decision to invade. Relying 
primarily on interviews with participants as well as their own experience covering the 
war in earlier years, these journalists for the first time presented completely new 
accounts o f the war.76 Official censorship rarely stepped in to block these exposes. And 
even when censors did move to block a piece from appearing in one media outlet, it 
could find its way to the public eye through another.77
73 Author’s interview with Georgiii Arbatov, March 24, 2008.
74 Beschloss and Talbot, At the Highest Levels, 123.
75 See, for example, Varennikov’s interview in Ogonek and the interview with General Kim Tsagalov: “ 
Afghanistan: Voinu proigrali politiki,” Argumenty i Fakty No.39, September 30,1989. Tsagalov went as 
far as to say “The decision to withdraw our troops is a manifestation o f great civil courage on our part as 
well as that o f the Afghan leadership. It is precisely that [courage] which was lacking in our previous 
leadership.”
76 Most notable is the work of Artem Borovik as well as the journalists David Gai and Vladimir Snegirev. 
The latter published a series o f articles in Vechernia Moskva [Evening Moscow] in the summer and fall of 
1989, and eventually a book, Vtorzhenie, that has been cited elsewhere in this thesis. See, for example 
David Gai, “Afganistan: Kak Eto Bylo: Voina Glazami Ee Uchastnikov” [Afghanistan the way it was: the 
war through the eyes o f its participants], Vecherniaia Moskva, October 30, 1989.
77 Such was the case with a piece prepared by Aleksandr Bovin on the situation in Afghanistan in 
December 1988. Bovin’s report, based on his visit to Afghanistan, noted that “the withdrawal o f Soviet 
troops is not accompanied by increased stabilization in the country” and went on to highlight the 
continued divisions within the PDPA and other problems. Excised from the December 11 broadcast,
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Not surprisingly, journalists exposed not only the political mistakes made during 
the war, but also the brutal nature of the fighting, including the atrocities committed by 
Soviet troops. Issues like drug use and hazing (dedovschina) were also being written 
about for the first time, both with regard to service in Afghanistan as well as army life in 
general. Needless to say, these sort of investigative articles had been virtually unheard of 
in the Soviet Union. These revelations, and the emotional public reaction they evoked, 
contributed to the growing rift between the military and the civilian leadership, which
7 0
often sided with the journalists.
Similarly, the proliferation of civil groups like the “soldier’s mothers” 
organization, which were at least partially a response to the war in Afghanistan, 
contributed to the loosening of state and party control over society. Some of these 
organizations, particularly the veterans organizations, were originally formed within the 
framework of traditional party organizations like the Komsomol By 1990 they were 
increasingly emerging as fully independent organizations, openly bypassing or defying 
state and party organizations. Their aims, however, had little to do with high politics and 
more to do with immediate concerns -  medical and social aid for veterans, better
70treatment within the military, and so on.
Crucially, neither Gorbachev nor Shevardnadze faced serious criticism for their 
policies in Afghanistan. Throughout the 1989-1991 period, criticism of the war focused 
on the decision to intervene and the management o f the war in its early years. Partially 
this was a result of genuine curiosity on the part o f journalists who wanted to understand 
the origins o f the war. It was also the result of decisions by Politburo leaders to keep the 
focus o f blame on Brezhnev and his circle.
Bovin saw to the pieces publication in Argumenty i Fakty less than a week later. “Pis’mo v redaktsiu: 
glasnost na polovinu,” Argumenty i Fakty, December 17, 1988.
78 Liakhovskii, Tragedia i doblest', 750-751; Odom, Collapse o f  the Soviet Military, 284-85.
79 Galeotti, Afghanistan: The Soviet Union's Last War, 79-83.
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USSR, Russia and Afghanistan
When the withdrawal of Soviet troops was completed in February 1989, the USSR was 
still a superpower, with satellite states in Eastern Europe, allies throughout the Third 
World, and the Warsaw Pact organization a seemingly unshakable counterweight to 
NATO. By the end o f the year most of the communist parties in Eastern Europe were out 
of power. A year later East Germany was on its way to reunification with the Federal 
Republic of Germany, the Warsaw Pact had ceased to exist, and the USSR was facing 
economic catastrophe. By 1991 it was breaking apart at the seams.
In this context it was probably inevitable that sooner or later Soviet material 
support to Afghanistan would cease or at least decrease to insignificant levels. Although 
Gorbachev still had at least the nominal allegiance o f the military up to his resignation at
finthe end o f December, the state was coming apart at the seams. Indeed, in 1991 the
o  1
Soviet Union was only able to deliver 10% of the fuel contracted to the RA. An 
Afghan delegate visiting the Soviet Union in the early fall o f 1991 told a reporter "We 
saw all these empty stores in Moscow and long queues for a loaf o f bread and we thought 
what can the Russians give us?"82 Perhaps most damaging for Najibullah was the loss of 
political support that Soviet disintegration entailed.
Najibullah harbored a justified fear that at some point or another he would be 
“abandoned.” He was no doubt aware of the rumors circulating in the international press 
that Soviet officials were hinting, off the record, they might be willing to drop their 
insistence on keeping Najibullah in a transition government. And as he watched the early 
stages o f the USSR’s ultimate dissolution, he expressed anxiety regarding where it might 
leave him. Najibullah was keenly aware that his support was in decline within
80 The assertion o f sovereignty and in some cases independence by republican governments contributed to 
Moscow’s budgetary crisis, as republic leaders curtailed taxes (as well as agricultural products) sent back 
to the center. See Yegor Gaidar, Collapse o f  an Empire, 228-242.
81 Barnett R. Rubin The Fragmentation o f Afghanistan, 171.
82 “Gardez victory, Soviet message o f support revive Kabul regime,” Agence France-Presse October 14, 
1991.
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Gorbachev’s inner circle and among newly emerging political figures like Boris Yeltsin. 
In a New Years’ greeting to Aleksandr Iakovlev, he reminded the “architect of 
perestroika” that the Afghans “would never forget those who helped our people in 
difficult, crucial periods o f our history.”83 In August 1990 he complained to Gorbachev 
that “the chairman of the Supreme Soviet of the RSFSR Yeltsin has publicly spoken for 
ceasing aid to Afghanistan.” He went on to defend Soviet assistance to Afghanistan, 
pointing out that while the USSR had carried out its obligations under the Geneva 
agreement, Pakistan and the United States had not. Gorbachev assured Najibullah that 
the USSR had no plans to abandon him; on the contrary, the US was coming around to 
the Soviet view that the Kabul government had to be part o f any transitional 
arrangement.84
Throughout 1991 Gorbachev’s power declined. Republican leaders, particularly 
Russian president Boris Yeltsin, increasingly saw Gorbachev and the Soviet government 
as competitors for power. Republican governments were declaring that their laws 
superseded Soviet law; many were developing their own institutions, including ministries 
of foreign affairs, and working to get recognition abroad. Revenues were no longer 
reaching the Soviet treasury. Throughout the year Gorbachev was preoccupied with 
establishing a new All-Union treaty, and in July 1991 a draft was approve by the 
Supreme Soviet. It was due to be signed on August 20. On August 4 Gorbachev went on
83 Although one cannot be sure, there seems to be a strong hint o f irony in the letter. Najibullah almost 
certainly knew the position that Iakovlev was taking on support for Afghanistan. First, he may have had 
such information from Kriuchkov, who had a very acrimonious relationship with Iakovlev which 
continued to play out long after the Soviet collapse. Second, Iakovlev’s role as one o f the “most liberal” 
people in the leadership was a matter of public comment in the Soviet and foreign press. Thus it is hard to 
imagine that the following is written without a trace of irony: “I am well aware o f your attention and 
tireless efforts directed at providing aid to the long-suffering Afghan people, o f the constant support the 
Soviet Union provides to the Republic o f Afghanistan... Our government and our people highly value 
your persistent efforts and are grateful to your for this.” Najibullah to Iakovlev, [translated from Dari], 28 
December 1989, GARF F. A -10063, op.2, d. 56, 4-5.
84 “Record o f conversation between Gorbachev and Najibullah” August 23, 1990 NSA, READ/RADD, 
Box 9.
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holiday; on August 19 a group of hardliners, including Kriuchkov and Varennikov, tried 
to launch a coup. Their attempt failed, but it ended up taking Soviet power with it.85
As Gorbachev’s power faded throughout 1991, his assurances to Najibullah 
increasingly rang hollow. When Kriuchkov and Shebarshin traveled to Kabul in April 
1991, Najibullah asked for further confirmation of continued Soviet support and for more 
arms. Kriuchkov promised both. Later Shebarshin told his boss that he doubted whether, 
in the developing political climate, such ongoing support was likely. Kriuchkov replied, 
rather sharply, that it would continue.86 In April 1991 Kriuchkov was still in a position to 
give such promises. He was a member of the leadership and chief o f the KGB; 
furthermore, Gorbachev’s “turn to the right” in the fall o f 1990 and the spring of 1991 
had brought him closer to Kriuchkov and other conservatives. Yet much changed in 
the coming months. In June, Boris Yeltsin, who had advocated the cessation of supplies a 
year earlier, was elected president of Russia. The failure o f the coup attempt led to the 
arrest o f Kriuchkov and the ouster of Shebarshin.88 Shevardnadze had already resigned at 
the end o f 1990, embittered by attacks from conservatives who blamed him for giving up 
the Soviet empire.89
The fall o f Khost, a provincial capital and a crucial strategic center, in April 1991 
also began to change the calculus within Afghanistan. The rebel’s take-over of that town 
weakened Najibullah and Watan, much like the government’s success at Jalalabad in 
March 1989 and the suppression o f the Tanai coup in February 1990 confirmed their 
ability to stay in power. Pakistan now began to harden its position, while the mujahadeen 
were eager to press their success further.90
85 GarthofF, The Great Transition, 457-60, 470-83; Pikhoia, Sovetskii Soiuz, 570-632.
86 Author’s interview with Leonid Shebarshin, March 19, 2008.
87 Brown, Gorbachev Factor, 270-271. It is possible that fears o f a military coup, rumours o f which had 
circulated since March 1990 to September 1990, also motivated Gorbachev to rely more closely on 
Kriuchkov. Odom, Collapse o f the Soviet Military, 339-341.
88 The coup also led to the arrest o f Varennikov and the suicide o f Akhromeev.
89 Brown, Gorbachev Factor, 277-279.
90 Note for the Secretary General on Afghanistan, April 12, 1991 SML, Perez de Cuellar Papers, Box 10, 
Folder 107.
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The failure o f the August coup in Moscow, whose plotters sought to arrest the 
USSR’s disintegration by sidelining the reformers, had immediate repercussions for the 
Afghan problem. Only days before Nikolai Kozyrev, who Moscow’s chief negotiator at 
the Geneva talks and still active in Afghan matters as an ambassador-at-large, had 
restated the Soviet position for “negative symmetry plus,” i.e. a guarantee that not only 
the US but other parties like Saudi Arabia would cease supplying arms to the 
resistance.91 Then on September 13, 1991, after a meeting between Baker and the new 
Soviet Foreign Minister, Boris Pankin, the United States and the USSR signed an 
agreement to halt arms supplies to the belligerents and issued a statement confirming the 
right o f the Afghan people to decide their own destiny without outside interference.92 
Kriuchkov’s removal from the leadership proved crucial to an agreement finally being 
reached.93
In one sense, Kriuchkov’s assurance to Najibullah held true. The Soviet Union 
never publicly renounced him, and indeed public avowals of support continued in the 
months leading up to its final dissolution. Although Moscow had been forced to abandon 
its insistence that arms supplies from Saudia Arabia and other source be completely cut 
off, it did not have to give up Najibullah. Baker’s statement after the signing ceremony 
implied that Najibullah was expected to stay on at least until the end o f the election 
process, which would be organised by UN officials.94 And Pankin writes that he had 
received private assurances from Baker that the US would press Saudi Arabia and 
Pakistan to also stop supplying the mujahadeen.95
91 Boris Pankin, The Last Hundred Days o f the Soviet Union, (New York: I.B. Tauris, 1996), 117-118. 
Negotiations on a mutual cut-off date had been going on throughout 1991. Moscow also insisted that a 
cut-off could not take place without a cease-fire. See Notes on meeting between Sevan, Picco, and 
Nikolai Kozyrev, March 13, 1991. SML, Perez de Cuellar Papers, Box 10, Folder 107.
92 “US, Soviets Agree to Halt Arms to Combatants in Afghanistan” Washington Post, Sept 14, 1991, 1.
93 Pankin, Last Hundred Days, 117-118. Nikolai Kozyrev confirmed in an interview with me that 
Kriuchkov’s influence in this period was crucial for maintaining Soviet deliveries to Najibullah. Author’s 
interview with Nikolai Kozyrev, Moscow, November 14, 2008.
94 “US, Soviets Agree to Halt Arms to Combatants in Afghanistan” Washington Post, Sept 14, 1991, 1.
95 Pankin, Last Hundred Days, 118.
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In the chaos of the Soviet Union’s last months, rumors and whispers that 
Moscow might force Najibullah to resign, traced in the press to anonymous diplomats, 
became ever more common.96 Afghan officials admitted that such reports were deeply 
demoralizing, but the Soviet government proved willing to reiterate its support as long as 
it was in a position to do so. In October, following a successful government defense of 
the city o f Gardez against a rebel attack, Boris Pastoukhov, Soviet ambassador in Kabul, 
confirmed the old Soviet line that Najibullah’s government could not be excluded from 
the peaces process and proclaimed support for the Watan leaders’ proposal for a 
government of national unity.97
Such assurances counted for less with each passing week. Following the August 
coup, Gorbachev’s standing within Russia and what was left o f the USSR had fallen 
sharply relative to Boris Yeltsin’s. Yeltsin’s voice increasingly dominated not only 
domestic issues but foreign policy questions as well. As we saw earlier, Najibullah had 
expressed concern about this rising star in the summer of 1990. Now it was becoming 
clear that he needed to secure the support of Yeltsin and his associates before it was too 
late.
As the USSR was falling apart, Najibullah tried to make contacts with Russian 
leaders, perhaps sensing that there were now multiple centers o f power in the Soviet 
Union which would be involved in deciding his fate. While Yeltsin initially seemed to 
react positively to the Afghan government’s overtures, it soon became clear his 
government did not believe Najibullah could hold on to power. In November Yeltsin’s 
vice-president, Afghan veteran Aleksandr Rutskoi, met with a mujahadeen delegation in 
Moscow, and told them that Yeltsin’s government would “take all measures to bring
96 See, for example, “No friends for Najibullah,” The Economist, October 12,1991, p.34.
97 “Gardez victory, Soviet message o f support revive Kabul regime” Agence France Presse October 14, 
1991. This position was reiterated by a Soviet Foreign Ministry spokesman. See “Soviet approach to the 
settlement of the Afghan issue,” TASS, October 14, 1991.
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about peace to the long-suffering land of Afghanistan.”98 In the resulting communique, 
both sides expressed an understanding that all power ought to be passed to an Islamic 
interim government.”99 Towards the end of 1991 Yeltsin’s Foreign Minister Andrei 
Kozyrev and Aleksandr Rutskoi, in Pakistan to discuss the release o f Soviet POW’s, also 
made contacts with mujahadeen leaders.100
The division between the Soviet and Russian positions was also evident when 
representatives of both governments met with mujahadeen representatives in Moscow. 
Afghanistan, and the POW issue in particular, were becoming pawns in the political 
battle between Yeltsin and Gorbachev, and between the Soviet and Russian 
bureaucracies.101 Rutskoi, apparently, let it known that Russia would be willing to help 
depose Najibullah and accept the installation of an Islamic government. Rabbani seized 
on this and announced publicly that Russia was now finally ready to dump Najibullah, a 
fact Soviet officials immediately denied. Rutskoi, meanwhile, also announced Russia’s
1 fY fintention to cut off supplies of fuel.
Lacking Soviet support and with no hope that Russia would help keep him in 
power, Najibullah’s days were numbered. His “lobby” in Moscow was out of the picture; 
the KGB, the institution which had backed him most forcefully, was in the process of 
being dismantled. Their importance, particularly in keeping Najibullah on life support in 
1990-1991, was demonstrated by the rapid turn of events after August 1991. For Russian 
politicians Afghanistan primarily represented a POW issue; they felt no sense of
98 “Afghan rebels meet Rutskoy,” Agence France Press, November 11, 1991.
"M aley, The Afghanistan Wars, 187.
100 Kniazev, Istoria Afganskoi Voiny, 56. See also “Boris Yeltsin’s First 100 Days,” Heritage Foundation 
Backgrounder #869, November 27, 1991, http://www.heritage.org/Research/RussiaandEurasia/bg869.cfm 
accessed October 17, 2008.
101 Prior to the August putsch, the Soviet MFA had avoided allowing Russian politicians to play any role 
on Afghanistan. In the fall o f 1991 they found this much harder, since the Russian government was 
increasingly treated as an equal by foreign leaders and also had easier access to financial resources. Now 
it was the Russian MFA that sought to sideline Soviet diplomats. I.Adrionov to Rutskoi, Memorandum 
“On Talks with the Delegation o f Afghan Mujahadeen,” undated, September or October 1991, GARF 
Fund 10026, op. 4, d. 2840, 30-34.
102 “Rebels Say Russia Supports Their Struggle Against Kabul Government,” Associated Press,
November 11, 1991; “Soviet-Afghan talks in Moscow,” TASS, November 12, 1991; “Afghan leader feels 
Moscow draught,” The Guardian, November 19, 1991; Pankin, Last Hundred Days, 120-121.
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obligation to the Afghan regime, nor were they concerned about preserving their own 
superpower status.
Conclusion
When Bush and Gorbachev met at Malta in December 1989, the US leader expressed his 
disappointment with Soviet policies in the Third World. Bush pointed out that Soviet 
actions in the Third World were “out of step with ‘new thinking’ and new Soviet 
directions in Eastern Europe and in arms control.” Bush went on to say that “Soviet 
policies in regional conflicts were a major hindrance to the improvement of the overall 
US-Soviet relationship.”103 Indeed, Bush hit on a central paradox o f foreign policy under 
Gorbachev -  New Thinking seemed to evolve much slower with regard to the Third 
World than it did in other areas o f foreign policy, even though the Third World might be 
expected to be of lesser importance to Soviet prestige than, for example Eastern Europe 
or arms control.
The Russian government that competed for power against the remnants of the 
Soviet regime in Moscow and finally took over at the end of 1991 did not feel any long­
standing commitment to the Kabul regime. Yeltsin had positioned himself as early as 
1990 as an opponent of continued support for Najibullah, and no one in the Russian 
leader’s circle seemed interested in pushing him in a different direction.104 Gorbachev, 
on the other hand, was never able to break with Najibullah. Despite the rumors that 
frequently surfaced in the Western press about Moscow’s willingness to stop supporting 
Najibullah, the Soviet government continued to push for his participation in a transition 
government until the very end. Unlike previous periods, however, Gorbachev was
103 Summary o f discussions at Malta presented to Perez de Cuellar by Ambassador Thomas R. Pickering, 
December 7, 1989, SML, Perez de Cuellar Papers, Box 10, Folder 109. Bush focused in particular on 
Nicaragua and Cuba.
104 That includes Aleksandr Rutskoi, a fighter pilot shot down in Afghanistan and briefly held as a POW. 
Yeltsin picked him as vice-president in part to deflect potential criticism from security forces. Although 
Rutskoi proved to be an unreliable ally in most ways, he never challenged Yeltsin on his Afghan policy. 
Indeed, as we saw earlier, Rutskoi took the lead in meeting with mujahadeen leaders and promising to 
end support for Najibullah.
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probably concerned more with the political rather than the ideological ramifications of  
“abandoning” Najibullah. The Afghan leader still had influential backers in the Soviet 
government whose support was crucial for Gorbachev’s political survival.
Gorbachev’s priority in this period was maximizing the political gains of 
withdrawal while avoiding the fallout that might result if  the Najibullah regime 
collapsed. The emerging free media consciously or unconsciously acquiesced in this. 
Most o f the blame for the war was directed at the decision-makers who chose 
intervention. Using Soviet forces to help the regime, even during a particularly difficult 
moment such as the battle of Jalalabad, was out of the question. By 1989 Gorbachev and 
his reformers had opened up the media and allowed articles quite critical o f the war to 
appear. There was no way to guarantee that even limited operations would not make him 
appear as a hypocrite quite willing to continue using the Soviet military in 
“adventuristic” ways. Moreover, continued or renewed intervention could undermine his 
greatest foreign policy achievements -  his radical reorientation of relations with the 
United States, Europe, and China, which in 1989 still contributed to his popularity at 
home and made him a hero to many abroad.
Moscow did not have a coherent long-term policy for Afghanistan in February 
1989, in part because many officials expected the Najibullah regime to collapse sooner 
rather than later. Gorbachev and many around him may have been hoping for at most a 
“decent interval” in those weeks after the withdrawal, a space of time prior to Kabul’s 
defeat that would allow them to distance themselves from the war enough to minimise 
the political damage of Najibullah’s defeat. The successful defense o f Jalalabad in March 
proved that the regime could survive without Soviet troops as long as it had Soviet 
advisers and materiel. This was a boon politically, but also meant that Moscow was still 
not rid o f the Afghan problem and had to continue demonstrating its involvement and 
support. With Gorbachev increasingly distracted by the myriad domestic problems
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confronting him and not involved in Afghan issues on a daily basis, Kriuchkov could 
guarantee a basic level o f support and fend off any suggestions about abandoning 
Najibullah and accepting US-Pakistani conditions for a transitional government.
On Afghan issues and foreign policy in general, in this period Gorbachev sought 
international consensus and agreement as a way to compensate for Moscow’s rapidly 
declining ability to control events and negotiate from a position of strength. Soviet 
diplomats hoped that the UN would act to enforce the Geneva Accords, apply pressure 
on Pakistan and the United States, and in general take an active role in the formation of a 
new world order in which the USSR would be seen as a guarantor o f peace. Yet UN 
officials proved reluctant to bear such a burden. Perez de Cuellar, for one, sought to 
avoid continued UN involvement. Even though the UN did continue to play a role 
(largely due to Soviet insistence), it proved capable of little beyond coordinating 
diplomatic efforts.
Finally, even as Gorbachev, Shevardnadze, and some of their advisers predicted 
(correctly) that the withdrawal from Afghanistan would help improve relations with the 
West, they also hoped that this improved relationship would facilitate a solution in 
Afghanistan. They had sustained this hope since at least the fall o f 1987. Gorbachev and 
Shevardnadze showed their frustration in meetings with American counterparts precisely 
because they believed that an understanding, albeit informal, was being breached each 
time the US insisted on a settlement that excluded Najibullah and continued to provide 
support to the resistance. Their “cooperation” with the Bush administration in other areas 
was going completely unrewarded - by the end of 1990 they had acquiesced in the 
reunification of Germany and the US led operation against Sadam Hussein, a one-time 
Soviet ally. As with other questions o f foreign policy, Gorbachev learned the hard way 
that his “friendship” with US leaders had some narrowly defined limits.
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“There is scarcely a family in the country which has not the 
blood of kindred to revenge upon the accursed Feringhis 
[foreigners]. The door o f reconciliation is closed against us; 
and if the hostility o f the Afghans be an element o f weakness, 
it is certain that we have contrived to secure it.”1
John Williams Kaye, History of the 
Wars in Afghanistan (1851)
“We are leaving the country in a pitiable state. The cities and 
villages are ravaged. The economy is paralyzed. Hundreds of 
thousands of people have died.”
-USSR Foreign Minister Eduard 
Shevardnadze, January 1989
Conclusion
By January 1992, the war in Afghanistan had entered its for thirteenth year and showed 
few signs o f ending. The Watan government still held Kabul and most provincial 
capitals, but with no more Soviet aid forthcoming (and no Russian aid to replace it) it 
could not hope to fight the mujahadeen indefinitely. Najibullah was economically and 
politically isolated. Although his military still had plenty of Soviet planes, tanks, and 
weapons with which to carry on fighting, the elimination o f fuel supplies was taking its 
toll. Najibullah’s air force, which provided a crucial advantage over mujahadeen forces, 
was grounded. The government was forced to spend its rapidly depleting currency 
reserves on fuel from Iran.2
One by one, Najibullah’s remaining allies abandoned him. By April, Kabul was 
surrounded by Massoud’s forces closing in from the North and Hekmatyar’s from the 
south, in a preview of the carnage that would continue to envelop the country in the 
years to come. UN officials continued to work for the creation of an interim 
government, but as had often happened previously their efforts were overtaken by 
events. On April 12, Najibullah called the most senior of the seven remaining Soviet 
(now Russian) officer-advisers in Kabul to his residence. Power would soon be in the 
hands of the opposition, Najibullah said, and it was time for the officers to leave. The
1 John Williams Kaye, History o f the War in Afghanistan, (London, 1851-57), Vol II, 669.
2 Rubin, Fragmentation o f  Afghanistan, 71.
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Soviets were traitors, he said, but nevertheless he felt obligated to see that they were 
sent home safely. The next day, Najibullah met the seven officers at the airport, 
personally making sure that the plane took off without incident.
A day later, on April 14, Najibullah was confronted with the presence of a 
militia led by Rashid Dostom within the capital. Dostom’s loyalty had been crucial over 
the past few years, particularly in putting down the Tanai coup in 1990. His division 
was the best equipped, most disciplined and effective in the RA military. However, 
now, Dostom, sensing that regime’s collapse was imminent, began acting as a free 
agent, looking to ally himself with the forces that would soon take Kabul. Without him, 
Najibullah’s government, or what was left of it, did not have a hope for even a decent 
bargaining position vis-a-vis the forces threatening to take the city.
In 1989 Najibullah had rejected Soviet offers to take refuge in Moscow. By 
April 1992 he understood there was little hope of holding on to power or even making a 
graceful exit. The President of Afghanistan went to the UN compound in Kabul and 
asked for help to leave Afghanistan and join his family in India. When he arrived at the 
airport several days later, accompanied by his bodyguards and several US officials, he 
found it surrounded by Dostom’s militia. His escape blocked, Najibullah spent the next 
four years living in the UN compound -  until the Taliban took Kabul in 1996, seized 
him, and strung him from a lamppost.4 In the meantime, the former mujahadeen proved 
that opposition unites much better than power does. Soon after they took Kabul, conflict 
erupted between the forces o f Hekmatyar and Massoud, who, along with Dostom 
controlled the capital. Armed groups roamed the city in an orgy of looting and
3 Liakhovskii, Tragedia i doblest’, 702.
4 The story o f  Kabul’s last weeks under Najibullah and the valiant effort o f UN officials to arrange a 
transfer o f power and avert an intra-mujahadeen civil war is told in Philip Corwin, Doomed in 
Afghanistan: A UN Officer's Memoir o f  the Fall o f Kabul and Najibullah’s Failed Escape, 1992 (New 
Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 2003).
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destruction. Having survived the past thirteen years relatively unscathed, Kabul now felt 
the full brunt o f war.5
Russia played a minimal role in these final months. Although Russian diplomats 
were involved in trying to secure Najibullah’s safe passage, Moscow in no way sought 
to continue playing an influential role in Kabul. The Russian government’s attitude was 
highlighted by Kozyrev’s statement that “Everything in Afghanistan is ready for 
settlement -  the only problem is the Soviet support of ‘extremists’ led by Najibullah.”6 
As Evgeny Ostrovenko, the ambassador of the Russian Federation sent to Kabul in 
1992, told an interviewer, “By early 1992 the regime had outlived its time. We Russians 
had nothing to do with it.”7
A number o f former Soviet participants later spoke out against the Russian 
government’s handling o f the Afghan crisis. Varennikov, Kriuchkov, Egorychev, and 
others have pointed to the “betrayal” o f Najibullah by Russian leaders as the reason for
Q
the chaos that later enveloped Afghanistan. Indeed, it does seem that Yeltsin’s foreign 
policy team used the Afghanistan issue to distance themselves from Gorbachev and to 
identify him with the more notorious aspects of the Soviet regime, while elevating their 
own status as true democrats and reformers. It may also have been a way for Yeltsin to 
raise his profile among foreign leaders, who only grudgingly began to accept him as the 
leading figure in Moscow.9
In any case, the economic basket-case that was Russia in January 1992 could 
have done little to support Najibullah. The military was on the verge of collapse, and the 
Central Asian republics were no longer reliable staging grounds for any kind of support 
to Kabul, making the logistics of any such operation very difficult. Most importantly, 
Russia had very little diplomatic clout. Dependent on foreign aid to feed its citizens and
5 Rubin, Fragmentation o f  Afghanistan, 265-275.
6 Gareev, Afganskaia Strada, 318.
7 Pravda -  April 13, 1993.
8 See, for example, the interview with Nikolai Kozyrev in Moskovskii Komsomolets, March 5, 2004.
9 Garth off, Great Transition, 464-465,470-471, 489-496.
271
on institutions like the IMF and the World Bank to prop up its collapsing economy, it 
could do little to help Najibullah even if it had wanted to.
Unlike the Soviet Union, the Russian Federation in the 1990s did not see itself 
as the liberator o f Third World states. Indeed, many Russians felt that such aid had 
helped undermine and impoverish their own country. The Russian Federation, so far, 
has not intervened militarily in support of any foreign government or movement.10 It is 
only in the last five years that Moscow, buoyed by high energy prices, has been able to 
play a serious role abroad. During the 1990s, its military efforts were limited to trying to 
arrest the process o f disintegration that had already led to the break-up o f the Soviet 
Union.
Soviet and US interventions in the Third World played an important part in 
shaping the Cold War and the history o f the newly-liberated states emerging out o f the 
collapsing European empires. For Soviet leaders, the success or failure o f their clients in 
these Third World states often had both ideological and strategic significance -  
ideological because success proved the superiority of their model of modernization; 
strategic because it helped to maintain the balance o f power in the world and to prevent 
US domination. In 1962, the desire to protect the Cuban revolution and also to balance 
Washington’s superiority in inter-continental nuclear missiles led Khrushchev to place 
Soviet atomic weaponry on that island, taking the world to the brink of nuclear war. In 
later years, Moscow’s aid and interventions had similar dual motivations. The recent 
historiography on Soviet intervention in Hungary (1956), Czechoslovakia (1968), and 
the role o f military aid and advisors in the Horn of Africa and the Middle East confirms 
this.11
10 The exception, as o f this writing, may be the war with Georgiiia in August 2008.
11 On the Horn of Africa, see O.A. Westad, “The Fall o f Detente and the Turning Tides o f History,” in 
Westad, ed., The Fall o f  Detente: Soviet-American Relations during the Carter Years, (Oslo:
Scandinavian University Press, 1997), 3-33; on Hungary and Chechoslovakia, see Csaba Bekes, “The 
1956 Hungarian Revolution and World Politics,” CWIHP Working Paper No. 16 (1996); Zubok, A Failed 
Empire, 115- 119 and 207-209; Pikhoia, Sovetskii Soiuz, 301-43.
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Soviet involvement in the Third World, particularly direct involvement, always
had its critics within the CPSU and the government. These critics argued that Soviet
involvement in the Third World brought few benefits to the USSR while at the same
time undermining detente with the United States. Throughout the 1970s they were either
overruled or ignored altogether. In March 1979, as panicked Afghan communists asked
for Soviet military power to put down a major uprising in Herat, the critics’ views held
sway, preventing an intervention. By December of that year, their ability to influence
decision-making had been eroded by the more persistent lobbying of those who saw
intervention as the only way to protect Soviet strategic interests as well as prestige.
Yet the decision to send troops to Afghanistan also represented the apex of
Soviet interventionism and indeed of Soviet involvement in the Third World. Russian
disillusionment with involvement abroad in the 1990s had its roots first and foremost in
that fateful decision taken at Brezhnev’s dacha in 1979. As the extent of the quagmire
became evident, Soviet leaders, even the arch-interventionists, began to reconsider the
value o f propping up friendly regimes with Soviet troops. When protests threatening the
socialist government in Warsaw erupted in 1980, Andropov, a key figure in the decision
to intervene in Hungary, Czechoslovakia, and Afghanistan, rejected this option for the
10Polish crisis, saying, “The quota of Soviet interventions abroad has been exhausted.”
The so-called Sinatra doctrine, which allowed socialist regimes in Eastern Europe to 
collapse in 1989, rightly belongs to the Gorbachev era, but its roots were in the early 
1980s, when Soviet leaders began to feel the full effect o f the hangover that resulted
Ifrom their overindulgence over the previous decade.
Thus, not only had Soviet leaders before Gorbachev already decided that the 
Soviet intervention in Afghanistan was too costly and began to look for a way out, they
12 Zubok, A Failed Empire, 267.
13 See Matthew J. Ouimet, The Rise andFall o f  the Brezhnev Doctrine in Soviet Foreign Policy (Chapel 
Hill: University o f North Carolina Press, 2003). Looking at Soviet behaviour in Eastern Europe in the 
1970s and early 1980s, Ouimet persuasively shows that the Brezhnev doctrine had largely been rejected 
by the time o f the Polish crisis.
273
had also begun reevaluating the value of Soviet involvements more generally. 
Afghanistan, of course, was quite different from any other Soviet involvement in the 
Third World. The stakes were simply higher. For one thing, there was the sheer scale of 
the intervention. True, Soviet advisors and even pilots had helped armies in Africa,
Latin America, and Asia fight their enemies, but here, for the first time, Soviet troops 
were involved en-masse, essentially taking on the primary duties of the host country’s 
military. In this way, the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan resembled those in Hungary 
and Czechoslovakia much more so than its involvement in the Arab-Israeli conflict or in 
any o f the localised conflicts in Africa. This made the intervention more costly and it 
raised the stakes -  the loss o f the Kabul government could mean not only an ideological 
defeat but also a military one, something which both Gorbachev and his predecessors 
sought at all costs to avoid.
In Afghanistan, also, Moscow was confronted with a popular uprising against a 
client government’s rule which it had not faced elsewhere. The resistance in Hungary 
and Czechoslovakia, which did shake Soviet leaders in 1956 and 1968, barely merits
thcomparison with the much wider jihad  against the Kabul government and the 40 army. 
In those cases, protesters in the capitals were quickly dealt with by overwhelmingly 
superior force and were labeled counter-revolutionaries. The country-side stayed quiet. 
In Afghanistan, Soviet leaders were under no illusion that the resistance had popular 
support and the Kabul government had few friends in the countryside. Prior to the 
intervention, many in the Politburo realised that Soviet troops, if they were sent in, 
would end up fighting common Afghans, a disastrous situation from the ideological 
perspective that could be easily exploited by the USSR’s enemies, a tricky issue which 
no amount of counter-propaganda could undo. Yet, rather than moving Soviet leaders to 
beat a hasty retreat, this situation also raised the stakes and moved them to look for 
victory. If the Kabul government could somehow be made more palatable to the
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population, then a Soviet intervention, perhaps, would not look like a police action 
directed against the peasantry o f a poor neighboring country.
Finally, as Soviet diplomats never tired o f pointing out in negotiations, the 
Soviet Union and Afghanistan shared a 2000 kilometer border. Throughout the war 
Soviet leaders did not worry much about a “spill-over” effect -  the possibility that the 
war would ignite serious uprisings in Central Asia. The issue was different -  
Afghanistan could become yet another state used by the US and NATO to surround the 
USSR. As other historians have shown, and I have noted in the introduction, the fear 
that Afghanistan would become a base for missiles directed at Moscow was one o f the 
key factors motivating Andropov and Ustinov to push for intervention. Many years 
later, Kriuchkov and Shevardnadze made similar arguments as they urged Gorbachev to 
do everything possible to protect the Najibullah regime from collapsing. Indeed, as 
Shevardnadze argued, the Soviet campaign in Afghanistan meant that “anti-Sovietism” 
would exist there for a long time -  and the country would now be more open to taking 
an anti-Soviet stance and making itself available for the USSR’s enemies.14
High as the stakes were, Moscow was not prepared to expand the war. Although 
one of the 40th army’s main strategic problems was cutting off the supply o f arms 
coming from Pakistan, Soviet leaders never took serious punitive measures, either 
military (bombing the training and supply camps on the Pakistani side o f the border) or 
diplomatic (breaking diplomatic relations). Such an expansion of the war, a la the US 
bombing o f Cambodia and Laos during the Vietnam War, would have made sense 
militarily but would have caused further isolation for Moscow. The refusal to expand 
the war shows that Soviet leaders were trying to minimise the extent o f confrontation 
caused by the invasion.
14 Politburo meeting, June 11, 1987, GFA PB 1987, 342.
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It also points to a certain degree o f confidence among Moscow’s leaders that 
their political advice and technical assistance could help overcome the numerous 
difficulties faced by the PDPA regime. Parallel to the military effort of the 40th army 
(and Soviet advisers in the armed force o f the DRA), there was also a smaller army of 
political advisers, technicians, educators, and the similar personnel that undertook a 
modernization and nation-building project in Afghanistan. These advisers and 
specialists dug ditches, operated mines, extracted natural gas, wrote speeches on behalf 
of politicians and memoranda on behalf of ministers, and went out into the countryside 
to help Afghan communists reach out to the local population. The last of these efforts 
may have often done more harm than good, but the technical advisers, at least, did 
create tangible benefits for many Afghans: factories provided employment, medical 
clinics brought modem health services to areas where they were previously unheard of, 
and extraction o f natural resources helped keep the government solvent throughout most 
of the 1980s.15 Needless to say, these benefits served as poor compensation, in the eyes 
of ordinary Afghans, for the carnage wrought by revolution and war.
Soviet leaders believed that they needed to undertake a nation-building project 
in order to stabilise the country and bring their troops home. Moscow had been 
supplying technical and political advisers since the 1950s, and sent even more after the 
Saur revolution. It was the invasion, however, that turned this assistance into a nation­
wide project. Building socialism was not the goal. Soviet leaders believed the country 
was not ripe for socialism and urged their tutees in the PDPA to move away from a 
revolutionary agenda.16 The goal was political stabilization, with modernization as its
15 Rubin, Fragmentation o f  Afghanistan, 164. Even the technical and agricultural aid often had 
unintended consequences, and the aid effort has now begun to attract attention from Western analysts. See 
Paul Robinson, “Russian Lessons. We aren’t the first to try nation building in Afghanistan.” American 
Conservative, August 1, 2009 issue, http://amconmag.com/article/2009/aug/01/0003Q/ accessed July 14, 
2009.
16 Many contemporary observers did not see it this way, explaining the presence o f Soviet advisers as a 
program o f “Sovietization.” One observer, arguing that Afghanistan was being “Sovietised” on the 
Central Asian model, wrote “When Soviet leaders hint at a possible willingness to withdraw military 
forces, they say nothing about withdrawing their second army-the army o f social and cultural
276
major tool. That this modernization often looked like socialism stemmed from two 
factors. First, that the PDPA leaders thought o f themselves as revolutionary Marxists 
and shed this coat only reluctantly, and second, that the advisers sent by Moscow, 
particularly the party and agricultural advisers, only knew how to replicate their 
experience in the USSR and therefore could not (or would not) shed the their ideas 
about what modernity was.
The Soviet experience in Afghanistan was thus a culmination of the USSR’s 
other Third World involvements during the Cold War. For decades it had been offering 
a version of modernization, sending its military, political, and technical advisers to 
emerging states that were socialist or leaning that way. Soviet modernization was a 
challenge to colonialism and to the American model -  although, as practiced in the 
context of counter-insurgency warfare (for example, in Vietnam), the two models 
looked remarkably similar, a subject further discussed below.17 Since the scale o f the 
effort in Afghanistan was so grand, the potential for failure was considerably heightened 
as well. Soviet power and influence rested on several pillars: its military might, its 
technological prowess, and the superiority o f its political model for achieving 
modernization and fending off neo-colonialism. It cannot be ignored that the specter of 
a high profile failure, the kind that might reveal the vulnerability o f all three o f these 
pillars, hung over Soviet leaders as they tried to plot a course out of the Afghan 
quagmire.
transformation, spearheaded by the KGB -  or dismantling the programs designed to accomplish this end.” 
A. Rasul Amin “The Sovietization of Afghanistan,” in Roseanne Klass, ed. Afghanistan: The Great Game 
Revisited (New York: Freedom House, 1987), 334.
17 The literature on Soviet aid efforts in the Third World is quite sparse. Although there are a number o f  
works that distill Soviet thinking about modernization and transitions to socialism in the Third World, 
there is no parallel to works such as Michael Latham’s Modernization as Ideology: American social 
science and "nation-building" in the Kennedy era (Chapel Hill, NC: University o f North Carolina Press, 
2000); Nils Gilman’s Mandarins o f  the Future: modernization theory in Cold War America (Baltima:
John Hopkins University Press, 2007); or Bradley Simpson’s Economists with Guns', authoritarian 
development and U.S.-Indonesian relations (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2008), which are 
concerned with the ideas and practice o f US aid to the Third World.
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A fourth pillar of Soviet power was loyalty to friends, something the country’s 
leaders believed in quite firmly. There may have been some abstract notions of honor 
involved, but there were also geo-strategic and ideological reasons. A state that 
abandoned its allies in difficult times would not hold on to its global influence for long. 
Individuals (like Karmal) could be expandable, but entire governments were certainly 
not. It is hardly surprising that the imperative of “not abandoning Najibullah” and the 
potential reaction among other Soviet allies in the Third World if  Moscow were to do so 
came up repeatedly in Politburo debates. Of course, the Soviet leaders were not alone in 
thinking this way. Such thinking was typical o f superpower politics, and echoes o f  
similar concerns could be heard in the US debate about South Vietnam and Taiwan.
Between 1982, when Moscow began to look seriously for a way out of 
Afghanistan, and 1989, when the withdrawal of troops was completed, Soviet leaders 
worked to buy time for their modernization and political strategies to work. They may 
have believed their generals when the latter said that there was no military solution to 
the Afghan problem, but still needed the 40th army to provide the breathing space for 
their other strategies to work. Those strategies included the modernization program 
discussed above, the effort at National Reconciliation (both after the initial invasion and 
in its reincarnation in 1987), and the shuffling of leaders at the top. The Soviet strategy 
also included the diplomatic effort, undertaken through the UN and other channels, to 
secure recognition for the government in Kabul and at the same time create a legal 
framework for a Soviet withdrawal. Important as that effort was, however, changes in 
US-Soviet relations were more consequential.
Although Gorbachev understood the importance o f bringing Soviet troops home 
in early 1985, the imperative of protecting Soviet prestige and relations with client 
states, as well as avoiding the “ideological damage” domestically o f a failure in 
Afghanistan, led him to support a series of initiatives during his first three years in
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power. These measures included the replacement o f Karmal with Najibullah, the 
launching of National Reconciliation, the resuscitation o f the Geneva Talks, and a 
diplomatic push on all fronts.
The decisive turn that Afghan policy took in late 1987 and early 1988 was 
motivated by two factors. The first was Gorbachev’s realization that none of these 
initiatives had done or would do much to stabilise Afghanistan. The Policy of National 
Reconciliation had stalled because of resistance from within the PDPA and a lackluster 
response from opposition forces. Najibullah proved a more capable leader than Karmal, 
but he was no panacea. Talks with Najibullah in July 1987 had left Gorbachev deeply 
disappointed.18 By mid 1987, the consensus in the Politburo on what could be achieved 
in Afghanistan had changed dramatically. Most o f the leadership was willing to accept a 
secondary role for Moscow’s client within a future Afghan government.19
The diplomatic effort to find a settlement on Afghanistan followed the contours 
of the US-Soviet relationship in the 1980s. In mid-1987, Moscow’s Afghan policy 
seemed to be failing, but US-Soviet relations were improving. The second half o f 1987 
became a major turning point in the relationship between the countries. After two 
important, but ultimately unsuccessful summits (Reykjavik in 1986 and Geneva in
1985), the groundwork had been laid for a summit in Washington and then in Moscow. 
Gorbachev and his foreign policy team knew that a resolution in Afghanistan would go 
a long way to improving relations with the US. At the same time, Gorbachev came to 
believe that an improving relationship with the United States could help secure the kind 
of settlement in Afghanistan that he and his predecessors had been looking for.20
18 Notes from Politburo meeting, July 23, 1987, GFA PB 1987, 429.
19 The new consensus in the Politburo was that the PDPA would be only one of the political forces in 
power after Soviet troops left. Even Kriuchkov agreed that reconciliation would have to take place not 
around the PDPA, but with its participation. Gromyko, too, said that the PDPA should be one o f the 
parties in the government, but not the leading one. See Politburo meeting, May 22 ,1987, GFA PB 1987, 
319.
20 It is worth noting here the perceptive assessment o f RAND analyst Tad Daley: “The costs o f staying in 
Afghanistan did not come to exceed the costs of leaving because o f any dramatic changes in the tangible 
costs o f the occupation. What changed instead was the new Soviet leadership’s perception o f the nature of
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The changes in Moscow’s approach to the Afghan problem in 1987 and 1988 
were related to broader changes in the Politburo’s approach to foreign policy problems. 
This was the period when, thanks to Gorbachev’s efforts, like-minded reformers had 
been brought into the Politburo and conservative politicians, including Andrei 
Gromyko, were pushed out. The slow pace o f change in Gorbachev’s first two years 
pushed him to try for more radical approaches, and he increasingly linked the success of 
his foreign policy to improved relations with the West.21 This served as an added 
incentive to find a way out of Afghanistan, even at the risk of abandoning the key 
principles that had kept Brezhnev, Andropov, and even Gorbachev himself from 
reversing the intervention. The period 1987-88 saw the most profound change in 
Moscow’s Afghan policy since the intervention. Yet it was not completely irreversible. 
Once the withdrawal had actually begun and it looked like the long-feared collapse in 
Kabul might actually take place, Gorbachev reverted to supporting more aggressive 
policies, even at the risk o f aggravating tensions with the West.
One scholar, who wrote about the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan in the 
mid-1990s, has argued that it represented a success of reformist thinking over 
conservative elements in Moscow and identifies this change primarily with 
Gorbachev.22 While it is true that this reformist thinking contributed to the change in 
how Soviet leaders formulated foreign policy and viewed their commitments and 
rivalries, the story o f the withdrawal reveals remarkable continuities as well. With the 
minor exception of Gorbachev’s first years in power, Afghan policy was made in 
Moscow by a small group of men, who often shut detractors out o f the decision-making
those costs themselves.” Tad Daley “Afghanistan and Gorbachev’s Global Foreign Policy,” Asian Survey 
29(5), 1987,497. This is particularly accurate o f the months prior to the signing o f the Geneva Accords 
and immediately afterwards- when the possibility o f a major breakthrough in US-Soviet relations made a 
withdrawal, even one under less than ideal conditions, seem much more attractive than previously.
21 See Vladislav Zubok “Gorbachev and the End o f the Cold War,” Cold War History, 2(2), 2002, 79-82 
and 92-93.
22 See Sarah E. Mendelson “Internal Battles and External Wars: Politics, Learning, and the Soviet 
Withdrawal from Afghanistan” World Politics, Vol. 45, No. 3 (1993), 327-360 and Changing Course: 
Ideas, Politics, and the Soviet Withdrawal From Afghanistan.
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process. During the first years of the war in particular, when Afghan policy was 
dominated by the heavyweights Andropov, Ustinov and Gromyko, outmanoeuvring 
them proved almost impossible. Policy could only be altered when these leaders had 
changed their minds, which started to happen in 1981. During the Gorbachev years, it 
was difficult but not impossible to outmanoeuvre Kriuchkov and Shevardnadze, who 
had come to dominate Afghan policy, though such a move could carry serious 
consequences.23
This last point raises another question; how did those who came to dominate 
decision-making on Afghanistan reach their individual conclusions about what policy 
should be followed in that country? This thesis has shown how decisions were made 
both within the Politburo as a whole and the broader mindset o f leaders who made 
Afghan policy. Lack of solid evidence makes it difficult to answer this more specific 
question definitively, but on the basis of material presented in this thesis, several factors 
need to be noted.
The first factor is the impact of reporting from junior officials working in 
Afghanistan. Unjustifiably positive reporting was a problem in many areas of Soviet 
bureaucracy and it almost certainly contributed to Soviet leaders’ misunderstanding of 
the situation in Afghanistan. Advisors and other Soviet officials working in Kabul had 
every incentive to make their reports more positive, since these reports were evaluations 
of their own success. True, there were negative, critical reports also -  but if leaders like 
Andropov, Gromyko and Ustinov did not shut such reports out completely, in the first 
year of the war at least they seemed to balance negative assessments of their Afghan 
policy against the positive ones. Thus it is not surprising that a similar refrain could be
23 As it did for Kornienko in the fall o f 1988. Gorbachev was not completely deaf to the entreaties o f his 
advisors who disagreed with Kriuchkov and Shevardnadze. For example, when Najibullah requested 
Soviet air support to defend Jalalabad against a major mujahadeen onslaught in March 1989, he was 
dissuaded despite the strong endorsement o f such a move by Shevardnadze and Kriuchkov. See 
Chemiaev, Afganskii Vopros (Mezhdunarodnie Otnoshenia: 2000), 49-50; Politburo notes, March 10, 
1989 GFA PB 1989, 202.
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heard in Politburo discussions of the Afghan problem from 1980 until 1987: there were 
still problems, but progress was being made, so the right thing to do was to extend the 
Soviet presence in Afghanistan until the problems were solved. The debates after 
Gorbachev’s realignment of Soviet Afghan policy showed that no one was immune to 
this line o f thinking. Kriuchkov and Shevardnadze fell into the same trap, believing that 
Najibullah was making progress toward forming a more stable government and using 
this as an argument against curtailing Soviet support for him.
A second factor, related to the first, was the rivalry between different agencies 
working in Afghanistan. The rivalry affected decision-making because whichever 
agency had the most effective sponsor in Moscow would have the edge in presenting 
their point of view. In these turf wars the military usually ended up the loser and the 
KGB the winner, as happened in the fall o f 1988. Indeed, Soviet officials were often 
acting as proxies in the intra-PDPA power struggle championing the position of their 
advisees in Moscow. As a result, decisions in Moscow sometimes reflected preference 
for an Afghan faction or leader even if that faction or leader did not necessarily act in 
Moscow’s broader interests.
A final factor, the most subjective in nature and hence most difficult to evaluate, 
was the internal politics and power struggles within the Politburo. Andropov, Gromyko, 
and Ustinov were all potential successors to Brezhnev, and there were other contenders 
as well. Any major failure in Afghanistan would reflect poorly on them and jeopardise 
their chances at successfully assuming a top post or the top post in a post-Brezhnev 
government. Indeed, a post-Brezhnev leadership might well look for scapegoats if  faced 
with a disaster in Afghanistan. For these men, Afghanistan had become a test of their 
resolve, their ability not to run from setbacks, to defend Moscow’s allies, and see a 
foreign policy crisis through to a satisfactory conclusion. Only when they were 
convinced that their military, economic, and political efforts within Afghanistan were
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not going to bring the desired result did they turn to UN diplomacy and reconsider other 
channels they had rejected earlier. Gorbachev and Shevardnadze shared similar 
concerns -  as reformers with little foreign policy experience, a disaster in Kabul could 
call their ability to guide the Soviet Union through a difficult crisis into question.
The recent US-led interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq have prompted 
scholars, officers, and policymakers to re-examine the nature of counter-insurgency at 
both tactical and political levels.24 The dilemma facing Soviet leaders was similar to that 
of other politicians managing a counter-insurgency. The most useful comparison in the 
Cold War context is, o f course, the US counter-insurgency campaign in Vietnam. There 
are enormous differences between the two cases, not least of which are the very 
different kind o f domestic pressures US and Soviet leaders faced, but there are some 
very useful parallels to consider.
96In both cases, the military’s involvement was only part o f the picture. In the 
early years of the Vietnam war, US policy makers, inspired by modernization theory, 
undertook initiatives like the Strategic Hamlets Program to win over Vietnamese 
peasants and show that the Diem government could provide the peasants with economic
24 Most famously, the military counter-insurgency manual overseen by US Army General David Petraus. 
“Counterinsurgency” (US Army, 2006) http://www.fas.org/irp/doddir/armv/fm3-24.pdf Accessed March 
21. 2009. For a survey o f the dilemmas faced by Great Powers fighting counter-insurgencies, see David 
Edelstein “Occupational Hazards: Why Military Occupations Succeed or Fail,” International Security 
29.1 (2004) 49-91, especially the section entitled “The Dilemma o f Failing Occupations.”
25 For the following section I have relied on several general volumes on Vietnam, including Marilyn B. 
Young The Vietnam Wars, 1945-1990 (New York: HarperCollins, 1991); George C. Herring, America’s 
Longest War: The United States and Vietnam, 1950-1975, 3rd edition (New York: McGraw Hill, 1996); 
Lloyd C. Gardner and Marilyn B. Young, eds Iraq and the Lessons o f  Vietnam (New York: The New  
Press, 2007). I am also grateful to several scholars who provided with me papers prepared for a 
conference called “The Politics o f Troop Withdrawal” held at the Miller Center in June 2008 which are to 
appear in a forthcoming issue o f Diplomatic History. These are Robert Jervis, “The Politics o f Troop 
Withdrawal: Salted Peanuts, the Commitment Trap, and Buying Time” and Robert J. McMahon, “The 
Politics, and Geopolitics, o f American Troop Withdrawals from Vietnam, 1968-1972.”
26 In his study comparing the US involvement in Vietnam and the Soviet involvement in Afghanistan, 
Douglas Borer analyzes some o f the political dilemnas involved as well as the effect o f the wars on the 
superpowers. His book contains some valuable insights, including this statement on the dilemma o f  
intervention in support o f an unpopular regime: “We can now understand that superpower intervention in 
Vietnam and Afghanistan created an irreconcilable contradiction: without direct military support, the 
regimes in Saigon and Kabul could not survive; yet with superpower intervention the regimes undermined 
their chances o f convincing their populations that they were legitimate governments.” Douglas A. Borer, 
Superpowers Defeated: Superpowers defeated: Vietnam and Afghanistan compared (London: Frank 
Cass, 1999), 197. However, Borer greatly exaggerates the effect the war had on the Soviet Union, seeing 
it as one o f the main causes o f the USSR’s collapse.
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and military security. Both the US effort in Vietnam and the Soviet effort in 
Afghanistan were motivated by a belief in a type o f modernization, an ideology that 
often did not work well with the reality on the ground. In addition, as with Soviet “clear 
and hold” efforts, US advisers played a key role not only in military operations but also 
in political and development efforts. The strategic hamlets program, abandoned in 1963, 
resurfaced under President Lyndon Johnson as “New Life” hamlets. Ultimately, 
however, US leaders relied on military power and, eventually, international diplomacy 
to bring the troops home.
Although the wars in which they were involved in were unpopular at home and 
in the international community, in both cases superpower elites were concerned about 
the way that withdrawal would impact their countries’ credibility, and whether it might 
not lead to the collapse of other allies under pressure from insurgent movements. Soviet 
leaders feared undermining the USSR’s position and authority as the leader of the 
communist movement and supporter of national-liberation movements. The possible 
effect of a defeat in Afghanistan on the Soviet Union’s reputation was a concern, not 
only of “old-thinkers”, like Leonid Brezhnev and Yurii Andropov, but also the reformist 
group that dominated the Politburo after 1985, which included Gorbachev himself. In 
the case o f the US and Vietnam as well there was continuity in this regard stretching 
from the administrations of Eisenhower to Nixon.
Crucially, the presence of the US and USSR in Vietnam and Afghanistan 
respectively was extended by the elites’ belief in what their country could accomplish 
through military might alongside the aforementioned modernization programs and 
political advice. Thus, even though Soviet leaders recognised that the Soviet example 
was the inappropriate for Afghanistan to follow, they believed that they could go a long 
way towards stabilizing its client government in Kabul through a mixture o f political 
tutelage and modernization programs. Soviet leaders prolonged their country’s presence
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in Afghanistan was because of a desire to give their programs there a chance to work, 
much like US leaders continued to believe that their military victories and various 
initiatives within Vietnam would bring about desired results long after it became clear 
that overwhelming superiority of technology, military capability and resources were not 
bringing success.
Similarly, in both cases the clients proved capable o f manipulating the patrons, 
to their own advantage, thereby extending the superpowers’ involvement. Despite a 
general consensus at the top of the Soviet hierarchy on Moscow’s goals in Afghanistan, 
the various groups in Kabul often made little effort to coordinate their activities with 
each other. These disagreements allowed Afghan communists, themselves divided, to 
play sides off against one another and even to develop a “lobby” for their views in 
Moscow. Some, like Abdul Wakil, tried to sabotage the signing of the Geneva Accords 
to delay the Soviet withdrawal; others sabotaged Soviet efforts to reach out to rebel 
commanders, as argued in Chapter 5. The US faced similar problems with its South 
Vietnamese clients, not least President Nguyen Van Thieu, who did his best to block a 
US agreement with North Vietnam that would end its direct military involvement.
Finally, the Soviet-Afghan conflict was prolonged by the heightened tensions 
between the Soviet Union and the United States in the 1980s. Soviet leaders believed 
that a settlement on Afghanistan would only be possible if the United States agreed to 
stop supporting the mujahadeen. At the same time, Moscow was cautious in opening a 
dialogue with the United States, fearing that to do so would be an admission that the 
invasion was a mistake and that it would lose the freedom to act as it saw fit in 
Afghanistan. Ultimately, however, Moscow reached out to the United States and 
Pakistan in hopes of reaching an international settlement that would put an end to the 
conflict and allow Soviet troops to come home. Similarly, Nixon and Kissinger turned 
to active diplomacy with Moscow and China, the patrons of North Vietnam, in the
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hopes that a change in the international situation would help stabilise the situation in 
Indochina and allow US troops to come home.
Soviet and American interventions during the Cold War were not just about 
setting limits or drawing lines in the sand for the rival superpower. Leaders in Moscow 
and Washington undertook interventions to support elites who had declared themselves 
for one or the other version of modernity. Elites like the Khalqists who came to power 
in 1978 envisaged radical transformation in their countries. When these elites’ vision 
met strong resistance, they called for help. Here was the culmination of the “tragedy of 
Cold War history,” as Westad puts it, for nowhere was the anti-imperialist USSR more 
of a colonial power than in Afghanistan.27 That this intervention was largely 
“colonialism by invitation” was ultimately o f little comfort to the Afghan villagers 
trying to survive aerial bombardment or to Soviet soldiers and their families. And the 
requests for troops o f DRA leaders were easily ignored by the USSR’s enemies, who 
used the intervention as proof that Moscow was not, in fact, an anti-colonial power, but 
an aggressive, militaristic, and imperialist one.
It remains, then, to evaluate Gorbachev’s handling of the Afghan problem from 
the time he took office. Whatever the influence o f officers, advisors, or other Politburo 
members, his was the last and most decisive word on foreign policy, at least until late 
1991. He has been attacked both for betraying “friends” and for not pulling Soviet 
troops out earlier. There is some justification to these criticisms. If one approaches the 
issue dispassionately, however, it becomes clear that Gorbachev’s overall approach to 
the Afghan problem flowed logically from the prerogatives that were largely set by the 
situation he inherited in 1985.
Gorbachev believed that the invasion had been a mistake and that the war had to 
be stopped. If it was allowed to drag on it would remain an obstacle to his other foreign
27 Westad, Global Cold War, 397.
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\policy aims. If he withdrew too quickly and the regime collapsed, he would quickly face 
criticism from many conservatives. Gorbachev could not withdraw Soviet troops before 
1988 because seemed likely that if he had done so the Kabul regime would have 
collapsed. The Afghan army had only been able to take a lead in operations in 1986, 
demonstrating its potential to operate once Soviet troops had gone. Prior to this time, it 
played only a supporting role in Soviet-led battles. Babrak Karmal proved unable or 
unwilling either to overcome divisions within his party or to reach out to rebel 
commanders. Changing the Soviet strategy and giving a new Afghan leader the chance 
to establish himself took time, as did trying to find a diplomatic solution. As Chapter 
Four has shown, Moscow worked to secure Washington’s agreement to end US arms 
supplies to the mujahadeen, and, after the Washington summit, Gorbachev believed that 
he had secured that agreement.
Some scholars believe that the Afghan war played a significant role in the
78ultimate collapse o f the Soviet state. While it is true that the war helped expose many 
of the injustices o f Soviet military life, as well as some o f the shortcomings of the 
military in general, it did not critically undermine the military as an all-Soviet 
institution.29 The growing chorus of criticism that the military faced in the 1989-91 
period was the result more of new openness and general disillusionment with the party 
and state than the war as such. Finally, it is worth remembering that the Najibullah 
regime collapsed four months after the USSR ceased to exist. Therefore, the withdrawal 
of Soviet troops never became a military defeat.
Yet if  the general outline of Gorbachev’s Afghan policy is understandable, even 
commendable, then certain aspects of how he handled it deserve serious criticism. His
28 For example, Anthony Arnold, The Fateful Pebble: Afghanistan’s role in the fa ll o f  the Soviet Empire 
(Novato: Presidio, 1993); Rafel Reuveny and Aseem Prakash, “The Afghanistan war and the breakdown 
o f the Soviet Union,” Review o f  International Studies (1999), 25, 693-708.
29 The wars most important effect on the disintegration o f the Soviet military was that it led to wide­
spread draft evasion. But other aspects o f the Soviet military’s decline in 1989-91 were caused by other 
factors, including rising nationalism in the constituent republics, the questioning o f all Soviet institutions, 
including the military, that resulted from glasnost, and the collapse o f the Soviet state. See Odom, 
Collapse o f  the Soviet Military, 247-251 and 272-304.
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most important failing is that he never really took control of the Afghan problem. He 
trusted his deputies and colleagues to follow the general line. Usually this approach is 
considered smart management, but the conflict had created to too many internal 
conflicts that reached to the top of the Soviet leadership, and, by 1987-88, it is clear that 
there were widely differing interpretations of National Reconciliation, the extent of the 
withdrawal, and the future of Soviet Afghan relations. These differences were evident 
not just in policy making, where they ostensibly contributed to healthy debate, but in 
policy implementation, where the result was contradictory and often conflicting 
endeavours. This fatally undermined attempts to provide real peace and reconciliation 
for a much scarred nation, a legacy that resonates to the present day.
All o f which leads to a number o f questions as to what the lessons the Soviet 
efforts in Afghanistan might hold for today. With NATO troops bogged down in a 
prologued conflict in Afghanistan at the time of writing, questions and debates as to 
how and when to depart are again being raised. The situation is obviously different. 
Gorbachev had to deal with the US supplying arms to the mujahadeen, a sceptical and 
often hostile Pakistan, as well as, after 1989, a disintegrating Soviet Union. US 
President Barack Obama, if all goes well, can hope for a cooperative Russia and even 
Iran, while Islamabad will likely continue to be supportive of US efforts. Still, many of 
the dilemnas are remarkably similar. Does the US commit to a reinvigorated nation- 
building program, with a focus on building Afghan government institutions, or does it 
pull back its advisors and focus instead on buildling up a strong leader in Kabul, a 
policy nicknamed “find the right Pushtun” by one think-tank.30 Does it continue to back 
Hamid Karzai, the leader after US forces helped topple the Taliban in 2001, or does it
30 “Afghanistan: New US administration, new directions” ICG Asia Briefing 89 March 2009.
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look for a new face?31 Would US and UK leaders be able to explain failure to their own 
people?32
While it is not the place of this thesis to offer policy recommendations, what 
seems imperative is that we look back seriously into history not only in order to try and 
understand the issues, country and legacies that confront policymakers today, but also to 
provide the means by which they can learn the lessons of the past and thus best avoid 
the fate o f repeating failures in the present. The Soviet experience will not offer any 
clear paths or guidelines, but it does point to the importance o f humility, honesty, and 
political courage. Interventions becomes tragedies not only for the civilians caught up in 
conflict and the soldiers sent to fight, but also for the intervening powers themselves. 
Leaders that inherit the interventions, like Gorbachev and Obama, both reformers 
bringing a promise of change to nations in crisis, must be sure not compound previous 
errors for fear that they will be seen as weaklings unable to defend the interests o f their 
countries.
31 See the discussion of Obama’s options in a recent paper from the Council o f Foreign Relations: Daniel 
Markey “From AfPak to PakAf: A Response to the New U.S. Strategy for South Asia” CFR Policy 
Options Paper, April 2009.
32 For more on this debate see the roundtable with Scott Lucas, Andrew Johnson, Scott Smith, Marilyn 
Young and Artemy Kalinovsky, Neoamericanist, Summer 2009.
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